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II. Extended Abstract 
 
Intelligent computing is rapidly reshaping healthcare. In light of the global burden of population 
aging and neurological disorders, dementia and elderly care are among the healthcare sectors 
that are most likely to benefit from this technological revolution. Trends in artificial 
intelligence, robotics, ubiquitous computing, neurotechnology and other branches of biomedical 
engineering are progressively enabling novel opportunities for technology-enhanced care. These 
Intelligent Assistive Technologies (IATs) open the prospects of supporting older adults with 
neurocognitive disabilities, maintain their independence, reduce the burden on caregivers and 
delay the need for long-term care (1, 2). While technology develops fast, yet little knowledge is 
available to patients and health professionals about the current availability, applicability, and 
capability of existing IATs. This thesis proposes a state-of-the-art analysis of IATs in dementia 
and elderly care. Our findings indicate that advances in intelligent technology are resulting in a 
rapidly expanding number and variety of assistive solutions for older adults and people with 
neurocognitive disabilities. However, our analysis identifies a number of challenges that 
negatively affect the optimal deployment and uptake of IATs among target users and care 
institutions. These include design issues, sub-optimal approaches to product development, 
translational barriers between lab and clinics, lack of adequate validation and implementation, as 
well as data security and cyber-risk weaknesses. Additionally, in virtue of their technological 
novelty, intelligent technologies raise a number of Ethical, Legal and Social Implications 
(ELSI). Therefore, a significant portion of this thesis is devoted to providing an early ethical 
Technology Assessment (eTA) of intelligent technology, hence contributing to preparing the 
terrain for its safe and ethically responsible adoption. This assessment is primarily focused on 
intelligent technologies at the human-machine interface, as these applications enable an 
unprecedented exposure of the intimate dimension of individuals to the digital infosphere. Issues 
of privacy, integrity, equality, and dual-use were addressed at the level of stakeholder analysis, 
normative ethics and human-rights law. Finally, this thesis is aimed at providing evidence-based 
recommendations for guiding participatory and responsible development in intelligent 
technology, and delineating governance strategies that maximize the clinical benefits of IATs 
for the aging world, while minimizing unintended risks.  
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VIII. Methodology 
 
This thesis summarizes the main findings and implications of a 3-year research project 
conducted at the University of Basel between September 2014 and August 2017. The study 
obtained an official waiver (Unbedenklichkeitserklärung) from the Ethics Committee 
Northwest/Central Switzerland (EKNZ). The Committee motivated that the study was “ethically 
unobjectionable” (ethisch unbedenklich), hence did not require further approval from EKNZ. 
The protocol synopsis submitted to EKNZ is presented in Appendix 6. 
The project was structured modularly and articulated into three main Modules.  
 
Module 1: Systematic Literature Review and Technology Index  
 
In the first Module, a systematic review of the relevant literature on IATs for dementia and elderly care 
was conducted. A literature search was performed for English language articles indexed in the following 
search engines and bibliographic databases: IEEE, PubMed, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Web of Science. 
The following query logic was developed and pilot-tested (see Tab. 1). Whenever necessary, the query 
was modified to adapt to the language used by each engine or database.  
 
LOGICAL 
OPERATOR 
AND AND AND 
OR assistive technolog* Intelligent Alzheimer* 
OR assistive device Adaptive dementia 
OR assistive application Computer ag*ing 
OR  Robotic Elder* 
Tab. 1- Query logic for systematic literature review 
 
Inclusion Criteria: In order to be included into the quantitative synthesis, retrieved articles had 
to meet the following inclusion criteria: 
- Were published in the format of original articles, book Chapters or conference 
proceedings. Reviews, commentaries, letters to the editors, and opinion articles were not 
considered;  
- Were written in English;  
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- Were published in the period between January 1, 2000 and April 12, 2016; 
- Presented the (a) design and development, or (b) assessment and evaluation of one or 
more intelligent assistive systems with current or potential applications to dementia  
 
Filtering: Following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
(PRISMA) guidelines (3), four steps of filtering were performed: duplicates removal, eligibility 
assessment, in-depth review of full-text articles, and screening and further review of secondary 
sources. In the first phase of filtering, duplicates were removed using both the ENDNOTE tool 
for duplicate detection and manual techniques. Second, eligibility assessment was performed on 
the remaining papers to remove sources that did not meet the review’s inclusion criteria (4). 
Third, in-depth review was performed on the full-text articles of the remaining entries included 
in the synthesis. Fourth, additional records were identified by reviewing the references of all 
articles included in the synthesis and underwent in-depth review. For a detailed visualization of 
the filtering process see flow diagram presented in Fig. 2. Two reviewers performed all stages of 
filtering independently, and only the papers rejected by both reviewers were removed from the 
working corpus.  
Clustering: In order to produce an informative and logically consistent technology index, 
retrieved IATs were clustered according to the following main characteristics: (I) technology 
type, (II) application, (III) function assisted, (IV) user-centered design, (V) primary target-user 
population, (VI) evidence of clinical validation, and (VII) and ethical values in product design. 
Characteristics I-VI and VII were organized in two distinct datasets and analyzed separately 
from each other in order to explore two distinct research questions:  
(I-VI) Assessing the number, availability, capability and applicability of current IATs for 
dementia and elderly care.  
(VII) Investigating the prevalence and distribution of value-sensitive approaches and ethical 
considerations in IAT design. 
Research question A is addressed in Chapter 2.1 of this thesis, whereas B in Chapter 2.2. While 
clusters I to VI were analyzed using quantitative analysis (e.g. frequency distribution), cluster 
VII was analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative (qualitative content analysis and 
disclosive computer ethics) methods.  
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Module2: Qualitative Interviews with Health Professionals 
 
In the second Module, qualitative interviews with relevant stakeholders were conducted. The 
goal of this qualitative Module was to generate original information on the views, attitudes and 
needs of health professionals concerning the use of IATs in dementia and elderly care. This 
research strategy was employed to generate person-centered insights on the use and applicability 
of IATs in the clinical setting (both institutional and home care) and to explore possible barriers 
to the clinical implementation of current IATs.  
 
Study sample: The study participants for this Module included health professionals from 
Switzerland, Germany and Italy. The rationale for that stems from the fact that these three 
countries have among the highest longevity and lowest birth rate in the world, hence are 
particularly exposed to population aging. The study participants were actively working within 
the fields of geriatrics, psychiatry, neurology, neuropsychology, gerontology, nursing, and 
healthcare management. In addition, they had direct experience and were actively working 
within the field of dementia and elderly care.  
Participants were purposively selected based on their professional profiles and recruited 
through personal communication at research institutions or e-mail communication. Such 
purposive sampling strategy was adopted from previous research in order to obtain a diverse 
selection of stakeholders from both private and public health institutions with varying 
professional experience.  
A total of 18 stakeholders were selected but one respondent dropped out from the study 
due to health issues. Therefore, a total of 17 interviews were completed. The invitation message 
contained the following information: (i) title of the study: “Health professionals’ views on 
Intelligent Assistive Technology for Dementia and Elderly Care”, (ii) study rationale, design 
and purpose (iii) interview methodology and approximate length, (iv) safeguards employed for 
the protection of confidentiality and anonymization of the collected data, (v) contact details of 
the research team, as well the (vi) informed consent form. 
 
Informed consent: Following international research ethics guidelines, written informed consent was 
obtained from research participants prior to enrolling them in the study. A template of the 
informed consent form used in this study is presented in Appendix 5.  
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Interview guide: The inquiry method used in this Module was semi-structured interviews 
(5). Interviews examined the critical needs, wishes and attitudes of health professionals 
regarding the opportunities and challenges of IAT in dementia and elderly care. Together with 
participants’ experiences and perceptions, the interviews sought to understand what critical 
physical and psychosocial needs arise as a consequence of diminishing health and how 
technological solutions could empower patients and allow them to have some level of healthy 
aging. Finally, the interview questions sought to identify critical barriers to IAT adoption in the 
clinical setting. In addition to open-ended questions, this semi-structured interview guide also 
contained several closed ended questions based on the results obtained in Module 1 (6).  
 
Interview and analysis: The interviews were carried out by the PhD candidate author of this 
thesis. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim using the f4transkript software1. 
Interview transcripts were analysed using content analysis. The following qualitative analytic 
strategy was employed: multiple readings of interview responses and reflective process notes 
followed by thematic coding. Data analysis was performed with the assistance of the MAXQDA 
software for computer-assisted qualitative analysis (release 12.3.1)2. 
 
Module 3: Conceptual and Normative Analysis of Ethical, Legal and Social 
Implications (ELSI)  
 
Our systematic review results (see Module 1) revealed which ethical considerations are most 
neglected in current IAT design. This information was triangulated with our interview results 
(see Module 2), which delineated a number of clinical needs and technical features that should 
be prioritized in IAT development. The triangulation of these results and further literature 
review identified which ethical gaps in IAT design require urgent assessment to guarantee the 
safe and responsible clinical implementation of these technologies. Four ethical themes emerged 
as primary salient: privacy, data security, autonomy and justice.  
 
1   For a full description of software specifications see: https://www.audiotranskription.de/english/f4.htm  
2 MAXQDA is a property software developed and distributed by VERBI Software. See:  
http://www.maxqda.com/  
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 Subsequently, conceptual, normative and legal analysis was performed to explore the 
major ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI) associated with the use of IATs in relation to 
these four major themes. First, conceptual analysis (7) in conjunction with literature review was 
employed to delineate a theoretical framework for machine and cyborg ethics that could account 
for the interaction between humans and machines enabled by IATs. Second, normative ethical 
analysis in conjunction with literature review and argumentative technology assessment (8) was 
employed to investigate the implications of IATs for the four ethical themes described above. 
Third, legal document analysis in conjunction with literature review and standard technology 
assessment was employed to investigate the implications of IATs for the legal entitlements 
associated with the four themes described above.  
 Finally, the normative evaluations resulting from this Module of the study were used to 
provide a set of recommendations for relevant stakeholders (health professionals, policy-makers 
and regulatory bodies) in relation to the responsible use of IATs.  
 This this third and last Module of the thesis configures as an ethical Technology 
Assessment (eTA) of intelligent technology. An eTA is an ethics-focused form of technology 
assessment serving as “a tool for identifying adverse effects of new technologies at an early 
stage” (p.543) (9). The eTA presented in this thesis is designed to anticipate possible adverse 
effects of advancing intelligent technology and inform responsible innovation in this emerging 
field. Methodologically observed, this thesis complies with the nine-point checklist developed 
by Palm and Hansson as a guiding reference for eTA (ibid).  
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Part 1: General Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Today's AI is about new ways of connecting people to 
computers, people to knowledge, people to the physical world, 
and people to people.” 
 
Patrick Winston 
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1.1. The Global Burden of Population Aging and Dementia  
 
1.1.1. Population Aging 
Today, humans are living longer than ever in history. Most people currently alive can 
expect to live into their sixties and beyond (10). As the median age in the world population 
increases, human societies are facing a global phenomenon known as global population aging 
(11). Due to a demographic regime characterized by rising life expectancy and/or declining 
fertility rates, over 900 million people worldwide were reported in 2015 to be over the age of 
60, comprising approximately 12% of the world’s population. In the next three decades, this 
proportion is predicted to double and the overall number of people aged 60 years and older is 
expected to reach two billion (12).  
This demographic trend is particularly recognizable in the European continent. 
Forecasts predict that the proportion of ind iv idua l s  older than 65 years in Europe will 
reach 27.5 % by 2050 (13). In parallel, the relative proportion of the oldest-old is set to increase 
at a faster pace than any other population segment. As a consequence of that, the share of people 
aged 80 years and older in the European population is projected to increase from 5.4 % to 
12.7 % in the next few decades (14).  
This relative increase in the share of older people in the total population is particularly 
accentuated in countries characterized by higher life expectancy at birth and lower fertility rates. 
People living in European countries like Switzerland, Italy and Germany have among the 
world’s highest life expectancy at birth (Switzerland 83.4; Italy 82.7; Germany: 81.0) and the 
lowest fertility rates (Italy 1.43 births/woman; Germany: 1.44; Switzerland: 1.55) (15). In these 
countries, people aged 60 years and over already account for nearly one fourth of the total 
population (Italy: 28.6; Germany: 27.6; Switzerland: 23.6%) and are expected to account for 
approximately one third by 2030 (16). 
Global population aging is associated with a number of profound societal 
transformations. One of these is the declining share of working-age persons in the population. 
The old-age dependency ratio3 for the EU-28 zone was 29.3 % in 2016, meaning that there were 
nearly four persons of working age for every senior person. In countries like Italy (34.3%), 
 
3 The old-age dependency ratio is a metrics used to measure the level of support given to younger and/or 
older persons by the working age population. This ratio is expressed in terms of “the relative size of 
younger and/or older populations compared with the working age population” 14. Eurostat. 
(European Commission Luxembourg, 2017).  
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Switzerland (33.3%)4 and Germany (32%) this dependency ratio has already shrunk to only 
three working age people for every person aged 65 and older (14). With the increasing number 
of senior citizens who are no longer in working age, this phenomenon will likely result in an 
increased financial burden on retirement plans and national pension systems (13). This is feared 
to jeopardize the long term sustainability of the solidarity-based European health care (17).  
Concurrently, the expansion of the old-age dependency ratio will likely result in a 
shortage of caregivers as the number of older people who need care is growing at a faster pace 
than the number of younger people who can provide (either formal or informal) care and 
assistance (18). Caregiver shortage is particularly alarming in light of the fact that the 
probability of becoming physically or cognitively disabled significantly increases with age. 
Cross-sectional comparisons show that increased age is associated with lower levels of cognitive 
performance, with some cognitive functions beginning to decline already in young adults and 
then worsening dramatically after the age of 60 (19, 20). In light of their higher risk of physical 
and cognitive disability, older adults often require assistance and care (21).  
 
1.1.2. Aging and the Burden of Neurological disorders 
 
Global population aging brings forth a number of health-related concerns since age is the 
main risk factor for the most prevalent diseases of developed countries: cancer, cardiovascular 
disease and neurological disorders5 (23). Neurological disorders are disorders of the central 
nervous system (24). These include those conditions that are caused by progressive 
neurodegenerative disease such Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease (PD) or traumatic injury.  
 Neurological disorders affect hundreds of millions of people worldwide –approximately 
one in six individuals─ and their prevalence strongly correlates with advancing age (22). For 
example, Alzheimer’s disease (AD) affects less than 1% of the population under the age of 59, 
almost 4% of the population segment aged 60-79, and over 11% of those aged 80-89 (25). With 
the ageing of the global population, the number of people with AD worldwide is expected to 
 
4 Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO): https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/349257/master 
5 In this thesis, the term “neurological disorder” and its definition are used in accordance with the World 
Health Organization’s report “Neurological Disorders: Public Health Challenges” 22. WHO, 
"Neurological disorders: public health challenges,"  (World Health Organization, Brussels/Geneva, 
2006).. Further information about the use of this term is available here: 
http://www.who.int/features/qa/55/en/  
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nearly triple by 2050 (26). By 2050, there will be 135.5 million people with AD worldwide, 1  
in  85  people globally (27). 
AD is not the only neurological disorder whose risk and prevalence increase with age. 
Research indicates that advancing age is “the biggest risk factor” also for PD, as age-related 
decline causes increased neuronal loss within this disease (28). The same goes for vascular 
dementia (VaD) (29). Age is widely acknowledged as a major risk factor not only for 
progressive neurodegenerative disorders but also for stroke. Evidence shows that the risk of 
stroke increases with advancing age, as its incidence doubles with each decade after the age of 
45 years (30). Over 70% of all strokes are reported to occur above the age of 65 (31).  
Many neurological disorders determine chronically disabling and incurable conditions 
whose effects may continue over long periods of time (years or decades). For example, AD 
causes an irreversible neurodegeneration whose disabling effects dramatically increase over 
time and are eventually fatal (26). As the brain is the principal site of human cognition, emotion 
and behavior, neurological disorders ─including neurodegenerative diseases as well as traumatic 
injury and stroke─ can result not only in physical but also in cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral symptoms. In addition, they are a major cause of permanent physical and 
neurocognitive disability (22). Some neurological disorders such as AD and PD can lead to a 
degree of decline in cognitive and other mental function that is severe enough to interfere with 
daily life. Dementia is the overall term used to describe this general condition of neurocognitive 
disability ─e.g. decline in memory, reasoning, judgment, attention, language and other cognitive 
functions─ and the wide range of associated symptoms6.  
Old age is also associated with what has been multimorbidity (21). This includes higher 
rates of mental health morbidity. According to the WHO, one in four older adults worldwide 
experiences some mood disorder including depression and anxiety disorders (32). Such trends 
are particularly concerning in light of the fact that current preventative services for this 
population are limited and, as the WHO reports, only one-third of older adults with mental 
health problems receives treatment. The high number of untreated seniors with mood disorders 
results in poor health outcomes, higher health care utilization, increased disability and 
impairment, compromised quality of life, increased caregiver stress, increased mortality, and 
higher risk of suicide. In fact, people aged 85+ reportedly have the highest suicide rate of any 
age group (33).  
 
6 For a detailed definition of dementia see the Alzheimer’s Association’s pamphlet “What is 
Dementia?”: http://www.alz.org/what-is-dementia.asp 
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The rising proportion of older people and the associated prevalence of neurological 
disorders are placing an upward pressure on overall health care spending in several countries. 
According to a recent review, neurological disorders represent a major social and economic 
burden globally. Their yearly costs in the sole European continent were estimated around 800 
billion euros and the number of afflicted people reached 179 million (22). Based on the facts, 
researchers have concluded that neurological disorders “are an unquestionable emergency and a 
grand challenge for neuroscientists” (34).  
Within the domain of neurological disorders, AD and other dementias are considered to 
be a major component of the global burden of disease and among the most expensive diseases in 
human societies, with an average price tag in 2013 of around $160 billion (35). According to 
the World Alzheimer Report, the estimated global cost of dementia –including both formal and 
informal care- was $818 billion in 2015 (36). These significant costs a r i s e  primarily from 
long-term care at nursing homes and other health-care institutions, whose burden affects not 
only public finances but also older patients, their non-professional caregivers (e.g. spouses and 
relatives) and the health-care system. At the family level, the problem of population ageing 
results in a caregiving burden on informal carers (36). In most countries, care, assistance and 
support for elderly and disabled adults are primarily provided by their informal caregivers, who 
are mostly family members such as spouses, children and grandchildren (37). This informal 
caregiving service is highly time consuming and requires great effort from caregivers in terms of 
physical and mental energy. The provision of caregiving services frequently comes at high 
socioeconomic cost for caregivers, who often need to give up jobs, leisure time, and social 
activities to effectively take care of their loved ones (38). As research increasingly shows (38-
40), the informal caregiving burden for elderly and disabled people is a significant source of 
psychological distress for carers, worsened mental health functioning, anxiety, perceived stress, 
and depression (38). As most caregivers of elders with physical or cognitive disabilities are 
themselves growing older (average age 63), and one third of them are reported to be in fair to 
poor health (41), the reduction of caregiving burden is expected to contribute to the promotion 
of healthy and successful ageing within society at large. In spite of this multi-domain burden, 
informal care is neither accounted for nor reimbursed in many national healthcare economies 
(42). Finally, at the individual level, older adults with dementia or other age-related cognitive 
decline are reported to experience diminished quality of life, reduced autonomy, independence, 
and work productivity (26). 
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For these reasons, the WHO and the Lancet Commission on dementia prevention, 
intervention and care, have recently described global ageing and the consequent increasing 
prevalence of AD and other dementias as a “priority for public health” (41, 43) and called for 
urgent strategies to tackle this global problem. This call echoes previous warnings, such as 
those of the Working Party on Biotechnology of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), which back in 2013 defined dementia a “grand global challenge” 
which requires the development of a multi-national plan (44).   
 
 
1.2. Intelligent Technology in the Aging World 
 
1.2.1. Computers in Medicine: Current and Emerging Trends 
 
In response to the global burden of age-related neurological disorders and in absence of 
significant progresses in pharmacological therapy, coordinate and innovative solutions are 
increasingly required to tackle this national and global crisis. Among these innovative solutions, 
the integration of advanced Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and biomedical 
engineering into standard care is rapidly emerging as a viable strategy to optimize healthcare 
expenditures, enhance care provision and improve the quality of life of patients.  
 In particular, four emerging trends in ICT and biomedical engineering have shown a 
potential from the perspective of dementia and elderly care: robotics, Pervasive and Ubiquitous 
Computing (PUC), neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence (AI).   
Robotics is the branch of computer technology that deals with the design, development and 
application of autonomous or semi-autonomous machines called robots. In recent years, the use 
of robots in healthcare has increased in number, magnitude and variety. Today, 
machines capable of automatically carrying out a complex series of actions are available to 
complement and enhance standard care for a variety of medical applications including 
telesurgery (45), disinfection (46), pharmacy dispensing (47), telepresence as well as assistance 
and rehabilitation (48).  
PUC is the embedment of computing capabilities in various devices, formats and locations 
with the purpose of making computation available anytime and anywhere. While traditional 
personal computers were physically confined to the desktop site, PUC trends enabled to “move 
the site and style of interaction beyond the desktop and into the larger real world where we live 
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and act” (49). Today, computing capabilities are increasingly embedded in everyday objects 
(from clothing to cars and home appliances) and in a variety of settings, including healthcare. 
Medical uses of PUC include ambulatory care, home/mobile care, emergency medicine and 
rehabilitation (50).  
Neurotechnology is a trend in biomedical engineering concerned with the development 
of technologies that can directly monitor, visualize, measure, restore and even improve neural 
function. Neurotechnologies include brain measurement technologies like 
electroencephalography (EEG), neuroimaging techniques (e.g. functional magnetic resonance -
fMRI), electric or magnetic neurostimulators (e.g. transcranial direct current stimulation -tDCS), 
brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) and neural implants. These tools can be used for a variety of 
clinical purposes including prevention, diagnostics, functional restoration and 
neurorehabilitation. Neurotechnologies can be either invasive or non-invasive. Invasive 
neurotechnologies monitor, measure, restore and modulate brain functions through surgical 
implantation on brain tissue. In contrast, non-invasive neurotechnologies enable the 
accomplishment of those tasks via electrodes or other components placed outside the skull. The 
massive deployment of clinical neurotechnologies is often considered a promising 
complementary strategy to drug therapy to tackle the global burden of neurological disorders 
and associated mental health issues (51-53). For this reason, several countries are pushing 
research in neurotechnology to the frontline of their scientific agenda. For example, the US 
White House has launched in 2013 the BRAIN Initiative (Brain Research through Advancing 
Innovative Neurotechnologies Initiative), a generously funded (current annual budget over $300 
million) aimed at developing and applying innovative technologies that can improve the 
understanding of brain function and tackle neurological disorders7. Researchers have argued that 
efforts need to be made to internationalize this neurotechnology-oriented research agenda (54). 
In order to provide flexible and adaptive solutions in care settings, robots, embedded 
systems and neurotechnologies all need to perceive their environment, classify information and 
take action in a specific context in a manner that maximizes their chances of success at some 
goal. For this reason, they need to exhibit some degree of intelligence. The capacity of 
computers to exhibit intelligence or “act intelligently […] in increasingly wider realms” (55) is 
called Artificial Intelligence (AI).  Chief examples of AI include the ability of robots to 
manipulate objects, navigate spaces, plan motion or process natural language as well the ability 
 
7 For further information see: https://www.braininitiative.nih.gov/ 
 35 
 
of PUC systems to inductively predict aspects of their environment from sensor inputs. 
Similarly, neurotechnologies increasingly use AI to classify the information generated from 
neural recordings (56). In a more narrow sense, however, AI refers to the hypothetical capacity 
of machines to flexibly simulate human cognitive functions such as learning, reasoning and 
knowledge representation ─an hypothesis known as strong AI (57) or artificial general 
intelligence (58). Authors have introduced the notion of superintelligence to refer to the 
possibility that AIs might surpass human brains in general intelligence. Since machine 
intelligence is not subject to the same physical and biological constrains of human intelligence, 
this possibility is considered by many researchers a realistic outcome of linear development in 
AI and general computing (59, 60).  
Besides robotics, PUC and neurotechnology, clinical applications of AI include medical 
assistance. The data flows generated by PUC-enhanced care environments, robots, 
neurodevices as well as other digital information (e.g. digital medical records and patient 
dossiers) can now be aggregated into comprehensive datasets and mined using intelligent 
technology to discover medically relevant patterns. Intelligent medical assistants use AI to 
enable predictive analysis of large data volumes and can enhance medical decision making at 
various levels including prevention, diagnosis, therapy, care delivery and care management. 
These tools – especially those using machine learning such as IBM Watson (61) – are showing a 
great potential in optimizing and guiding medical decision making as well as delivering 
personalized solutions to patients (62). Successful applications of this technology could identify 
clinically significant patterns among large volumes of heterogeneous medical records and other 
health information and deliver patient-centered solutions that maximize clinical efficacy and 
optimize resource allocation. AI can also be used to improve device performance. In fact, 
robots, PUC systems and neurotechnologies increasingly use aspects of AI to improve their 
precision, accuracy, reliability and flexibility (63, 64). 
This thesis will use the umbrella term intelligent technology to refer to the wide realm of 
ICT applications described above. The common denominator of these technologies, in fact, is 
the capacity to process information and simulate aspects of human intelligence such as sensing, 
perception, memory, planning, problem-solving, inductive and deductive reasoning, as well as 
adaptive behavior. It is worth noting that the adjective intelligent in intelligent technology is not 
used in this thesis in its narrow denotation, i.e. exclusively to refer to machines capable of 
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passing the Turing test8. Rather, it is used in the broad sense of “simulating aspects of human 
intelligence”, regardless of whether they do it in a manner that outperforms human ability.  
 
1.2.2. Intelligent Technologies for the Aging Brain 
 
Dementia and elderly care are among the divisions of healthcare provision that are 
expected to benefit the most from this technological revolution (1). The reasons are multifold. 
First, given the high relative costs of formal and informal care (66), technological systems 
capable of delaying or obviating the need for long-term care could reduce healthcare costs and 
secure the provision of institutional services among a rapidly growing ageing population (67). 
Second, given the erosion of the old age support and the caregiver-to-patient ratio (68), the 
massive deployment of technology-assisted care could supplement the incipient shortage of 
human caregivers and complement current care provision, hence reduce the burden on unpaid 
caregivers and improve the quality of care (2). Third, in the absence of effective therapeutic 
solutions for many age-related neurological disorders such as AD, medical AI, wearable 
devices, and assisted-living solutions have the potential to reveal insights from large amounts of 
unstructured data, hence spark innovation in prevention, diagnostics, personalized therapy and 
care management (69). Fourth, the incorporation of computing and, in particular, AI into care 
platforms and care environments could favor the delivery of personalized, adaptive and patient-
centered care solutions (70). This would have a twofold consequence: (i) helping patients fulfill 
their wish to live autonomously and age in place and (ii) improve their quality of life. Finally, 
wearable PUC devices, digital phenotyping and neuromonitoring technologies enable remote 
monitoring and continuous collection of electrophysiological data (71, 72), hence open new 
possibilities for the self-assessment of patients’ physical and mental activity and the early 
detection of anomalies.    
 
1.2.3 What Is an Intelligent Assistive Technology? 
 
Older people and patients with dementia require increased physical and cognitive 
assistance compared to younger and healthy individuals. Therefore, a primary task of dementia 
 
8 The Turing test, firstly developed by Alan Turing in 1950 65. A. M. Turing, Computing machinery 
and intelligence. Mind 59, 433-460 (1950)., is a theoretical procedure to test whether a machine has the 
ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. 
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and elderly care is to provide assistance to this population in need. Research shows that trends in 
computing and biomedical engineering are creating new opportunities for the development of 
technologies that can deliver such assistance (73-75).  
Assistive technology (ATs) is the umbrella term used to encompass the wide and 
heterogeneous domain of technological applications in healthcare for assistance purposes. The 
UK Royal Commission on Long 
Term Care (76) defines AT as “any 
device or system that allows an 
individual to perform a task that 
they would otherwise be unable to 
do, or increases the ease and safety 
with which the task can be 
performed”. In the context of 
dementia and elderly care, ATs 
allow to “increase, maintain or 
improve capabilities of 
individuals with cognitive, 
physical or communication disabilities” (p.9) (77). Consequently, robots, PUC-environments, 
neurotechnologies and AI-systems qualify as ATs as long as they are used to help people with 
disabilities to increase, maintain or improve their (cognitive, physical, emotional and 
behavioral) capabilities.   
 In recent years, researchers have introduced the notion of Intelligent Assistive 
Technology (IAT) to differentiate purely mechanical ATs from technologies that incorporate 
computing capabilities like those described in the previous paragraph (2, 6, 67, 78), especially 
aspects of artificial intelligence. In short, IATs are intelligent technologies used for assistive 
purposes. Unlike traditional assistive aids such as crutches, walking canes and pill dispensers, 
IATs have own computing capacity, can carry out complex series of actions in an automatic or 
semi-automatic manner and may exhibit aspects of intelligent in relation to a variety of tasks. 
Heterogeneous hardware technologies such as distributed systems9, integrated sensors, handheld 
 
9 A distributed system is a “model in which components located on networked computers communicate and 
coordinate their actions by passing messages” 79. G. F. Coulouris, J. Dollimore, T. Kindberg, Distributed 
systems: concepts and design.  (pearson education, 2005)..  
Figure 1-  Conceptual and semantic relationship between different concepts 
(set and subsets) 
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devices (e.g. smartphones and tablets), digital assistants, robots, powered exoskeletons and 
wheelchairs, may all qualify as IAT.  
 In a few occurrences, this thesis will also use the notion of cognitive technology, a term 
firstly introduced in 2005 by Dascal & Dror  (80), to designate the subset of intelligent 
technologies that assist, augment or simulate cognitive processes. This characteristic is 
particularly prominent in BCI and other technologies that directly interface the nervous system. 
However, virtually any intelligent technology can be regarded as cognitive technology if it is 
used in relation to cognitive processes. In addition, cognitive technologies can be regarded as 
IATs if they are used for assistive aims (e.g. memory support or other cognitive assistance). A 
visual overview of these notions and their conceptual and semantic relationships is presented in 
Figure 1 and Table 2.   
 
Concept Definition Technological types 
encompassed 
Intelligent Technology Any ICT that simulates aspects 
of human intelligence 
Robots, distributed systems, 
wearables, handheld devices, 
neurotechnologies, software and 
mobile apps, powered mobility 
aids, intelligent digital assistants  
 
Intelligent Assistive 
Technology (IAT) 
Any intelligent technology 
used for assistive aims 
All of the above if used for 
assistive aims 
 
Cognitive Technology Any intelligent technology that 
deals with cognitive processes  
All of the above if used to assist, 
augment or simulate cognitive 
processes (esp. BCI) 
Tab. 2- Conceptual and semantic relationships between different concepts (synoptic view) 
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1.3 A Comprehensive Taxonomy of IATs for Dementia & Elderly Care 
 
While the clinical use of IAT is increasingly raising the attention of researchers, no up-to-date 
comprehensive and systematic knowledge about cutting-edge IATs for the aging society was 
available prior to this study. Previous studies had not been systematic (73), limited their scope 
only to specific subsections of the IAT domain (81) or date back to the past decade, hence are 
not up-to-date given IAT development rates (2). Given the increased need for IATs in dementia 
and elderly care and the reported translational delay in their clinical implementation (82), a 
comprehensive technology index would be critical to orient health professionals, people in need 
and other stakeholders involved in the provision or reception of dementia and elderly care 
services (6). In addition, systematic and replicable approaches are highly required to organize 
the wide and heterogeneous IAT domain into a rigorous taxonomy or system of classification.  
To this purpose, the first Module of the present study was concerned with conducting a 
meta-analysis of existing IATs and producing a first comprehensive index and taxonomy of the 
IAT domain. The methodology used in this Module of the study was a systematic review of the 
relevant literature and following data analysis according to the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) (3). A detailed description of the study 
methodology is presented in Chapter 2.  
Our review identified 539 IATs with current or potential applications to dementia and 
elderly care and revealed a linear expansion of the IAT spectrum over time, with the total 
number of available IAT experiencing a six-fold increase between 2006-2010 and a fifteen-fold 
increase in the period 2011-2016. The IAT spectrum appeared to encompass seven main 
technological types or families: distributed systems, robots, mobility and rehabilitation aids, 
handheld and multimedia devices, software applications, wearables and human-machine 
interfaces. Existing IATs showed applicability in a variety of domains of dementia and elderly 
care including: support in the activities of daily living (ADL), monitoring, physical and 
cognitive assistance, interaction, engagement, rehabilitation and emotional assistance.  With 
regard to end-user populations, most devices were designed for the general elderly and disabled 
population, whereas smaller fractions were specifically targeting people with dementia and mild 
cognitive impairment (MCI). Very few IATs appeared to be exclusively designed for people 
with AD. A visualization of the main characteristics of the IAT spectrum is presented in Tab. 3.  
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Type   Application  Target-user 
Population 
 
Distributed Systems 
 
ADL General senior and 
disabled population 
  
Robots Monitoring People with AD 
 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aids 
Cognitive Assistance People with MCI 
 
Handheld & 
Multimedia Devices 
Physical Assistance  
 
Software & Mobile 
Apps 
Interaction/Engagement 
 
Wearables Emotional Assistance 
 
Human-machine 
Interfaces 
 
Tab. 3- A Taxonomy of IATs for Dementia and Elderly Care (type, application & target-user 
population) 
 
A detailed quantitative description of the study results is presented in Chapter 2.1. This 
Chapter also contains the state-of-the-art index of IATs for dementia and elderly care and 
provides an analytic discussion of the study results including their implications for clinicians, 
developers, healthcare services and policy makers.  
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1.4. Designing IATs: Current Stand & Possible Improvements 
 
As any other (biomedical) technology, the clinical applicability of IATs is highly influenced by 
their process of design and development. In fact, design and development are critical phases of 
the production of a new technology. Design is the “specification of an object, manifested by an 
agent, intended to accomplish goals in a particular environment, using a set of primitive 
components, satisfying a set of requirements, subject to constraints” (83). In the subsequent 
development phase, such specification is programmed, built, documented and tested. The 
process of design and development usually results in a new technological product.   
 Research has shown that the approach to design and development adopted by technology 
producers highly influences the future success of a technological product (84). In particular, 
growing evidence shows that top-down approaches ─where the design and development is 
driven by producers─ tend to correlate with lower acceptance of IATs among users and lower 
chance for IATs to fulfill care needs. In contrast, bottom-up approaches ─where end-users are 
involved in the design and development process on an equal footage─ seem to correlate with 
higher acceptance and better chances for IATs to fulfill care needs (85-87).  
 An encouraging approach to improving the design and development of IATs is user-
centered design (UCD). UCD is a strategy “based on the needs and interests of the user, with an 
emphasis on making products usable and understandable” (88). Through UC approaches, end-
users’ (e.g. patients’ and caregivers’) needs and wishes are “elicited correctly, reflected properly 
into the system requirements, and verified thoroughly by the tests” (ivi). In the context of IATs 
for elderly and dementia care, UC approaches make sure that the needs and wishes of patients, 
their caregivers and health professionals are (i) elicited correctly through bottom-up and 
participatory approaches, (ii) reflected properly into the IAT requirements, and (iii) verified 
thoroughly by tests and adequate clinical validation. User-centered approaches are particularly 
desirable in the context of IATs for AD and other dementias. In fact, one of the eight core 
principles for advancing Alzheimer’s treatment and care postulated by the Ware Invitational 
Summit is precisely to engage patients and family caregivers in the decision-making process 
(89). 
 In order to assess current approaches to the design and development of IATs for 
dementia and elderly care, our meta-analysis also controlled for the prevalence of UC 
approaches across the IAT spectrum (n=539). Our results show that only 40.1% of reviewed 
IATs are explicitly designed, developed, or assessed in a user-centered manner (see Fig. 7). In 
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addition, the slight majority of existing IATs (50.65%) did not receive any clinical validation 
through studies involving human subjects. These findings indicate that the clinical efficacy and 
safety of current IATs as well as their capacity to fulfil end-users’ needs are not adequately 
verified at present. Even the subset of IATs that was subject to testing and clinical validation 
studies appeared to be affected by small sample sizes (less than 20 participants) and extremely 
low prevalence of randomized-controlled trials (1,1%).  
However, a positive trend could be detected as the results of a logistic regression showed a 
statistically significant increase in UC approaches to IAT design and assessment over time. If 
such trend persists, most IATs are expected to be developed through UC approaches in a non-
distant future. 
Chapter 2.1 presents a detailed quantitative analysis of current trends in IAT design and 
development. In addition, it provides evidence-based recommendations about how to improve 
future IAT production in a manner that increases acceptance among end-users, facilitates 
adoption and clinical implementation, and improves the clinical validity of existing tools.  
 
1.5. Value-Sensitive and Ethical Design in IAT 
 
Involving end-users into the design and development process through UC approaches is not the 
only strategy for improving the production of IATs for dementia and elderly care. Besides 
transitioning to UC approaches, there is a growing consensus among researchers that IATs 
should account for human values, especially the ethical values of stakeholders (90). These 
considerations have led researchers in engineering and ethics of technology to develop a 
theoretically grounded approach to the design and development of (biomedical) technologies 
called value-sensitive design (VSD). Through VSD approaches, human values are incorporated 
into technology design “in a principled and comprehensive manner and throughout the whole 
process” (91, 92). Among these values, the moral values of direct and indirect stakeholders are 
often believed to play a central role. Moral values (also called ethical values)10 are values 
related to the moral domain, i.e. the domain of life concerned with how individuals and 
machines “ought to behave in relation to others and themselves and how society should be 
organized as to promote the right course of action” (90). Examples of moral values include 
justice, equality, freedom, autonomy and privacy. Researchers have argued that the 
 
10 In line with the relevant literature, the terms “moral value” and “ethical value” are used 
interchangeably in throughout this thesis.  
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consideration and incorporation of moral values is a critical requirement for preventing harm, 
improving “human situations”(93) and guaranteeing responsible technology development. This 
ethics-focused version of VSD is often called ethical design. According to Karr, ethical design 
allows to prevent various forms of harm to technology users and other stakeholders including 
interpersonal (e.g. risk of stigmatization), psychological (e.g. discomfort and distress), and 
social/societal harm (e.g. exploitation and injustice)(93).  
 At core of the advocacy of ethical design as a strategy for technology development there 
is a twofold theoretical assumption. First, research in Science and Technology Studies (STS) has 
promoted the view that technology, its application, the practices it generates and the contexts in 
which it is used, are not morally neutral but raise significant ethical implications (94). Second, 
the so-called embedded values approach has underscored that technological artifacts “can have 
built-in tendencies to promote or demote particular values” (90). When a technological 
specification or other characteristic is built-in in a certain technological product to promote the 
realization of a (moral) value, such specification can be said to incorporate an embedded value 
(90). The promotion of embedded values in technology development is a central feature of 
ethical design.   
In relation to IATs for dementia and elderly care, ethical design prescribes that IATs should 
account for the ethical values of elderly people (including people with a diagnosis of dementia), 
their caregivers as well as of health professionals involved in the delivery of care services (30). 
In compliance with VSD requirements, ethical considerations and values should be incorporated 
early on into IAT design “in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design 
process” (95).  
While many experts agree that VSD and ethical design would massively benefit progress 
in IATs for the aging world (96, 97), yet information about these trends in relation to 
psychogeriatric care is scant. To our knowledge, no study had evaluated the prevalence of 
ethical values in current IATs for dementia and elderly care prior to the present research project. 
In absence of such studies, assessing the prevalence of VSD approaches and the ethical 
sensitivity of current IATs for dementia is tempered by insufficient evidence. This is significant 
because the lack of ethical values and considerations has been identified as a major barrier for 
technology transfer of IATs (98). In addition, healthcare professionals have urged developers to 
thoughtfully consider ethical and socio-cultural issues throughout the design process (99). 
To fill this gap in the literature and corroborate decision-making on this topic with 
extensive evidence, we have investigated the prevalence of embedded moral values in current 
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IATs. As embedded (moral) values are the atomic constituents of VSD and ethical design, this 
study component also provided information about the frequency of these approaches in current 
IAT design. Chapter 2.2 presents the key findings of this analysis and provides a set of 
recommendations for facilitating the transition to VSD and ethical design in IAT for dementia 
and elderly care. Our results show that the vast majority of (67%) current IATs are developed in 
absence of explicit ethical considerations and values, hence not in compliance with VSD and 
ethical design requirements. Consequently, the current prevalence of VS and ethically-informed 
approaches to the design of IATs for dementia and elderly care appear rare. Furthermore, the 
distribution of ethical values within the subset of value-sensitive IATs appeared not uniform. In 
fact, values like independence and safety appeared significantly more prevalent than the values 
of interdependence, privacy and justice. The latter three appeared indeed remarkably rare 
(<10%). Based on this evidence, recommendations for designers and developers were proposed. 
These include the prioritization of affordable and open-source technology, a closer and more 
systematic cooperation between IAT designers and information security experts, as well as the 
incorporation of encryption, data security and other privacy-enhancing strategies. For a detailed 
analysis see Chapter 2.2.  
The approach to the study of embedded (ethical) values in technology design employed in 
this study component is called disclosive computer ethics (100). The goal of disclosive computer 
ethics is to “uncover values and moral decisions embedded in ICT artefacts” (90). In most 
technological products, in fact, ethical values or devalues are not directly manifest to the 
average user, hence the ethical significance of these products remains largely undetermined. In 
technical terms, they are said to be morally opaque (90). This moral opacity may be due to 
many reasons including a lack of ethical awareness among product designers and technological 
complexity ─i.e. when understanding the basic features or operations of a certain technology 
requires sophisticated expertise in computer science and engineering, hence is hard to achieve 
for the layperson. IATs that involve highly complex AI features such as deep learning are even 
more likely to be morally opaque since the algorithms through which they operate might be 
inscrutable even to the engineers who created them and, in most cases, cannot be traced back 
(101). The higher the moral opacity, the higher is the risk that ethically relevant technical or 
emergent biases unknowingly enter the system. This could have a negative impact on end-users, 
a risk that is particularly problematic in relation to IATs for dementia and elderly care since 
their end-users belong to frail and vulnerable population segments. Through disclosive 
approaches such as the one presented in this study, the moral opacity of the technologies under 
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investigation is reduced. Consequently, moral transparency is promoted because extensive 
information is provided to end-users and other stakeholders about what (moral) values are at 
stake in relation to those technologies.  
 
1.6. A Framework for Ethical Design: the PED-ART Framework 
 
The issue of addressing ethics in technology design is a relatively recent concern. Until recently, 
most research at the intersection between ethics and medical engineering was focused on the 
post-production assessment of IATs. Rather than investigating ethical values at the level of 
product design, previous studies were primarily concerned with assessing the compatibility of 
existing IAT products with ethical norms, especially as a consequence of ethical conflicts 
arising from the sub-optimal use of such IATs. This approach to the ethics of technology can be 
labeled as reactive because the ethical analysis is urged as a reaction to ongoing ethical or social 
conflicts associated with the use of IATs. However, the reported low frequency of ethical values 
at the level of IAT design jointly with repeated calls for VSD, have led researchers to advance 
the thesis that ethics should not be introduced only at the end of product development but 
incorporated early in the design and development process. For example, Feng (2000) has argued 
that there is a need for “addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology”, 
hence “bringing ethics back into design” (102). In Chapter 2.3, we propose a framework for the 
introduction of ethical values early on in IAT design with the purpose of increasing the clinical 
effectiveness, acceptance and ethical sustainability of this technological family. The Chapter 
suggests that to achieve this goal a conceptual shift is required: reactive approaches to the ethics 
of (bio)medical technology need to be complemented with what we called proactive approaches. 
Instead of merely reacting to existing ethical problems, proactive approaches enable the 
anticipation of future potential uses, requirements, and unintended consequences of new 
technologies before they generate ethical conflicts or other problems.  
To facilitate this conceptual shift, Chapter 2.3 proposes a framework for ethical design 
and development in IAT. We called this framework the Proactive Ethical Design (PED) 
framework for assistive and rehabilitation technology. The PED framework is characterized by 
the convergence of UC and VSD approaches to technology design through a proactive mode of 
ethical evaluation (103, 104). The realization of the PED-ART framework relies on four basic 
normative requirements: minimization of power imbalances, compliance with biomedical ethics, 
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translationality and social awareness. See Chapter 2.3 for a detailed characterization of this 
framework.  
In addition, this Chapter provides an ostensive and operative model of the PED-ART 
framework: the Cybathlon, i.e. an international competition organized by ETH Zurich for 
disabled competitors allowed to use IATs (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2- Photographic reports from the first edition of the Cybathlon competition. Zurich, Switzerland, October 2016. Photo 
credit: g.tec medical engineering GmbH.  
 
1.7. Attitudes and Views of Health Professionals 
 
While our review results show that the spectrum of IATs with possible direct application to 
dementia and elderly care is rapidly expanding in number and variety, the clinical 
implementation and adoption rates of these technologies are still reportedly low (105, 106). 
Lower-than-expected acceptance and use of IATs in elderly and dementia care has been 
reported in a number of countries including Germany, Norway, England, France and the United 
States (107, 108). In brief, IAT is developing at a much faster rate than patients and healthcare 
professionals are willing to adopt.  
Investigating the views of key stakeholders involved in dementia and elderly care is 
gaining momentum as an effective strategy for acquiring valuable insights about possible 
barriers to the successful adoption of IATs in the institutional and home-care setting (107). Co-
determinant of lower-than-expected acceptance might include demographic, socioeconomic and 
sociocultural factors. In addition, they might depend on the specific needs, wishes and attitudes 
of direct and indirect stakeholders, such as elderly people (including people with dementia), 
their informal caregivers and health professionals. The latter category is particularly relevant to 
understand barriers to the implementation of IATs in the institutional setting, as health 
professionals are critical decision-makers in the adoption of new medical technologies in 
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healthcare facilities. In addition, they also have a critical advisory role in the use of IATs in the 
homecare setting. To date, most research has focused on the views and attitudes of direct 
stakeholders, especially elderly people, people with dementia and their informal caregivers (109, 
110). More research is needed to complement existing knowledge with quantitative and 
qualitative evidence on the views and attitudes of health professionals towards IATs. Such 
studies are particularly needed in the countries that are most affected by current trends in 
population aging. 
 To this purpose, in the second Module of this PhD project, qualitative interviews with 
health professionals were conducted to explore the promises and challenges of IATs for 
dementia and elderly care. This study component involved semi-structured interviews conducted 
with health professionals in three among the countries with the highest longevity and lowest 
birthrate (Switzerland, Germany and Italy), hence particularly exposed to aging-related health 
burden (for a detailed description of the study methodology see Chapter 2.4). Results show that 
healthcare professionals identify two major barriers to adoption: (a) limitations in the design, 
development clinical implementation of current IATs, and (b) perceived collateral risks and 
obstacles in the translation of research results from the designing lab into the clinics. In addition, 
the study reveals an insufficient information transfer between, on the one hand, designers and 
developers and, on the other hand, clinicians. This is confirmed by the fact that interactions and 
information exchanges between the two groups appeared very rare, with less than one in five 
health professionals reporting active interactions with designers, developers or marketers of 
IATs for clinical purposes. This study Module also explores issues such as current limitations in 
elderly and dementia care, perceived opportunities and challenges associated with clinical 
applications of IATs and the future of dementia and elderly care in light of current trends in 
digital technology. Our qualitative data analysis identified six main themes and seventeen 
associated subthemes. An overview of the main themes and subthemes emerging from the 
interviews is presented in Tab. 6 in Chapter 2.4. This Chapter also provides a detailed analysis 
of the key findings emerging from this second Module of the PhD project.  
 
1.8. Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI)  
 
Involving direct and indirect stakeholders in the design of new IATs through UC design and 
incorporating values in product design through VSD approaches (e.g. the PED-ART framework) 
might not be sufficient to develop ethical IATs. In fact, while VSD prescribes the incorporation 
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of values in product design, it remains an open normative question which values should be 
incorporated. Documentary research and empirical research with stakeholders are important 
strategies to inform these normative evaluations, but cannot determine them. The reason for that 
stems from two major theoretical impediments. First, as postulated by Hume’s law (also known 
as Hume's guillotine), normative statements (i.e. statements about what ought to be) cannot be 
deduced from positive or descriptive statements, i.e. statements about what is (111). Therefore, 
normative statements about which ethical values and considerations ought to be implemented 
into IATs for dementia cannot be deduced from descriptive analyses of which values and 
considerations are being implemented in current products. Second, as illustrated by Moore’s 
open-question argument (112), moral properties are not identical to natural properties such as 
desirability. Therefore, it would be fallacious to deduce which moral properties should be 
addressed in IATs from what stakeholders consider desirable. It is important to consider that 
these two theoretical impediments do not make descriptive research invalid but simply 
demarcate its epistemological validity. In fact, Hume’s law and Moore’s argument do not rule 
out that descriptive research can very useful to inform and orient normative analyses. In 
contrast, they indicate that descriptive research alone is not sufficient to address normative 
problems, hence needs to be complemented with (empirically informed) normative approaches. 
For this reason, the third Module of this PhD project was concerned with the normative 
dimension of IATs for dementia and elderly care. Key findings emerging from this third Module 
are presented in Chapters 2.4 to 2.15. In particular, these Chapters provide:  
▪ A theoretical foundation of normative ethical analysis in the context of assistive technology 
and human-machine interaction (including IAT) 
▪ A normative evaluation of the major ethical implications associated with IAT development 
and adoption. These include issues of autonomy, privacy, cybersecurity, and dual-use.  
▪ A normative evaluation of the major implications of IATs from the perspective of 
international human rights law.  
▪ Recommendations for clinicians, developers and other stakeholders to guide the responsible 
development of IATs with special focus on specific IAT subfamilies: BCIs, AALs, 
wearables, and assistive robots.  
 
1.8.1. Theoretical & Normative Foundations of Human-Machine Interaction 
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Normative ethics is the branch of ethics concerned with questions related to how one ought to 
act. As such, it is distinct from descriptive ethics since the latter is concerned with the empirical 
investigation of moral properties in biological and artificial agents. The first Chapters of this 
thesis addressed descriptive ethical questions related to IATs for dementia and elderly care. 
These included the analysis of embedded moral values in current IATs and the empirical 
investigation of health-professionals’ views and beliefs in relation to ethically relevant factors.  
The next sections, in contrast, will address normative questions. The common objective of these 
sections is to outline a comprehensive normative ethical assessment of IATs for dementia and 
elderly care, anticipate or early detect ethical risks, and provide empirically informed and 
normatively justified recommendations for relevant stakeholders.  
It is worth noting that the normative analysis contained in these pages is applied in 
character. In fact, this thesis will not discuss which features make a technology or an action right 
or wrong. In contrast, it will discuss through an evidence-based and practice-oriented approach 
which characteristics or applications of IATs are ethically more sustainable than others in a 
specific context. Applied ethics, in fact, is a branch of ethics concerned with the study of 
particular ethical issues in particular contexts. In ethics typologies (113), applied ethics is 
further classified into main sub-disciplines based on context or area of application of the ethical 
analysis. IATs for dementia appear to intersect at least three main sub-disciplines of applied 
ethics: biomedical ethics11, machine ethics and cyborg ethics. Biomedical ethics is concerned 
with ethical issues emerging from biomedical research and clinical practice. This subdomain 
intersects IATs for dementia and elderly care as these technologies are being developed in the 
context of biomedical research for the achievement of clinical aims, i.e. the assistance of elderly 
people and people with dementia. Machine ethics (also called computational ethics) is 
concerned with the moral features and behavior of intelligent machines (114) as well as with 
ethical issues emerging from their development and application. This subdomain intersects IATs 
for dementia as these technologies qualify as intelligent machines (some of which also exhibit 
autonomous behavior) and generate a number of novel ethical issues in the context of 
development and use. Finally, cyborg ethics is concerned with the moral features and behavior 
of human-machine integrated systems called cyborgs12 (116) as well as with the ethical issues 
 
11 In this section, the phrase “biomedical ethics” is used to comprehensively refer to the study of ethical 
issues in biomedicine, hence encompasses subdisciplines such as medical ethics, neuroethics and 
research ethics.  
12 The term cyborg to denote human-machine integrated systems was also used in relation to the 
Cybathlon competition (see section 1.6), which was often labeled as “Cyborg Olympics” in the media 
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emerging from human-machine interaction. This subdomain intersects IATs for dementia as 
these technologies operate in close interaction with the people they assist and, in some 
circumstances, augment or compensate for their impaired biological functions (e.g. memory, 
locomotion, biosensing) with mechatronic ones.  
While biomedical ethics as a professional and academic discipline originated in the early 
seventies (117) and can now rely on relatively solid principled theoretical foundations (118-
120)13, machine and cyborg ethics are more recent endeavors in applied ethics. As a 
consequence of their novelty, these disciplines are grounded on less widely accepted theoretical 
foundations14. Literature reviews show that a number of different and mutually conflicting 
foundational approaches co-exist, as there is no consensus within the research community about 
which (if any) approach should be prioritized (123).  
 For this reason, prior to moving to the analysis of the major ethical implications 
associated with the use of IATs, Chapter 2.5 provides a contribution to the theoretical 
foundations of machine and cyborg ethics. This contribution attempts to propose an alternative 
macroethical framework for machine and cyborg ethics by linking the foundations of these 
disciplines with a general theory of cognition15. In fact, while machine ethicists have 
investigated the cognitive requirements for attributing moral status to intelligent machines and 
cyborg ethicists have discussed the ethical implications of man-machine hybrid systems, yet it 
remains an open question which theory of cognition should set those cognitive requirements and 
address those implications. This latter question is foundational in the sense that, as Himma 
(2007) described, “it is more abstract and basic” than the former two and necessary for their 
solution (124). The Chapter proposes to base machine and cyborg ethics upon an active 
 
and scientific literature. See Nature, 536/7614: 20-22: 115. S. Reardon, Welcome to the Cyborg 
Olympics. Nature 536, 20-22 (2016)..  
13 For the sake of completeness, not every researcher in bioemedical ethics agrees on the disciplines’ 
theoretical foundations. Controversy around the principlist approach is widespread. However, the wide 
prevalence of principlist foundational approaches in medical curricula 121. P. Schröder-Bäck, P. 
Duncan, W. Sherlaw, C. Brall, K. Czabanowska, Teaching seven principles for public health ethics: 
towards a curriculum for a short course on ethics in public health programmes. BMC medical ethics 15, 
73 (2014). indicates a much broader common theoretical ground compared to machine and cyborg ethics.  
14 According to Floridi and Sanders (p. 2), debates on the theoretical foundations can be viewed as “a 
metatheoretical reflection on the nature and justification of computer ethics” 122. L. Floridi, J. W. 
Sanders, Mapping the foundationalist debate in computer ethics. Ethics and information Technology 4, 1-
9 (2002).. 
15 Based on Floridi and Sanders model for mapping foundational issues in computer ethics, the approach 
presented in this thesis belongs to what they call innovative approaches as opposed to, respectively, 
radical and conservative approaches 122. L. Floridi, J. W. Sanders, Mapping the foundationalist 
debate in computer ethics. Ethics and information Technology 4, 1-9 (2002)..  
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externalist approach to the study of cognition in, respectively, human beings (e.g. older people 
with dementia), human-machine hybrid systems (e.g. older people with dementia as users of 
integrated IATs), and artificially intelligent systems (e.g. the IATs themselves). This approach is 
based on the notion of extended mind, i.e. an hypothesis in theoretical cognitive science 
according to which cognitive states and processes do not locate exclusively in human nervous 
systems (125, 126) but might be “hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and 
nonbiological realms” (127) if certain conditions are satisfied. The extended mind model is 
proposed as a useful approach to investigate information processing across human users and 
intelligent technologies (especially cognitive technologies) and to elegantly describe their 
mutual interaction.  
 For the reasons delineated above, Chapter 2.5 is aimed at contributing to laying down the 
theoretical foundations of machine and cyborg ethics, hence providing a more solid conceptual 
ground for the applied normative analysis presented in the next Chapters.   
 
1.8.2. Privacy and Data Security 
 
Like any other computer system and network, IATs collect, store and share information, usually 
in digital format. The rapid increase in the number and types of IATs for dementia and elderly 
care (as reported in Chapter 2.1) is causing a parallel increase in the quantity and variety of 
information collected, stored and shared by those devices. This trend is part of a broader socio-
technological phenomenon, namely the digitalization of various aspects of human life, 
healthcare included. This digitalization of healthcare (128) is accompanied with a number of 
intricately related sub-trends such as the digitalization of medical records (129), the leveraging 
of the information contained in those records and its combination with other data sources (62), 
the multiplication of data-generation and data-access points facilitated by PUC trends, the 
application of AI for predictive purposes, and the increasing use of automation to complement 
or replace care tasks. As healthcare becomes digitalized, more and more healthcare-related data 
are being generated. Studies show that the size of healthcare and biomedical data volumes is 
approximately doubling every year (130). By 2025, a ten-fold increase in worldwide data is 
predicted with an annual data creation rate of 16.3 zettabytes16 (131).  
 
16 One zettabyte (ZB) is one trillion gigabytes (GB).  
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 In addition to this quantitative increase, healthcare data are expanding in variety as well. 
IATs are co-responsible for this trend. Current IATs can collect, store and share various and 
very heterogeneous types of healthcare-related data, as described in Tab. 4. 
 
Information 
type 
Data sources IATs enabling  
collection and sharing 
Privacy sensitivity 
Environmental  • - Video recordings of 
private spaces  
• - Optical and photoelectric 
information 
• - Gas levels (e.g. smoke 
detectors) 
• - AALs 
• - Sensorics 
 
Behavioral - Video-recorded behavior  
- Voice recordings 
- Tracked physical activity 
(e.g. podometrics) 
- AALs  
- Wearables 
- Care robots 
 
 
Medical records • - Disease chronicles 
• - Surgical history  
• - Family history 
• - Demographics 
• - Genetic data 
• - Electronic medical 
records (EMRs) 
• - Healthcare data 
platforms  
• - Intelligent digital 
assistants 
 
 
Physiological • - Real-time heart rate 
• - Glucose levels 
• - Neural information (e.g. 
EEG-recordings) 
- AALs  
- Physiological 
monitoring devices 
- BCIs & other 
neurodevices 
 
 
Tab. 4- Types of privacy-sensitive information collectable via IAT and relative risk 
  
Thank to AI and predictive analytic, these different data types and sources can be 
aggregated into large data sets to generate comprehensive insights on the person whose data are 
being recorded (and his/her environment). The increasing availability of these various data 
sources and their subsequent analyzability are predicted to benefit the delivery of dementia and 
elderly care services worldwide (132). In fact, they are likely to enable more targeted, 
personalized and optimized care solutions for the affected individuals as well as novel insights 
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for care providers (62). At the same time, however these trends will produce an unprecedented 
quantity and quality of patient data to be introduced into the digital ecosystem. IATs will 
increasingly make end-users’ medical records electronically available to service providers, 
permanently track their activities, monitor their behavior and record their physiological 
parameters. This raises a fundamental ethical question: Are our current digital infrastructures 
and, legal and ethical safeguards, adequate for this upcoming data explosion? This question 
acquires particular ethical significance in relation to private and sensitive data. In fact, research 
increasingly shows that novel breaches of privacy violation are emerging from IAT use, a 
consequence of the fact that privacy and data security are not prioritized in IAT design (133). As 
described in Chapter 2.2, privacy and data security are among the least prevalent considerations 
in IATs design in spite of the fact that stakeholders perceive them as critical requirements for 
responsible IAT use.  
Some of the breaches for privacy violation emerging from IAT use are instances of 
already known ethical challenges in technology-mediated healthcare. For example, the 
disproportionate tracking and monitoring of behavioral activities of users (e.g. via camera-based 
monitoring and GPS tracking) has been largely addressed in the literature as a major risk for the 
physical and informational privacy of end-users (134-137). Other breaches are, however, 
qualitatively novel and directly enabled by emerging IAT types. Among these, BCIs and other 
cognitive technologies are critical. BCIs for device-control and/or self-monitoring such as those 
based on EEG-measurements enable the access to highly private and sensitive data sources, 
namely the neural correlates of mental processes such as interests, intentions, moods and 
preferences (138). These data are only partly under voluntary conscious control, contain 
personally identifiable signatures, and can be aggregated by data-handlers to capture or predict 
fundamental elements of health status, preferences and behavior. In absence of adequate 
safeguards at the level of design, the increasing pervasiveness of BCIs and other IATs is raising 
the probability of unauthorized disclosures of neural information and related privacy violations. 
These violations are facilitated by the reported unpreparedness of existing digital and regulatory 
infrastructures. In fact, phenomena such as data storage and sharing across unsecured channels 
as well the absence of privacy-protecting safeguards in products’ terms of service highlight an 
urgent need to develop adequate safeguards for neural data.  
To this purpose, Chapters 2.10 and 2.11 present a detailed analysis of emerging privacy 
issues associated with the increasingly pervasive use of IAT types that enable the collection, 
storage and sharing of private and sensitive information. Chapter 2.10 focuses primarily on BCI 
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and other neurotechnologies. Chapter 2.11, in contrast, focuses on AAL, wearable computing 
and robotics. After describing the technological peculiarities of these IAT families, the Chapters 
present a number of breaches for privacy violation opened by these technologies. In addition, 
the Chapters review current privacy safeguards and identify an urgent need to increase the 
privacy and security of the neurophysiological and behavioral data processed by IATs. Based on 
this analysis, the Chapters propose a number of privacy-protecting recommendations at three 
levels: individual users, technology producers or service providers, and policy and regulatory 
bodies. 
 
1.8.3. Dual-Use 
 
As described in Chapter 2.10 and 2.11, breaches for privacy and data security violation can 
emerge from the pervasive diffusion of certain IAT types and from the exponential proliferation 
of IAT-generated data. In addition, challenges for privacy, security and other ethical values can 
emerge from the misuse of IATs for malevolent purposes. In fact, research shows that several 
IATs, even though they were originally designed for beneficial clinical purposes, can be coopted 
for nefarious aims by malevolent agents. In ethical terms, they hold a dual-use potential: the 
same technology “has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes” (139). This 
generates an important ethical dilemma in relation to the governance of these technologies. In 
fact, while it is important to maximize the clinical and social benefits of IATs among end-users 
and their caregivers, it is equally important to minimize collateral risks associated with the 
misuse of these technologies.  
 Chapter 2.7 provides a detailed review of dual-use dilemmas emerging from the use and 
misuse of IAT types such as BCI and other neurotechnologies as well as neurally-controlled 
robotics. As the Chapter illustrates, dual-use dilemmas for these IAT-types primarily arise in 
two contexts: cyber-criminality and the military. The Chapter presents a detailed list of dual-use 
possibilities in the IAT context and takes a normative stance in the debate over their governance. 
In light of the current global burden of population aging and dementia, the Chapter suggests that 
regulatory approaches should be calibrated in a manner that maximizes clinical benefits for 
older people and people with cognitive disabilities. Therefore, the Chapter suggests that a global 
ban or moratorium on military IAT research should be discouraged since it could delay the 
development and administration of clinically effective solutions for the people in need. The 
reason for that stems from an important characteristic of dual-use dynamics in the IAT context: 
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the fact that technologies originally developed by the military for national security purposes 
often spillover into the civilian sector with beneficial impact on healthcare (140). This 
characteristic, known as reverse dual-use, is illustrated in Chapter 2.7 through various examples.  
In addition, the Chapter calls for the development of a biosecurity framework specific to 
neurotechnology. This framework, which is called neurosecurity framework, consists of 
calibrated regulatory interventions, ethical guidelines and awareness-raising activities within the 
neuroscience community.  
 
1.8.3.1. A Paradigmatic Example of Dual-Use Risk in IAT: the Case of Malicious 
Brain-Hacking 
 
As Chapter 2.7 illustrates, BCIs are among the IAT-types with the highest dual-use potential. In 
addition to being researched and tested in the military context, these technologies also are a 
potential target for criminality. Research shows that BCI headsets can be experimentally 
coopted by malevolent agents for nefarious purposes and turned against their users. In 
particular, they have been used to extract sensitive information from the user’s EEG-recordings 
without their consent and even awareness (141-143). These experimental results demonstrate the 
actual feasibility of performing targeted attacks against BCI users and denote an emerging dual-
use risk called malicious brain-hacking. Similarly to malicious computer hacking, malicious 
brain-hacking involves the unauthorized extraction and sharing of sensitive information for 
malevolent purposes. Unlike traditional computer hacking, however, it enables the direct 
extraction of information from neural recordings, hence a more direct access to a person’s 
mental states. This unique feature of malicious brain-hacking raises a new set of ethical 
questions related to the degree of control that individuals should exercise over their brain data, 
the private status of their mental information and the implications for their autonomy and 
personhood resulting from the unprecedented possibility of direct external manipulation of their 
brain activity. To explore this new domain of ethical issues, a component of the third Module of 
this PhD study was devoted to the ethical assessment of malicious brain-hacking. This 
assessment was aimed at anticipating possible risks for end-users, clarifying the spectrum of 
ethical issues associated with this novel opportunity for technology misuse, and providing 
guidance for stakeholders (end-users, BCI developers & designers, clinicians, and cybersecurity 
experts).  
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1.9. Intelligent Assistive Robots: Recommendations for Clinicians 
 
BCIs are not the only type of IAT that is believed to raise ethical challenges. Authors have 
argued that socially assistive robots (SARs) are also particularly problematic from a moral 
perspective since they raise a number of ethical challenges including the risk of deception (144), 
a feeling of objectification, and a loss of privacy, personal liberty and human contact (145). 
SARs are “robots that provide assistance through social, rather than physical, interaction”. 
These robots are aimed “to address critical areas and gaps in care by automating supervision, 
coaching, motivation, and companionship aspects of one-on-one interactions with individuals 
from various large and growing populations, including stroke survivors, the elderly and 
individuals with dementia, and children with autism spectrum disorders” (144). Thank to 
advances in AI, SARs are expected to provide increasingly flexible and adaptive responses to 
end-users’ care needs, hence to provide care standards that will ultimately match or even 
outperform those of human caregivers. At the same time, however, their technological novelty 
and semi-autonomous behavior generate ethical uncertainty among experts.  
 The ethical significance of SARs in the context of dementia and elderly care has elicited 
coordinate responses from institutions. A paradigmatic example is a workshop on the “Ethics 
and Policy of Robots in Healthcare”17 organized by the Foundation for Responsible Robotics at 
The Hague Institute for Social Justice, The Netherlands. The author of this thesis was among 15 
experts invited by the organizers to create a white paper on the governance of healthcare robots 
and a roadmap of guidelines for Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) in healthcare settings.  
 In light of this need for ethical guidelines and governance strategies, an important 
portion of the third Module of this PhD project was the development of a set of 
recommendations for clinicians and engineers regarding the ethically responsible application of 
SARs in the dementia and elderly care setting. A detailed analysis of this study segment and a 
full description of these recommendations is presented in Chapter 2.12.  
 
 
 
 
17 For further information about this workshop see: http://responsiblerobotics.org/2017/04/29/ethics-and-
policy-of-robots-in-healthcare-workshop/ 
 57 
 
1.10. Implications for Human Rights  
 
In normative analysis, ethical evaluations often intersect or even overlap with legal and social 
ones. To underscore this contiguity between these three domains, the acronym ELSI (Ethical 
Legal and Social Implications) is often used in the literature as semantic tool to demarcate the 
domain of normative analyses related to science and technology (146-148).   
 In the context of IATs, legal implications at the level of fundamental rights are of 
primary relevance. As Sullins has observed, there are “global challenges that revolve around 
human rights and ICTs”, and these are “one of the primary concerns of our time” (p.130) (149). 
In fact, many of the values that were identified as ethically relevant and/or neglected at the level 
of product design (see Chapters 2.10 and 2.11) do not only qualify as moral values but also as 
legally protected human rights. A typical example is the notion of privacy. Privacy, as we have 
seen, configures an important and often neglected ethical requirement of IATs for dementia and 
elderly care. In addition, it is also protected as fundamental human right under the The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 12), the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights (Art. 8) and the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 7 and 8).  
 Human rights are “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” 
regardless of sex, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and other biological or sociocultural variables 
(150). Such rights arise from ethical principles and moral norms. However, to become regularly 
protected as legal rights in municipal and international law, these principles or norms need to 
“reflect a fundamentally important social value (…), be consistent, but not merely repetitive, of 
the existing body of international human rights law, (…) be capable of achieving a very high 
degree of international consensus”, and “be sufficiently precise as to give rise to identifiable 
rights and obligations” (151).  
The primary importance of human rights analyses within ELSI studies on computing 
technology has been stressed by many authors. For example, Sullins has underscored how every 
technology-mediated activity leaves a trail of information, a so-called digital footprint, to 
emphasize that individuals should “pay close attention to the forces that access and manipulate 
that information” (p.118). In the digital era, he argued, the access to or manipulation of digital 
information can result in fundamental rights violations because it can “critically alter” the ability 
of people “to operate in the social world” (149). This risk is particularly evident in relation to 
technology misuse. As we have seen in relation to malicious brain-hacking, “the wrong 
information in the wrong hands” (ibid.) can significantly affect a person’s informational privacy, 
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autonomy or even identity. Floridi and associates at the Oxford Internet Institute have 
established an even closer link between computer technology and human rights, observing that 
digital information has an “ontological force in the construction of our personal identity” (149), 
hence it should be “a fundamental and inalienable right” (152).  
In most cases, the implications for human rights raised by novel intelligent technologies are 
accounted for by previously codified rights. In other cases, however, when advances in 
intelligent technology open novel and unprecedented technological capabilities (e.g. novel 
opportunities for monitoring, interfacing and controlling human behavior), there is uncertainty 
on how human right law should cope with such advancements. In fact, as data-security experts 
have argued, new technologies can open breaches, meaning “sudden new opportunities for 
offending that opened as a result of changes in the technological or social environment” (153). 
These breaches “are often the result of a defective legal or regulatory coverage”, hence might 
require the development of novel regulatory mechanisms. For example, as we have seen in 
Chapters 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11, the neurotechnology segment of the IAT spectrum opens 
unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from 
the human brain. In such cases, it is possible that existing human rights may not be normatively 
sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. The reason for that stems from the fact that those 
rights emerged in times and historical contingencies where the challenges currently posed by 
new technologies where not technically possible or even imaginable. For example, the right to 
privacy was originally formulated in the late 19th century as a response to "deep-seated 
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy” triggered by the massive diffusion of newspapers 
and other mass media (154). However, at that time and for many decades to come, the only three 
types of information that could be protected under privacy rights were written, verbally uttered 
and behaviorally observable information. With advances in neurotechnology and BCI, 
information about a person’s mental states can be directly decoded from neural recordings in 
absence of verbal utterances or observable behavior (see Tab. 4 at p. 49). This new 
technological opportunity, as we have seen in Chapters 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10, can be used to enable 
new types of privacy violation and can be coopted by malevolent agents for personal gain and 
privacy-threatening malevolent purposes (e.g. unauthorized disclosure of mental information).  
Based on these considerations, Chapters 2.13 and 2.14 discuss the implications of new 
intelligent technologies for fundamental rights, with a special focus on cognitive technologies. 
Taking a first step from Sullins’ “concern for our rights of citizens in the world of information” 
(149), the Chapters use literature review and comparative legal analysis to assess whether 
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existing rights are enough normatively equipped to account for novel advances at the brain-
machine interface. Based on this analysis, we advance the proposal that evolutionary 
interpretations of human rights or even the creation of brand new rights might be required to 
face the challenges posed by novel cognitive technologies. Possible candidates are the rights to 
cognitive liberty, mental privacy, mental integrity and psychological continuity.   
Further research is required to assess the implications for human rights of other disruptive 
trends in IATs such as autonomous and emotionally intelligent robots, big-data analytics, strong 
AI and superintelligence (59), as well as the so-called Internet of Everything (155).   
 
1.11. Governance of Cognitive Technology: Responsible Enhancement and the 
Need for Democratization  
 
The third and last Module of the present PhD projects ends with two contributions to the 
governance of intelligent ─especially cognitive─ technologies in light of the contextual factors 
presented in the previous sections of this thesis (e.g. global burden of dementia and population 
aging, dual-use potentials, cybercrime, risks for privacy and related rights). The focus of these 
contributions is twofold. The first contribution focuses on the governance of intelligent 
technology from the perspective of public health policy. After reviewing new evidence about the 
role of cognitive technology in maintaining cognitive performance among senior and 
cognitively disabled citizens, this contribution suggests that the responsible use of technology-
mediated cognitive enhancement should be carefully considered by policy makers as a possible 
public health strategy to tackle the global burden of population aging and dementia. The 
underlying assumption of this contribution is that the clinical potential of intelligent technology 
does not restrict exclusively to assistive purposes, but can be redirected to fulfil preventive and 
enhancement-related aims. This assumption is grounded on new longitudinal evidence such as 
the newly released findings from the 10-year long Advanced Cognitive Training for 
Independent and Vital Elderly (ACTIVE) study, which showed that computer-based 
technologies can not only augment cognition but also reduce dementia risk among older adults 
(156). Chapter 2.6 presents a detailed description of this proposal and a preliminary discussion 
of its moral significance. After reviewing a number of possible objections against public health 
applications of cognitive enhancement, the Chapter submits that the most substantive ethical 
issues arise in relation to cost, fair access and paternalism. This is consistent with previous 
considerations presented in this thesis emphasizing the moral centrality of guaranteeing fair 
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technology access, preventing digital divides and protecting the cognitive liberty of individuals. 
Therefore, the Chapter concludes that public health programs involving cognitive technology 
should prioritized the most disadvantaged population segments such as the oldest-old and the 
lowest socioeconomic classes. In addition, cheap and unobtrusive cognitive technologies such as 
those enabling environmental enrichment and those implementable on low-cost hardware should 
be prioritized ceteris paribus over more expensive ones, unless significantly different outcomes 
are evidenced. The Chapter also stresses the so-called recursive nature of cognitive 
enhancement to underscore how the improvement of cognitive performance might result in more 
positive overall health outcomes among older citizens.  
The second contribution focuses on the governance of intelligent technology from the 
perspective of deliberative democracy.  Unlike other contributions presented in this Module, this 
last section is not simply concerned with a normative ethical and legal assessment of IATs, but 
with a concrete policy deliverable: a practical proposal for the governance of cognitive 
technologies at the governmental and non-governmental level. This proposal originates from the 
observation of the paradigm-shifting effect (157) that these technologies can exert on human 
cultural evolution, not only in the medical context. In fact, the potential of cognitive technology 
to map, interface and simulate human cognition and its vulnerability to misuse urge the 
development of governance strategies that align the future of IATs with the basic principles of 
liberal democracy in free and open societies. For example, Ess and Thorseth (2010), have 
argued that the global diffusion of intelligent technology urges the development of “a global, not 
simply local, information and computer ethics”, especially in relation to the issues of “global 
deliberation and deliberative democracy” (158). Similarly, Ienca and Jotterand have suggested 
the development of a “procedural ethics grounded on a deliberative democracy approach” to 
shape the discourse on the ethics of neurotechnology (159).  
For this reason, Chapter 2.15 provides a preliminary description of an approach to the 
governance of IATs called the democratization approach. This governance strategy is aimed at 
aligning intelligent technology with the protection fundamental liberties and the basic principles 
of an open and democratic society. This approach is based on seven inter-related normative 
principles: avoidance of centralized control, pervasiveness, openness, transparency, 
inclusiveness, user-centeredness and convergence. This contribution is designed to achieve a 
more universal and even distribution of the potential benefits of IATs in a manner that avoids 
the exacerbation digital and/or socioeconomic inequalities and mitigates the risks for individuals 
and groups associated with the misuse of such emerging technologies. To quote Neuralink CEO, 
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Elon Musk, “If everyone has AI powers, then there’s not any one person or a small set of 
individuals who can have AI superpower”18. Global empowerment of individual technology 
users is proposed to achieve this goal. The Chapter also presents a number of examples and 
concrete suggestions for the practical realization of this governance strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Quote reported in Forbes, December 13, 2015:  
 https://www.forbes.com/sites/theopriestley/2015/12/13/does-elon-musk-and-openai-want-to-
democratise-or-sanitise-artificial-intelligence/#7b6712fad754  
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Part 2: Original Research 
Contributions19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 All research contributions presented in this section have been published, in modified form, in peer-
review academic journals or edited volumes. Information about the relevant publication outlet is 
presented in the cover page of each contribution. The in-text citations and references for this section have 
been formatted to suit the general style of this thesis. 
 63 
 
Module 1 
 
2.1. - Intelligent Assistive Technology for Alzheimer’s Disease and Other 
Dementias: A Systematic Review*  
 
* Reprinted from the Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, with permission from IOS Press20. 
 
Full Reference: Ienca, Marcello, Jotterand Fabrice, Bernice Elger, Maurizio Caon, Alessandro 
Scoccia Pappagallo, Reto W. Kressig, and Tenzin Wangmo. "Intelligent Assistive Technology 
for Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias: A Systematic Review." Journal of Alzheimer's 
Disease 56, no. 4 (2017): 1301-1340. 
 
Full name(s) of author(s): Marcello Ienca1, MSc. MA, Fabrice Jotterand1,2, PhD, Bernice 
Elger1,3, MD, PhD, Maurizio Caon4, PhD, Alessandro Scoccia Pappagallo5, MSc., Reto W. 
Kressig6,7, MD, Tenzin Wangmo1, PhD 
 
Full affiliation(s):  
1Institute for Biomedical Ethics, Faculty of Medicine, University of Basel 
2 Institute for Health and Society, Medical College of Wisconsin 
3 University Center for Legal Medicine, University of Geneva, Switzerland  
4 HumanTech Institute, Department of Computer Science, University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western 
Switzerland 
5 Fooder Ltd., London, UK 
6 University Center for Medicine of Aging, Felix Platter Hospital, Basel, Switzerland  
7 Chair of Geriatrics, University of Basel, Switzerland 
 
Complete correspondence of corresponding author:  
Institute for Biomedical Ethics 
University of Basel 
Bernoullistrasse 28, CH-4056 Basel 
+41(0)61 267 02 03 
marcello.ienca@unibas.ch 
 
Keywords: dementia, assistive technology, robotics, AAL, technology index, cognitive assistance, pervasive 
computing 
 
20 Current Impact Factor: 3.920 (2016) 
 64 
 
Abstract 
 
Intelligent Assistive Technologies (IATs) have the potential of offering innovative solutions 
to mitigate the global burden of dementia and provide new tools for dementia care. While 
technological opportunities multiply rapidly, clinical applications are rare as the technological 
potential of IATs remains inadequately translated into dementia care.  In this article, the 
authors present the results of a systematic review and the resulting comprehensive technology 
index of IATs with application in dementia care. Computer science, engineering, and medical 
databases were extensively searched and the retrieved items were systematically reviewed. For 
each IAT, the authors examined their technological type, application, target population, model 
of development and evidence of clinical validation. The findings reveal that the IAT spectrum is 
expanding rapidly in volume and variety over time, and encompasses intelligent systems 
supporting various assistive tasks and clinical uses. At the same time, the results confirm the 
persistence of structural limitations to successful adoption including partial lack of clinical 
validation and insufficient focus on patients’ needs. This index is designed to orient clinicians 
and relevant stakeholders involved in the implementation and management of dementia care 
across the current capabilities, applications and limitations of IATs and to facilitate the 
translation of medical engineering research into clinical practice. In addition, a discussion of the 
major methodological challenges and policy implications for the successful and ethically 
responsible implementation of IAT into dementia care is provided.  
 
Introduction 
 
The increasing prevalence of dementia poses a major challenge for global health at 
multiple levels. At the financial level, Hurd and colleagues (2013) calculated that dementia 
and specifically AD are among the most expensive diseases for Western society, with a price 
tag per year of around $160 billion (35, 36). As the greatest relative cost increases are 
occurring in low-income African and in East Asia regions (160), the provision of dementia care 
services will be seriously exposed to danger due to pre-existing limitations of local national 
budgets.  
Long-term care at nursing homes and other healthcare institutions is a major component 
of this societal and economic burden whose impact affects not only public finances but also the 
provision of healthcare services. In addition to institutional care, a large proportion of dementia 
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care is provided by informal caregivers (usually family members). In the U.S., more than 15 
million Americans provide unpaid care for family members affected by AD and other types of 
dementia (161). At the individual level, these informal caregivers often experience 
psychological burden, with more than 40% of them reporting emotional stress and 74% 
reporting concern about maintaining their own health since becoming a caregiver (161). In 
2014, this unpaid informal contribution provided an estimated 17.9 billion hours of medical and 
social assistance, hence providing an overall value nearly equal to the costs of direct U.S. 
medical and long-term care of dementia (35). However, this crucial component of dementia care 
provision is expected to rapidly shrink as a consequence of demographic trends. Currently, the 
Potential Support Ratio (PSR) ─ defined as the number of people aged 20-64 divided by the 
number of people aged 65 and over ─ is under 4 in most North American and European 
countries (160). By 2050, at least 35 countries will have PSRs below 2, hence having fewer than 
two people under 65 for each senior person. In the context of dementia, the caregiver-to-patient 
ratio is expected to reduce accordingly (162). This progressive scarcity of human caregivers will 
put additional financial and logistic pressures on the healthcare systems. Finally, due to the 
highly disabling condition of their disease and the increasing limitations to the provision of care, 
the growing population of older adults with dementia and their caregivers will face major 
challenges to quality of life (36).   
In response to this emerging global scenario, technological innovation is likely to be a 
critical factor. Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), Pervasive and Ubiquitous 
Computing (PUC), robotics, and mobile computing combined with new developments in 
wireless networking and Human-Computer Interaction open the prospects of reshaping dementia 
care with intelligent technology. In fact, the pervasive deployment of Intelligent Assistive 
Technologies (IATs) for dementia may have a disruptive impact on dementia care (67). IATs 
could (i) mitigate the burden on public finances through the delay or obviation of institutional 
care, (ii) reduce the psychological burden on formal and informal caregivers, (iii) compensate 
for the progressive scarcity of human caregivers while enhancing and optimizing quality of care, 
and (iv) empower older adults with dementia and thereby improving their quality of life.  
Assistive technology is the umbrella term used to describe devices or systems which allow 
to “increase, maintain or improve capabilities of individuals with cognitive, physical or 
communication disabilities” Marshall (77). IATs are assistive technologies with own 
computation capability and the ability to communicate information through a network. Most of 
them display the ability to sense the external environment or digital ecosystem and provide 
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adaptive responses in a manner that maximizes the benefits for the users (e.g., increasing 
safety). IAT encompasses a wide spectrum of technological applications currently used or in-
development with potential application to dementia care. These include self-contained devices 
(e.g., tablets, wearables, personal care robots etc.) and distributed systems (e.g., smart homes, 
integrated sensor systems, mobile platforms etc.), as well as software applications (e.g., mobile 
or web-based apps). While AI provides systems capable to simulate aspects of human 
intelligence, PUC embeds intelligent microsystems into everyday objects and homes whose 
friction with the user is progressively mitigated by advancements in Human-Computer 
Interaction. In parallel, intelligent service robots can assist users in a variety of dimensions 
including personal care, companionship, social and emotional support.  
Although IATs open up promising prospects for the future of dementia care, yet their 
adoption is still lower than expected (2). This has been attributed to suboptimal information 
transfer and dissemination across technology development and medical implementation (107) as 
well as to the lack of solid and highly generalizable clinical validation of many IATs (163). 
Clinicians and other health professionals are often unaware of new IATs and their applicability 
to dementia care as little cooperation has occurred between technology development and 
medical implementation. In addition, a mismatch between the user’s cognitive profile and the 
prescribed IATs has been reported as a consequence of top-down approaches to technology 
design (164).  
Concomitantly, the prevalence of participatory and user-centered (UC) approaches to 
technology design is reportedly low (2). The “user-centered” or “patient-centered” approach is a 
framework for the design and development of new products or for the assessment and evaluation 
of existing products in which the needs, wishes, and limitations of end-users of the IAT are 
given extensive attention at each stage of the design or assessment process (165, 166). Such low 
prevalence of participatory and UC approaches to technology design  has been observed as a co-
determinant of low adoption rates since it obstacles the incorporation of end-users’ needs, 
desires and wishes into product development (167). Finally, clinical studies designed to validate 
IATs are often affected by structural limitations and methodological weaknesses including small 
sample-size, high drop-out rates, low statistical significance and inadequate adjustment for 
multiple comparisons (163). This lack of solid and highly generalizable clinical validation might 
contribute to the slow translation of emerging IATs from the designing labs into the clinics.  
While the number of publications in this area has been significantly growing in the past few 
years (168),  yet a comprehensive and up-to-date index of IATs with possible application into 
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dementia care has not been produced. Given the pace of innovation in medical technology and 
the reported translational gap between bench and bedside, the production of a comprehensive 
index is highly needed to orient health professionals, affected individuals and other operators 
involved in the provision of dementia care across this rapidly emerging domain. Such a state-of-
the art index will provide comprehensive information for relevant stakeholders about current 
IAT possibilities and limitations hence contributing in raising awareness about the pros and cons 
of their integration into care. While one study recently reviewed dementia-focused assistive 
technologies (169), their review did not result in the production of a technology index. A 
cognitive function based review of assistive technologies for cognitive impairment retrieved 
only 13 studies with direct focus on assistive technologies for dementia, hence covering a very 
small portion of the currently estimated technological spectrum (170). In addition, both studies 
failed to distinguish IAT from other assistive technology (e.g. tools without computing 
capacity), thus underestimating the specificity of intelligent technology and its potentially game-
changing role in the clinical setting. Other previous reviews have either not been systematic (73) 
or have limited their scope to a subsection of assistive technology for dementia such as 
“assistive devices for the hours of darkness” (171). The latest comprehensive list of IATs 
(especially cognitive orthotics and advanced integrated sensors) with potential applications to 
dementia care dates seven years back (75). As technology evolves fast, a new up-to-date index 
is urgently needed to keep up with advancing innovation, guide health professionals across 
emerging technological opportunities, and contribute towards adequate uptake of potentially 
useful tools to improve the lives of older adults with dementia.  
In order to facilitate the successful implementation of emerging intelligent assistive 
technologies into dementia care, such index should address six critical questions: (i) How large 
is the current IAT spectrum and what is its growth rate over time? (ii) What types of device are 
currently available? (iii) What cognitive or physical functions can be assisted through IAT? (iv) 
Which patient population segments are targeted as end-user groups? (v) Which is the current 
level of clinical validation of existing IATs? (vi) What approach is prevalent in the design and 
development of such devices?  
In the following we address these critical questions by presenting the results of our 
systematic review and aggregate such information into a comprehensive technology index. This 
index is designed to provide comprehensive information to clinicians, researchers, patients, 
caregivers and other stakeholders involved in dementia care about the current possibilities and 
limitations of intelligent assistive technology for dementia.  
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Methodology 
Data search and extraction 
 
A literature search was performed for English language articles indexed in the following search 
engines and bibliographic databases: IEEE, PubMed, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Web of Science. 
We searched title, abstract, and keywords for the terms: (“assistive technolog*” OR “assistive 
device” OR “assistive application”) AND (“intelligent” OR “ICT” OR “adaptive” OR 
“computer” OR “robotic”) AND (“Alzheimer*” OR “dementia” OR “ag*ing” OR “elder*). 
Query logic was modified to adapt to the language used by each engine or database. Studies 
included in the synthesis had the following features: (I) original articles, book Chapters or 
conference proceedings, (II) written in English; and (III) published between January 1, 2000 and 
April 12, 2016. Additionally, studies included in the synthesis must present the (a) design and 
development, or (b) assessment and evaluation of one or more intelligent assistive systems with 
current or potential applications to dementia care. Reviews, commentaries, letters to the editors, 
and opinion articles were removed. 
Intelligent assistive systems included into the technology index met the following inclusion 
criteria: (I) had their own computing capability21, (II) had direct applicability to dementia care, 
and (III) could assist or compensate for one or more functional impairments associated with AD 
or other age-related dementias (e.g. memory loss and executive dysfunction). Reviewers 
excluded non-intelligent systems (i.e. without own computational capacity, such as walking 
canes or printed cognitive training books) as well as systems developed for the support of non-
progressive traumatic brain injuries with limited applicability to the cognitive, emotional and 
physical deficits specific of AD and other age-related dementias.  
A total of 617 papers were initially identified. Following the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) criteria (3), four steps of filtering were 
performed (See Fig. 2). First, additional 167 records were identified by reviewing the references 
of all initially retrieved articles. Second, duplicates were removed using the ENDNOTE tool for 
duplicate detection. Additional duplicates were removed manually after reviewing the abstracts. 
A total of 5 duplicates were detected. Second, eligibility assessment was performed on the 
 
21 Devices with own computational capacity are those that enable the collection, processing and transfer 
of information without external support.  
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remaining 779 papers to remove sources that did not meet the review’s inclusion criteria. 
Further 208 publications were rejected at this stage of filtering. Third, in-depth review was 
performed on the full-text articles of the remaining 571 entries included in the synthesis. Fourth, 
articles were clustered according to the categorization criteria described below. Two reviewers 
performed all stages of filtering independently, and only the papers rejected by both reviewers 
were removed from the working corpus.  
 
Figure 3- Systematic Review Flow Diagram 
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Categorization  
In order to produce a systematic technology index, retrieved technologies were clustered 
according to the following main characteristics: (I) technology type, (II) application, (III) 
function assisted, (IV) user-centered design, and (V) primary target-user population, and (VI) 
evidence of clinical validation. For already marketed products the official commercial names 
were adopted. In contrast, prototypes without commercial name were listed according to the 
names or descriptions that the study authors used.  
Technological types categorize IATs according to their hardware or software architecture, 
composition (single device vs distributed system), and type of human-machine interaction (e.g., 
wearables vs hand-held devices). We grouped them into seven major categories: distributed 
systems, robots, mobility and rehabilitation aids, hand-held multimedia devices, wearables, 
human-machine interfaces, and software applications. A distributed system is defined as a 
system composed of several sensing and processing sub-systems, which communicate through a 
computer network, “hosting processes that use a common set of protocols to assist the coherent 
execution of distributed activities” (172). This category includes Ambient Assisted Living 
(AAL) systems, i.e., distributed assistive systems based on the Ambient Intelligence paradigm 
that shape the user’s environment in a manner that is sensitive, adaptive, and responsive to their 
needs. When AAL systems are used to reshape and augment the user’s home (e.g. with sensors, 
wireless networks and software applications for healthcare monitoring), this is called a smart 
home. Personal robots are autonomous service robots designed for the use and benefit of 
individuals. These include domestic service robots that support Activities of Daily Living 
(ADL), robotic cognitive assistants, as well as companionship and socially assistive robots that 
support, respectively, the relational and social dimension of patients. While robots are 
autonomous individual agents, mobility aids are mobile machines (e.g. powered wheelchairs) or 
worn assistive systems (e.g. exoskeletons) that can facilitate mobility, limb movement and 
control for users with physical disability. Hand-held multimedia devices are mobile devices 
having a display screen with touch input and/or a miniature keyboard, hence usable with hand 
control. These include smartphones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), tablets and other 
multimedia technologies capable of generating text, audio, images, animation, video and 
interactive content. Finally, wearable devices are technologies incorporated into items of 
clothing and accessories worn by the user, hence represent the most intimate and closed-up form 
of non-invasive human-computer interaction. 
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Applications categorize the primary type of activity supported by the system and its primary 
functionality. In contrast, the category “function assisted” determines the specific functional 
impairment caused by or associated with AD or other dementias to which the IAT provides 
compensation or assistance. When IATs were designed for the compensation of more than one 
single cognitive, emotional or physical deficit, they were categorized as general-purpose 
systems.  
Finally, the target user category indexes IATs according to the specificity of the primary 
end-user population targeted by researchers when designing the system. In fact, although all 
IATs included in the index had direct application as compensatory tools for one or more 
functional impairments associated with AD or other age-related dementias, some of them may 
not be designed exclusively for AD patients but with a more inclusive population target.  
In addition, the reviewers determined for each IAT whether it was developed and designed 
following a user-centered approach and including participatory design techniques. Since UC 
design has often been considered a major predictor of social adoption and a crucial factor of 
ethically sustainable technology development (37, 75, 167), we investigated what proportion of 
the entire spectrum of IATs for dementia incorporates such approaches. A logistic regression 
was performed on the correlation between time and the frequency of user-centered models of 
technology design with the purpose of testing if the adoption of user-centered models is 
increasing over time. Finally, following several reports on the lack of evidence-based studies on 
the clinical effectiveness of IATs for dementia (168, 173), the reviewers investigated if each 
IAT had been preliminary validated via clinical studies on human subjects.  
 
Results 
Our review identified 539 IATs with current or potential applications to dementia care. 
These systems are included into the technology index summarized in Tab. 5 and analyzed 
according to the previously listed core categories. For each IAT, their technological type, 
function, assisted deficit, a user-centered design, primary end-user population, and evidence of 
clinical validation are presented.  
 
IAT Technology type Application Function 
Assisted 
User-
Centered 
design 
Primary 
Target 
Population 
Evidence of 
Clinical 
Validation 
References 
2D motion 
coordination 
enhancement  
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No 
(only test on 
1 healthy 
Tsagarakis et 
al. (2008) 
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subject) 
3D infrared sensor 
anti-collision 
system for 
powered 
wheelchair  
Distributed system ADL Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No Dementia No Viswanathan 
et al. (2008) 
3D SLAM Distributed system ADL Perception No GEPND No Lili et al. 
(2014) 
3D VFT for iAT 
environments 
HMI Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD Yes  
(30 healthy 
young adults 
aged 25-40, 
30 healthy 
adults of aged 
65+, and 30 
patients with 
mild AD)  
Kosmidou et 
al. (2014) 
3G-based assistive 
network 
Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Fong et al. 
(2013) 
6-DOF Jaco 
robotic arm 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Bassily et al. 
(2014) 
AAL system Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD Yes Cavallo et al. 
(2015) 
ABLE  Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Giokas et al. 
(2014) 
ACTION  Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Magnusson et 
al. (2012) 
Active 
synchronized 
motion control for 
comfortable 
walking support 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Pervez et al. 
(2007) 
Activity board Software  Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
No Dementia Yes DeOliveira et 
al. (2010) 
Adapted Smart TV Distributed system Engagement Social 
interaction 
Yes GEPND No Alaoui  et al. 
(2013) 
Adaptive 
equipment 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia No Gitlin et al. 
(2006) 
ADL Monitor Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes Ando et al. 
(2015) 
Affective Robot Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No GEPND No Carelli  et al. 
(2009) 
Affectively 
aligned cognitive 
assistant 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition No AD No Luyan et al. 
(2014) 
AIBO Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No GEPND Yes Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
AILISA Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Monitoring Motor No GEPND Yes Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
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ALADIN 
prototype 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Schulke et al. 
(2010) 
ALiFE Wearable Engagement Perception Yes GEPND No Mahadi et al. 
(2008), Werda 
et al. (2007) 
ALLT  Distributed system Engagement Perception No GEPND No Attarwala et 
al. (2013) 
Alziminder Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes AD No Xenadikis et 
al. (2014) 
Ambient Assistant 
application 
Software ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Lee et al. 
(2011) 
Ambient 
monitoring system 
for activity 
recognition 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND Yes (trial on 
100 
households) 
Chiriac et al. 
(2011) 
AMIGA prototype Distributed system Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes GEPND Yes Reis et al. 
(2012) 
AP@LZ Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No AD Yes  
(2 
participants 
with AD) 
Imbeault et al. 
(2014) 
App for mobile 
technology 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Interaction Communication Yes GEPND Yes Isaacs et al. 
(2013) 
App-based issue 
reminders 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia Yes (cohort 
with 9 
participants) 
Hartin et al. 
(2014) 
Arm-Balancer Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes Miyawaki et 
al. (2010) 
ARMin robot Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(7 healthy 
subjects and 
3 chronic 
stroke 
patients) 
Guidali et al. 
(2011) 
ARVK  Wearable (VR) Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Ong et al. 
(2012) 
Ashley Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes  
(29 older 
adults aged 
70+) 
Spiekman et 
al. (2011) 
ASIBOT Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Heute et al. 
(2012), Jardon 
et al. (2012) 
Assisting mat 
system for wheel-
chair 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Nagamachi et 
al. (2014) 
Assistive 
communication 
robot  
Robot Interaction Communication No GEPND No Khosla et al. 
(2010) 
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Assistive 
exoskeleton 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes Hirota et al. 
(2016) 
Assistive 
household robot 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Kantorovitch 
et al. (2014) 
Assistive mobile 
application 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Interaction Communication Yes GEPND Yes Madeira et al. 
(2015) 
Assistive mobile 
robot 
Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Duy et al. 
(2016) 
Assistive 
motorized hip 
orthosis 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes Olivier et al. 
(2013) 
Assistive 
rehabilitation hand 
device 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
ADL Motor No GEPND No Huang et al. 
(2008) 
Assistive robot  Robot ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND No Moreno et al. 
(2015) 
Assistive robot for 
gait training 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes  
(RCT with 41 
patients with 
PD) 
Picelli et al. 
(2012) 
Assistive robot 
prototype 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Znagui et al. 
(2011) 
Assistive robotic 
agent for 
pedestrian 
mobility 
Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Wasson et al. 
(2001) 
Assistive smart 
environment 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Manning et al. 
(2008) 
Assistive system 
for smart homes 
based on the 
analysis of 
electrical load 
signatures at the 
steady-state 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes Belley et al. 
(2014) 
Assistive system 
prototype 
Distributed system Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia No Colonius et al. 
(2010) 
Assistive 
videomonitoring 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND No Edgcomb et 
al. (2013) 
ASTROMOBILE Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Cavallo et al. 
(2013) 
ATLEC 
personalised 
mobile application 
Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(thoroughly 
tested with 
people with 
disabilities, 
teachers, 
trainers, 
carers and 
Papavasiliou 
et al. (2014) 
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professionals: 
29 people in 
Belgium, 20 
in Greece, 20 
in Italy, 20 in 
the UK) 
Attendant 
propelled 
wheelchair 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Suzuki et al. 
(2012) 
Attentional 
guidance system 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Attention) 
Yes GEPND No Stork et al. 
(2009) 
Audio and video 
signal processing 
for a multimodal 
environment 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Karpov et al. 
(2014) 
Automatic fall 
detection system 
with a rgb-d 
camera 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Dubois et al. 
(2013) 
Autonomous 
assistive robot 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Meng et al. 
(2006) 
AVICENA Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Gomez-
Sebastià et al. 
(2016) 
AXO-SUIT Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes O'Sullivan et 
al. (2015) 
Bandit II 
(humanoid torso 
mounted on the 
Pioneer mobile 
base) 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL Social 
interaction 
No Dementia Yes Nestorov et al. 
(2014), Tapus 
et al. (2009) 
Basic doorbell 
system  
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes moderate AD Yes 
(7 patients 
with AD) 
Lancioni et al. 
(2013) 
Basis B1 
Smartwatch 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia Yes 
(1 patient 
with 
dementia) 
Boletsis et al. 
(2015) 
Bath support 
device 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Nagamachi et 
al. (2014) 
Bayesian plan 
recognition for 
IWS 
Software ADL Motor No GEPND No Huentenmann 
et al. (2007) 
BCI controller for 
Assistive Robot 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Krishna et al. 
(2013) 
BCI for AT HMI Interaction Motor No GEPND Yes Cincotti et al. 
(2008) 
BCI wheelchair HMI Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Carlson et al. 
(2012) 
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Biofeedback based 
portable device  
Wearable  ADL Motor Yes GEPND Yes 
(6 older 
people with 
Parkinson's 
Disease and 3 
age-matched 
control 
subjects) 
Mancini et al. 
(2009) 
B-Live Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Santos et al. 
(2007) 
BMI for hand 
exoskeleton 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Witkowski et 
al. (2014) 
BMI-control for 
smart homes 
HMI Interaction Communication Yes GEPND Yes Ogawa et al. 
(2015) 
Brain Machine 
Interface System 
Automation  
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Penaloza et al. 
(2014) 
Brian 2.0 Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition No Dementia Yes Chan et al. 
(2010), 
McColl et al. 
(2013) 
Brian 2.1 Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
Yes GEPND Yes  
(survey with 
with 46 
elderly 
adults) 
Louie et al. 
(2014) 
CACA Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
No GEPND No Jednoralski et 
al. (2011) 
Calendar Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Consciousness) 
No Dementia Yes DeOliveira et 
al. (2010) 
Calendar Clock Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes AD Yes Yuginovich & 
Soar et al. 
(2014) 
CamBadge Wearable Monitoring Emotion No GEPND No Blythe et al. 
(2004) 
Camera system Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia No Sugihara et al. 
(2012) 
Candoo Software (mobile 
app) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes AD No Yamagata et 
al. (2013) 
CARA (Context 
Aware Real-time 
Assistant) 
Distributed system ADL Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
No GEPND No Bingchuan et 
al. (2014) 
CARDEAGate Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No GEPND Yes Guerra et al. 
(2014) 
Care Media Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No AD No Carrillo et al. 
(2009) 
Care-O-bot Robot  ADL Motor No GEPND Yes Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
CDSS for mobile Handheld/Multimedia Care & Cognition Yes CARE No Roy et al. 
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devices Rehabilitation (Decision-
making) 
(only 
feasibility 
study via 
simulation) 
(2014) 
CDSS for smart 
home services 
Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
Cognition 
(Decision-
making) 
Yes CARE No 
(only 
feasibility 
study via 
simulation) 
Roy et al. 
(2014) 
CIRCA (Computer 
Interactive 
Reminiscence 
Conversation Aid)  
Software Interaction Communication Yes Dementia Yes 
(3 patients 
with 
dementia and 
1 
conversation 
partner) 
Purves et al. 
(2015) 
CIRCA I Distributed system Engagement Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia Yes Alm et al. 
(2009) 
CIRCA II Distributed system Engagement Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia Yes Alm et al. 
(2009) 
Cloud architecture 
for family 
recognition 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes AD Yes Fardoun et al. 
(2015) 
COAALAS Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Moreno et al. 
(2013) 
COACH Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes Boger et al. 
(2010) 
COGKNOW Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia Yes Meiland et al. 
(2012), 
Nugent et al. 
(2008) 
COGKNOW Day 
Navigator Version 
I 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia Yes Droes et al. 
(2010), 
Meiland et al. 
(2010) 
Collaborative 
patient-carer 
system 
HMI Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes AD Yes Beattie et al. 
(2015) 
Collaborative 
reading of digital 
books 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception No GEPND No Snelgrove et 
al. (2010) 
Communication 
interface and 
protocol for 
robotic assistive 
device 
HMI Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Lubecki et al. 
(2012)                      
Compact 
Assistence System 
prototype 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Yamada et al. 
(2013) 
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CompanionAble Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No Dementia No Nestorov et al. 
(2014), 
Kerssens et al. 
(2015), 
Merten et al. 
(2012), Gross 
et al. (2011), 
Pastor et al. 
(2009) 
Computer based 
cognitive training 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception Yes MCI Yes 
(59 patients 
with MCI) 
Stavros et al. 
(2010) 
Computer vision 
based sensing 
agent 
Distributed system ADL Perception No Dementia No As'ari et al. 
(2012) 
Computer vision-
based fall 
detection system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(15 elderly 
people in a 
simulated 
home 
environment) 
Miao et al. 
(2012) 
Computer-aided 
program 
Software ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes 
(6 persons 
with multiple 
disabilities) 
Lancioni et al. 
(2015) 
Computer-aided 
program 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes moderate AD Yes 
(16 subjects 
with 
moderate 
AD) 
 
Lancioni et al. 
(2015) 
Computer-aided 
telephone system 
Handheld/Multimedia Interaction Communication Yes AD Yes 
(5 patients 
with AD) 
Perilli et al. 
(2013) 
Computer-based 
third element to 
the interaction 
Distributed system Interaction Communication Yes Dementia No Alm et al. 
(2013) 
Computerized 
guidance system 
using Markov 
decision processes 
(MDPs) 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No Dementia No Boger et al. 
(2006) 
Context-Aware 
Distributed Sensor 
Network System 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No Dementia No Aung Aung et 
al. (2010) 
Context-Aware 
Smart Oven 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND No Yared et al. 
(2015) 
Conversational 
agent 
Distributed system Interaction Communication No Dementia No Hung-Hsuan 
et al. (2014) 
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Conversational 
robot 
Robot Interaction Communication Yes GEPND Yes 
(30 elderly 
adults) 
Heerink et al. 
(2008) 
Cooker Monitor Distributed system Monitoring Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia No Adlam et al. 
(2004) 
CORBYS gait 
rehabilitation robot 
Robot Care & 
Rehabilitation 
Motor No GEPND No Grosu et al. 
(2015) 
Corscience 
CORBELT 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes 
(interviews 
with 12 older 
adults) 
Ehmen et al. 
(2012) 
Cross platform Distributed system Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Yanyan et al. 
(2013) 
Daily Assistant Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No GEPND No Duong et al. 
(2011) 
DANAH assistive 
system 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Lankri et al. 
(2009) 
DAT Service Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Andrich et al. 
(2007) 
Data logging 
system with RFID 
technology 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia No Sugihara et al. 
(2012) 
Decision making 
support 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Decision-
making) 
No GEPND No Lin et al. 
(2009) 
Decision support 
for AD patients in 
smart homes 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Decision-
making) 
No AD Yes Shuai et al. 
(2008), Zhang 
et al. (2008) 
DIADEM 
application 
Software (WEB) ADL Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
Yes GEPND No Money et al. 
(2011)             
Digital Photo 
Diary 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia Yes 
(survey with 
408 
professionals) 
Harrefors et 
al. (2012) 
Digital Sign 
System for Indoor 
Wayfinding 
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No GEPND No Tjan et al. 
(2005) 
Distributed 
Adaptive Control 
(DAC) 
Software Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Stoelen et al. 
(2014) 
Distributed 
cognitive aid 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia Yes LoPresti et al. 
(2008) 
Domeo Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL Emotion Yes GEPND No Zsiga et al. 
(2013) 
Dress (Develop a 
Responsive 
Emotive Sensing 
System) 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No AD No Tung et al. 
(2013) 
Dusty Robot ADL Cognition Yes GEPND Yes King  et al. 
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 (2012) 
Dynamic Pointing 
Assistive Program 
(DPAP) 
Wearable ADL Perception Yes GEPND Yes Shih et al. 
(2011) 
E-assessment tool Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Decision-
making) 
Yes CARE Yes 
 
Nilsson et al. 
(2014) 
Ed Robot  ADL Cognition Yes AD Yes 
(10 
participants 
with AD) 
Rudicz et al. 
(2015) 
EEG-based BCI 
for assistive 
wheelchair 
HMI ADL Motor No GEPND Yes Li et al. (2013) 
E-JUST assistive 
device (EJAD) 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND Yes Salah et al. 
(2013) 
Electric lifting 
chair with hip-up 
function 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Ju-hwan et al. 
(2011) 
Electronic 
guidance system 
Wearable ADL Perception No GEPND No Agarwal et al. 
(2015) 
Embedded 
platform for fall 
detection  
Distributed system Monitoring Motor Yes GEPND No Kwolek et al. 
(2014) 
Emergency Call 
System 
Distributed system Monitoring Cognition Yes AD Yes Yuginovich & 
Soar et al. 
(2014) 
EMG-controlled 
Rehabilitation 
Robot 
Robot Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Akdogan et al. 
(2011) 
EMG-Controlled 
Robotic Elbow 
Prosthesis 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Kumar Kundu 
et al. (2007) 
Emotionally 
intelligent 
cognitive assistant 
I 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No AD No Lin et al. 
(2014) 
Emotionally 
intelligent 
cognitive assistant 
II 
Robot Cognitive 
Assistance 
Emotion No AD No Luyuan et al. 
(2014) 
Engaging Platform 
for Art 
Development 
(ePAD) 
Handheld/Multimedia Engagement Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
Yes Dementia Yes 
(6 patients 
with mild to 
moderate 
dementia) 
Leuty et al. 
(2013) 
ePAD Handheld/Multimedia Engagement General-
Purpose 
No AD No Tung et al. 
(2013) 
ePAD I for Art Handheld/Multimedia Engagement Emotion Yes Dementia Yes Mihailidis et 
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therapy al. (2011) 
ePAD II for Art 
therapy 
Handheld/Multimedia Engagement Emotion Yes Dementia Yes Mihailidis et 
al. (2011) 
ePAD III for Art 
therapy 
Handheld/Multimedia Engagement Emotion Yes Dementia Yes Mihailidis et 
al. (2011) 
Epitalk Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes Mei et al. 
(2006) 
EpiTalk advisor 
system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No AD Yes Sun et al. 
(2006) 
eWALL Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia No Mihovska et 
al. (2014) 
eWALL Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND No Kyriazakos et 
al. (2016) 
Exertion games Distributed system Engagement Emotion No GEPND No Gerling et al. 
(2010) 
Exoskeleton for 
ankle propulsion 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Wiggin et al. 
(2011) 
Exoskeleton Robot 
for Human 
Forearm and Wrist 
Motion Assist 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Gopura et al. 
(2008) 
EXPOS Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Kyoungchul et 
al. (2006) 
ExPress Play Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia Yes Alm et al. 
(2011) 
ExpressPlay Distributed system Engagement Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia Yes Alm et al. 
(2011) 
Eye-contolled 
multitask gadget  
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception No GEPND No Gandhi et al. 
(2010) 
EyeSEC HMI Interaction Perception No GEPND No Moita et al. 
(2012) 
Face recognition 
app for Android 
OS 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition No Dementia No Doukas et al. 
(2010) 
FALL 
DETECTION 
SOLUTION for 
smarphone 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Zhuang et al. 
(2013) 
FOOD Smart 
Kitchen 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Grossi et al. 
(2014) 
Framework for 
context-aware 
online 
physiological 
monitoring 
Software Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Shuai et al. 
(2011) 
Friendly Rest 
Room (FRR) 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND No Magnusson et 
al. (2011) 
Fusion of machine 
vision and an 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia No Matic et al. 
(2009) 
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RFID system 
Fuzzy Control for 
Electric Power-
Assisted 
Wheelchair 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Seki et al. 
(2012) 
Fuzzy controller 
for automatic 
microphone 
Distributed system ADL Perception No GEPND No Gonzalez-
Delgado et al. 
(2014) 
Gait analysis 
protocol for walk 
assistive device 
Software Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND Yes Martins et al. 
(2013) 
Gait assistive 
device 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes Das et al. 
(2014) 
Gait Trainer (GT) Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Regnaux  et al. 
(2008) 
GAL technology Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(79 
apartments 
with senior 
citizens) 
Haux et al. 
(2014) 
Gamification tool Wearable Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No GEPND Yes Korn 
(2012)/13/14) 
et al. (2014) 
Garmin premium 
heart 
rate monitor 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Ehmen et al. 
(2012) 
Gator Tech Smart 
House 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Helal et al. 
(2009), 
Davenport et 
al. (2007) 
Gaze pattern based 
mobile eye 
tracking system for 
user authentication 
Wearable ADL Cognition 
(Memory) 
No GEPND No Koceijko et al. 
(2012) 
Geriatric Software Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia Yes DeOliveira et 
al. (2010) 
Giraff Robot (Telepresence) Monitoring Communication Yes GEPND Yes Boman et al. 
(2013) 
Giraffplus Robot (Telepresence) Monitoring Social 
interaction 
No GEPND Yes Coradeschi et 
al. (2013) 
GiraffPlus-mobile 
(GP-m) 
HMI Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Palumbo et al. 
(2014) 
Global Public 
Inclusive 
Infrastructure 
(GPII) 
Distributed system Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND No Vanderheiden 
(2012)/14) et 
al. (2014) 
Graphical user 
interface (GUI) for 
service robot 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia Yes 
(11 subjects 
with MCI and 
Pino et al. 
(2012) 
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11 elderly 
with normal 
cognition) 
Graphical user 
interface for drag 
and drop 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia Yes Vella et al. 
(2011) 
Gravity-balanced 
assistive device for 
sit-to-stand tasks 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND No Fattah et al. 
(2004) 
Guido robotic 
walker 
Robot Physical 
Assistance 
Perception Yes GEPND Yes 
(45 elderly 
participants) 
Rentschler et 
al. (2008) 
Hair-washing 
Robot 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Wan-Ling et 
al. (2013) 
HAL Exoskeleton Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes Sczesny-
Kaiser et al. 
(2015) 
Hand tracker for 
COACH 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes Czarnuch et 
al. (2015) 
Handheld 
technology 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No AD Yes Becker et al. 
(2007) 
Handwashing 
gudance tool 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes Von Bertoldi  
et al. (2008) 
HAPPY AGEING 
system 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Marcelini et 
al. (2011) 
Haptic 
Touchscreen 
Interface 
HMI Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception No GEPND Yes Nishino 
(2010)/11) et 
al. (2011) 
Haptic user 
interfaces (HUIs) 
for computer 
navigation 
HMI Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception Yes Dementia No Kim et al. 
(2011) 
Haptic web 
browser 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception No GEPND Yes Nishino et al. 
(2012) 
Health care 
information 
system 
Handheld/Multimedia Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes Stefanos et al. 
(2008) 
Health monitoring 
system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Schilling et al. 
(2009) 
HicMo ICT 
platform for active 
aging 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes Peruzzini et al. 
(2014) 
Highly-integrated 
system for 
behavioral analysis 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND No Liciotti et al. 
(2014) 
Home automation 
system for elderly 
care 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Grossi et al. 
(2008), Mann 
et al. (2007) 
Home health Distributed system Monitoring General- No GEPND No Sabarivani  et 
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assistive system Purpose al. (2015) 
Home health 
monitoring system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes  
(Survey with 
673 older 
persons with 
chronic 
physical 
conditions) 
Mann et al. 
(2007) 
Home robot 
companion for 
people with mild 
cognitive 
impairment 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes MCI 
Yes 
Gross et al. 
(2012) 
Home solution for 
medication 
management and 
communication I  
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Lee et al. 
(2011) 
Home solution for 
medication 
management and 
communication II 
Distributed system Interaction Communication No GEPND 
Yes 
Chaiwoo et al. 
(2011) 
HomeCare Hub  Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Ashford et al. 
(2007) 
HomePUI Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Burns et al. 
(2008) 
Hopis  Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
Hug Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Interaction Emotion No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
Human activity 
and health 
monitoring system 
prototype 
Wearable  Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Oniga et al. 
(2014) 
Human Emotion 
Management 
System (HEMS) 
add on 
LAGUNTXO 
Software Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No Dementia 
No 
Martinez et al. 
(2010) 
Human-driven 
spatial language 
robot system 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Carlson et al. 
(2014) 
Humanoid 
domestic robot 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
McGinn et al. 
(2014) 
Humanoid robot  Robot Cognitive 
Assistance 
Social 
interaction 
No Dementia 
No 
Simou et al. 
(2015) 
Humanoid robot 
for AT evaluation 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Miura et al. 
(2013) 
iARM Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Oyama et al. 
(2012) 
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iCane Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Pei et al. 
(2012) 
iCat Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes Dementia 
Yes 
(29 older 
adults aged 
70+) 
Nestorov et al. 
(2014), 
Spiekman et 
al. (2011), 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
iGrocer Handheld/Multimedia Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Shekar et al. 
(2003) 
i-Locate LBS 
monitor  
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(86 older 
adults) 
Thomas et al. 
(2013) 
Indicator-based 
Smart Glasses 
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Forouzian et 
al. (2015) 
Indoor Wayfinding 
System Based on 
Passive RFID 
Wearable Monitoring Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No Dementia 
No 
Chang et al. 
(2008), Yao-
Jen et al. 
(2008) 
Information 
support for 
PaPeRo 
Software ADL Communication No Dementia Yes 
(5 
participants 
with 
dementia) 
Inoue et al. 
(2012) 
Informationally 
Structured Room 
for Robotic 
Assistance 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Tsuij et al. 
(2015) 
Infrared Sensor 
Anticollision 
System 
Wearable  ADL Motor No Dementia 
Yes 
Mihailidis et 
al. (20079 
In-home 
monitoring system 
(IMS) 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Larizza et al. 
(2014) 
INHOME platform Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Vergado et al. 
(2010) 
In-home robotic 
agent  
Robot  Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes Dementia 
No 
Fauconau et 
al. (2009) 
INREDIS  Cloud-
based Assistive 
Technology 
Service 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Murua et al. 
(2011) 
Integrated 
Platform for 
Ambient Assisted 
Living 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Rossi et al. 
(2014) 
IntelliCare Software ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Valente et al. 
(2010) 
Intelligent aging- Distributed system Care & General- No GEPND No Song et al. 
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in-place home care 
web services 
platform 
Rehabilitation Purpose (2015) 
Intelligent 
powered 
wheelchair 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No Dementia 
Yes 
Mihailidis et 
al. (2007) 
Intelligent robotic 
system 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Jarvis et al. 
(2009) 
Intelligent speed 
adaptation (ISA) 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Klarborg et al. 
(2012) 
Intelligent Sweet 
Home (ISH) 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Lee et al. 
(2007), Jung 
et al. (2005), 
Jin-Woo et al. 
(2005) 
Intelligent system 
with a monitoring 
infrastructure 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Casas et al. 
(2008) 
Intelligent toilet 
prototype 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(trial in a day 
activity 
centre over a 
period of 2 
months with 
29 primary 
and 12 
secondary 
users) 
Panek et al. 
(2009) 
Intelligent total 
access system 
(ITAS) 
HMI Interaction Social 
interaction 
No GEPND 
No 
Scott et al. 
(2004) 
Intelligent 
walking-aid 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Mederic et al. 
(2005) 
intelligent 
walking-aid robot  
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Xu  et al. 
(2015) 
Intelligent WC Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Nagamachi et 
al. (2014) 
Intelligent 
Wheelchair 
System (IWS) I 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Boucher et al. 
(2013) 
Intelligent 
Wheelchair 
System (IWS) II 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
ADL Motor Yes Dementia 
Yes 
How et al. 
(2013) 
Interactive digital 
television (iDTV) 
Distributed system Engagement Emotion Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Bures et al. 
(2012) 
Interactive 
entertainment 
system 
Distributed system Engagement Emotion Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Alm et al. 
(2007) 
Interactive Distributed system Monitoring Cognition Yes AD No Al-Muhanna 
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multimedia system (Memory) et al. (2011) 
Interactive screen-
based Augmented 
Exercise Biking 
with Virtual 
Environments 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Bruun-
Pedersen et al. 
(2014) 
Interactive visual 
multiple choice 
question game 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Chilukoti et al. 
(2007) 
Interface for 
Assistive Robot 
HMI Interaction Communication Yes GEPND 
No 
Broz et al. 
(2015) 
Interface for 
Assistive Robot 
Based on Growing 
Neural Gas 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Yanik et al. 
(2014) 
Interface for joints 
exoskeleton robots 
HMI Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Kizilhan et al. 
(2015) 
Internet Browser 
Interface I  
HMI Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Pai Hsun et al. 
(2014) 
Internet browser 
interface II 
HMI Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Chen et al. 
(2014) 
IoT enabled cross-
platform 
Distributed system  Interaction general-purpose No GEPND 
No 
Konstantinidis 
et al. (2015) 
iPad Hub for 
Smart Homes 
Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Alvseike et al. 
(2012) 
iPhone-based 
portable brain 
control wheelchair 
HMI ADL Motor No GEPND 
No 
Jiang et al. 
(2012) 
iRobot Roomba Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Wan-Ling & 
Sabanovic 
(2013), 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
IRT Home-
Assistant Robot 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Yamazaki et 
al. (2012) 
ISISEMD system Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Mitseva et al. 
(2012) 
iTutorials Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Rubio et al. 
(2011) 
iWalker Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Cortes et al. 
(2008) 
Jungle App Software (mobile 
app) 
ADL Emotion Yes AD 
No 
Yamagata et 
al. (2013) 
Kannon Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zao et al. 
(2006) 
Keep- In-Touch Distributed system Interaction Communication Yes GEPND Yes (6-month 
pilot study in 
a clinic) 
Kieffer et al. 
(2011) 
KOBIAN Robot  ADL General- Yes GEPND No Zecca et al. 
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Purpose (2009) 
Kompaï robot Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes Dementia Yes 
(6 older 
adults with 
cognitive 
impairment) 
Nestorov et al. 
(2014), Wu et 
al. (2014) 
KSERA  Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Johnson et al. 
(2014) 
LAGUNTXO Distributed system ADL Emotion Yes Dementia 
No 
Martinez et al. 
(2010) 
Leap Motion Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Care & 
Rehabilitation 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Kin Fun et al. 
(2014) 
Leap Motion 
Controller 
HMI Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Bassily et al. 
(2014) 
Light-based alarm 
for general smart 
building system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Jarvinen et al. 
(2012) 
Lightweight 
walking assistant  
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Li & 
Hashimoto 
(2016) 
Living Lab Distributed system Engagement Cognition 
(Decision-
making) 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Panek et al. 
(2007) 
Localization and 
safety monitoring 
cane 
Handheld/Multimedia Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Lee et al. 
(2015) 
Lokomat (LOKO) Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Regnaux  et al. 
(2008) 
Louise HMI Monitoring Cognition 
(Consciousness) 
Yes Dementia 
No 
Wargnier et al. 
(2015) 
Lower limb 
exoskeleton I 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Miranda-
Linares et al. 
(2015) 
Lower limb 
exoskeleton II 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Tang et al. 
(2014) 
LUCAS Robot Robot  Interaction Perception No MCI 
No 
Behan et al. 
(2005) 
MaKey MaKey Handheld/Multimedia Engagement Emotion Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Rogers et al. 
(2014) 
Matilda Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Interaction Communication No Dementia 
Yes 
Khosla et al. 
(2014) 
MATS  Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Balaguer et al. 
(2006) 
Memory assistant 
companion 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia 
No 
Hung-Hsuan 
et al. (2012) 
Memory karaoke Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Tang et al. 
(2007) 
MEMS-based 
intelligent 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zao et al. 
(2006) 
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sensor/actuator 
Modules 
Microsoft Kinect  Distributed system  Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Znagui et al. 
(2011), Cunha 
et al. (2014) 
Microsoft's Speech 
Application 
Programming 
Interface (SAPI) 
HMI Interaction Communication No GEPND 
No 
Luo et al. 
(2011) 
Mobile app for 
speech recording 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Interaction Communication No Dementia 
No 
Chai et al. 
(2015) 
Mobile AR system 
(tablet) 
Handheld/Multimedia Interaction Social 
interaction 
Yes GEPND Yes (48 
participants 
including 
elderly 
people, 
caregivers 
and experts) 
Saracchini et 
al. (2015) 
Mobile AR system 
(wearable) 
Wearable  Interaction Social 
interaction 
Yes GEPND Yes 
48 
participants 
including 
elderly 
people, 
caregivers 
and experts) 
Saracchini et 
al. (2015) 
Mobile assistive 
technology (MAT) 
Handheld/Multimedia Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Zerth et al. 
(2012) 
Mobile 
Conversational 
Agent 
HMI Engagement Communication Yes AD 
No 
Griol et al. 
(2015) 
Mobile device for 
remote monitoring 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Havlík et al. 
(2012) 
Mobile phone-
based video 
streaming system 
Handheld/Multimedia Interaction Communication Yes Dementia 
No 
Shuai et al. 
(2013) 
Mobile robot Robot ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Ballantyne et 
al. (2009) 
Mobile touch 
screen based 
assistive tool 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
No 
Mayer et al. 
(2013) 
Mobile translation 
system (Speech 
Language to Hand 
Motion Language) 
Handheld/Multimedia Interaction Communication Yes GEPND 
No 
Rekha et al. 
(2014) 
Mobile-compatible 
home robot system  
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Benavidez et 
al. (2015) 
Mobility Assistant Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Krieg-
Brückner et al. 
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(2010) 
MOBOT* Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Ho Hoang et 
al. (2015), 
Khai-Long et 
al. (2015) 
Model of activity 
recognition in 
smart homes 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Roy et al. 
(2011) 
Modular Elder 
Service Zone 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zao et al. 
(2006) 
Mon Ami™ Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Balog et al. 
(2012) 
Monitoring 
Memory Streams 
(MMS) iPad 
application  
Handheld/Multimedia Monitoring Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes AD 
Yes 
AlMazrua et 
al. (2013) 
Motor imagery 
based BCI 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Jiralerspong et 
al. (2014) 
Mouse driver Wearable ADL Perception Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Shih et al. 
(2011) 
MOVAID Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
MPVS system Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
No AD 
No 
Zhang et al. 
(2014) 
Multi-agent 
system for 
assistive social 
network 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Barruè et al. 
(2015) 
Multi-function 
mobility assistive 
device 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Asker et al. 
(2015) 
Multimedia 
contents for 
remote assistance 
Distributed system Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Hamada et al. 
(2009) 
Multimedia 
convergence user 
interface for smart 
home 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes 
(7 people 
aged from 60 
to 93) 
Jenko et al. 
(2007) 
Multimedia verbal 
instructions 
Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes Moderate AD Yes 
(11 patients 
with AD) 
Lancioni et al. 
(2010) 
Multimodal 
interactive system 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Mokhtari et al. 
(2012) 
Multimodal 
Robot/Human 
Interface 
HMI ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Jarvis et al. 
(2009) 
Multimodal sensor 
system  
Distributed system  Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Schumm et al. 
(2010) 
Multiple sensor Distributed system Cognitive Cognition No GEPND No Mustapha et 
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based Obstacle 
Detection System 
(ODS) 
Assistance (Orientation) al. (2014) 
Multipurpose 
robotic system 
Robot ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Irene 
Cavallaro et 
al. (2012) 
Multiuser indoor 
localization system 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Veronese et al. 
(2014) 
Music choice 
program 
Software Engagement General-
Purpose 
Yes moderate AD 
Yes 
Lancioni et al. 
(2014) 
Music therapist 
robot 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No AD 
Yes 
Tapus et al. 
(2009) 
My Life (Digital 
Reminiscence 
Therapy Software) 
Software (WEB) Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Hellman et al. 
(2014) 
Nabaztag Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(29 adults 
aged 70+) 
Spiekman et 
al. (2011) 
Nadine robot  Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Interaction Social 
interaction 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Magnenat-
Thalmann et 
al. (2014) 
Nao Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(29 adults 
aged 70+) 
Spiekman et 
al. (2011) 
Navigation system 
for powered 
wheelchairs 
Distributed system ADL Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No GEPND 
No 
Fioretti et al. 
(2000) 
Network System Distributed system  Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Houde et al. 
(2015) 
Neural control for 
robot 
HMI Interaction Motor No GEPND 
No 
Masse et al. 
(2011) 
NFC Interface for 
smart 
environments 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Spinsante et 
al. (2015) 
NFC-based 
monitoring system 
Distributed system  Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Jara et al. 
(2014) 
NFC-based video 
system 
Handheld/Multimedia Engagement Cognition No GEPND 
No 
Rafferty et al. 
(2014) 
Night Light Distributed system Monitoring Motor No Dementia 
No 
Adlam et al. 
(2004) 
NIRS-based 
experimental smart 
house 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Ogawa et al. 
(2015) 
NOCTURNAL Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia Yes 
(8 people 
with 
dementia) 
Martin et al. 
(2013), Martin 
et al. (2013) 
Noninvasive 
monitoring 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Leone et al. 
(2013) 
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platform based on 
3D sensors 
Novel Point-select 
Technique for 
Assistive Robots 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Williams et al. 
(2007) 
Nursebot Robot  Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Matthews et 
al. (2004) 
Ontology-based 
pervasive M2M 
healthcare 
environment 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Chellouche et 
al. (2013) 
Organizational 
centered multi-
agent system 
(OCMAS) 
Architecture for 
Ambient 
Intelligence 
Software ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Roy et al. 
(2012) 
OSGi-based 
service platform 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia Yes 
(controlled 
trial with 10 
participants 
aged 25-30 
and 10 aged 
75-85) 
Qiang et al. 
(2012) 
Palm Tungsten T3 Handheld/Multimedia ADL Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Siek et al. 
(2005) 
PAMAID 
(Personal Adaptive 
Mobility Aid) 
Wearable Physical 
Assistance 
Perception Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Rumeau et al. 
(2012), Mac 
Namara et al. 
(2000) 
PaPeRo Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Inoue et al. 
(2012) 
Paro Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes Dementia 
No 
Nestorov et al. 
(2014), Wan-
Ling et al. 
(2013) 
PASS Distributed system  Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Siddiqi et al. 
(2008) 
Pattern recognition 
based system 
Distributed system Monitoring Motor No GEPND 
No 
Sasidhar et al. 
(2013) 
PDA Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(673 older 
persons  with 
chronic 
physical 
conditions) 
Mann et al. 
(2007) 
Pearl Robot  Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
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Personal 
amplifying device 
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Yuginovich & 
Soar et al. 
(2014) 
Personal Social 
Assistant. 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Verstockt et 
al. (2009) 
Pervasive ZigBee 
network 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Cavallo et al. 
(2009) 
PhonAge Handheld/Multimedia ADL Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Abdulrazak et 
al. (2013) 
Physiotherapeutic 
Assistive Trainer 
(PAT) for Nao 
Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Bhuvaneswari 
et al. (2013) 
PIA system Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Hellman et al. 
(2014) 
Pictorial 
instruction 
program 
Software ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes moderate AD 
Yes 
Lancioni et al. 
(2013), 
Lancioni et al. 
(2014) 
Picture Album Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception No GEPND 
No 
Duong et al. 
(2011) 
Pilot ICT service  Handheld/Multimedia Interaction Communication Yes AD 
No 
Stancic et al. 
(2011) 
Platform for 
muscle fatige 
monitoring 
Distributed system  Monitoring Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Tatarisco et al. 
(2012) 
Play System for 
Elderly Therapy 
(PSET) 
Handheld/Multimedia Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes GEPND 
No 
Zviel-Girshin 
et al. (2011) 
Plug-&-play 
integration for 
Gator Tech Smart 
House (GTSH) 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Abdulrazak et 
al. (2006) 
Pocket Buddy Wearable (VR) Interaction Communication No AD 
No 
Carrillo et al. 
(2009) 
Polar wear link 
coded R 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Ehmen et al. 
(2012) 
Power assistive 
device for self-
supported transfer 
motion 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Nagai et al. 
(2002) 
Power-assisted 
transport 
wheelchair 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Chi et al. 
(2013) 
Predictive 
location-aware 
algorithm for 
assurance systems 
Software ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Vuong et al. 
(2011) 
Prompts Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes AD 
Yes 
Lapointe et al. 
(2013) 
 94 
 
Prototype 
development of an 
overhead robot 
arm 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Suzuki et al. 
(2000) 
Prototype 
Intelligent Power 
Wheelchair (IPW) 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND Yes 
(12 older 
users, 4 
caregivers 
and 
12clinicians) 
Rushton et al. 
(2015) 
Public Domain 
Dataset 
Software Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Bruno et al. 
(2014) 
Queensland Smart 
Home Initiative 
(QSHI) 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Soar et al. 
(2009) 
RAPUDA  Robot  ADL Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Oyama et al. 
(2012) 
Reading Assistive 
Computer System 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Perception No GEPND 
No 
Se-Yeol et al. 
(2014) 
Real-time 
detection system 
for water flow 
detection  
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No AD 
No 
Taati et al. 
(2010) 
Recognition 
scheme based on 
the Growing 
Neural Gas (GNG) 
algorithm 
Software Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Yanik et al. 
(2012) 
Rehabilitation 
shoes 
Wearable Care & 
Rehabilitation 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Simsik et al. 
(2012) 
Remote mobile 
healthcare 
monitoring 
Distributed system  Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Vuong et al. 
(2011) 
Remote 
monitoring system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia Yes 
(real-life test 
in nursing 
home) 
Schikhof et al. 
(2008) 
Remotely 
controlled robot 
Robot  Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No MCI 
No 
Devaux et al. 
(2011) 
Remotely 
controlled robot 
with video-
communication 
capability 
Robot  Interaction Emotion Yes GEPND 
No 
Seelye et al. 
(2012) 
RFID Localization 
System for smart 
homes 
Distributed system Monitoring Cognition No Dementia 
Yes 
Fortin-Simard 
et al. (2012) 
RFID-based 
assistive platform 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Alvarez et al. 
(2007) 
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RFID-based 
system for assisted 
living 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Symonds et al. 
(2007) 
RIBA Robot  Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Wan-Ling et 
al. (2013) 
Ri-man Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
ROBADOM Robot  Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition No MCI 
No 
Wu et al. 
(2012) 
RobAlz Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes AD 
No 
Salichs et al. 
(2016) 
RoBOCARE Distributed system ADL general-purpose No GEPND 
Yes 
Cesta et al. 
(2007) 
Robot for 
mealtime 
monitoring 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
McColl et al. 
(2014) 
Robot vacuum 
cleaner 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Yuginovich & 
Soar (2014) 
Robotic assistive 
technology for 
locomotion  
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Riviero et al. 
(2015) 
Robotic bed Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Vazquez-
Santacruz et 
al. (2016) 
Robotic cane Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Ady et al. 
(2013) 
Robotic dog AIBO Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Naganuma et 
al. (2013) 
Robotic fitness 
coach 
Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Gorer et al. 
(2013) 
Robotic Home 
Environment 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Güttler et al. 
(2015) 
Robotic stand-up 
assist system  
Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Miyake et al. 
(2014) 
Robotic system Robot ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Begum et al. 
(2013) 
Robotic walker Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No Dementia 
Yes 
Morris et al. 
(2003) 
Rosetta system Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Meiland et al. 
(2014) 
Routine organizer Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
DeOliveira et 
al. (2010) 
SALIG device Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Boman et al. 
(2016) 
SAM (Smart 
Autonomous 
Majordomo) 
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Leroux et al. 
(2013), Lebec 
et al. (2013) 
Scooter Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Schilling et al. 
(2009) 
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Self-monitoring 
ability-reactive 
technology 
(SMART) 
Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
No 
Hakobyan et 
al. (2014) 
Self-transfer 
robotic facility 
Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Hari Krishnan 
et al. (2015) 
SEMG acquisition 
system for 
assistive robot 
HMI Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Shuang et al. 
(2012) 
Semi-autonomous 
wheelchair 
controlled using 
head-mounted 
sensors 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Rönnbäck et 
al. (2006) 
SenseCam 
(Microsoft) 
Wearable Monitoring Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia 
No 
Barnard et al. 
(2011) 
Sensor Fusion-
Oriented Fall 
Detector I 
Distributed system Monitoring Motor No GEPND 
No 
Cagnoni et al. 
(2009) 
Sensor Fusion-
Oriented Fall 
Detector II 
Wearable Monitoring Motor No GEPND 
No 
Cagnoni et al. 
(2009) 
Sensor Mat Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Yuginovich & 
Soar et al. 
(2014) 
Sensor network for 
multi-person smart 
spaces 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Biswas et al. 
(2011) 
Sensor system for 
mobility 
monitoring 
Distributed system Monitoring Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Marques et al. 
(2013) 
Sensor-based in-
home monitoring 
system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Bradford et al. 
(2013) 
Service 
Architecture for 
Assistive Robot 
Software Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Khosla et al. 
(2013) 
Service connection 
device (SCD)  
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Chien et al. 
(2014) 
SHARE-it Distributed system Interaction Motor No GEPND 
No 
Cortes et al. 
(2008) 
Sharioto Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Huentenmann 
et al. (2007) 
Simple sensor 
network 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Lofti et al. 
(2012) 
SIMPLE-use (Set 
for Intuitive 
Movement and 
Proximity Logging 
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
D'Angelo et 
al. (2014) 
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for Everyday ) 
Simplified e-mail 
interface 
HMI Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Sohlberg et al. 
(2003) 
Simplified 
hardware 
infrastructure for 
assisted living 
Distributed system  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Mokhtari et al. 
(2015) 
SJOBOKS Software (WEB) Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Heijkers et al. 
(2013) 
SLIDE FLEX HMI Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Nihei et al. 
(2012) 
Smart Assistive 
Living (SAL) 
platform 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Zhang et al. 
(2014) 
Smart augmenting 
walker in 
ubiquitous-
computing 
environment 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Chen et al. 
(2008) 
Smart chair to 
assist sit-to-stand 
transferring 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Lu et al. 
(2014) 
Smart environment Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Kerbler et al. 
(2014) 
Smart garment 
system 
Wearable ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
McCann et al. 
(2008) 
Smart Glasses for 
E-health support 
Wearable ADL Cognition Yes Dementia 
 No 
Zhao et al. 
(2015) 
Smart grab bars Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes 
(69 older 
adults) 
Guitard et al. 
(2013) 
Smart Hoist Robot  Physical 
Assistance 
General-
purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Dantanarayana 
et al. (2014), 
Ranasinghe et 
al. (2014) 
Smart home device Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Cho et al. 
(2014) 
Smart home 
healthcare system 
utilizing assistive 
technology 
Distributed system Cognitive 
Assistance 
General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Fong et al. 
(2012) 
Smart Home IRIS Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(59 persons 
with 
disabilities 
and elderly 
people) 
Ocepek et al. 
(2013) 
Smart home pilot Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Melkas et al. 
(2013) 
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Smart home 
system via 
Wireless Bluetooth 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Ramlee et al. 
(2012) 
Smart household 
control system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Franco et al. 
(2013) 
Smart kitchen 
environment  
featuring 
workflow 
technology 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Sarni et al. 
(2013) 
Smart mobile 
walker 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Kiwan et al. 
(2014) 
Smart Mobile 
Walker (SMW) I 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Kim et al. 
(2011) 
Smart Mobile 
Walker(SMW) II 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Inho et al. 
(2011) 
Smart Mote-based 
Wireless 
Medication 
Management 
System 
Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia 
No 
Fook et al. 
(2008) 
Smart prompt-
generator 
Robot Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition Yes Dementia 
Yes 
Bewernitz et 
al. (2009) 
Smart robotic 
assisted healthcare 
tool 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Gilham et al. 
(2012) 
Smart rollator Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Chan et al. 
(2008) 
Smart skirt Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
No 
Culen et al. 
(2014) 
Smart Voice 
Messaging System 
(SVMS) 
Handheld/Multimedia Interaction Communication Yes Dementia 
No 
Sugihara et al. 
(2014) 
Smartbrain Software (mobile 
app) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
Yes AD 
No 
Yamagata et 
al. (2013) 
SmartCane Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Au et al. 
(2008) 
Smart-chair for sit-
to-stand transfer 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Hang et al. 
(2014) 
Smarter Safer 
Homes (SSH) 
platform 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Dodd et al. 
(2015) 
Smart-home based 
activity 
recognition 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Belley et al. 
(2013) 
SmartPal 
humanoid service 
robot  
Robot  ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Tsuij et al. 
(2015) 
Smartphione Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive Cognition Yes Dementia Yes Brankaert et 
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Interface Assistance al. (2014) 
Smartphone 
Application I 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes AD 
Yes 
De Leo et al. 
(2011) 
Smartphone 
application II 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Armstrong et 
al. (2012) 
Smartphone 
application III 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Armstrong et 
al. (2012) 
Smartphone 
application IV 
Software (mobile 
app) 
Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Armstrong et 
al. (2012) 
Smartphone-based 
monitoring system 
Handheld/Multimedia Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD 
No 
Megalingam 
et al. (2014) 
Smartphone-based 
prompting system 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
No Dementia 
No 
Das et al. 
(2012) 
SmartSenior 
system 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND Yes 
(35 
apartments 
with 35 older 
adults) 
Gövercin et al. 
(2014) 
Socially Assistive 
Robot 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Engagement Social 
interaction 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Frennert et al. 
(2013) 
Socially assistive 
robot (SAR) 
system  
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Engagement General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Fasola et al. 
(2012) 
Socially-Assistive 
Humanoid Robot  
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes GEPND Yes 
(8 elderly 
people) 
Torta et al. 
(2014) 
Software 
architecture for 
assistive robots 
Software Monitoring Cognition 
(Reasoning) 
No Dementia 
No 
Saunders et al. 
(2013) 
Software tool for 
smart homes 
Software Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Poland et al. 
(2009) 
Sophie Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Interaction Emotion Yes GEPND 
No 
Magnenat-
Thalmann et 
al. (2014) 
Speach interface 
for Ed 
HMI Interaction Communication Yes AD Yes 
(10 older 
adults with 
AD) 
Rudicz et al. 
(2015) 
SPIDer Robot  Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Moreno et al. 
(2013) 
Spoken dialogue 
interface to 
intelligent 
cognitive assistant 
HMI Interaction Cognition Yes Dementia 
No 
Wolters et al. 
(2015) 
Standing 
assistance system 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Chugo et al. 
(2012) 
Standing 
assistance system 
for an elderly 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Chugo et al. 
(2012) 
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person 
Stereo based 
system for 
Assessment of Sit-
To-Stand 
Movement 
Distributed system Monitoring Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Allin et al. 
(2009) 
Steward robot for 
smart home 
Robot  Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Park et al. 
(2008) 
SWEET-HOME 
system 
Distributed system  ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Vacher  et al. 
(2015) 
System for 
automated 
recognition of 
ADLs 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Sim et al. 
(2010) 
System for the 
control of 
autonomous 
assistive robots 
Software Interaction General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Meng et al. 
(2004) 
Tablet-based 
participatory tool  
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Decision-
making) 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Buman et al. 
(2013) 
Tactile Sight Inc. Wearable Monitoring Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No AD 
No 
Carrillo et al. 
(2009) 
TeleCalmPlus Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Budai et al. 
(2015) 
Telemedicine 
system for 
supporting optimal 
palliative care at 
home 
Distributed system Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion Yes GEPND 
No 
Levy et al. 
(2011) 
Teleoperated 
Home Care Mobile 
Robot 
Robot  Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zeng et al. 
(2007) 
Telephone support 
service 
Distributed system Interaction Communication No GEPND 
Yes 
Johansson & 
Becker (2011) 
Telerobot Robot (Telepresence) ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Michaud et al. 
(2010) 
Teletechnology for 
multifactorial in-
home 
rehabilitation 
Distributed system ADL general-purpose Yes GEPND Yes 
(14 
rehabilitation 
patients) 
Hoenig et al. 
(2006) 
The eHealthCom 
platform 
Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Ferreira et al. 
(2012) 
Toothbrush 
Handles 
Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND Yes 
(RCT with  
16 elderly 
participants) 
Kammers et 
al. (2015) 
Touch-screen 
videophone mock-
Handheld/Multimedia ADL Communication Yes Dementia Yes 
(4 persons 
Boman et al. 
(2014) 
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up for persons 
with dementia 
with 
dementia and 
their 
significant 
others) 
Tread-Walk 1 Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Nihei et al. 
(2008) 
Tread-Walk 2 Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Nihei et al. 
(2008) 
TUG Robot  ADL Cognition 
(Orientation) 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Wan-Ling et 
al. (2013) 
Ubiquitous 
Robotic 
Companion (URC) 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL general-purpose No GEPND 
No 
Helal et al. 
(2008) 
Ubiquitous sensors 
for smart 
environment 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No Dementia 
Yes 
Bilodeau et al. 
(2014) 
Ultrasound sensors 
for anti-collision 
systems of 
powered 
wheelchairs 
Distributed system Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
No 
Dutta et al. 
(2015) 
Upper-limb 
assistive device 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Gu et al. 
(2014), 
Gwang et al. 
(2014) 
Upper-limb 
exoskeleton 
system 
Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
ADL Motor No GEPND 
No 
Latt et al. 
(2014) 
User-friendly 
Elders' PDA 
Handheld/Multimedia ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zao et al. 
(2006) 
Verbal and non-
verbal human to 
TV-based 
application voice 
interaction 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Bures et al. 
(2012) 
Video conference 
system for 
Alzheimer's 
patients at home. 
Distributed system Interaction Communication Yes AD 
Yes 
(8 persons 
with AD) 
Carrasco et al. 
(2009) 
Video Monitoring 
System for 
Activity 
Recognition and 
Fall Detection 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Schulze et al. 
(2009) 
Virtual Agent 
prototype 
Handheld/Multimedia Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Memory) 
Yes AD 
Yes 
Yaghoubzadeh 
et al. (2013) 
Virtual Butler Robot  Interaction General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Costa et al. 
(2014) 
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Virtual 
development 
environment 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Driessen et al. 
(2003) 
Vision based 
interface system  
HMI Interaction Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Ju  et al. 
(2009) 
Vision based 
interface system 
for hands free 
control 
HMI ADL Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Jin-Sun et al. 
(2009) 
Vision-based door 
detection 
technique 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No GEPND 
No 
Shalaby et al. 
(2014) 
Visual Interaction 
System for 
Aldebaran NAO 
Robot Interaction Cognition Yes Dementia 
No 
Carcagni  et 
al. (2015) 
Visual interface 
for home telecare 
system 
Distributed system ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes AD Yes 
(30 patients 
with MCI) 
Mehrabian et 
al. (2015) 
VitalTrack Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Reyes et al. 
(2012) 
Voice activity 
detection driven 
acoustic event 
classification 
Distributed system Monitoring general-purpose No GEPND 
No 
Hollosi et al. 
(2010) 
Voice and 
graphical -based 
interfaces for 
interaction with a 
robot 
HMI Interaction Communication No GEPND 
Yes 
(11 elderly 
persons with 
MCI) 
Granata et al. 
(2010) 
Voice interface for 
Sweet Home 
HMI ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Vacher  et al. 
(2015) 
Wakamaru Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
ADL General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
Walker assistant Mobility & 
Rehabilitation Aid 
Physical 
Assistance 
Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
Martins  et al. 
(2013) 
Waseda 
Bioinstrumentation 
system No.1 (WB-
1) 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zecca et al. 
(2007) 
Water supply 
telemonitoring 
system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Tamura et al. 
(2002) 
Wayfinding 
assistant based on 
sensorimotor 
representation 
Software Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No AD 
No 
Zetzsche et al. 
(2012) 
Wearable 
computer-based 
orientation and 
Wearable Cognitive 
Assistance 
Cognition 
(Orientation) 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Ross et al. 
(2001) 
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wayfinding aid 
Wearable inertial 
measurement units 
(IMUs) 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Trkov et al. 
(2015) 
Wearable Knee 
Assistive 
Instrument 
(WKAI) 
Wearable Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Yong et al. 
(2012) 
Wearable lower-
limb assistive 
device 
Wearable ADL Motor No GEPND 
Yes 
 
Hasegawa et 
al. (2013) 
Wearable 
pervasive platform 
Wearable Monitoring Motor No GEPND 
No 
Pioggia et al. 
(2010) 
Wearable soft-
robotic glove  
Wearable Physical 
Assistance 
Motor Yes GEPND 
No 
Radder et al. 
(2015) 
Web-based non-
intrusive ambient 
system 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes AD Yes 
(10 healthy 
participants 
and 1 AD 
patient) 
Stucki et al. 
(2014) 
Web-page 
presentation 
Software Engagement General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
Yes 
Kurniawan et 
al. (2006) 
Whole-body 
emotion 
expression 
humanoid robot 
Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No GEPND 
Yes 
Endo et al. 
(2008) 
Willow Garage’s 
PR2 robot  
Robot ADL General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Mitzner et al. 
(2014) 
Wireless 
Architectures for 
Heterogeneous 
Sensing 
Software Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Viani et al. 
(2013) 
Wireless 
Intelligent 
Healthcare Gadget 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Megalingam 
et al. (2011) 
Wireless Sensor 
Network (WSN) 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Aleksander et 
al. (2015) 
Wireless sensor 
network based 
assistive system 
(WASN)  
Distributed system Interaction Perception No GEPND 
No 
Ren et al. 
(2006) 
Wrist wearable 
unit (WWU) 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Ahanathapillai 
et al. (2015) 
Wrist-worn 
wearable 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
Yes GEPND 
No 
Bruno et al. 
(2014) 
WWW-based 
home care system 
Distributed system Care & 
Rehabilitation 
General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Nambu et al. 
(2002) 
Yorisoi Ifbot Robot (Socially 
Assistive) 
Emotional 
Assistance 
Emotion No GEPND 
Yes 
Broadbent et 
al. (2009) 
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Zephyr bioharness 
BT 
Wearable Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
Yes 
Ehmen et al. 
(2012) 
ZigBee Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Bing et al. 
(2010) 
Zigbee-based 
Disease 
Monitoring device 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zhang et al. 
(2010) 
Zigbee-based 
Personal Wellness 
Monitoring Device 
Distributed system Monitoring General-
Purpose 
No GEPND 
No 
Zhang et al. 
(2010) 
Tab. 5- A Full Index of IATs for Dementia (stand 2016) 
 
Expansion of the IAT spectrum (2000-2016) 
Results show the number of IATs is rapidly increasing over time, hence confirming the 
progressive expansion of the IAT trend in dementia care. As represented in Figure 4, the number 
of IATs with application to dementia care has increased by over 6 times in the period 2006-2010 
as compared to 2000-2005 and has even increased by a factor of 15 in the period 2011-2015 
(since the literature review was carried until April 12, 2016, only approximately one-third of the 
IATs published in 2016 are captured in Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4- Increasing number of IATs over the time period of 2000 – 2016 
 
 
Of the total, the majority of systems were distributed systems (n=194), followed by robots 
(n=97), and mobility and rehabilitation aids (n=62). System goals were determined based on 
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their primary capability according to the intent of the manufacturer. Most IATs were designed 
with the purposes of supporting users in the completion of ADLs (n=148), monitoring users and 
their environment (n=100) or providing, respectively, physical (n=88) and cognitive assistance 
(n=85). Assisted deficits were determined according to the primary cognitive or physical deficit 
associated with dementia to which the IAT provides compensation. Of the total, most devices 
were general-purpose, i.e. non-modular but broadly applicable across psychophysical domains, 
without specialized features exclusive for a particular domain (n=250). Devices exclusively 
programmed for specific deficits include motor function (n=109), impaired cognition (n=140), 
and mood and emotional disturbances (n=31). The category “end-user population” was 
determined according to the end-user segment explicitly targeted by the researchers. Our review 
identified four end user types according to the specificity of the target population chosen by the 
researchers: general elderly and disabled population, people with dementia, AD, and specific 
stages of AD. Models of design and development or assessment and evaluation were screened to 
identify the proportion of IAT adopting user-centered design and assessed through clinical 
studies. The variation over time of UC approaches was also examined. Results reveal that the 
prevalence of UC approaches to IAT design and development is significantly increasing over 
time and that half of the IAT spectrum received preliminary clinical validation. In the following, 
we present these findings in detail.  
 
Technological Type 
With 194 items, distributed systems represent the largest proportion of IATs for dementia (Fig. 
4). These include smart service platforms and Ambient Assisted Living technologies, i.e. 
distributed assistant systems “for the constitution of intelligent environments” that “aim to 
compensate predominantly age-related functional limitations of different target groups” (174). 
An example of AAL distributed system is Zhang and colleagues’ (2014) Smart Assistive Living 
(SAL) platform. This platform is designed to support the delivery of telehealth and telecare 
services to older people suffering from dementia, and can enable them to stay at home longer 
and more independently (175). The digitalization of the domestic and residential environment is 
also accelerated by the application to healthcare of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology, 
another important subcategory of distributed systems (n=24).  
With rapid advancements in medical robotics, personal care robots represent the second 
most common technological type (n=97). While most reviewed robots are domestic service 
robots (n=62), i.e., autonomous systems that assist users in the completion of practical activities 
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such as house maintenance, alarming, telehealth etc., an interesting growing portion of robots 
(n=31) is being designed to assist the emotional and social dimension of older people with 
dementia. Robots of these type are called Socially Assistive Robots (37, 144). A successful 
example is robot PARO, developed by AIST (See: http://www.parorobots.com/; last accessed: 
June 2, 2016). Designed to stimulate patients with AD and other cognitive disorders by 
providing emotional assistance and companionship, PARO has been effectively applied as part 
of standard occupational therapy (176) and revealed a positive effect on the residents' quality-of-
life and pleasure scores (177). All reviewed robots including PARO presented some degrees of 
AI such as the ability to learn and remember their own name, and to learn when their behavior 
results in positive responses of the user.  
The relative frequency of hand-held multimedia devices (n=50) is presumably facilitated 
by the availability of these devices among the general population as everyday communication 
tools, as a consequence of the growing importance of such mobile devices in our societies. 
These technological types: include smartphones, tablets, PDAs, and other mobile devices, co-
evolving with a rapidly growing digital ecosystem of compliant mobile apps and other software 
applications (n=50). At the software level, in fact, most hand-held devices were designed to run 
specific assistive mobile or web applications programmed for people with dementia. For 
example, the SmartBrains mobile app was developed to provide cognitive enhancement for 
people with AD (178) and was reported to “greatly augment” the “traditional psychomotor 
stimulation” (179).  
Wearable devices (n=44) accounted for a slightly smaller portion of the IAT spectrum, 
possibly as a consequence of the most recent growth of this technological trend. However, since 
the number of wearables is increasing rapidly over time, it is reasonable to predict that such 
applications will play an increasingly prevalent role in technology-assisted dementia care. One 
promising application is the incorporation of a wrist wearable unit into an Android smartwatch 
to monitor the physical activity of the user and enhance independent living (180). 
Neurowearable devices such as Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) systems 
composed a smaller proportion of the IAT spectrum.  
Finally, Human-Machine Interfaces broadly encompass the realm of hardware and 
software systems (n=42) designed to establish a direct connection pathway between the human 
user and an external computer device. Among those, particular interest from the perspective of 
neurocognitive rehabilitation is raised by brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), as they allow users 
to control external devices solely with brain activity (usually via EEG-recordings), hence 
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bypassing the peripheral nervous and muscle system (181). Since BCI applications are usually 
based on instrumental learning and require users to self-regulate their brain activation —a task 
whose completion is very limited among elders with dementia, they were considered for many 
years not suitable for compensating the cognitive deficits in AD patients (182). However, recent 
advancements in the detection of involuntary brain signals (e.g.  related to emotional states) are 
enabling the development of new BCI solutions (n=7) with possible application to dementia 
care, including BCIs for early diagnosis, computerized cognitive training and communication 
(182, 183).  
 
Figure 5- Technological Types in IATs for Dementia & Elderly Care 
 
Application 
IATs are currently being implemented into dementia care for a variety of purposes 
(Figure 6). Our review results reveal that the most common application of IATs in dementia care 
is supporting older adults with dementia in the completion of ADLs (n=148) such as eating, 
bathing, dressing, toileting, and continence. These results reflect the oft-stated wish of elders 
with dementia to enhance their independent living and the need for healthcare systems to delay 
or obviate institutional care, hence age-in-place (184). With 100 systems, monitoring is the 
second most common application. Monitoring is a key function for enhancing a person’s safety 
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as it allows identifying patterns of abnormal behavior, prompting responses from caregivers in 
case of danger and collecting data for other connected applications. Physical (n=88) and 
cognitive assistance (n=85) also compose an important proportion of the overall applications of 
IAT to dementia care. Cognitive assistants are intelligent devices capable of supporting or 
augmenting cognitive functions in cognitively impaired individuals, functioning as external 
cognitive processors. These include memory aids and other cognitive orthotics. An example is 
the COGKNOW Day Navigator, a digital prosthetics to support persons with mild dementia in 
their daily lives, with memory, social contacts, daily activities, and safety (185). In contrast, 
physical assistants compensate for motor and locomotive deficits associated with dementia-
related disability. An example is the MOBOT, an intelligent physical assistant to support elderly 
patients with mobility disabilities during gait and sit-to-stand (STS) transfer (186). Emotional 
support and assistance represents a smaller (n=15) but rapidly developing portion of IAT 
application. Finally, promoting interaction (n=64) and engagement (n=22) as well as facilitating 
care and rehabilitation complete the picture of possible applications enable by current IATs for 
dementia.  
 
Figure 6- Most common IAT applications 
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Function Assisted 
Most reviewed systems appeared to be general-purpose (n=250), showing how the complex 
disabling condition of dementia affects in parallel various components of a person’s psycho-
physical dimension (Figure 7). With 140 items, the cognitive dimension (encompassing not 
exclusively executive function but also perception and communication) is the component of 
dementia-induced disability most commonly assisted via IAT. Among these cognitive faculties, 
memory predictably scores first (n=33), followed by communication (n=28), orientation (n=18), 
reasoning (n=12), and decision-making (n=8). Physical assistance such as assistance in mobility, 
navigation, and motor control represents the third most common category of deficits assisted by 
IATs. Dementia-associated disturbances of the emotional and affective sphere are supported by 
a significant portion of IATs (n=31), revealing an increasing effort to compensate through 
intelligent technology an often-neglected component of care provision for older adults living 
with dementia. Finally, a significantly smaller number of IATs (n=9) can provide assistance to 
the social dimension of elderly adults with dementia by reducing isolation and facilitating social 
interaction.  
 
Figure 7- Functions assisted by IAT 
 
User-centered Design 
Results show that, to date, only 40.1 % of reviewed IATs are explicitly designed, developed or 
assessed through UC approaches (see Fig. 8). Among those, cooperative design and 
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participatory design approaches are often recognizable, with researchers and users being 
involved on an equal footing in the various stages of the design process (187). However, the 
results of our logistic regression show a statistically significant correlation between time and the 
frequency of user-centered models of technology design and assessment (b = 0.21, Wald(1) = 
6.17, p < .01). Therefore, this correlation predicts that the prevalence of UC approaches will 
become majoritarian in IAT design and development in the near future.  
 
Figure 8- Prevalence of User-centered (UC) Design in IATs for Dementia & Elderly Care 
 
Primary Target Population 
As different forms of dementia and different stages of the disease progression may 
present inherently specific symptoms and care requirements, we looked at the level of selectivity 
adopted by the technology designers in determining the end-user population of each IAT. While 
all reviewed IATs could assist or compensate for one or more functional impairments associated 
with AD or other dementias, most of them were not exclusively designed for people with AD or 
other forms of dementia but also for the general elderly population with neurocognitive 
disability (n= 362).  A significantly smaller portion (n= 115) of intelligent systems was more 
selectively designed to primarily target people with dementia, or the specific cognitive, physical, 
and behavioral symptoms of people with AD (n=51). Finally, only nine devices were 
specifically designed to target either specific stages of AD (n=5) or Mild Cognitive Impairment 
(MCI) (n=5).  
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]  
Figure 9- Selectivity of end-user population targeted by IAT designers/producers 
 
Clinical Validation 
Our analysis of the clinical validation of IATs for dementia shows that little more than half of 
them (50.65%) did not receive clinical validation through clinical trials with human subjects. 
Among the subset IATs that received clinical validation (n= 266; 49.35%), most validation 
studies (n=254) were conducted with small sample sizes (<20 participants). Randomized-
controlled design was reported in only 1.1% of clinical trials, that is 3 studies.   
 
Discussion  
In comparison to previous reviews (2, 170), our review’s results show that the spectrum of IATs 
for dementia is expanding fast in volume, variety, and potential applications. Since the number 
of IAT applications is approximately doubling every five years, IATs are likely, in the near 
future, to become a ubiquitous trend in dementia care. In addition, as the overall processing 
power for computers is increasing linearly over time and rapid advancements in micro-
computing are accelerating the miniaturization of IAT systems (188), the expansion of the IAT 
spectrum will be accompanied by a coordinated performance potentiation. Such computing 
trends will generate novel possibilities for people suffering from dementia to live more 
independently, autonomously, and safely, and will facilitate the delivery of care to this growing 
patient population. 
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At the level of product development, the large proportion of AAL technology and other 
distributed systems attests an ongoing smart-environment trend in healthcare. As our results 
report, pervasive and ubiquitous computing techniques are being increasingly used to 
incorporate automation into domestic and residential environments with the purpose of 
delivering services, improving efficiency, performing or facilitating daily activities, and 
improving the wellbeing of their residents. After the Internet of Things has already incorporated 
computer technology into everyday objects such as televisions and other electronic appliances 
(189), the transition to smart homes could represent the next disruptive change in domestic 
environment. Although these trends are not exclusive to healthcare but common to various 
aspects of modern societies – i.e., through the creation of smart cities or cybervilles -, their 
application to dementia care is particularly promising since it could delay the need for long-term 
care and institutionalization, hence result in significant cost - reduction for healthcare finances 
and improved quality of life for the senior population (2, 67). In fact, such distributed assistive 
systems have the potential to prolong the safety and independence of older adults with dementia, 
preventing accidents, assisting them during the completion of ADLs, facilitating caregiver 
supervision, and triggering alarm in case of emergencies (190).  
Hand-held multimedia devices are also likely to play an important role in the future of 
technology-assisted dementia care. In the light of their widespread use as everyday technologies 
in modern society, smartphones and other hand-held devices are often recognized by users as 
familiar tools, therefore requiring a lower level of training —especially among baby-boomers, 
who are often smartphone savvy (191). This is likely to result in higher social adoption, in 
particular if combined with coordinated advances in mobile software technology. In parallel, the 
recently increasing frequency of wearable devices underscores the need for a more widespread 
distribution of friction-free, non-invasive tools since non-obtrusive use is a reported priority 
among elders (135, 192). Although the concept of wearable device dates back to the 80s, only 
recent progress in miniaturization, micro-computing, and reduction of form factors allowed a 
significant development of wearables for commercial and medical purposes. However, while 
commercial applications of wearable technology are becoming increasingly popular among 
general users, the assistive and medical application of this technological type has not reached 
yet a sufficient level of maturity. In the next few years, a new generation of low-cost, friction-
free, and information secure wearable devices is expected to add further opportunities to the 
current IAT spectrum. In contrast, assistive robots seem to have already reached a relatively 
high degree of commercial maturity, with several assistive robots ─ such as PARO (Daiwa 
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House Industry), NAO (Aldebaran Robotics), Pepper (SoftBank), and PALRO (FUJISOFT) ─ 
already being commercially available in Japan, Europe, and the United States. Future advances 
in robotics, especially the use of adaptive intelligence and the problem-resolution at the human-
machine interface, are likely to increase even more the distribution of these IAT types.  
The high distribution of IATs for facilitating human-to-human interaction and human 
caregiving shows that some reported worries about the potential risk of “dehumanizing care” 
with assistive technology (193) are rather unjustified. In fact, technology-enabled care is not 
alternative to human-delivered care but complementary. For example, telepresence robots such 
as Giraff (Giraff Technologies AB), allow caregivers to virtually enter the home of a person 
with dementia from their computer via the Internet, hence supervising, monitoring, 
communicating, and conveying their presence as if they were physically there.  
With the rapid erosion of the caregiver-to-patient ratio, the proportion of intelligent 
assistance to be integrated into general care is bound to expand significantly. This will require 
not only advancing the development of IATs for cognitive and physical assistance but for 
emotional support as well. As our results show, intelligent emotional assistants represent a 
minor proportion of IATs currently developed for compensating psychophysical deficits 
associated with dementia. However, developments in Artificial Emotional Intelligence could 
dramatically accelerate the successful integration of IATs into standard care. As people with 
dementia often present emotional disturbances such as anxiety, depression, agitation, and 
distress (194), IATs programmed to learn “when and how to display emotion in ways that 
enable the machine to appear empathetic or otherwise emotionally intelligent” will be crucial for 
the future of care (195). 
As the list of current applications shows, IATs are not only increasing in number but also in 
variety. While the first generation of IATs was primarily focused on promoting safety through 
tracking, alarm prompting, and remote monitoring (e.g., fall detectors and GPS trackers), current 
IAT applications are designed to support a number of activities including communication, 
telecare, and entertainment. In addition, the high number of applications for supporting ADLs 
shows that the main focus of most current IATs is not simply monitoring older adults with 
dementia, but empowering them by promoting the autonomous and successful completion of 
daily activities and the support of their psychosocial dimension (e.g. entertainment, engagement, 
and communication). Since emotional and psychosocial factors are recognized as important to 
stabilize mental health (196), this emerging holistic trend in IAT has the potential to achieve 
greater outcomes than earlier trends in technology-assisted dementia care.   
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From the perspective of the specific dementia-related deficits compensated for or assisted by 
IATs, the large prevalence of general-purpose systems (46.3% of the total) attests the complex 
and multifaceted condition experienced by elderly people with dementia. Since the disabling 
condition of dementia encompasses various components of a person’s physical, cognitive, and 
behavioral dimension, IAT solutions are often required to provide a holistic and multi-level 
support to their users. Therefore, advances in adaptive intelligence and other trends in AI are 
expected to be of extreme benefit for dementia care.  
When defining the product’s end-user population, there is a need for a more narrow focus on 
the specific needs of each category of end-users. As our results show, many IATs tend to be 
targeting a vast and clinically heterogeneous end-user population including people with various 
forms of dementia and general neurocognitive disability. This fact may reflect the commercial 
advantage for producers to maximize the number of possible end-users for each marketed 
product. In contrast, the proportion of devices selectively designed to support specific stages of 
dementia is currently low. This lack of specificity could represent a significant obstacle towards 
the massive adoption of IATs for dementia and could add an additional reason to the limited 
uptake of IATs. In fact, patients suffering from different stages of AD may present specific 
needs and limitations that may be qualitatively and/or quantitatively different than those of 
people with other age-related cognitive disturbances or disabilities (197). Also, people with mild 
AD often present different needs and limitations than people with moderate or advanced 
dementia and vice versa (198). Future IATs should be adaptive to each specific form of 
dementia and, within the same form of dementia, to each specific stage of progression of the 
disease in order to better reflect the specific needs of each end-user group and sub-group.  
Another limitation of current IATs emerging from the review is the scarcity of clinical trials 
assessing the clinical effectiveness and safety of each product. As every second IAT for 
dementia lacks clinical validation, health professionals and institutions may be reasonably 
reluctant to introduce IATs into standard care. In addition, among the subset of IATs with 
reported preliminary validation, several clinical studies reported major limitations in terms of 
sample-size, drop-out rates, statistical significance and adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
While technical feasibility and usability were successfully tested via simulations in 
approximately all reviewed IATs, well-designed, statistically-significant and highly 
generalizable randomized controlled studies with older adults with dementia are lacking.  
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Policy Implications 
 
While the IAT ecosystem is expanding rapidly and creating novel opportunities for 
technology-assisted dementia care, policy makers must seek to harmonize such developments 
and remove or prevent administrative, regulatory, and infrastructural obstacles that could delay 
the integration of IAT into standard care. In addition, they also have the responsibility to address 
situations and conditions that could potentially undermine the successful and ethically 
appropriate adoption of IATs among end-users. As recently addressed by the Working Party on 
Biotechnology of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
global challenge of AD and other dementias requires the development of a multi-national plan 
that could harmonize technology development, facilitate the process of technology transfer, 
establish a framework for public-private partnerships for innovative projects, and create new 
models for multinational governance (44).  
Since the increasing availability of IATs is disproportionally exceeding the number of 
tools currently used in clinical practice, a more effective commitment to accelerating 
translational research and pioneering responsible adoption is highly needed. Technology transfer 
is paramount to address this challenge. There is an urgent need for accelerating the translation of 
clinically effective technological innovation into clinical and commercial applications. This 
transfer will require cooperative work at the intersection between technology development and 
healthcare, the creation of multidisciplinary platforms for information exchange, and increased 
investments for innovative research as well as product development and marketing. To favor 
such cooperation, increased interaction between manufacturers and clinicians is required; with 
the former taking into account more closely the clinical needs of their end-user populations and 
the latter increasing their awareness of available technological applications. With the number of 
IAT prototypes more than doubling every five years, clinicians should monitor this rapidly 
expanding realm of assistive solutions, keep track of the novel technological availabilities, and 
supervise their responsible implementation. At the same time, manufacturers should be 
incentivized to adapt new prototypes more closely to the needs of patients, involve them 
constructively and in a participative manner into the design of future products via UC design 
and seek clinical validation of their prototypes through clinical trials run on larger sample sizes. 
Clinical effectiveness is a critical factor not only for technology adoption but, most importantly, 
also for guaranteeing the efficacy of technological products to improve care. Feasibility and 
usability tests via simulation are critical preliminary indicators of successful implementation. 
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However, in absence of large-scale, well-designed and statistically significant clinical trials, the 
clinical effectiveness of IATs cannot be presumed nor generalized across various geographical 
or clinical contexts. In particular, studies that evaluate IAT-derived functional improvements in 
patients via randomized controlled design are essential. In addition, there is still a great need for 
outcome studies on the effectiveness of IAT interventions in non-institutional real-life settings, 
such as studies with home-dwelling older adults with dementia during the completion of ADL 
tasks. Responsible translation in IAT for dementia should follow an evidence-based strategy that 
prioritizes systems with demonstrated clinical effectiveness and facilitates their responsible 
introduction into care. 
In parallel, health policies and business strategies that promote and facilitate the 
responsible uptake of IATs must be encouraged to prevent this reportedly large technological 
potential from remaining underused. To this respect, the significant increase over time of UC 
approaches shows that a first step in this direction is already being taken. Since the delayed 
transition to UC approaches to technology design and assessment has often been recognized as 
one of the major causes of the lower-than-expected uptake of IATs for dementia (199, 200), the 
increasing prevalence over time of such approaches reveals an ongoing transition in product 
development that is likely to ultimately result in increased societal adoption. UC approaches, in 
addition, are predicted not only to increase technology acceptance, but also to reduce marginal 
risks, increase effectiveness and maximize benefits for the end-user population (37, 167). As UC 
approaches give extensive attention to the needs, wishes, and limitations of end users at each 
stage of the design or assessment process, IATs will be increasingly more capable to match the 
needs, wishes, and limitations of people with dementia. This can also result in promoting the 
autonomy of end-users since they are given an active, prototype-shaping role, becoming co-
developers instead of being simply considered passive users of predetermined artifacts.   
While AI-modulated human-to-machine interaction is a critical pathway for empowering 
older adults with dementia and overcoming social isolation, human-to-human interaction should 
be pursued too. The need for more AI-modulated human-to-human interaction is particularly 
important for older patients who are not digital natives. 
At the ethical and social level, a number of considerations must be included into the 
design of new products to guarantee responsible and successful development. While the often 
stated goal of IAT researchers is to maximize older adults’ capacity for independent living and 
delay the need for institutional care (201-203), issues of privacy and information security should 
also be early considered during product development. Because various types of IATs could be 
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used to access private and sensitive user-related information (204-206), privacy and security 
breaches should be anticipated and prevented. With security by design being hard to achieve, 
measures for securing sensitive (e.g., behavioral, personal or physiological) information should 
be implemented at the level of product development, institutional use as well as in-home use. 
Finally, cost-related and access-related considerations should be addressed to avoid the risk 
that IAT adoption will be impeded by socio-economic factors or could even exacerbate existing 
socio-economic problems. To prevent this risk, the massive adoption of IATs for the aging 
population should be coordinated with health policy plans and health insurance programs to 
minimize the emergence of adverse unintended societal consequences. For instance, 
reimbursement plans, government incentives, and the promotion of low-cost and open-sourced 
IATs are crucial strategies to promote access to technological innovation and avoid the 
emergence of a digital divide between older adults with dementia who could afford IATs and 
those who could not. Such a divide, in fact, could exacerbate existing socio-economic 
inequalities (207).  
 
Conclusion 
Intelligent technology is reshaping the world we live in. Its application into dementia 
care has a great potential for older persons and our society. Based on our systematic review, we 
produced a comprehensive and up-to-date index of IATs developed for assisting older adults 
living with dementia. This index provides health professionals with a comprehensive and up-to-
date picture of the current availabilities of IATs for dementia, their major trends, limitations and 
possible applications into dementia care. As technology is rapidly advancing, future research 
should closely monitor this rapidly expanding technological spectrum and more extensively test 
their clinical effectiveness. In parallel, healthcare services and policies should keep up with 
advancing technology and facilitate the successful adoption of IATs into standard care in a 
manner that benefits patients, their caregivers, and society.  
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2.2. Ethical Design of Intelligent Assistive Technologies for Dementia: A 
Descriptive Review* 
 
*A version of this article was published in Science and Engineering Ethics22 
Full reference: Ienca, M., Wangmo, T., Jotterand, F., Kressig, R. W., & Elger, B. (2018). Ethical 
design of intelligent assistive technologies for dementia: a descriptive review. Science and 
engineering ethics, 24(4), 1035-1055. 
 
Abstract  
The use of Intelligent Assistive Technology (IAT) in dementia care opens the prospects of reducing the global 
burden of dementia and enabling novel opportunities to improve the lives of dementia patients. However, with 
current adoption rates being reportedly low, the potential of IATs might remain under-expressed as long as the 
reasons for suboptimal adoption remain unaddressed. Among these, ethical and social considerations are critical. 
This article reviews the spectrum of IATs for dementia and investigates the prevalence of ethical considerations in 
the design of current IATs. Our screening shows that a significant portion of current IATs is designed in the 
absence of explicit ethical considerations. These results suggest that the lack of ethical consideration might be a 
codeterminant of current structural limitations in the translation of IATs from designing labs to bedside. Based on 
these data, we call for a coordinated effort to proactively incorporate ethical considerations early in the design and 
development of new products. 
 
Introduction: A Technology Revolution in Dementia Care?  
 
The information technology revolution in healthcare is transforming the delivery, 
administration and management of healthcare services worldwide. Advances in robotics and 
medical engineering are rapidly multiplying opportunities for technology-assisted therapy, 
surgery, and rehabilitation. In parallel, advances in Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (PUC) 
are increasingly embedding computational capabilities (e.g. prompting, sensing and information 
sharing) into traditional domestic and institutional environments, as well as worn items. These 
trends are expected to increase patient safety and the pervasiveness of care delivery (2, 208). In 
parallel, with the digitalization of patient records and the exponential increase in medical data 
 
22 Current Impact Factor: 2.229 (2016) 
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worldwide, predictive analytics and data mining strategies enable the extraction, aggregation 
and analysis of large volumes of data.  
Dementia care is one of the branches of the health care industry that is most likely to benefit 
from such technological revolution. The reasons are manifold. First, with the high relative costs 
of formal and informal dementia care (66), technological solutions that can delay or obviate the 
need for long-term care could alleviate the burden on public finances and offer a viable path for 
the otherwise endangered provision of institutional services among a rapidly expanding elderly 
population (67). Second, given the erosion of the caregiver-to-patient ratio (68), the massive 
deployment of robot-assisted care could complement current care provision, reduce the burden 
on unpaid caregivers and improve the quality of care (2). Third, with effective pharmacological 
solutions still not in sight, big-data platforms can improve prevention, diagnostics, therapy and 
care management by revealing insights from large amounts of unstructured data (69). Fourth, 
the incorporation of computing and, in particular, artificial intelligence (AI) into care agents and 
care environments could favor the delivery of personalized, adaptive and patient-centered care 
solutions (70). This would not only help fulfill the wishes of patients but also empower them 
and improve their quality of life. Finally, neuromonitoring/neuromodulation technology and 
brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are opening new possibilities for the monitoring and 
purposeful modulation of the patients’ brain activity as well as for external device control using 
both invasive and non-invasive means (71, 72).    
A number of Assistive Technologies (ATs) of these diverse types have been developed to 
date with direct or indirect application in dementia care. AT is the umbrella term used to 
describe technological devices or systems which allow people with physical or cognitive 
disabilities to perform tasks “that they would otherwise be unable to do”, or to increase “the 
ease and safety with which a task can be performed” (209). Bharucha et al. (2007) have 
introduced the notion of Intelligent Assistive Technologies (IATs) to distinguish ATs with own 
computational capacity from mere mechanic tools (e.g. walking canes). The spectrum of IATs is 
wide and encompasses a variety of devices and systems including handheld devices (e.g. tablets, 
PDAs, GPS trackers), mobility aids (e.g. powered wheelchairs and electronic canes), distributed 
systems (e.g. smart homes, integrated sensor systems, mobile platforms etc.), wearable devices 
(e.g. fitness trackers), humanoid robots, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), and software 
applications (e.g. mobile or web-based apps). Ienca et al. have systematically reviewed the 
entire spectrum of IATs with current or possible application into dementia care and provided the 
first comprehensive index of IATs for dementia. Their results show that the number of IATs for 
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dementia is exponentially increasing over time, with an average five-year increase of 400%. As 
for the technological type, the most common IATs in dementia care are distributed systems, 
especially Ambient Assisted Living technologies (AALs), followed by humanoid robots and 
handheld devices. Most of these devices have been developed for supporting older adults with 
dementia during the completion of ADLs; other applications include monitoring, cognitive 
assistance and physical assistance (210).  
 
The Ethics of IATs for Dementia: Time for Proactive Approaches 
 
Due to their pervasive and ubiquitous character, IATs do not exclusively affect the clinical 
dimension of patients but their emotional, psychosocial and relational dimensions as well. IATs 
such as GPS trackers and videomonitoring technologies can enhance and partly replace the need 
for continuous human caregiver supervision (211). Personal care robots and Ambient Assisted 
Living (AAL) technologies can help older adults with dementia achieve greater independence in 
their home environment and autonomously perform routine activities (212). Cognitive assistants 
and patient-oriented handheld devices can support the cognitive dimension of patients and partly 
compensate for the cognitive deficits caused by the progression of their disease (213). 
Neurodevices and BCIs can enable better preventive diagnostics through brain activity tracking 
and favor interaction through the brain-control of external devices (214, 215). Finally, 
companionship robots can assist the emotional dimension of patients, alleviate agitation, 
loneliness, social isolation and improve their emotional wellbeing (216). As such, IATs open the 
prospects of becoming intimately intertwined in the psychosocial dimension of elders with 
dementia. In fact, the pervasive dissemination of IATs across various domains of life has the 
potential not only to enhance care delivery, but also to affect the psycho-social dimension of 
patients. Concomitantly, due to the technological novelty and complexity of IATs for dementia, 
the introduction of such systems into standard dementia care raises a number of ethical and legal 
issues. 
For example, Felzmann et al. (2015) argue that the switch from human care to technology-
assisted care could have an unintended impact on the subjective experience of older people with 
dementia (217). Other common normative ethical evaluations related to the use of IATs in 
dementia care include the appropriate obtainment of informed consent (96), the protection of the 
patients personal privacy from unconsented surveillance (218), the protection of patients from 
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restraint (219), and the normative status of “justifiable benevolent deception” when using 
socially assistive robots (220).  
A recent literature review has comprehensively evaluated the ethics of AAL technologies for 
people with dementia (221). This review identified various types of ethically relevant issues 
which should be systematically addressed as part of the development of new devices. These 
include user involvement in product development, informed consent, social isolation and data 
security (221). In a similar comprehensive fashion, Zwijsen et al. have reviewed the relevant 
literature to identify the ethical implications associated with the use of ATs in the care for 
community-dwelling elderly people, including people with dementia (137). Their results 
identified ethically relevant themes including privacy, autonomy, social stigma, affordability 
and safety.  
 Ethical concerns of key stakeholders, especially informal caregivers, have also been at 
focus of investigation. Mulvenna et al. (2017) examined the views of caregivers of people with 
dementia on the use of camera-based surveillance ATs, with special focus on ethically relevant 
values such as autonomy, freedom and privacy. Their results indicate a general willingness 
among caregivers to make use of camera technology, with some significant caveats around the 
risks of invading the patients’ privacy or reducing their freedom and autonomy (222). Such 
studies of stakeholder perspectives are crucial to overcome barriers and fine-tune new 
prototypes of IATs to the end-users’ needs in order to guarantee the ethically sustainable 
introduction of ATs into standard dementia care.  
It has been observed, in fact, that the absence or inadequate translation of ethical 
considerations is a major obstacle towards the successful adoption of assistive technologies (2, 
210). Ethical concerns have been observed to be a major predictor of suboptimal user 
acceptance and were reported as cause of skepticism towards technology among elderly adults 
with dementia and their caregivers. For example, Boise et al. (2013) investigated the acceptance 
of in-home and computer monitoring among elderly adults with mild cognitive impairment 
(MCI). Their results show that a majority of participants (60%) reported ethical concerns related 
to privacy and security (223).   
 Most ethical literature on IAT deals with the ethical evaluation of existing products with 
the aim of establishing standards or norms on how to use and apply new IATs in an ethically 
adequate manner. Consequently, ethics, in the context of IATs, plays primarily a reactive role: it 
reacts to pre-determined technological products and services by assessing their compatibility 
with existing ethical values and principles, and eventually making prescriptive judgments about 
 122 
 
the appropriate implementation of such technologies. For example, Perry et al. (2009) have 
investigated the impact of current IAT and telecare solutions for people with intellectual 
disabilities through the lenses of the four principles of biomedical ethics (224). The goal of their 
analysis was to assess whether present products and prototypes align or conflict with those 
ethical principles.  
In the last two decades, a growing number of researchers have called for incorporating 
ethical considerations early on in the design process through approaches to product design such 
as user-centered and value-sensitive design (102, 225, 226). For example, Van den Hoven has 
called for “a way of doing ethics that aims at making moral values part of technological 
design, research, and development”(226). Value-sensitive design is “a theoretically grounded 
approach to the design of technology that accounts for human values in a principled and 
comprehensive manner throughout the design process” (95). According to this approach, 
human values should be proactively incorporated at the level of design instead of being 
discussed only at the end of the technology development process. Among these values, ethical 
values play a critical role. In fact, researchers have argued that the consideration and 
incorporation of ethical values is a critical requirement for preventing harm, improving “human 
situations” (93) and guaranteeing responsible technology development. This ethics-focused 
instance of VSD is called ethical design (102). According to Karr, ethical design allows to 
prevent various forms of harm to technology users and other stakeholders including 
interpersonal, psychological, and social harm (93). For this reason, authors have called for 
“addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology” and “bringing ethics back 
into design” (102).  
While value-sensitive approaches are increasingly raising the attention of IAT researchers, 
little knowledge is available regarding the current prevalence of ethical values in IATs. In 
particular, no study to our knowledge has investigated whether and which ethical values are 
being currently incorporated into the designs of IATs for dementia.  
In this paper, we fill this gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of the spectrum of 
ethical values and considerations incorporated into the design of current IATs for dementia. This 
analysis is relevant for a twofold reason. First, it will provide a quantitative description of 
current trends in value-sensitive design for IATs for dementia, including evidence about the 
presence and prevalence of ethical values at the level of product design. In addition, this 
analysis can inform with empirical evidence normative approaches to the ethical co-design of 
future products. For example, it could help determine what ethical values are currently 
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underestimated, hence must be more carefully considered in the future to reduce the risk of 
drawbacks such as low social adoption, breaches for insecurity, and unintended ethical and 
social consequences. With the rapid introduction of intelligent systems into healthcare, working 
out how to build ethical systems is “one of the thorniest challenges in artificial intelligence” 
(227). Therefore, it is important to investigate whether and how current systems are meeting this 
challenge, in particular in the context of intelligent systems used in the care of vulnerable 
populations, such as people with dementia and neurocognitive disabilities (225).  
 
Methodology 
 
Data search and extraction 
A systematic literature review was performed to retrieve a comprehensive and up-to-date list of 
IATs with application to dementia care. Original research articles and application protocols 
were searched for the period 2000-2016 in the following search engines and bibliographic 
databases: IEEE, PubMed, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Web of Science. The following query logic 
was developed, pilot-tested and, whenever necessary, adapted to the language used by each 
engine or database: (“assistive technolog*” OR “assistive device” OR “assistive application”) 
AND (“intelligent” OR “ICT” OR “adaptive” OR “computer” OR “robotic”) AND 
(“Alzheimer*” OR “dementia” OR “ag*ing” OR “elder*). Based on the inclusion criteria, 
IATs included into the analysis met the following requirements: (i) had own computing 
capability; (ii) showed direct applicability to dementia care, and (iii) could be used to assist or 
compensate for the functional impairments associated with dementia. A total of 617 papers were 
initially identified. Subsequently, three steps of filtering were performed following the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) criteria (3): additional 
records identification through secondary sources, duplicates removal (both software-assisted and 
manual), and eligibility assessment. To minimize subjective biases, each stage of review was 
performed by at least two authors independently from each other.  
 
Data Analysis and Synthesis  
In-depth review of full-text articles included in the synthesis (n=571) was performed. Such 
systematic review resulted in the production of the Dementia Technology Index 2016 (DTI16). 
539 IATs with direct application to dementia care were identified and included in the DTI16 
(210). Subsequently, the DTI16 was analyzed with the purpose of retrieving the full list of 
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ethical considerations addressed in the design, development or assessment of each indexed 
technology. Our content analysis of the document consisted of three sequential steps. First, for 
each IAT, we screened the presence of ethically-relevant considerations. During this phase, 
ethically relevant keywords and statements were searched in the full texts of all reviewed 
articles. This process was performed by two authors using both software-guided keyword search 
(software used: Endnote X7) and unguided full-text review. Second, we clustered all retrieved 
ethical considerations into main categories following Constas’ account of the categorization 
process (228).  Based on thematic affinity, our analysis identified six main ethically relevant 
considerations: (I) Autonomy, (II) Privacy, (III) Beneficence, (IV) Non-Maleficence, (V) 
Interdependence, and (VI) Justice.  
The nomination phase of this categorization process was partly derived from the 
framework of the principles of biomedical ethics (118) and adapted to the specific context of 
assistive technology for dementia. In particular, given the distinctive nature of privacy issues in 
information technology (229), we classified privacy as an independent category rather than a 
sub-component of respect for autonomy. This is in accordance with  growing literature 
supporting the conceptual distinction between privacy and autonomy (230-233) and the oft 
stated suggestion that the physical and informational privacy of elderly adults with dementia 
should be seen as a primary consideration especially in relation to surveillance technology for 
in-home monitoring (234). In addition, ethical considerations related to the caregiver and care-
receiver relationship in dementia care were indexed under the category of interdependence 
based on the body of literature on this topic (235, 236).  
Each thematic family was further classified into sub-families relative to specific sub-
components of the main ethical theme. The nomination of subthemes was partly derived and 
expanded from the classifications provided by Novitzki et al. (2014) and Zwijsen et al. (2011).  
Based on interpretative orientation (228), we chose to separate safety-oriented considerations 
from the family of justice considerations since safety and risk-reduction represent critical 
components of the non-maleficence principle in biomedical ethics and have little in common 
with justice-oriented considerations (118). This classification was also informed by Friedman et 
al.’s list of human values (with ethical import) often implicated in system design (95).  
 
Thematic families and subfamilies in this ethical taxonomy were categorized in the following 
manner: 
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Autonomy 
The principle of autonomy was understood as the capacity of the person to deliberate or act on 
the basis of one’s own desires, that is the ability to act freely in accordance with a self-chosen 
plan (237). Subcomponents of the autonomy principle in relation to IATs for dementia are: 
independence, ageing-in-place, and user-centeredness. In fact, the ability for autonomous action 
and deliberation entails that the person’s activity is not exclusively dependent on contingent 
limitations or manipulative and distorting external forces. Therefore, independence (e.g. 
independent living) is an essential component of autonomy. In the context of dementia care, 
independence is strictly related to the wish of elders to age-in-place (2). The U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention defines aging-in-place as "the ability to live in one's own home 
and community safely, independently, and comfortably, regardless of age, income, or ability 
level” (238). In addition, the respect for autonomy entails that the IAT is designed upon and to 
better meet the user’s needs. Personal autonomy is maximized when users are not passive 
objects of top-down designs but when the IATs are adapted upon their needs. This notion of 
autonomy entails both a right that should be respected and a capability that should be promoted.  
 
Privacy 
The principle of privacy was defined as the ability and the legal right of an individual or group 
to seclude themselves, or information about themselves. Two subtypes of privacy could be 
distinguished: physical and informational privacy. Physical privacy pertains to the capacity to 
demarcate one’s personal physical space. This includes ethical considerations related to the 
invasiveness, intrusiveness and obtrusiveness of IATs into the intimate and private sphere of 
elders with dementia.  Informational privacy pertains to the capacity to seclude sensitive, 
confidential or private information. This includes ethical considerations on the protection of 
sensitive information about the users and the risk of disproportionate data collection. As a 
necessary prerequisite of informational privacy is the security of information and the protection 
of private data (e.g. personally identifiable data), these two are also included as a subtheme. 
 
Beneficence 
The principle of beneficence postulates the promotion of the benefit and welfare of the person, 
and is often considered the main end of medicine. While narrow definitions of beneficence have 
linked this principle exclusively to the end of healing and not to any other form of benefit (239), 
a growing consensus in biomedical ethics considers beneficence holistically, hence 
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encompassing the notions of quality of life (QoL), care (240), and enhancement (241, 242). QoL 
is a complex, multidimensional construct defined by the World Health Organization as 
‘individuals’ perceptions of their position in life in the context of the culture and value systems 
in which they live, and in relation to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns’(243). 
Care-related principles such as empathy, dignity and the protection of vulnerability categorized 
in the beneficence family, together with ethically relevant aspects of a person’s emotional and 
psychological well-being. Finally, enhancement refers to the augmentation of human physical or 
cognitive capacities beyond therapy, that is in relation to or pursuit of non-therapeutic aims.   
 
Non-Maleficence 
The principle of non-maleficence postulates a moral obligation to avoiding or, at least, 
minimizing the causation of harm (118). While every intervention – including technology 
assisted interventions in dementia care- involves some possible degree of harm, even if minimal, 
the non-maleficence principle maintains that the harm should not be disproportionate to the 
benefits of the intervention. This category thus includes ethical considerations incorporated into 
IAT for risk-prevention and risk-minimization – for example, smart smoke and fall detectors. 
Relatedly, it includes considerations for the improvement of safety, i.e. the protection from or 
reduced likelihood of danger or injury.  
 
Interdependence 
IATs enable elderly adults with dementia to maintain, restore, reacquire, or support social 
relations and the capacity to interact with the external social, digital and natural environments. 
This relational dimension, often articulated as a dialectic of human independence and 
dependence which is described as interdependence (235), is of particular relevance in the 
caregiver-care receiver relationship as well as in the relationship between care receivers and 
their significant others (244). This category encompasses subthemes related to the relational 
dimension of elders with dementia including the problem of social inclusion, the risk of 
loneliness and the loss of human contact.  
 
Justice 
The principle of justice postulates a fair distribution of benefits, risks and costs of technology. In 
the context of health technology, justice articulates into three major subfamilies: equality, fair 
access and openness. Equality considerations are concerned with enabling patients with equal 
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conditions to use a technology equally. Fair access considerations strive to maximize access to 
technology and consequent adoption for all socioeconomic classes while affordability 
considerations are concerned with the development of low-cost IATs with the purpose of 
preventing technological divides that may exacerbate pre-existing socioeconomic divides. 
Finally, openness issues refer to the availability to anyone and for any purpose of the software’s 
source codes, licenses, or even hardware components.  
 
Results 
Results show that the majority of current IATs (n=361; 67%) are developed in absence 
of any explicit ethical consideration (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10- Prevalence of value-sensitive ethical design in IATs for Dementia 
  
In the remaining portion of the IAT spectrum (n=178; 33%), ethical considerations at the 
level of design were detected and analyzed. As several IATs presented multiple considerations 
(i.e. more than one ethical theme), we detected in total 257 ethical considerations, as presented 
in Fig. 11. Among these, autonomy (n=99; 38.5%) was by far the most frequent family of 
ethical considerations, followed by non-maleficence (n=52; 20.2%) and beneficence (n=50; 
19.4%). In contrast, justice (n=24; 9.3%), interdependence (n=19; 7.4%) and privacy (n=13; 
5%) considerations appeared rare.  
 
67%
33%
Ethical Design in IATs for Dementia
Without EC With EC
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Figure 11- Distribution of Ethical Considerations in IATs for Dementia by Thematic Family 
(n=257) 
 
Results by Subfamily 
 
Autonomy and Independence 
Results show that autonomy, broadly conceived, is the primary and most common concern in 
current IAT designs. While some IATs (n=26) incorporated cognitivist conceptions of autonomy 
as self-determination ─i.e. the ability to deliberate and act in accordance with a self-chosen plan 
(237), the most common subtheme within this thematic family was independence (n=52) during 
the completion of daily activities. The prevalence of independence considerations occurs across 
all technological types of IATs. For example, assistive robots such as PaPeRo (245), smart 
mobile apps such as Smartbrain (178) and mobility assistants such as iWalker (246) were all 
designed with the purpose of supporting independent living among persons with dementia. 
However, independence considerations appeared particularly prominent among distributed 
systems such as AAL platforms, smart-home prototypes and other advanced integrated systems. 
For example, the assistive platform iWall (247), the home sensing environment INHOME (248), 
the smart house Intelligent Sweet Home (249) and the ICT infrastructure LAGUNTXO (250) 
had the common objective of promoting or enhancing the degree of independence of older 
adults with dementia. In contrast, considerations of autonomy as self-determination were more 
relevant among cognitive assistants such as the information system SJOBOKS (251).  
99
52 50
24 19 13
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In addition, issues of user-centeredness and adaptation of IAT to the user needs also 
covered a significant portion of the technological spectrum (n=21). These include issues of 
individualization and personalization of IAT applications according to the users’ needs and 
personal choices, as well as issues of non-patronization. For example, robot SAM’s (Smart 
Autonomous Majordomo) advanced assistive functions were designed to be user-friendly and 
adaptive to the user’s needs (252). Similar considerations were detected also in distributed 
systems like ISISEMD (253) and assistive software like DIADEM (254). Service robot 
ROBADOM was the only IAT explicitly designed with the concern of not patronizing its users 
(255).  
 
Beneficence  
With regard to beneficence-oriented considerations, the major concern in current IAT designs is 
the promotion of the QoL of elder adults with dementia (n=28). Such QoL-oriented 
considerations appear frequent across all IAT types. For example, multimedia system ePAD 
(256), AAL system ASTROMOBILE (257), and domestic smart environment RoBOCARE 
were all designed with the explicit purpose of improving “the quality of life of patients, their 
relatives, and their caregivers” (257). QoL considerations appeared particularly focused with the 
physical wellbeing of elderly adults with dementia. However, a small portion (n=5) focused on 
the proactive promotion of their emotional wellbeing (n=5). For example, a cloud architecture 
for family recognition was designed with the purpose of “improving their self-esteem and 
stimulating the patient with novel technology” (258). This characteristic was mostly exhibited 
by assistive systems exhibiting emotional intelligence features.  
Care-related considerations also compose an important portion of this thematic family 
(n=20). These include the promotion of quality of care, the alleviation of caregiving burden, 
issues of dignity, frailty and vulnerability, or the empowerment of elderly adults with dementia 
through technology use and the integration of social intelligence features into intelligent 
systems. For example, the ABLE platform (259) was designed with consideration of the 
condition of frailty and vulnerability typical of elderly adults with dementia, whereas the design 
of a robotic home environment addressed the problem of protecting the dignity of users (260). 
Finally, issues of cognitive and physical enhancement appear relatively rare (n=2).  
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Non-Maleficence, Safety and Risk Reduction  
No-harm considerations represent another important portion of ethical considerations 
incorporated in current IATs and are largely expressed in the form of risk-reduction strategies 
(n=13) and safety-promoting (n=38) considerations. For example, a number of mobility 
assistants, such as SmartCane (261), and ambient assisted living technologies, such as the 
FOOD Smart Kitchen (262), were designed to reduce domestic risks such as falls and fire. An 
even greater portion of systems including intelligent powered wheelchairs (263, 264), robotic 
walkers (265), and assistive robots such as Domeo (266) were designed to assure the safety of 
their elderly users.  
 
Interdependence  
In spite of the rapid increase in technical opportunities for human-machine interaction in 
dementia care, ethical considerations associated with the relational dimension of users and the 
relational capabilities of IATs still represent a small portion of the ethical IAT spectrum. Among 
them, the problem of social inclusion and the proactive reactivation of the user’s relational 
capacities are a dominant theme (n=13). For example, a number of IATs including intelligent 
agent Coaalas (267, 268), robot KSERA (269), cognitive prosthetics COGNOW (270), 
distributed system NOCTURNAL (271) and intelligent ebook ALLT (272) had the shared 
objective of favoring social inclusion by creating new opportunities for social exchange, 
supporting social activities and reducing social isolation. In parallel, a smaller number of 
devices (n=5) including the Monitoring Memory Streams (MMS) iPad application were 
designed for facilitating interactions between caregivers and people with Alzheimer's disease 
(273). Finally, issues of loneliness and the ethical concern that the expansion of technology 
assisted care will thereby cause a loss of human contact are considered by a very small portion 
of intelligent systems (n=1).  
 
Justice  
Justice and equality considerations compose another small portion of ethical considerations in 
current IATs for dementia. Among these, issues of affordability and cost-control are dominant 
(n=18). In particular, several IATs are designed with the explicit wish of achieving low-cost 
products, which could be afforded by a large number of elderly adults with dementia from 
virtually all socioeconomic classes instead only by the wealthy. These attitudes could be 
detected among IATs employing low-cost hardware — especially monitoring systems, home 
 131 
 
automation services and rehabilitation tools. Concomitantly, issues of universal access and fair 
distribution are considered only in five IATs, with special focus on delivering care in spite of 
accessibility barriers as in the case of the cloud-based INREDIS service (274). Finally, open 
design (both open-source hardware and software) considerations, where information about the 
hardware/software is easily discerned to enable other people to reproduce it, were detected in 
only one occurrence: a freely available dataset of acceleration data coming from a wrist-worn 
wearable device (275).   
 
Privacy 
Privacy considerations encompass the smallest portion of ethical considerations in current IATs. 
Among these, issues of physical privacy (n=7), especially in the form of non-invasiveness, non-
intrusiveness and non-obtrusiveness of IAT into the physical private dimension of elders with 
dementia, are considered. Issues of informational privacy compose a slightly smaller fraction of 
ethical coverage (n=5) and are mostly associated with tracking and monitoring technologies. For 
example, the Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSS) for mobile device incorporated privacy 
concerns in a context where it interacts with smart homes (276), while the user-centered design 
of an in-home monitoring system (277) addressed the problem of privacy of the information 
obtained through monitoring. Finally, issues of information security and data protection are 
proactively considered only in one IAT.  
 
A detailed summary of results by family and subfamily is presented in Table 6. 
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Autonomy 
(n=99) 
Non-
maleficence 
(n=52) 
Beneficence 
(n=50) 
Justice 
(n=24) 
Interdependence 
(n=19) 
Privacy (n=13) 
Independence 
(n=52) 
Safety  
(n=38) 
Quality of Life  
(n=28) 
Affordability 
(n=18) 
Social Inclusion 
(n=13) 
Physical Privacy 
(n=7) 
Self-
determination 
(n=26) 
Risk-
reduction 
(n=13) 
Care  
(n=20) 
Access  
(n=5) 
Interaction  
(n=5) 
Informational 
Privacy  
(n=5) 
User-
centeredness 
(n=21) 
 Enhancement 
(n=2) 
Openness 
(n=1) 
Loneliness & Loss 
of Human Contact 
(n=1) 
Data Protection/ 
Information 
Security (n=1) 
Tab. 6- Prevalence and Distribution of Ethical Values in IATs for Dementia (Themes and 
Subthemes) 
Discussion and Recommendations 
 
The finding that the vast majority of IATs for dementia (67%) is designed and developed 
in absence of explicit ethical values or considerations suggests that the current prevalence of 
value-sensitive approaches in IATs for dementia is still low. In addition, since addressing values 
in design in a principled manner is believed to increase the benefits and reduce the harms of a 
technology among a stakeholder group (92), it is possible that the low prevalence of ethical 
values in IAT design might negatively affect the adoption and use of IATs by people with 
dementia.  
 These results confirm previous research findings showing the persistence in the IAT 
community of conceptual and practical barriers to the incorporation of ethics into the design 
phase (102, 278). Closer collaboration among ethicists and engineers might be required to build 
IATs for dementia that can account for the values of end-users, hence favor effective and 
responsible clinical use.  
The recurrence of issues of independence reveals the often stated goal of IAT designers 
of maximizing the capacity for independent living of older adults with dementia (2). 
Independence and independent living are critical factors in IAT research, in particular from the 
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perspective of public health and health economy. In fact, technologies that can protract in-home 
independent living of older adults with dementia will delay or obviate the need for 
institutionalized care, hence alleviate the financial burden of dementia for health care systems. 
In addition, the greater independence elders with dementia can maintain at home or in skilled 
facilities the lower the need for both formal and informal care. This is likely to mitigate the 
burden on caregivers and may improve the well-being of both care receiver and care providers. 
However, while independence is crucial, other considerations should be carefully included too.  
In particular, the low frequency of justice and access-related considerations highlights a 
major societal challenge in the future of IATs for dementia. With the limited number of low-cost 
and open-source devices and the frequent failure of researchers to address issues of fair and 
universal access to technology, there is a risk that the adoption of IATs will be limited by socio-
economic factors or could even exacerbate existing socio-economic problems. To compensate 
for this problem, the massive adoption of IATs among the ageing population should be 
coordinated with health policy plans that minimize the emergence of adverse unintended 
societal consequences. For example, reimbursement plans and government incentives are crucial 
strategies to promote fair access to technological innovation and avoid the emergence of a 
digital divide between elderly adults with dementia who could afford IATs and those who could 
not. Such a divide, in fact, could exacerbate existing socio-economic inequalities. In addition, 
since the prevalence of dementia is not dependent on socioeconomic factors, the benefits of IAT 
for dementia should be shared among all socioeconomic classes, not only among the wealthy 
people who can afford such technologies. This is particularly relevant from a global health 
perspective. In fact, since the greatest relative cost increases are occurring in low-income 
African and in East Asia regions (279) it is critical to deploy low-cost IATs that can be afforded 
by low-income populations in the developing world. While access and affordability are critical 
predictors of technology adoption, open-source designs should be also pursued. Open design in 
IAT for dementia would assure that the hardware and software of future IATs is developed in a 
collaborative manner and can be distributed to anyone without copyright restrictions. This 
would facilitate the fair distribution of and access to IAT across different world regions and 
socioeconomic classes and guarantee the democratization of such technological trend. 
The dramatically underrepresented frequency of privacy considerations, especially of 
those related to informational privacy, raises a major ethical concern. In fact, it has been 
observed how various types of IATs could be used to access private and sensitive information 
(204, 264, 280, 281). Our results show that value-sensitive approaches to accounting for privacy 
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considerations, particularly privacy by design (282), are not a priority in current IATs for 
dementia. We argue that protecting the privacy of older adults with dementia as well as the 
security of their identifiable information should be a structural requirement of future products. 
This can be achieved by enhancing the security of future products and integrating tools that 
prevent unconsented extraction of private information or filter it out from the information flow 
processed by the IAT. To achieve this, closer collaboration between IAT designers and 
information security experts may be required. Ideally, this would result in increased attention to 
principled approaches to privacy and data protection and in the integration of encryption and 
jamming technology. However, with security by design being difficult to achieve, measures for 
securing sensitive (e.g. behavioral, personal or physiological) information should be 
implemented not only at the level of product development but also of individual use and 
regulation. With regard to data ownership, older persons with dementia should be legally 
entitled to claim ownership over the content and the form of their data, either directly, through 
advanced directives or via proxy. Since the degree of information security decreases with the 
amount of awareness of the user, older people with dementia are in principle ideal targets for 
cybercrime or unauthorized data extraction. For example, when using a smartphone app for 
cognitive assistance and training, they might not have enough knowledge or awareness about 
what privileges the app is requiring from their device. This could open breaches for insecurity. 
The problem of privacy and security breaches is exacerbated by the fact that several IATs are 
not FDA certified —since they are not classified as medical devices, and do not fall under the 
HIPAA rule (283). Consequently, they are not required to hold the same privacy and security 
standards of medical applications.  
The high prevalence of independence, risk-reduction and safety considerations indicates 
that the priority of IAT designers is to assist elders with dementia during the completion of their 
ADL. While the successful and autonomous completion of daily task is a major leap towards the 
empowerment of older adults with dementia, designers should look more carefully also at the 
emotional and cognitive underpinnings of behavior. In fact, although a certain IAT may be 
extremely successful at enabling users to independently perform task X, yet users might still not 
perform X because of their state of distress and agitation or due to forgetfulness. Therefore, 
there is a need for considering more carefully at the design level how IATs can be used to 
improve the emotional and cognitive dimension of elderly adults. In parallel, strategies should 
be developed to increase end-users’ trust in the system.    
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Finally, conflicting ethical principles should be balanced in a weighted manner. For 
example, as observed by Nestrorov et al., promoting patient autonomy and reducing caregiver 
burden through intelligent technology may cause a loss of human contact (284). Similarly, 
minimizing invasiveness and obtrusiveness may result in sub-optimal accuracy of the device in 
sensing or tracking the user or collecting user data, hence conflict with benefice-oriented 
principles of health optimization. Therefore, a weighted balance among conflicting values 
should be pursued in a case-by-case manner through a cooperative effort involving not only 
designers and ethicists but also end-users and their caregivers.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study presents several limitations. First, it is possible that ethical considerations might 
be addressed at the level of technology design in an implicit manner, i.e. without being reported 
in the study protocols or without the use of the explicit terminology. Although the value-
sensitive framework prescribes that values in design should be addressed “in a principled and 
comprehensive manner” (95), unprincipled and implicit considerations might also relevant be in 
assessing IATs. To minimize this risk, software-guided keyword search was complemented with 
full-text review. This phase of review was performed independently by two researchers. In 
addition, the lack of ethical considerations at the level of technology design might not 
necessarily lead to unethical technology. In fact, the absence of ethical values in product design 
does not necessarily imply poorer ethical outcomes in the application of a certain IAT. A clear 
distinction between intended ethical values in product design and ethical outcomes is important 
to avoid this conceptual confusion. Finally, the absence of ethically relevant considerations 
might not be exclusive to IATs for dementia but common to other trends in medical technology. 
Some of the findings and implications of this study are likely to apply to IATs designed for 
different target user populations.  
In spite of these limitations, the methodology employed in this study constitutes a valuable 
strategy to investigate the prevalence of value-sensitive approaches in IAT design and test 
whether and which ethical values are actually incorporated in current products. In addition, 
research in value-sensitive design has shown that addressing ethical values in a principled 
manner at the design level can result in increased benefits and reduced harms for technology 
users (92). Therefore, it is possible that mapping the prevalence of ethical values in IAT design 
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might help develop strategies for the clinically successful and ethical responsible use of IATs 
among people with dementia. 
Further research is required to investigate the ethical values addressed in IATs designed for 
different target populations such as people suffering from brain and spinal cord injury. In 
addition, further research is needed to explore the relationship between ethical design and 
technology acceptance among end-users. One possible strategy is to compare these review 
results with interview studies or surveys involving people living with dementia and their formal 
and informal caregivers. This triangulation would be particularly relevant in a cross-cultural 
context, since preliminary findings have revealed that elderly people from different world 
regions have different degrees of reservations about ethical issues (285).   
 
Conclusion 
The technology revolution in dementia care opens the prospects of reducing the global 
burden of dementia worldwide and enabling novel opportunities to reengineer the lives of 
elderly people with dementia and maximize their wellbeing. However, with current adoption 
rates being reportedly low, the potential of IAT in dementia care risks to remain under-
expressed or even misused if ethical considerations are not addressed. This article investigated 
the presence and prevalence of ethical values and considerations in current IATs for dementia. 
Our screening revealed that the vast majority of IATs are designed in absence of explicit ethical 
values and considerations. This raises concerns about the current prevalence of value-sensitive 
approaches to IAT design and the level ethical sensitivity of current products. As the lack of 
ethically relevant considerations has been described as a predictor of sub-optimal user 
acceptance (210, 286, 287), future IATs should incorporate more extensively such 
considerations in a cooperative and proactive manner. In addition, as issues of justice and 
equality as well as privacy and information security torn out to be the most ignored, more 
research is required to make future prototypes affordable and fairly accessible across all 
socioeconomic classes of users, as well as more secure and protective of users’ information, in 
particular in the context of private and sensitive data. Additionally, in order to match public 
expectations, technology designs should rely less on market-driven and inherently paternalistic 
approaches to product development and integrate factors and values that are considered relevant 
by end-users. This requires a transition to user-centered approaches to product development and 
more extensive needs-assessment research among end-users. Given the largely reported failure 
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of top-down approaches to technology design in medical technology, user-centered and value-
sensitive approaches should be prioritized.  
 As ethically designed and successfully implemented IATs open the prospects of 
improving the lives of people living with dementia, designers and developers have a moral 
obligation to incorporate ethical evaluations in their products and engage in a proactive debate 
with ethicists, clinicians, end-users and their caregivers. In this context, participation is critical 
for responsible development. At the same time, ethicists have a parallel obligation to being 
proactive instead of merely reactive. Instead of restricting their analysis solely on post-
development evaluations of existing products, they should proactively cooperate with designers 
and developers to the responsible creation of ethically sustainable products. 
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Structured Abstract 
Background 
Rapid advancements in rehabilitation science and the widespread application of 
engineering techniques are opening the prospect of a new phase of clinical and commercial 
maturity for Neuroengineering, Assistive and Rehabilitation Technologies (NARTs). As the 
field enters this new phase, there is an urgent need to address and anticipate the ethical 
implications associated with novel technological opportunities, clinical solutions, and social 
applications. 
Main idea 
In this paper, we review possible approaches to the ethics of NART, and propose a 
framework for ethical design and development, which we call the Proactive Ethical Design 
(PED) framework. 
 
Conclusion 
A viable ethical framework for neuroengineering, assistive and rehabilitation technology 
should be characterized by the convergence of user-centered and value-sensitive approaches to 
product design through a proactive mode of ethical evaluation. We propose four basic normative 
requirements for the realization of this framework: minimization of power imbalances, 
compliance with biomedical ethics, translationality and social awareness. The aims and values 
of the CYBATHLON competition provide an operative model of this ethical framework and 
could drive an ethical shift in neuroengineering and rehabilitation. 
 
Keywords: Ethics of assistive technology – proactive ethical design- user-centered- value 
sensitive design-  neuroethics- Cybathlon –  
 
Main Text 
 
Background 
With rapid advancements in rehabilitation science and the widespread application of 
engineering techniques for the restoration, compensation, assistance and enhancement of human 
neural systems, the field of neuroengineering is entering a new phase of clinical and commercial 
maturity. The first pioneering research prototypes of the 80s and 90s have evolved into an 
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increasingly mature technological spectrum with direct clinical applications and corroborated 
efficacy. Over the past two decades, assistive and rehabilitation technologies have increased in 
number and variety. Concurrently, many invasive and non-invasive neurotechnologies have 
become available for assistive and rehabilitation aims. This expanded technological domain 
might be regarded as Neuroengineering, Assistive and Rehabilitation Technology (NART). 
NARTs have been developed with the main purpose of mitigating several morbidities associated 
with diseases and traumatic injuries to the human nervous system. Today, this evolving 
spectrum encompasses five major technological families: devices for robot-assisted training, 
functional electrical stimulation (FES) techniques, neuroprosthetics, brain-computer interfaces 
(BCIs) and powered mobility aids, many of which were listed as competing disciplines in the 
CYBATHLON 2016 (288).  
Many of these applications have shown efficacy in improving neurological care and 
neurorehabilitation in relation to a number of functional domains. For example, randomized 
controlled trials performed on robotic devices for post-stroke therapy and rehabilitation showed 
that NARTs can enable significant improvements in the therapeutic outcomes compared to usual 
care (289), especially with respect to motor function (290) and quality of life (291). In parallel, 
at the commercial level, several neuroengineering tools for assistance and neurorehabilitation 
have made their way onto the market and are now available as effective tools for neurological 
care and rehabilitation. The InMotion ARM™ robot, for instance, allows the efficient delivery 
of personalized intensive sensorimotor therapy to neurologic patients who need upper-limb 
rehabilitation while the Lokomat® powered robotic gait trainer has shown effectiveness in 
improving locomotor gait-training for patients with incomplete spinal cord injury.  
As the field of NART enters a new phase of clinical and commercial maturity, many 
authors have urged to address the ethical implications of this emerging field.  
In a recent report based on the outcomes of a joint workshop between the US National 
Science Foundation and the German Research Foundation on “New Perspectives in 
Neuroengineering and Neurotechnology”, a group of international experts identified key 
technological, social and ethical challenges to the adoption of neuroengineering applications in 
the clinical setting. They concluded that the envisaged progress in NARTs requires a careful 
reflection on the ethical and social implications, in particular in relation to issues such as safety, 
security, privacy, public acceptance and respect for autonomy (292). In a similar fashion, 
participants of an interdisciplinary symposium at the NeuroTechnology Center (NTC) at 
Columbia University have advocated for the integration of ethics into neurotechnology and 
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recommended the development of ethical guidelines for developers and users of novel products 
(103). This need for ethical guidelines has not been advocated only by researchers and scientists 
but also by rehabilitation professionals. Nijboer et al. have investigated the views of 
rehabilitation professionals and other stakeholders on the use of BCIs (one of the six disciplines 
featured in the Cybathlon) as assistive technologies. Their findings show that professionals are 
urging developers to carefully consider ethical and socio-cultural issues at the level of design 
(99). In addition, the lack of ethical consideration is increasingly seen as a major barrier for 
technology transfer of BCIs as assistive technology in neurorehabilitation (98).  
Although it has only recently become an object of empirical and normative investigation, 
the need for ethical analysis in clinical neuroengineering is not a new demand but one that is 
deeply rooted in the neurorehabilitation practice. In fact, ethical significance is inherent to the 
very objectives and mission of the neuroengineering enterprise. As the goal of clinical 
neuroengineering and neurorehabilitation is to restore, repair, assist and enhance the capabilities 
of people with neurological conditions, its very mission is of primary ethical relevance and 
implicitly incorporates moral principles such as promoting end-user’s autonomy, wellbeing and 
independence, empowering them across a wide range of activities and reducing their social 
isolation. This predominantly beneficence-oriented and autonomy-oriented ethical goal is well 
captured by the mission of the Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology Society of 
North America (RESNA). RESNA’s mission statement, in fact, emphasizes the aim of 
improving the potential of people with disabilities to achieve their goals through the use of 
technology.24 An ethics-laden language is also at core of the Cone Health Neurorehabilitation 
Center, where a stroke support group was recently established for newly diagnosed patients “to 
make certain they feel empowered to take charge of their health and wellness to live a full 
life”.25  
In addition, the clinical implementation of NART raises ethical attention because the 
end-user population of these technologies is largely composed by vulnerable individuals with 
neurological conditions and other functional variabilities that, in virtue of their vulnerability, are 
often entitled to extraordinary ethical protection. For example, clinical BCIs can be used by 
individuals with advanced neuromuscular disorders, including patients with locked-in syndrome 
 
24 See: http://www.resna.org/ (last accessed: 02/28/2017)  
25 See: http://www.conehealth.com/app/files/public/3030/Empowering-Parkinsons-and-stroke-
patients.pdf 
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(293), while robot-aided rehabilitation provides effective support during the recovery process of 
patients following a stroke (294).  
Finally, as the pace of development of new technological products is reportedly faster 
than their social adoption and ethico-legal assessment, there is a risk that the beneficial potential 
of clinical neuroengineering and neurorehabilitation technology remains under-expressed if 
social, ethical and legal implications remain unaddressed. This is particularly relevant for 
potentially disruptive sociotechnological trends such as assistive robotics as well as for 
technologies ─such as invasive BCIs─ that establish direct connection pathways with the human 
brain, hence raising delicate ethical questions about integrity, mental privacy and personhood 
(206). A recent review about responsibility in rehabilitation robotics (including 
neurorehabilitation robots, robotic prostheses, and even next-generation personal assistance 
robots), has observed that most devices operate in close proximity or direct physical contact 
with patients, manipulate instruments inside their bodies or directly move their impaired limbs, 
and have invasive or non-invasive connections with the human nervous system (295). This 
raises the need for high ethical attention. While there is an increasing consensus among 
scientists, engineers and clinicians that ethics is relevant for NART, several conceptual and 
practical obstacles prevent the successful incorporation of ethical factors into product design and 
development.  
First, at the conceptual level, it is often unclear what ethical considerations should be 
prioritized and at what level of the technology development process (e.g. design, clinical trials, 
or post-commercialization assessment).  
Second, at the practical level, ethical guidelines and ethics-oriented clinical 
recommendations remain rare. For example, the RESNA Strategic Plan 2014-2018 does not 
address ethical considerations and even the RESNA Code of Ethics provides only eight general 
integrity guidelines to guide the conduct of members and service providers but remains silent on 
how to incorporate ethics into technology or how to maximize ethical values through their 
applications.26 Similarly, the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBS), the 
world’s largest international society of biomedical engineers, provides a set of rules for ethical 
conduct in research but does not address substantive ethical considerations associated with 
technology use. In other words, existing guidelines focus on how to ethically develop assistive 
 
26 See: http://www.resna.org/get-certified/code-ethics/code-ethics (last accessed: 02/19/2017).  
 143 
 
technologies. However, little guidance is available to engineers and researchers on how to 
develop ethical assistive technologies, that is technologies that promote ethical values.   
Third, in many assistive domains such as the support and rehabilitation of elderly adults 
with physical or cognitive disabilities, ethical design remains reportedly sporadic while ethical 
assessment and compliance with guidelines are often perceived by developers and 
manufacturers as delay factors in the process of development and commercialization of new 
products (6).   
In this paper, we review possible approaches to the ethics of neuroengineering and 
neurorehabilitation technology and propose a framework for ethical design and development, 
which we call the Proactive Ethical Design for Assistive & Rehabilitation Technology (PED-
ART) framework. We also suggest that the aims and values of the Cybathlon competition 
provide an ostensive and operative model of this ethical framework.  
It is important to highlight that the ethical challenges raised by assistive and 
rehabilitation technology are not necessarily unique but might apply also to other sectors of 
medical technology. Nonetheless, the repeated calls for ethical guidelines advocated by experts’ 
committees and the relative infrequency of ethical guidelines in professional codes indicate a 
need for a proactive and collaborative framework that could facilitate the successful design, 
development and implementation of assistive and rehabilitation technology in an ethically 
responsible manner.  
 
Reactive vs. Proactive Ethics of Assistive Technology 
 
The ethical aspects of NART can be approached either reactively or proactively. 
Reactive approaches focus on the critical ethical evaluations of novel products and the 
assessment of their compatibility with existing normative ethical principles. In reactive ethics, 
ethical conflicts or problems are addressed as they arise, which usually occurs only at the end of 
the development process when the finished system is being implemented. For example, authors 
have performed ethical assessment of commercially available consumer-grade BCIs and argued 
that their security vulnerabilities may conflict with the principle of informational privacy (206, 
296).  
In contrast, proactive approaches are characterized by the development of strategies and 
solutions before a new technology becomes a source of potential ethical confrontation or 
conflict. Instead of merely reacting to an existing ethical problem, proactive approaches 
 144 
 
anticipate future potential uses, requirements, and unintended consequences of new technologies 
before they become ethical issues. For example, Bonaci et al. (2015) have anticipated an 
operative solution to the privacy problem of commercial BCIs described above and developed a 
system called BCI Anonymizer that integrates privacy safeguards into the BCI headset (297), 
hence proactively promoting the ethical principle of respect for privacy. 
The notion of proactive ethics was independently coined in the fields of, respectively, 
business ethics and clinical ethics consultation. In business ethics, the notion “proactive” is used 
when a business introduces ethical measures (e.g. transparency, accountability and 
communication) before the eruption of crisis situations, rather than in response to the crisis 
(298). Similarly, in clinical ethics consultation, this notion is used to describe a process-oriented 
approach to ethics consultation (e.g. in ICUs) where communication and planning begin prior to 
crises (299). Pavlish et al. (2013) have further developed this notion into a Proactive Ethics 
Framework, that is a comprehensive set of proactive, ethics-specific, and evidence-based 
strategies for mitigating ethical conflicts in the clinical setting (300). This framework included 
sequential key action points, beginning with the creation of an ethics-minded culture, and 
continuing with the implementation of risk reduction strategies and the response to early 
indicators.   
Reactive and proactive approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can be 
complementary. As the example above shows, they can be two sequential phases of a continuing 
technology assessment process: first, in the reactive phase, ethical conflicts are identified and 
assessed; concurrently, in the proactive phase, further ethical considerations are anticipated and 
ethically relevant solutions are incorporated into the design of novel products.  
The advantage of reactive approaches to the ethics of neuroengineering is that they allow 
ethicists and engineers to optimize their efforts and focus on concrete problems rather than on 
the anticipation of possible future scenarios that are often hard to foresee. However, reactive 
approaches ─if not in conjunction with concurrent proactive considerations─ present several 
disadvantages. First, they are structurally postdated since they provide ethical advice, by 
definition, only at the post-development level (301), that is at a stage when there is little or no 
room for modification of an assistive technology or rehabilitation device. Second, in several 
domains of cognitive and physical disability such as dementia and age-dependent frailty, the 
lack of proactive ethical and social considerations has been inferred as a determinant of low 
adoption and acceptance of technology (2, 302). In fact, if the impact of ethically relevant 
factors is not anticipated, products might not match the end-users’ needs and wishes, hence 
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result in sub-optimal uptake, implementation lag and delayed clinical or social benefit. Third, 
there is a risk that lack of proactive ethical considerations may cause negative public perceptions 
or even unjustified Luddite fears among end-users, caregivers and other relevant stakeholders 
(303). This risk is particularly concrete in relation to advanced technologies such as those that 
incorporate or embed Artificial Intelligence, as their underlying mechanisms and functionalities 
are often unclear to users (304). Finally, reactive approaches are a possible source of antagonism 
and conflict between designers and developers, on the one hand, and ethicists and policy 
makers, on the other hand. The reason for that stems from the fact that, in a reactive context, 
engineers and ethicists may engage in a competitive dynamic where the work of the former 
professionals is being constantly questioned and judged by the latter. By contrast, in a proactive 
approach, all parties are encouraged to work together. It is worth considering, however, that 
even though proactive approaches encourage interaction among ethicists and engineers, they are 
not necessarily conductive to collaborative approaches.  
 
Modes of Proactive Ethics: User-centered and value-sensitive design 
 
In most circumstances, the type of approach to the ethics of neuroengineering and 
neurorehabilitation technology chosen by manufacturers is influenced by the process of product 
design. For example, the increasing prevalence of bottom-up and user-driven approaches to the 
design of assistive technologies has been often observed to “move a step further to the ethics of the 
user” (305), reduce usability problems or conflicts ─since these can be identified and resolved 
before the systems are launched, and facilitate the incorporation of ethical considerations in the 
design process (6). This suggests that the type of technological design adopted by manufacturers 
is not morally neutral but determines the possibilities of an assistive technology and has 
consequences for human wellbeing (301).  
The “user-centered” (sometimes also referred to as “patient-centered”) approach is a 
framework of processes for the design and development of assistive technologies in which the 
needs, wishes, and limitations of end-users are given extensive attention at each stage of the 
design process (166) (Fig. 12).  
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Figure 12- A Visual Representation of the Iterative Dynamics of User-Centered Design (UCD) 
 
The user-centered (UC) family encompasses a number of methodologically contiguous 
approaches including cooperative design (where designers and users are involved on an equal 
footing), participatory design (where users are involved through active and participative 
processes) and contextual design (where the participatory process occurs in the actual context or 
environment). For example, the Us’em wearable device, a rehabilitation tool for motivating 
stroke patients to use their impaired arm-hand in daily life activities, was designed and 
developed using an user-centered process during which stroke patients, therapists, rehabilitation 
researchers, and interaction design experts were actively involved (306).  
UC approaches are being increasingly considered a necessary requirement for ethical 
design of assistive and rehabilitation technology (37, 98). The reason for that is twofold.  
First, by putting users at the center of design and development, UC approaches shift the 
location of power in the research process (307). Through this approach, users are no longer 
conceptualized as passive recipients of a new product who are implicitly coerced to change their 
behavior to accommodate the new technology. In contrast, they are empowered at each stage of 
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the design and development process (requirement analysis, pre-production models, mid-
production and post-production). In addition, they are no longer subordinated to designers in the 
decision-making process regarding a new technology, but actively involved in a cooperative 
dynamic and on a potentially equal footing.  
Second, at the practical level, UC approaches facilitate the translation of new assistive 
technologies into standard rehabilitation practice and care, hence accelerate and maximize the 
social and clinical benefits of technological innovation. In fact, the translation of new 
technologies from the designing lab to the rehabilitation clinic can best be accomplished if a 
patient-centered focus is incorporated throughout the research and development continuum and 
changes are made so that biomedical innovation serves the broadest needs within the shortest 
period of time (308). This societal outcome is consistent with multiple ethical principles and 
theories. For example, it is consistent with Stuart Mill’s principle of aggregate utility, the 
foundational ethical tenet of classic utilitarianism according to which people desire happiness —
the utilitarian end— and where general happiness is considered “a good to the aggregate of all 
persons” (309).  
Third, in determining this shift in the location of power, UC approaches inherently 
promote ethical principles, especially the respect for autonomy, which is one of the four 
fundamental principles of biomedical ethics (118). At least two components of personal 
autonomy are promoted through UC design: decisional autonomy and executional autonomy 
(310). Decisional autonomy is the capability to make decisions without restraint from other 
actors or pre-imposed designs. This capability is promoted if users are actively involved in the 
decisional process of product design and enabled to make choices or suggestions based on their 
wishes and needs. Executional autonomy is the capability to act according to a desired course of 
action. This capability is promoted if users can successfully use assistive technologies tailored 
around their needs and wishes, hence become able to perform tasks that they might not be able 
to perform otherwise.  
However, authors have argued that decisional and executional autonomy might not be 
sufficient to guarantee full autonomy and participation of users in rehabilitation. Rather, another 
component of the autonomy concept is required, that is self-realization (310). According to this 
notion, users should not only be granted the capability to make free decisions and act 
independently, but should also be able to shape their life “into a meaningful existence which 
expresses individuality” (p. 972). Patients who need assistive and rehabilitation technologies 
may be experiencing a reduction in their capacity to act as autonomous persons along all these 
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three dimensions (decisional, executional and self-realization). Therefore, assistive and 
rehabilitation technologies may compensate for such reduced capacity and boost patient 
autonomy.  
Considerations of this kind have led researchers to complement the user-centered 
framework with values of psychological and ethical significance. The resulting systematic 
approach is called value-sensitive design (VSD) and is characterized by the embedment of 
human values into technology design. In the VSD approach values are defined as the “principles 
or standards of a person or society, the personal or societal judgment of what is valuable and 
important in life” (311). 
According to the VSD approach, assistive and rehabilitation technologies should embody 
and account for ethical, social and psychological values “through a theoretically grounded 
approach in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design process” (312). VSD 
has often been described by engineers, clinicians and ethicists as a successful strategy to 
incorporate ethics in the overall design process of assistive and rehabilitation technology (301, 
313). In light of this, VSD approaches have raised increasing interest among researchers, a 
phenomenon confirmed by a fivefold increase in research papers in the field of human-computer 
interaction mentioning “human values” during the past ten years (314).  
Recently, ethicists of healthcare technology have tried to operationalize the principles of 
VSD in the context of assistive and rehabilitation technology. For example, van Wynsberghe 
has used the blueprint of VSD “as a means for creating a framework tailored to care contexts”. 
These efforts are motivated by the need of guaranteeing that assistive and rehabilitation 
technologies enter the clinical domain in a manner that “supports and promotes fundamental 
values” in healthcare (313).   
While having the merit of enhancing the ethical sensitivity of emerging assistive 
technology, neither the UC nor the VSD approach are anchored by default on a specific 
normative grounding or ethical theory (315). Rather, they can be realized through multiple 
normative principles or ethical theories. In addition, it has been observed that differences exist 
between designers’ values and users’ values (316). This raises the question of how to implement 
VSD approaches in a multi-cultural society where people could reasonably disagree on 
important values. While we recognize the importance of the problem, in this paper we refer to 
VSD as a method “that can be applied in principle to any set of values” and not as the 
“methodological instantiation of a particular set of values” (314). Future ethical research should 
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discuss which ethical values (e.g. universal vs. culturally-relative) should actually be 
instantiated in emerging technologies.  
While we remain agnostic about the specific instantiation of ethical values in the strong 
sense, in the following, we propose a UC and VSD approach to ethical assistive and 
rehabilitation technology based on four basic normative requirements. We call this approach the 
Proactive Ethical Design for Assistive & Rehabilitation Technology (PED-ART). Finally, we 
refer to the experience of the Cybathlon competition as an ostensive and operative model of this 
ethical framework.  
 
A Framework for Proactive Ethical Design 
There is an increasing consensus that UC and VSD are necessary requirements for 
ethically sustainable development of assistive and rehabilitation technology (6, 98, 99). 
However, little analysis is available on the prerequisites of successful adoption of such 
approaches. Based on the inherent goals and objectives of UC and VSD described above, we 
argue that four basic normative requirements are necessary for the successful implementation of 
ethical NART.  
Minimization of power imbalances: Both UC and VSD presuppose the minimization 
of power imbalances in decision-making and a certain degree of inclusiveness and 
democratization in the design process. This shift in the location of power across the technology 
design continuum is best achieved through a goal-oriented cooperation among designers, 
developers and end-users. This principle implies that in order to be involved on an equal footage 
in the design process, all stakeholders should be incentivized to share common goals that could 
be pursued through coordinated and cooperative efforts. In fact, in absence of common goals or 
even in presence of mutually conflicting objectives between different stakeholders (e.g. 
designers vs users), no successful cooperation within the UC and VSD framework is likely to 
occur. An example of conflicting objectives between different stakeholders is the observation 
that designers and developers of assistive and rehabilitation technology often prioritize the 
effectiveness of a new technology whereas users often prioritize usability. Effectiveness refers 
to the accuracy and completeness with which end-users can achieve certain goals in a certain 
environment. Usability is the easiness and extent to which a technology can be used by users to 
effectively achieve these goals. This discrepancy between effectiveness and usability has been 
particularly investigated in the context of assistive BCI, one of the technologies featured in the 
CYBATHLON 2016. For example, a review of BCIs as access pathways for people with severe 
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disabilities has shown that most current prototypes are developed with focus on speed and 
accuracy instead of usability (317). These conflicts of objectives can have detrimental 
consequences for rehabilitation as they could concur in the phenomenon of technology 
abandonment. This refers to the fact that users of an available assistive or rehabilitation 
technology might stop using it after an initial phase, a phenomenon that is particularly common 
with technologies for home use. Scherer has reported that about one third of all assistive 
technologies are abandoned, and many others might continue to be used sub-optimally due to 
unease and discomfort. As she states: “we have no information about the number of people who 
continue to use devices they are unhappy or uncomfortable with because they cannot abandon 
them without facing more severe consequences”(318). In addition, the absence of common 
objectives among different stakeholders involved in the design and development of assistive and 
rehabilitation technologies is likely to cause the so-called “problem of many hands” (319). This 
problem denotes the risk that in complex process where multiple stakeholders are actively 
involved errors can be made although no class of stakeholders acted in an explicitly reckless or 
negligent way.  
To overcome this problem, there is a need for harmonizing the objectives of all relevant 
stakeholders involved in the design process through an iterative and dialogic confrontation. This 
could be achieved by creating cooperative scenarios where all stakeholders are incentivized to 
pursue a common goal or objective.   
 
Compliance with biomedical ethics: The second requirement for the successful 
implementation of ethical assistive technology in rehabilitation is compliance and coherence 
with biomedical ethics. NARTs are integral part of biomedicine and biotechnology. 
Nonetheless, their degree of ethical scrutiny by biomedical ethicists is often lower compared to 
other domains of biomedicine and biotechnology such as pharmacological interventions. This is 
probably due to many factors including the relative novelty of assistive and rehabilitation 
technology, a less stratified history of misuse and different risk-related perceptions among 
professionals.  
We argue that successful technology development via UC and VSD presupposes the 
compliance with biomedical ethics. As we said before, this requirement can be fulfilled through 
compliance with multiple approaches and values in biomedical ethics such as utilitarianism, 
Kantianism or virtue ethics. Among others, one viable and, according to some, easy-to-
implement approach is principlism, a practical approach for ethical decision-making that 
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focuses on four common-ground moral principles: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and 
justice. Research shows that the principlist approach has the largest circulation among health 
professionals and the highest prevalence in ethics curricula for health science students (104, 
121). This fact could, ceteris paribus, guarantee better acceptance and easier implementation 
among health professionals.  However, it is important to highlight that, at any rate, referring to 
any specific ethical theory in a predetermined manner risks to preempt normative input from 
users. Therefore, it is important that, at any rate, ethical theories or principles are chosen based 
on the needs and values of users, and adapted to these needs and values through an iterative and 
flexible process. In other words, the investigation of the users’ needs and values should 
determine which ethical content is most suitable for a certain technology in a certain patient 
population, not vice versa.  
Principlism, uses a “common morality” approach and “mid-level” prima facie principles: 
beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice (118). Beneficence is the 
promotion of the wellbeing of people with disability through the successful implementation of 
assistive and rehabilitation technology. As we have seen above, the field of assistive and 
rehabilitation technology urges a broad concept of beneficence that is not only focused on the 
effectiveness of new technologies but also on their usability.  
Non-maleficence is the principle of preventing or minimizing harms associated with the 
use of assistive and rehabilitation technology. This principle is promoted through the 
implementation of safeguards for the safe and secure use such as the precautionary approach, 
namely the idea that technologies whose consequences are difficult to predict should be first 
investigated in a safe setting (301). Neurorehabilitation experts have tried to systematize the 
principle of non-maleficence in relation to robot-assisted neurorehabilitation (320). Their model 
is based on the postulation of three fundamental laws called the laws of neurorobotics in 
rehabilitation, a re-elaboration of Asimov’s laws of robotics (321):  
(I) A robot for neurorehabilitation may not injure a patient or allow a patient to come to 
harm.  
(II) A robot must obey the orders given it by therapists, except where such orders would 
conflict with the First Law.  
(III) A robot must adapt its behavior to patients’ abilities in a transparent manner as long as 
this does not conflict with the First or Second Law. 
The first law postulates that rehabilitation robotics should be safe not only in terms of 
movement, but also from other medical points of view. This can be achieved by designing new 
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products in accordance with the international standards such as ISO 13482:2014 (322) and 
through careful consideration of unintended harms, where harm is understood as any “possible 
damage to patients” including discomfort and time spent on ineffective rehabilitation. The 
second law postulates that assistive technologies should not replace therapists, but rather 
complement existing treatment options. Therapists should always be on the loop of robot-
assisted rehabilitation and maintain a position of control in relation to the adjustment of 
technological parameters, the avoidance of harmful compensation strategies and identification 
of trade-offs between rehabilitative goals and the psychological dimension of patients. Risks of 
reduced control over technological parameters such as is the discrepancy between the desired 
and actual values of some parameters of the electromechanical Gait Trainer (323) should be 
prevented. At the same time, based on the third law, automatic features and artificial intelligence 
might be used to support rehabilitation therapists by performing all the control changes required 
for a successful therapy. 
 The principle of respect for personal autonomy, as stated above, should not be seen 
exclusively as the promotion of decisional and executional autonomy, but of self-realization as 
well. To achieve that, UC approaches should not only involve the active participation of end-
users and investigate their perceptions only in relation to quantitative parameters such as 
effectiveness and usability, but should proactively incorporate user-driven ethical and 
psychological factors in product design. Given the requirements of context-sensitive design, this 
attempt to “materializing morality” (94) through assistive technology should be dependent on 
the specific context and environment of end-users.  
 Finally, justice is the principle of biomedical ethics that requires assistive technologies to 
be fairly accessible to users, affordable across various socioeconomic classes, and evenly 
distributed across rehabilitation clinics in various world regions. While this principle can be 
incorporated into product design by favoring scalable, low-cost and pervasive technologies, yet 
design alone might be insufficient. In addition to that, justice-promoting policies should be 
pursued at various levels of health-technology regulation. Reimbursement policies and State 
incentives have been advocated elsewhere as possible justice-promoting regulatory interventions 
(37). 
 
Translationality: The third requirement is translationality. In fact, the ethical goal of 
maximizing wellbeing for all individuals with disability through the use of assistive and 
rehabilitation technology is highly dependent on the process of translating research from the 
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designing lab to the rehabilitation center. In order to maximize the societal benefits of assistive 
and rehabilitation technology, we need to ensure that new technologies actually reach the 
patients or population for whom they are intended and are implemented correctly (324). Slow or 
incomplete translation across bench, bedside and community ─ which the European Society for 
Translational Medicine calls the “three main pillars” ─ is likely to reduce the beneficial impact 
of assistive technology on the global healthcare system. According to the Institute of Medicine's 
Clinical Research Roundtable two distinct phases in the translational process are in particular 
need of improvement: the first translational block (T1) prevents basic research findings from 
being tested in a clinical setting; the second translational block (T2) prevents proven 
interventions from becoming standard practice.27 
 
Social awareness: Finally, the fourth requirement is raising social awareness and favoring 
knowledge dissemination across society. The public is often skeptical or reluctant regarding the 
use of new technologies because of lacking knowledge on the technology and its applications 
(325). Sociologists have identified historical patterns and dynamics of opposition to 
technological innovation”. For example, Juma has explored the multi-layered dimensions of 
socio-political resistance to various types of technological innovation including biomedical 
technology. These include established social norms, financial considerations, health 
implications, social disruption, as well as prejudices or human ignorance (325). Patterns of 
resistance to new technologies have also been observed in the specific context of healthcare 
technology (326). This opposition seems to be particularly significant in relation to technologies 
that enable proximity to the human body such as wearable devices and neural prosthetics. A 
2014 Pew survey showed that 53% of Americans think it would be a bad thing if “most people 
wear implants or other devices that constantly show them information about the world around 
them.” In contrast, just over one third (37%) think this would be “a change for the better” (327). 
Since many NARTs operate in close proximity or direct physical contact with patients, and have 
invasive or non-invasive connections with the human nervous system, they are likely to be 
affected by these negative public perceptions.   
 The media, a major catalyzer of attention and knowledge on novel technological possibilities, 
have started only recently to properly cover the domain of rehabilitation technology. 
Concurrently, since NARTs are still in an initial phase of the technology life cycle, their 
 
27 See: https://ncats.nih.gov/about 
 154 
 
pervasive implementation might still be limited by enduring habits of health professionals, 
financial limitations and issues of resource allocation  or conservative managerial decisions ─all 
phenomena that have already been observed in other sectors of healthcare technology (328-330). 
If improving the effectiveness, usability and ethical potential of assistive technology is the grand 
challenge for neuroengineering, raising social awareness on assistive technology is the 
corresponding challenge at the level of society. It is worth stressing that these requirements 
should not be seen as values per se, but as conditions of possibility for the consideration and 
incorporation of values through UC and VSD (see Fig. 13).  
 
 
Figure 13- A Framework for the Proactive Ethical Design (PED) of assistive & rehabilitation 
technologies 
 
In fact, we hypothesize that UC and VSD approaches cannot be properly implemented if: (i) 
major power imbalances persist, (ii) biomedical ethics is ignored, (iii) prototypes are not 
adequately translated into viable products for users and (iv) there is a lack of social awareness 
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about the clinical benefits. However we recognize that this causal relationship can be 
bidirectional as: (i) the 4 normative requirements enable UC & VSD, but, in parallel, (ii) the 
adequate realization of UC & VSD guarantees the fulfillment of the four normative 
requirements.  
 
 
Proactive Ethical Design: The Cybathlon Lesson 
 
In October 2016, ETH Zurich organized in Switzerland the first edition of the 
CYBATHLON, an international championship for competitors with disabilities using bionic 
assistive technologies. The competition featured six disciplines – a FES bicycle race, a Powered 
Leg Prosthesis Race, a Powered Wheelchair Race, a Powered Exoskeleton Race, a Powered 
Arm Prosthesis Race, and a BCI neurogaming race. 
We argue that this innovative event represents an ostensive and operative model of the 
ethical framework delineated in this paper. The reason for that stems from the fact that the 
Cybathlon embodies all four required approaches for the successful implementation of ethical 
assistive technology in rehabilitation. 
First, the Cybathlon fulfills the first requirement by providing an ideal setting for a goal-
oriented cooperation among different stakeholders. During the CYBATHLON 2016 
competition, designers, developers and end-users have not only engaged in cooperative 
dynamics on an equal footage (as required by the UC approach) but also shared a common 
goal.  This created a goal-converging dynamic where the success in the race of the user (the 
competing athlete) corresponds to the success of the designing team. Such gamification creates a 
fruitful and possibly reproducible setting for harmonizing the objectives of all relevant 
stakeholders involved in the design process. Concurrently, it shifts the location of power by 
putting the user (the individual athlete with disability) at the center of the arena. This centrality 
of the user in the competition is an ultimate form of empowerment: instead of being a passive 
recipient of technology-assisted rehabilitation, the person with disability becomes the 
protagonist of a cooperative process.  
Second, the CYBATHLON model fulfills the second requirement by proactively 
anticipating compliance and coherence with the principles of biomedical ethics. The day prior to 
the competition, a roundtable discussion involving end-users, patient and industry 
representatives also hosted a prominent ethics researcher. In addition, the creation of a goal-
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oriented cooperation between designers and athletes facilitates the promotion of beneficence, 
non-maleficence and patient autonomy by giving them the possibility to request adaptations of 
the prototypes according to their wishes and needs at every stage of the process. This iterative 
process of need assessment and product adjustment exemplifies the ideal feedback-loop between 
designers and users that should be pursued in the research setting according to the UC and VSD 
frameworks. While beneficence is captured by the need of increasing efficiency, effectiveness 
and usability in order to win the competition, and the non-maleficence principle is embodied by 
safety-enhancing safeguards, the autonomy of users is maximized by their physical and 
decisional centrality in the process. As a factor of limitation, the justice principle appeared more 
sporadically during the competition due to multiple facts: (i) high-performing technologies are 
likely to be financially expensive; (ii) the competition took place in one of the world’ most 
affluent countries; (iii) most competing teams were from affluent and highly industrialized 
countries. However, future editions of the competition may compensate for this omission and 
incorporate the justice principle by creating a component of the competition involving low-cost 
technologies, hosting the event in non-European and non-North American countries and 
encouraging participation of research teams from emergent and developing countries.  
Third, the CYBATHLON competition fulfills the translationality requirement by 
enabling a smooth and accelerated translation of innovative research in assistive technology for 
the benefit of individual users and the community. Each competing team in the CYBATHLON 
championship is a small-scale translational round-block that translates research findings into 
utilizable technology and assesses them in a public arena together with real end-users. This 
translational power is corroborated by the possibility that through the CYBATHLON 
competition many technologies originally designed for a small-sized group of people with 
disability may found an application in larger markets including people with similar functional 
disabilities or even able-bodied people. From a business perspective, this possibility, jointly 
with the commercial relevance of the CYBATHLON, could expand the market of assistive 
technologies from a small-scaled niche that creates little incentives for the industry to pull the 
technology onto the market into a broader, more mature and pervasive domain of technological 
innovation.  
Finally, the surprising media coverage and societal attention raised by the 
CYBATHLON could become a critical catalyzer to raising social awareness on disability and 
assistive technological solutions. Several international media including the British BBC, the 
German Deutschlandfunk, the Swiss SRF, and the Canadian CTV provided live coverage and 
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subsequent analysis of the competition. This degree of international coverage in mainstream 
media could be a ground-breaker in the effort of raising social attention and awareness about 
novel technological possibilities in rehabilitation. In addition, the possibility of watching real-
time successful applications of current assistive technologies may contribute in changing 
negative societal perceptions on these products and disseminate information and knowledge 
about this ever-evolving technological domain across society.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As the fields of assistive technology and neuroengineering are entering a new phase of 
clinical and commercial maturity, there is an increasing need to address the ethical implications 
associated with the design and development of novel assistive and rehabilitative technological 
solutions. After reviewing various ethically-sensitive approaches to the design of NART, we 
proposed a framework for ethical design and development, which we call the Proactive Ethical 
Design (PED) framework. This framework is characterized by the convergence of user-centered 
and value-sensitive approaches to product design through a proactive mode of ethical 
evaluation. Four basic normative requirements are necessary for the realization of this 
framework: minimization of power imbalances, compliance with biomedical ethics, 
translationality and social awareness.  
Cooperative efforts of researchers, end-users, clinicians and societal stakeholders are 
necessary to drive assistive and rehabilitation technology towards the PED framework and 
maximize the benefits of neuroengineering for individual users and society at large. The 
innovative paradigm of the CYBATHLON competition provides a promising operative model 
of this ethical framework and could drive an ethical shift in neuroengineering and rehabilitation. 
In fact, the CYBATHLON establishes a platform for exchange and cooperation among various 
stakeholders including people with disabilities, researchers, developers, funding actors, media 
and the general public. In addition, it encourages a convergence of goals between researchers 
and end-users, promotes compliance with ethical considerations, facilitates successful 
translation of new technology and raises social awareness on assistive technology and disability.  
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Abstract 
 
Intelligent Assistive Technologies open the prospects of alleviation the global burden of 
population aging and dementia. However, their translation from designing labs to the clinical 
setting appears suboptimal. This study aims at obtaining more detailed knowledge on the 
clinical translation of IATs by exploring the views and attitudes of key health professionals 
involved in dementia and elderly care. Qualitative data were gathered in three among the 
countries with the highest longevity and lowest birthrate (Switzerland, Germany and Italy), 
hence particularly exposed to aging-related health burden. Our findings provide a qualitatively 
rich picture of the current opportunities and challenges of using IATs in the clinical setting. In 
addition, we indentify a number of possible barriers to the adequate translation of IATs into the 
clinics.  
 
Introduction 
Today over 900 million people worldwide are aged 60 years and over as a consequence of rising 
life expectancy (331). In many countries increased longevity is being accompanied by declining 
fertility rates causing a rapid increase in the proportion of older people to the total population. 
This trend is particularly recognizable in Western European countries such as Italy, Germany 
and Switzerland, characterized by extremely high life expectancy (Switzerland 83.4; Italy 82.7; 
Germany: 81.0) and low fertility rates (Italy 1.43; Germany: 1.44; Switzerland: 1.55) (15). In 
these countries, people aged 60 years and over constituted more than one fifth of the total 
population in 2015 (Italy: 28.6; Germany: 27.6; Switzerland: 23.6%), a number that is expected 
to increase by an additional 8-9% by 2030 (16). These demographic trends pose a major 
challenge to public health since older age is associated with rising incidence of non-
communicable chronic diseases, increased disability and higher healthcare costs. A major 
component of health burden among older population in those countries is represented by 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and other age-dependent dementias. People with dementia experience 
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major cognitive and physical disabilities, hence need constant care during basic activities of 
daily living (331). This is reported to create a “heavy economic and social burden” (332), 
primarily as a consequence of the high financial and social costs of long-term medical care, 
informal care provided by families, and social care provided by community care professionals.   
Gerontechnologies that can help older adults and people with dementia remain mobile and 
independent, hold the promise of mitigating this global health challenge by decreasing the costs 
for long-term care to families and society, alleviating caregiving burden, facilitating the delivery 
of medical care, and increasing the quality of life of this vulnerable population (2, 67). 
Intelligent Assistive Technology (IAT) is the umbrella term used to comprehensively describe 
the broad spectrum of gerontechnological solutions (both hardware and software) designed to 
assist elderly adults and people with dementia in the homecare and institutional setting (2). A 
recent review has shown that the number of IATs with application to dementia and elderly care 
has nearly tripled in the last 5 years and even increased by a factor of 15 compared to beginning 
of the new millennium (6). The same review shows that the IAT spectrum appears to encompass 
a large variety of computing solutions including distributed systems such as ambient assisted 
living technologies, care robots, mobility and rehabilitation aids, handheld devices, apps, 
wearables and human-machine interfaces. The common denominator of these otherwise 
different technologies is their capacity to use intelligent computation to support psychogeriatric 
care. IATs are being developed for a variety of clinical and social-care purposes including 
assistance during the completion of activities of daily living, health and behavioral monitoring, 
physical and cognitive assistance, facilitated interaction and engagement, care delivery and 
rehabilitation, as well as emotional support (6).  
While technology is developing fast, studies assessing the clinical and social effectiveness of 
IATs remain scarce and significantly vary in number and level of generalizability depending on 
the specific IAT type. Bemelmans et al. have shown that socially assistive robots such as Paro 
can have a positive effect on mitigating the mood scores of patients in various stages of 
dementia (333). This positive effect is particularly recognizable in long-term care setting (334). 
However, large-scale cohort studies are rare for this IAT type. Other IAT types such as ambient 
assisted living (AAL) technology have been investigated more extensively. For example, the 
UP-TECH project involved a randomized control trial with 438 patient-caregiver dyads to 
validate an integrated package of AAL solutions in Italy. Nonetheless, experts have emphasized 
the need for improved evaluation methods, “particularly feature-focused scenario-based 
evaluations” (335). Furthermore, cross-national and cross-cultural studies appear still rare.  
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Besides validation, one further challenge is adoption. Research shows that adoption rates of 
IATs in dementia and elderly care are still low (107).  Investigating the views of key 
stakeholders involved in dementia and elderly care is gaining momentum as an effective 
strategy for acquiring valuable insights about possible barriers to the successful adoption of 
IATs in the institutional and home-care setting. In 2014 a German interview-study investigated 
the views of dementia caregivers and identified a lack of awareness and unsuccessful 
information transfer across relevant stakeholders (107). A UK study involving people with 
dementia and their caregivers enriched such qualitative evidence and suggested that lack of 
information and cost-related considerations might play a role in determining adoption rates 
(336). To date, researchers have indicated a number of possible barriers and obstacles to 
adoption including lack of robust evidence for the cost-effectiveness of IAT solutions (337), 
low-prevalence of user-centered approaches to technology design (6), information gaps at the 
cross-section of technology development and healthcare (107), high costs of IATs and absence 
of viable reimbursement plans (336, 337), as well as unaddressed ethical considerations, privacy 
in particular (191, 225). A few studies investigated the perspective of health professionals on the 
use of IATs for dementia and elderly care. A recent study in the UK explored the views on IATs 
of GPs, people with dementia and their caregivers (338). Their results indicate moderately high 
awareness among GPs about IAT solutions but show persistent obstacles in the dissemination of 
adequate information and support (338). As health professionals are critical decision-makers for 
the adoption of new medical technologies, more research is needed to investigate their views 
and attitudes towards IATs, especially in light of current trends in population aging. 
To this purpose, our study aims at obtaining more detailed knowledge on the views and 
attitudes towards IATs of key health professionals involved in dementia and elderly care. 
Qualitative data were gathered in three among the countries with the highest longevity and 
lowest birthrate (Switzerland, Germany and Italy), hence particularly exposed to aging-related 
health burden. Furthermore, it aims at producing qualitative, experience-based and clinically-
oriented knowledge that can be used by gerontechnologists to inform future development and 
implementation studies involving IATs in psychogeriatric care. As IATs compose a numerically 
considerable (210) and ethically challenging (1) component of gerontechnology, cross-national 
expert assessments of IAT can provide useful information not only for IAT designers and 
developers but also for ethicists, health professionals, policy makers and gerontechnologists.  
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Methods 
Study sampling and recruitment 
We conducted and analyzed open-ended qualitative interviews with health professionals and 
researchers working in Switzerland, Germany and Italy. Interviewees were conducting research 
and/or actively working within the fields of geriatrics, psychiatry, neurology, neuropsychology, 
gerontology, nursing, and healthcare management. They had direct research experience in the 
field of gerontechnology and/or in the professional care for psychogeriatric patients including 
people with dementia and other age-dependent disability. Purposive sampling was adopted 
according to positions, expertise, research background and years of experience to obtain a 
diverse selection of stakeholders from both private and public health institutions with varying 
disciplinary affiliation and professional experience. A total of 21 stakeholders were purposively 
selected from the homepages of the research institutions according to their professional profile 
or recruited through subsequent snowballing. The initial sample was adopted based on previous 
qualitative studies assessing IAT use among caregivers of persons with dementia whose sample 
sizes were comprised between 10 and 25 (339-341). Snowball was interrupted once theoretical 
saturation was achieved. Participants were contacted via e-mail outlining the research and 
invited to participate in the study. Three respondents declined the invitation due to conflicting 
commitments while one respondent dropped out from the study after initial acceptance due to 
health issues. A total of 17 interviews were completed (see Tab.7). The overall response rate 
was 85%. The invitation message contained the following information: (i) title of the study: 
“Health professionals’ views on Intelligent Assistive Technology for Dementia and Elderly 
Care”, (ii) study rationale, design and purpose (iii) interview methodology and approximate 
length, (iv) safeguards employed for the protection of confidentiality and anonymization of the 
collected data, (v) contact details of the research team, as well the (vi) informed consent form. 
Prior to recruitment, the study obtained a waiver from the Ethics Committee Northwest/Central 
Switzerland (EKNZ).  
 
 
Country n (%) 
     Switzerland 
     Germany 
     Italy 
10 (59) 
4 (23) 
3 (18) 
Professional Experience  
     Gerontology 1 (6) 
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     Geriatrics 
     GP 
     Neurology 
     Neuropsychology  
     Nursing 
     Nursing Home Management 
     Psychiatry  
2 (13) 
1 (6) 
2 (13) 
3 (19) 
1 (6) 
1 (6) 
5 (31) 
Gender  
     Male 
     Female 
10 (59) 
7 (41) 
  
Tab. 7- Interviewees' Distribution (N=17) 
 
Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out and the research team designed an interview guide. 
Using the interview guide, we sought to explore healthcare professionals’ (a) expectations, 
needs and perceptions regarding the clinical application of IATs, and (b) practical experiences 
with the clinical use of these technologies. Additional questions were also added to understand 
the issues of effectiveness, clinical evaluation, care needs, interactions with designers, 
developers and other stakeholders, as well as issues related to the governance and management 
of IATs. Finally, interviewees were invited to provide recommendations for IAT designers and 
developers based on their clinical experience and perceived clinical needs with the purpose of 
improving IAT use for the benefit of end-users. The interview guide was pilot-tested and 
adapted during the first few interviews. Whenever useful to orient the conversation or provide 
tangible technological examples, participants were presented with the latest comprehensive 
index of IATs for dementia and elderly care known to the interviewer, encompassing the 
following IAT types: distributed systems, robots, mobility and rehabilitation aids, 
handheld/multimedia, software/apps, wearables and human-machine interfaces (6).  
Fifteen interviews were conducted face-to-face at the interviewees’ institutions or at a location 
of their choice. Two interviews were conducted via video-call upon request from the participant. 
The first author conducted all the interviews in the time period between October 2016 and April 
2017 and they were digitally recorded. The interviews lasted approximately between 21 and 55 
min, with an average duration of 33 min. The recorded audio files were transcribed verbatim in 
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the original language of the interviewees (English, German, or Italian) using the F4transkript 
software.   
 
Data checking and data analysis  
To ensure respondent validation (342), study participants were given the opportunity to review 
their interview transcripts. Two participants made use of this option. Thereafter, thematic 
analysis (343) was used for systematically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into, 
patterns of meaning (themes) across a dataset. All data were read thoroughly by two researchers 
(MI, ML) in the language of the interview, and thereafter coded openly with the support of the 
data analysis software MAXQDA 12. Data analysis included three sequential steps. First, a code 
system was developed based on thematic relations using both inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Second, major themes were identified and categorized independently by two 
researchers. Finally, emerging themes were analyzed and compared within the code system, and 
adaptations were made to increase logical consistency. Discrepancies in interpretation were 
discussed and revised at various phases until a consensus was reached among all members of the 
research team. 
 
Results 
 
Our analysis identified six main recurrent themes:  
(I) IAT-use in response to current challenges in elderly and dementia care 
(II) Personal experience and clinical implementation 
(III) Expected benefits of IAT-use 
(IV) Barriers to adoption of IAT 
(V) Recommendations for designers and developers 
(VI) The future of dementia and elderly care in the digital era.  
Each of these core themes was further analyzed in detailed. An overview of themes and 
subthemes is presented in Table 8.  
 
Themes I. IAT-use in response 
to current challenges 
in dementia and 
elderly care 
II. Personal 
experience and 
clinical 
implementation 
III. Expected 
benefits of 
IAT-use 
 
IV. Barriers 
to adoption of 
IAT 
 
V. 
Recommendations 
for designers and 
developers 
VI. Future of DEC 
in the digital era 
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Subtheme 1 Lack of resources: 
Technological 
Financial 
Human 
Awareness  Improving 
QoC 
Mismatch 
between 
patients’ needs 
and IATs 
Clinical validation Holistic 
approaches- IAT in 
conjunction with:  
Pharma. therapy 
Early diagnosis 
Human care 
 
Subtheme 2 Caregiver burden Actual 
utilization of 
IATs 
Reducing 
caregiver 
burden 
Technical 
limitations 
Technical 
requirements:    
Portability 
Reliability 
User-friendliness 
 
Personalized care 
Subtheme 3 Communication Need for open-
minded and 
evidence-based 
approaches 
 
Improving 
communicatio
n and social 
interaction 
Translational 
problems 
User-centeredness  
Subtheme 4 AD diagnostics  Improving 
HRQoL of 
patients 
   
Tab. 8- Overview of interview themes and subthemes 
 
IAT-use in response to current challenges in elderly and dementia care 
Interviewees repeatedly discussed IATs in the context of current challenges in dementia and 
elderly care. In particular, they identified the lack of technological support, together with the 
scarcity of financial and human resources, as a major obstacle towards the successful delivery of 
elderly and dementia care services at their institutions. The lack of adequate technological 
equipment and digital infrastructures was perceived as a possible cause of sub-optimal care 
delivery jointly with the shortage of skilled healthcare workers, especially skilled nurses with 
specific training in the care of elderly people with dementia.  
 
P15, Neurologist, Female, Italy: “In our hospital we don’t have much technological support. 
Often it happens that a patient wanders away and this creates problems, even though there are 
guardians. But it still happens that patients wander away.”  
 
P4, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “The main problem, in my view, is the lack of trained 
healthcare professionals, and financially viable… and, of course, also of (technological) 
instruments, individual devices… of course… we are better off but this is a big problem in 
nursing homes and other institutions… we receive more and more questions about this.” 
 
IATs were also presented in relation to the problem of limited therapeutic opportunities for 
various forms of dementia, especially AD, and the rapid erosion of the caregiver-to-patient ratio. 
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Caregiver burden among formal caregivers was perceived as a major source of problem at the 
interviewees’ institutions.  
P3, Nursing Home Manager, Female, Switzerland: “Yes, they (caregivers) are always 
overburdened. So, we always have to check that they are still here, that they don’t get sick.” 
 
In light of unmet expectations with pharmacological therapy and in view of caregiver shortage 
and budget limitations at healthcare institutions, interviewees hypothesized that IAT support 
could mitigate the burden of disease and its associated financial problems before adequate 
therapeutic solutions are developed. The increasing need for skilled caregivers and persistent 
budget limitations at care institutions appeared hardly reconcilable unless smart technology-
mediated solutions are deployed. 
P6, GP, Male, Switzerland: “I think that in the future (IATs) are the only way to overcome the 
dilemma between the lack of caregivers and the lack of money. “  
 
Some interviewees identified a special challenge in their communication with patients with 
dementia, which was thought to be an important component of the doctor-patient relationship. 
Consequently, strategies that could facilitate or improve communication between patients and 
health professionals were perceived of primary importance.  
P7, Geriatrician, Female, Switzerland: “This is the greatest challenge: approaching patients 
and communicating with them”.   
 
Finally, in the specific context of AD, interviewees addressed the problem of late diagnosis and 
the lack of adequate tools and strategies for the early and accurate diagnosis of the disease. In 
this respect, health professionals expressed hopes that advances in personalized mHealth such as 
wearable health monitoring or portable brain and eye imaging could lead to better diagnostic 
outcomes, especially in the form of self-assessment.    
P2, Neuropsychologist, Male, Switzerland: „The big challenge, I think, is that we should 
become able to tell what it is as early as possible and as reliably as possible. […] We should get 
to a point where we can develop various examinations that patients can perform autonomously 
because the features of the device are so easy to grasp that they become self-explanatory.”   
 
Personal experience and practical implementation 
Reference to personal experience in relation to the clinical utilization of IATs was a common 
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thematic pattern. Our findings show that most health professionals were aware of the existence 
and clinical availability of various types of IATs for elderly and dementia care including 
ambient assisted living technologies (AALs), personal care robots, handheld devices and 
activity trackers.  
P8, Geriatrician, Female, Switzerland: “I know many GPS systems, alarm systems, and all 
these types of wearables, and then I know these intelligent beds (…) and security systems, 
sensors…” 
 
P13, Gerontologist, Male, Germany: “We have been working on projects involving assistive 
devices, smartphone based, and glasses… smart glasses for people with mild cognitive 
impairment” 
 
P16, Psychiatrist, Female, Italy: “Yes, I’ve heard about these (social robots)” 
 
However, only less than one third of them reported having actually used such technologies at 
their institutions to enhance care. Concurrently, interactions between health professionals and 
technology producers appeared rare, with less than one in four healthcare professionals 
reporting active interactions with designers, developers or marketers of assistive technologies 
for clinical purposes even though such interaction was often perceived as necessary to enable 
clinical translation.  
P15, Neurologist, Female, Italy: “No, nobody ever came here to show or propose some 
products to us… maybe because we are just ambulant clinics… but at regional level either… 
nothing.” 
 
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “Having a look at what's technologically possible. And in 
the help-desk kind of study, clinicians would not refer to that, they would not feel like "oh let's 
have a look at what is available nowadays"... clinicians wouldn't do that. So it really has to be 
presented to them. There are some people who are more interested and they, on conferences for 
example, would go to stands and see what's new... but most clinicians wouldn't. So if it's not 
presented to them, they wouldn't get in touch with it.”   
 
Results show that interviewees had mixed but mostly positive views about the use of IATs in 
elderly and dementia care. Such positive attitudes were often associated with the idea that the 
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assessment of new medical technologies should require open-minded attitudes to technological 
novelty and evidence-based approaches to technology evaluation. Most interviewees argued that 
prejudices against technological innovation could harm medical progress and delay the delivery 
of better healthcare services for patients. At the same time, interviewees felt that the efficacy of 
technology-mediated interventions should be carefully assessed and that the risks of hype or 
unintended effects should be prevented. As multiple interviewees reported:  
 P5, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “Of course, you need to have a critical mindset but you 
shouldn’t be anti-technology. I think there is a lot of hostility towards new technologies, I was 
affected by it myself. When I first saw this robot seal I said: “please, spare me this crap!“ but 
then I realized this was a stupid attitude. You shouldn’t be hostile. You should first try and then 
judge “.   
 
P6, Neuropsychologist, Female, Switzerland: “I don’t have anything against them (IATs). I 
think they are a ‘must’ in the future.” 
 
P17, Psychiatrist, Male, Italy: “I am absolutely in favor of any therapeutic-technological device 
that can benefit the patient. Our hospital is full, completely full of geriatric patients, so are the 
emergency wards, so any tool that can help prevent hospitalization would be good.” 
 
Expected benefits of IATs 
Positive attitudes towards IATs were largely dependent on optimistic expectations regarding the 
potential of these technologies to improve care delivery and ultimately benefit elderly patients. 
These attitudes appeared associated with recurring subthemes:  
First, improving the Quality of Care (QoC) was perceived has a major opportunity enabled by 
IATs as these technologies were perceived as able to gather more and better information about 
patients, hence deliver more personalized care solutions;  
P10, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “I think the environment and the type of dementia care… 
an individualized care closely dependent on the stage of the disease and as adapted as possible 
to the personal needs (of the user)…” 
 
Second, participants expected that IATs will reduce the burden on formal and informal 
caregivers, which was often reported by interviewees as a major challenge in current dementia 
and elderly care; 
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P4, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “I see these technologies especially useful among patients 
with advanced dementia as a relief for caregivers… as they can undertake certain mechanical 
functions…” 
 
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “I think where I see a potential is in assistive functions, so 
apps that can, for example, monitor motivation and the general psychological condition of 
relatives, support it and maybe even automates first aids or starts a conversation” 
 
P6, Neuropsychologist, Female, Switzerland: “Of course they can reduce the burden on 
caregivers if they are adequately implemented” 
 
Besides caregivers, elderly patients with dementia were also considered primary beneficiaries of 
the clinical application of IATs. In fact, participants perceived that IATs have the potential to 
improving the health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of patients and increase their safety and 
security;  
P10, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “Through technology you can obtain targeted alleviation 
of burden and workload or, under certain circumstances, increase the safety of patients, or in 
other circumstances… where you can transfer care tasks to technology.”  
 
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “I think the issue of safety/security is the one that is best 
addressed through IATs” 
 
P15, Neurologist, Female, Italy:” I think that the priority is to care about the safety of people. 
Precisely because care is so hard, so hard. So I would welcome those (IATs)” 
 
Fourth, IATs were perceived as enablers of novel opportunities for patient-caregiver 
communication, hence capable of digitally enhancing the patient-health professional and 
patient-relative relationships. This possibility appeared particularly useful in the context of 
multilingual communities.   
 
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “I have tested tracking devices and telephone hotlines and 
I had a positive experience with them. Even though the devices sometimes weren’t so good, but 
my impression was that the care workers were well sensitized. Of course, there are always 
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barriers with such media tools. But if I have somebody over the phone and through such 
devices… when a relative asks for support, in such circumstances having the chance to rely on 
devices that can process information, or navigate… videoconferences, videochats, videos that 
can give me an understanding of the situation, or that you can have a consultation with…”  
 
P6, Neuropsychologist, Female, Switzerland: “In Switzerland we have so many foreign care 
workers and they are not able to converse with patients with dementia in their native language. 
So, I would envision conversational robots that can say something or translate sentences.”  
 
Finally, IATs were expected to maintain or even improve the social relations of patients. This 
expected benefit was often perceived in conjunction with the capacity of these technologies to 
reduce loneliness and social isolation; 
P16, Psychiatrist, Male, Italy: “It could be a success. Because robots can talk, relate, interact, 
so patients maybe don’t feel lonely… maybe patients, from this point of view, don’t feel 
abandoned. Especially because these patients are very fragile. Every small thing can (help). It 
may sound silly but I have experienced many times that some patients have pets and that these 
pets can make them feel much better. So, this can improve their quality of life.” 
  
Barriers to adoption of IATs 
Barriers to adoption from the perspective of health professionals appeared strongly associated 
with both (i) current limitations in the design, development clinical implementation of IATs, and 
(ii) perceived collateral risks and obstacles in the translation of research results into the clinics. 
Three subthemes could be identified:  
Frist, low technology acceptance among elderly patients was often attributed to a mismatch 
between patients’ needs or abilities and design characteristics of currently available products. 
According to the interviewees, the specific cognitive and physical limitations of elderly adults, 
especially those of people with AD, are not adequately addressed by current IATs, resulting in a 
number of usage-related difficulties from the perspective of patients. These difficulties included: 
low familiarity among older users with advanced computing technology, the problem of 
adapting to unintuitive interfaces, excessive cognitive workload required by the IAT during 
everyday use, long training times required or the presence of visible features that can lead to 
social stigma;  
P13, Gerontologist, Female, Germany: “These are people that no longer use any technology in 
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their daily life, except for a light switch…very few can use a coffee machine, so it’s very difficult 
to approach...” 
 
P11,Nurse, Male, Germany : “Sometimes you have one button and many lights, and that makes 
it difficult even for a technology-savvy man like me to unambiguously understand which lights 
correspond to which alarm or what kind of signal…” 
 
P1, Neuropsychologist, Male, Switzerland: “Programming a reminder is way too complicated… 
the cognitive impairments of these patients do not allow them to do that… so patients can’t 
benefit from it (app-based cognitive assistant).” 
 
P12, Gerontologist, Female, Germany: “Ahm… acceptance is influenced by… you know, 
products are too big, or not adapted to their target population, or too clunky, or not enough 
unobtrusive and not enough user-friendly.” 
 
P11, Nurse, Male, Germany: “I think that many technologies, as they are today, are still made 
in a manner that can generate visual stigma.” 
 
Second, technical limitations and low efficacy of certain IATs were also widely reported. 
Interviewees identified technical challenges in the IATs they used at their institutions. These 
challenges included poor quality of hardware and software, unoptimized interfaces, low 
reliability, low accuracy and others. These issues were perceived to negatively affect the 
utilizability of these technologies among end-users and even jeopardize the entire IAT market. 
In fact, the presence in the IAT market of numerous poorly designed, clinically ineffective and 
insufficiently validated devices was often presented as a risk factor that could harm the 
reputation and credibility of the entire market. 
P12, Gerontologist, F- Germany: “In most cases we’re talking about devices that are not so 
valuable. The specifications and materials are awful.” 
 
P6, Neuropsychologist, F- Switzerland: “Once you have a negative image, this will negatively 
affect the future production of truly helpful robots“ 
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P1, Neuropsychologist, M- Switzerland: “A really, truly helpful assistive technology… I’ve 
experienced that rarely…” 
 
Besides technical considerations, critical problems in the successful translation of research 
prototypes from the designing labs to the clinical setting were identified. These translational 
problems included a knowledge gap between technology producers and clinicians due to 
insufficient interaction among these stake-holders groups, lack of time or absence of mediators 
that can enable information transfer across these groups, and difficulties associated with 
interdisciplinary collaborations between engineers and clinicians;  
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “There was only once a research project... proposed... but 
it was really difficult to imagine how that could, in the very end, translate into clinical relevance 
so we didn't follow up on that.”   
 
P13, Gerontologist, Male, Germany: “I have experienced this myself with security sensorics 
that worked very well theoretically, still worked well in the lab but then in reality didn’t work 
properly anymore.” 
 
P11, Nurse, Male, Germany: „There are language barriers between medicine and 
engineering.” 
 
P11, Nurse, Male, Germany: „This is of course a big problem. How can a clinic, how can a 
health professional, how can patient associations transfer knowledge to the engineers that are 
responsible for creating a new device? 
 
P8, Geriatrician, Male, Switzerland: “I can’t meet with all (IAT) companies. I just don’t have 
the time!” 
 
These considerations led many interviewees to advocate the creation of intermediary platforms 
that could bridge the gap and facilitate information transfer across relevant stakeholders. 
 
P9, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “People in the clinics have just a general idea of what can 
be done, but very few ideas, not so much understanding of what that technologically means. I 
am sure that a mediation (between clinicians and tech-producers) is very important.”  
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Recommendations for IATs producers 
Based on their clinical experience, interviewees provided recommendations for IAT producers 
on how to adapt technological designs and development strategies to their clinical needs with 
the purpose of increasing clinical effectiveness and acceptance among end-users. One major 
subtheme in this respect was clinical validation. Most interviewees argued that a cause of 
reluctance towards the introduction of IATs in their clinical praxis was the insufficient clinical 
validation of current products and the lack of sufficient and generalizable data about their safety 
and effectiveness.  
P10, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “So I looked into the studies and saw that the evidence is 
very poor. (…) There are studies that say „it works“ and others that say “it doesn’t work”. But 
evidence is currently small. Until there is a lack of evidence any discussion with industrial 
partners is difficult”.   
Concurrently, interviewees argued that study results in design labs and other experimental 
settings should be complemented with studies in real-world scenarios:  
P12, Gerontologist, Female, Germany: “You should definitely get out from the lab and back 
into reality! There should be more every-day studies… there is certainly not enough.”   
This recommendation appeared strongly linked with the theme of persistent translational 
barriers as interviewees reported the difficulty of replicating in the field research results 
previously obtained in controlled laboratory settings:  
P13, Gerontologist, Male, Germany: “I have experienced this myself with security sensorics 
that worked very well theoretically, still worked well in the lab but then in reality didn’t work 
properly anymore.” 
 
Other interviewees, however, proposed to distinguish minimally invasive IATs such as activity 
trackers and monitoring technologies from other devices and argued that the former might be 
entitled to faster clinical validation given their low invasiveness and risk. In such circumstance, 
a conflict appeared between the physician’s need for clinical validation and the need for 
accelerating the development of new products for the benefit of patients.  
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “Actually with devices that only show that they are (…) 
helpful and they are not invasive, I wouldn't mind too much about it going quicker to the market. 
Because that's the thing: in this field the consumer will then very easily show if a product is 
 175 
 
good or not by using it, buying it, or especially using them or not. So I would not insist on a big 
dataset beforehand”.  
 
Frequently associated with the theme of clinical validation was the problem of identifying 
“signal-from-noise” in the IAT market. Interviewees largely shared the view that it is hard for 
them to detect truly effective tools in the large and ever-evolving IAT market, hence 
recommended to divert more efforts from the design of new prototypes to the clinical 
implementation of existing ones.  
P12, Gerontologist, Female, Germany: “The money shouldn’t be invested for even more new 
hyperhigh prototypes, in contrast we should place more research funds in the implementation.”  
 
In order to increase technology acceptance among end-users, interviewees recommended 
ameliorating the technical specifications of current IATs and prioritizing the principles of 
reliability, portability and user-friendliness. Reliable functioning was perceived as a necessary 
requirement to guarantee that users can trust and safely rely on and their assistive tools in their 
daily activities.  
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: “Reliability is key. So this is an experience we made with 
GPS systems: very frequently they are just not working. And that's not helpful for the patients or 
the caregivers if the devices frequently have issues with the battery or no signal or something 
like that. That leads to frustration and then they don't use it at all. So reliability is very 
important.”   
 
The importance of portability (i.e. the ability to be easily carried, worn or moved) was 
associated with the problem of forgetfulness, which is particularly prominent among elderly 
people with AD and other dementias.  
P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany: ”So it would be a device that can be carried on the body, 
and would not have to be remembered to take with you. So, it can be a watch on the wrist or 
around your neck. So probably it would be a good kind of device for cognitive assistance.”   
 
Virtually all interviewees highlighted the importance of user-friendly, cognitively easy and 
behaviorally effortless interfaces to increase acceptance and efficacy among end-users. This 
theme appeared strongly linked with consideration of unintuitive and cognitively demanding 
interfaces as a major barrier to adoption and acceptance among elderly users.  
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P14, Psychiatrist, Female, Germany:” One thing that's really important is that the device 
should not have too many buttons or too many functions because patients wouldn't be able to 
use them anyway in most cases and it would be confusing for them. So where there is like one 
button to record something and one button to play probably it would be the easiest way and 
most likely to be used then.” 
 
Finally, a general consensus could be identified among interviewees regarding the importance of 
pursuing user-centered approaches to technology design. In addition to patient-centered 
approaches, inclusive approaches favoring the involvement of caregivers were also positively 
evaluated.  
P10, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “It’s absolutely important that engineers closely work 
together with clinicians as well as patients and their relatives, and that these can tell engineers 
what dementia is and what the needs of these patients are.”    
P4, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “It’s not sufficient to simply involve patients in the process. 
You also have to involve their caregivers, relatives etc…. because sometimes their needs might 
be different“.  
 
The future of elderly and dementia care in the digital era 
A significant subset of coded themes was associated with views, expectations and predictions 
about the future of elderly and dementia care in the digital era. Interviewees expected that with 
advances in robotics and the progressive digitalization and automation of healthcare, IATs will 
become increasingly ubiquitous.    
P7, GP, Male, Germany: „I cannot foresee if in 20 years robots will be regularly utilized, but 
I’m very confident that they will.” 
 
However, all interviewees agreed that IATs should integrate and complement human-delivered 
care but not replace it altogether.  
P3, Nuring Home Manager, Female, Switzerland: “Technology is an added value, a support, 
but I don’t think that it can replace human care.” 
 
P4, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “I think that these instruments should remain assistive 
tools and shouldn’t replace medical examinations, diagnoses or therapies. I find this a risky 
trend: if doctor-patient contact is abolished and everything runs via apps… I think this is 
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dangerous…” 
 
This consensus about the integrative but not substitutive nature of technology-mediated care was 
often associated with the idea that assistive robots and other IATs cannot adequately support the 
social dimension of the patient-caregiver dynamic and replicate eminently human abilities such 
as empathy, companionship and human contact.  
P5, Psychiatrist, Male, Switzerland: “This (IAT) is a support but if it ends up replacing human 
care entirely then we will be deprived of this… human contact, humanity… this empathy and 
emotional exchange.” 
 
Interviewees indicated IATs as one of the strategies that should be pursued to tackle “the grand 
challenge” of global aging and dementia. Additionally, they called for holistic approaches 
consisting of coordinated strategies including prevention, early diagnosis, better 
pharmacological therapies, personalized care and IATs.  
P16, Psychiatrist, Male, Italy: “Raising awareness and investing more resources and funds for 
the establishment of interdisciplinary teams that can support the patient not only clinically but 
also socially.” 
 
From their perspective, various parallel approaches will be required to mitigate the global 
burden of population aging and dementia and IATs are likely to become part of a multi-strategic 
roadmap for dementia and elderly care in the upcoming decades. 
 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. While the use of a qualitative method allowed exploring a 
multifaceted topic in depth, such qualitative design prevents representative and generalizable 
conclusions. The study sample may not have represented the full range of experts’ views from 
the field of dementia and elderly care in the three target countries, since it was limited in regards 
to sample size, recruitment strategy as well as geographical and cultural variation. However, 
since the interviewees came from three countries characterized by large proportions of 
psychogeriatric population and worked at internationally renowned healthcare institutions with 
direct experience with gerontechnology development and testing, we believe that their views 
and perspectives provided valuable insights on IAT use in light of current trends in population 
aging.   
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In addition, there may be selection biases due to the recruitment process. In order to provide 
participants with adequate information, a brief summary of the project description was included 
in the invitation email (see methods section). This could have stimulated participants to reflect 
on the topic before the actual interview. Despite these limitations, the obtained findings show a 
variety of well-differentiated attitudes which add significant knowledge about how health 
professionals’ and researchers’ attitudes towards IATs for elderly and dementia care. Further 
research is required to provide (i) quantitative data on health professionals’ awareness, views 
and attitudes regarding IATs, (ii) qualitative insights from different cultural settings, and (iii) a 
more detailed assessment of the ethical issues at stake from a clinical perspective.  
 
Discussion  
Awareness, clinical utilization and translational issues 
Participants appeared very aware of current trends in IAT and gerontechnology. However, the 
small number (less than one third) of experts who reported having actually used IATs in the 
clinical setting denotes insufficient transfer at the cross-section between technology 
development and clinical implementation. This is confirmed by the recurrent report of 
unresolved challenges in the translation of prototypes into clinically viable products. In contrast, 
the general open-mindedness and positive attitude about IATs of interviewees seems to 
challenge the elsewhere reported hypothesis (344) that lower-than-expected adoption might be 
caused by conservative attitudes towards technology among stakeholders.  
This insufficient information transfer seems to be confirmed by the fact that interactions 
between health professionals and technology producers are reportedly rare, with only few 
interviewees reporting active interactions with designers, developers or marketers of assistive 
technologies for clinical purposes. Interviewees indicated as possible causes of such missing 
interaction the lack of time and interest of health professionals (especially physicians) in 
engaging with IAT producers, and the absence of mediators that can enable information transfer 
across these groups. Based on this evidence, increasing investments and strengthening efforts 
for the adequate implementation of IATs, as many interviewees suggested, seem to be an urgent 
priority. To facilitate such implementation, there is a need for creating new intermediary and 
consulting services at the cross-section between the lab and the clinics. While all interviewees 
acknowledged such need, and called for the creation of intermediary and consulting services, 
there was disagreement and uncertainty about which stakeholders should be responsible for such 
intermediation.  
 179 
 
Strictly linked to the problem of insufficient transfer at the cross-section between technology 
development and clinical use is the frequently reported presence of unresolved problems in the 
translation of research prototypes into viable clinical tools. Translation is a fundamental 
mechanism for leveraging the benefits of IATs for dementia (345). In light of our findings, three 
main translational challenges need to be addressed. First, producers should improve the 
technical reliability of their products in order to provide health professionals with more reliable 
tools. Second, the clinical validity of current IATs needs to be increased through larger and 
better designed studies, especially studies involving (i) larger population samples of (ii) elderly 
adults with specific forms/stages of cognitive impairment (iii) in real-world settings (e.g. 
homecare). As hypothesized in previous studies (2, 210), our results show that technical 
reliability and clinical validity are predictors of trust in IAT among health professionals, hence 
might positively influence final adoption into clinical practice. Large-scale randomized control 
trials were often perceived as a privileged method of clinical validation. Furthermore, our results 
support the claim by Kearns et al. (2016) that proof of concept studies in gerontechnology are 
useful but not sufficient (346).  
 
Promises and challenges 
 
Overall our findings seem to identify a positive match, from the health professionals’ 
perspective, between the perceived challenges in elderly and dementia care and the perceived 
capacity of IATs to address such challenges. In fact, our findings show that assistive 
technologies that can (i) alleviate caregiving burden, (ii) provide new tools for self-assessment 
and early diagnosis, (iii) optimize financial expenditures by providing more targeted and cost-
effective interventions, (iv) facilitate doctor-patient communication and (v) supply for the 
imminent shortage of human caregivers, are perceived by health professionals as capable to 
fulfill the major challenges in elderly and dementia care.  
At the same time, however, results indicate a general wish to inscribe IATs into a broader and 
multi-strategic roadmap for tackling the grand challenge of population aging and dementia. Our 
findings show a strong consensus that IATs should not replace human care, diagnostics and 
therapy but complement these human activities by providing mechanical and informational 
support for the benefit of patients and their caregivers. Particularly, interviewees hypothesized 
the impossibility of replicating via IATs (e.g. care robots) putatively human aspects of care such 
as empathy, human contact and emotional intelligence. While it remains an open empirical 
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question whether advances in emotional intelligence can achieve such human-like features 
(347), our findings suggest that preserving (aspects of) human care will increase the likelihood 
of IAT-interventions to be accepted by health professionals. Concurrently, our results indicate a 
need for harmonizing efforts in IAT development and implementation with other long-term 
strategies for enhancing elderly and dementia care, including prevention, pharmacological 
therapy, diagnosis and end-of-life support.  
 
Validation and Assessment  
The open and positive attitude of interviewees towards IATs denotes an incentive for future 
technological development in this field. These results confirm previous findings corroborating 
the positive potential of IATs for improving elderly and dementia care (67). However, our 
interviewees recommended that the focus in IAT-research should be shifted from the 
development of new prototypes to their validation and successful implementation. This is 
consistent with recent review results (6) showing that the IAT market is rapidly expanding in 
size and variety but is still affected by inadequate clinical validation, slow implementation and 
outdated models of technology design. Our findings indicate a need for supporting physicians in 
the process of filtering signal from noise in the IAT market, that is identifying safe, clinically 
effective, adequately validated and socially beneficial devices and distinguishing them from 
devices that do not meet these requirements. While consumer preferences and market dynamics 
could, on the long term, enable such filtering process, proactive designs and calibrated 
regulatory interventions could help accelerate and maximize the benefits of IATs in the short-to-
medium term. In addition, even though there is general agreement that “adequate 
implementation” is pivotal (see P6), it remains open what kind of implementation qualifies as 
“adequate”, i.e. which criteria and methods are required. It is worth observing that calibrated 
regulatory interventions and adequate implementation strategies can contribute not only to 
accurately identifying safe and effective products within the chaotic IAT domain, but also, and 
most importantly, to accelerate responsible innovation and the sharing of clinical benefits 
among psychogeriatric patients. 
 
User-centered design 
To this respect, our findings confirm health professionals’ preference for user-centered 
approaches to technology design and indicate room for cross-disciplinary collaboration among 
designers, developers and healthcare professionals with the aim of involving end-users in the 
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process and better adapting future products to their specific needs. Since review results show the 
almost half IATs for dementia and elderly care are developed in absence of user-centered 
approaches to product design (6), more efforts are needed to roots such approaches in 
technology development. In addition, interviewees often associated the lack of user-centered 
approaches with higher risk of technical limitations such as unintuitive, demanding or inflexible 
interfaces, which were identified as major barriers towards adoption. Consequently, a shift to 
user-centered approaches has the potential to initiate a virtuous circle where the early 
involvement of end-users in the design phase results in better products that obtain higher 
adoption rates among end-users, hence creating an incentive for companies to pursue user-
centered approaches.  
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Abstract 
 Machine ethics is the branch of ethics concerned with the behavior of artificially 
intelligent systems. Cyborg ethics is the related field of investigation concerned with the ethics 
of human-machine hybrid systems. While these areas of ethical investigation are experiencing 
rapid growth urged by disruptive advances in artificial intelligence, robotics and human-
machine interaction, yet their theoretical foundations continue to elude consensus among 
researchers. In fact, most attention in machine and cyborg ethics has been devoted to normative 
and applied ethical questions concerning the moral status of artificially intelligent systems, the 
moral permissibility of their application in specific contexts, and the normative principles 
governing the interaction between artificially intelligent systems and humans. While cyborg 
ethicists have discussed the ethical implications of integrating man and machines, machine 
ethicists have long debated on whether artificially intelligent systems have the cognitive 
capacities necessary for the attribution of moral status. It remains unexplored, however, what 
theory of cognition is best placed to explain and assess these cognitive capacities or competent 
 
29 No Impact Factor currently available for this journal 
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actions, especially in relation to human-machine interaction. This contribution aims at 
harmonizing the theoretical foundations of, respectively, machine and cyborg ethics and argues 
that an externalist account of cognition based on the notion of extended mind might offer a valid 
substrate for such harmonization. 
 
Cognition and the Problem of Moral Status 
 
Machine ethics is the branch of ethics concerned with the behavior of artificially intelligent 
systems. A basic problem in machine ethics is determining which artificially intelligent systems 
possess the cognitive capacities necessary for attributing moral status and moral responsibility.  
The answer to this problem is strictly dependent on another problem, often addressed in 
cognitive psychology and theoretical artificial intelligence, namely that of determining which 
mechanism realizes cognition in living organisms and artificial systems. In fact, in order to 
determine which systems possess capacity X (where X = cognitive capacity necessary and 
sufficient for the attribution of moral status and moral responsibility), we first need to explain 
what X is. In accordance with the requirements of modern science, this explanation should 
ideally be in functionalistic and mechanistic form.  
The default position in neuroscience is that cognitive processes in living organisms are 
largely implemented by the brain. The reason for that stems from the fact that the brain 
functions, in all vertebrate and most invertebrate animals, as the center of the nervous system, 
where center is meant in two ways. First, the brain is the functional center of information 
processing, which continuously receives sensory information in input, and then, after rapidly 
analyzing this information, responds by producing outputs which serve to control virtually all 
bodily actions and functions. Second, the brain is the necessary component of the nervous 
system, in absence of which no computation-like information processing connecting from 
sensory inputs would take place. Given these two characteristics, the analogous of the brain in 
artificial intelligent systems is often described as a central processing unit (CPU) in a serial 
processing digital computer. 
This idea is well rooted in the observation that the brain of humans is a particularly 
complex organ. Although it has the same general structure as the brains of other mammals 
(348), it is over three times as large as the brain of a typical mammal with an equivalent body 
size. It has been estimated to contain  50–100  billion  (10¹¹) neurons (349), of which about 10 
billion (10¹º) are cortical pyramidal cells (350). Most of the expansion of the human brain 
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with respect to the brain of other mammals comes from the cerebral cortex, a convoluted layer 
of neural tissue that covers the surface of the forebrain, which plays a key role in putatively 
cognitive processes such as thinking, reasoning, memory, attention, consciousness, language and 
perception.  
These cortex-enabled capacities are usually considered by ethicists as co-determinants of 
moral status. Therefore, the possession of such cognitive capacities among artificially intelligent 
systems would justify the attribution of moral status to these artifacts. For example, according to 
Kant, only beings with the capacity for practical rationality have moral standing (Kant 1788). In 
a similar fashion, Bentham (1823) proposed sentience as a discriminant of morality. Other 
intellectual capacities that have been proposed as grounding full moral status include 
intentionality (149), self-awareness , and future-oriented planning (351).  
For a theoretically well-founded machine and cyborg ethics, however, it is not sufficient 
to know what cognitive capacities are associated with moral status. Another foundational 
question is determining how these cognitive capacities can be realized in humans, machines and 
interactive human-machine systems. Consequently, developing a consistent theory of how 
cognition can be realized should cast light on how morality-enabling cognitive capacities can or 
should be realized in, respectively, humans, machines and interactive human-machine systems. 
Additionally, addressing the question about the realization of cognitive capacities would provide 
a more solid metaethical foundation to machine and cyborg ethics. Developing a theory of how 
morality-enabling cognitive capacities are realized at the functional level would cast light on 
what cognition means in relation to functions or processes that enable (the attribution of) moral 
properties. 
 
Internalism vs Externalism 
According to a position in cognitive science which obtained significant success in the 
'70s and 80s, the relation between the brain and the cognitive processes it implements basically 
resembles the relation   between computer hardware and system software: the brain, on the one 
hand, is hardware, i.e. the physical part of the computer; the mind, on the other hand, is 
software, i.e. a set of programs and related data installed in the hardware in order to provide 
instructions for the hardware to accomplish tasks (Block 1995)30.  
 
30 In recent times, the brain-computer metaphor has become increasingly controversial as many authors have 
criticized this analogy based on anti-representational approaches to cognitive science. See, among others, 
Epstein (2016).   
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The traditional view regarding the role of external (e.g. bodily or ecological) factors in 
cognitive processes admits that these factors play a causal role in determining which input 
patterns will be processed by the nervous system, in particular by the brain, through a finite 
number of internally defined successive states and manipulated to produce an  output. However, 
this view does not attribute to environmental factors any constitutive role in the information 
processing itself. According to the traditional view, indeed, cognitive processing in biological 
organisms corresponds to information processing in the form of electrochemical signaling within 
the neural circuits of the nervous system. 
In the past 20 years, findings in findings in cognitive psychology (352), biolinguistics , 
artificial intelligence (353) and philosophy of mind (125) that the functioning of cognition 
might intimately depend on external (e.g. bodily and environmental) resources. In particular, 
these findings  have led some cognitive scientists to formulate two related (even though not self-
implicating) hypotheses: (i) that cognitive processes in humans, non-human animals, AI systems 
and cyborgs (defined as human-machine integrated systems) might be actively influenced by 
external (e.g. bodily and environmental) factors (an hypothesis known as 'embedded cognition'), 
and (ii) that cognitive processes might partly capitalize on (indeed, be partly constituted by) 
information being stored and elaborated in natural or artificial representational systems located 
outside  the  organism  or  artificial  system  (an  hypothesis  known  as 'extended mind').  These 
findings,   as  well as their conceptual implications, have questioned the default brain-centered 
paradigm of neuroscience according to which cognition is computation-like information 
processing which is exclusively realized inside the brain. 
In this contribution, I will describe this externalist account of cognition by presenting its 
major theoretical components: embodied cognition, ecological cognition, distributed cognition 
and situated artificial intelligence. Subsequently, I will argue that this family of externalist 
approaches might offer a viable contribution to the theoretical foundations of machine and 
cyborg ethics in the era of human-machine interaction.  
 
Forms of Externalism 
 
Embodied Cognition 
Embodied cognition is the view according to which “cognition is deeply dependent upon 
features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent's body beyond the 
brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing” (354). 
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For example, findings in the cognitive psychology of perception (355) have shown that 
internal bodily states affect distant perception. Participants were randomly assigned by the 
researchers to three groups: high-choice (or freedom of choice), low- choice (experimenter 
choice), and control conditions. They were also asked to walk across a certain area. At the 
conclusion of the experiment, each participant was asked to estimate the distance she walked. 
The results showed that the high-choice participants perceived the distance walked as 
significantly shorter than participants in the low-choice and control groups, even though they  
walked  the  same  distance.  These results show the ability of internal states to influence 
perception of physical distance moved. This illustrates the reciprocal relationship of the body 
and mind in cognitive processing. Similarly, findings in the cognitive psychology of vision  
(356)  have shown that bodily orientation can affect information processing in visual search, 
thus supporting the view that vision is often action-guiding, and bodily movement and the 
feedback it generates are more tightly integrated into at least some visual processing than has 
been anticipated by traditional models of vision (357). Experimental findings in support of the 
causal role of bodily factors in cognitive processing have been reported with regard to many 
other cognitive  processes,  including  memory  (358), language (359), and moral cognition 
(360).  
Such findings have also encouraged AI researchers to bring embodiment theory into 
Artificial Intelligence. The resulting approach is called Nouvelle AI. Whereas traditional AI 
(sometimes referred to with the acronym  GOFAI, Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) 
has by and large attempted to build disembodied intelligences whose only way of exhibiting 
human-like cognitive performances is to process symbolic information (regardless of the 
morphology of the robot that these processes are implemented  by),  Nouvelle AI  attempts  to  
build  embodied  artificial intelligences in which structural and morphological factors of the 
robot play a causal role in driving cognitive processes. To the representational and symbolic 
stance of traditional AI, which was ultimately aimed at simulating human general intelligence, 
nouvelle AI approaches oppose an embodied stance aimed at emulating the behavior of 
evolutionarily simpler organisms such as insects. 
 
Ecological Cognition 
Research in embodied cognition has shown that bodily factors external to the nervous 
system of a living organism can play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in 
cognitive processing. Therefore, this approach has extended the boundaries of cognition from 
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the nervous system of a living organism to its entire body. The ecological cognition approach 
attempts to further expand the class of factors that are causally relevant for cognition as to 
include factors localized outside the organism, i.e. in the local environment where the organism 
lives and with which it interacts. According to this view, cognition is not exclusively realized by 
the brain but might, under certain conditions, emerge at the interplay between the brain, the rest 
of the body and the external environment. This view is succinctly captured by James Gibson's 
motto: "Ask not what's inside your head, but what your head's inside of" (361). 
 
Distributed Cognition in Human-Machine Interaction 
According to the distributed cognition approach, cognitive information-processing does 
not occur entirely within an individual cognizing organism but is distributed across a cognitive 
continuum involving the agent and the physical or social structures with which it interacts (362). 
This interaction chiefly occurs in symbolic form. Accordingly, a cognitive state, say a 
perceptual state, is a distributed state that includes the perceiving organism as well as elements 
in the perceiving organism's environment (363).   
Distributed  cognition  has  turned  out  to  be  a  useful  approach  for analyzing social 
aspects of cognition (socially distributed cognition) as well as cognizing in the digital 
technology era. Cognizers in a digital environment tend to offload some of their cognitive 
functions onto cognitive technologies such as personal computers and the internet, thereby 
extending their performance capacity beyond the limits of their own brain power (359)31. A 
prime example of cognitive technology is search engine technology.  Sparrow et  al.  (2011)  
have shown  that  if  people  rely  on  internet-stored  information  which  they expect it would 
be accessible later in time, they were worse at remembering  the  actual  trivia,  but better  at  
remembering whether  it would be accessible (364). These results suggest that (i) processes of 
human memory adapt to the digital environment of computing and communication technology; 
and that (ii) external cognitive technologies do not merely determine instrumental and 
quantitative changes, but can rather have qualitative effects on how information is processed. In 
the light of the two considerations, proponents of the distributed cognition approach think that 
such types of phenomena are better understood by redesigning human cognition as not confined 
to the individual cognizing organism but distributed across the organism and its (digital and 
 
31 While Dror and Harnad’s research on cognitive technology emphasizes the causal role of external artifacts 
in cognitive processing, these authors surprisingly reject “extended” approaches to the ontology of the mind. 
See Dror and Harnad (2008, p. 2). 
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social) environment. In this context, distributed means that the operation of the cognitive system 
involves (i) various internal and external components and (ii) a functional coordination between 
these components. 
Today, a number of cognitive technologies are available for supporting cognitive 
processing among people with cognitive disorders or disabilities. For examples, an increasing 
number of intelligent devices is being developed for providing external cognitive assistance 
(especially memory assistance in the form of adaptive prompts and reminders) to people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (5). Cognitive technologies do not include exclusively 
digital artifacts but brain-dependent cognitive faculties too. For instance, language itself is often 
understood as a form of cognitive technology that (I) allows cognizing organisms to offload 
some of their cognitive functions onto the brain of other cognizers (social environment), and (ii) 
extends organisms' individual and joint cognitive performances, distributing the load through 
interactive cognition (363). 
 
Situated Artificial Intelligence 
The role of external factors in    driving    cognitive    processes    has also been 
highlighted by recent research approaches in Artificial    Intelligence (AI). For example, the 
situated approach in contemporary AI is aimed at designing artificial agents that are situated in a 
given environment and are capable of behaving successfully in it. The cognitive architecture of 
situated artificial systems is commonly referred to as a 'subsumption architecture' (365). 
Whereas classical architectures for artificial systems rely on a central processing unit (CPU), i.e. 
an hardware unit that carries out the instructions of a program by processing the basic operations 
of the system through serial processing, subsumption architectures have multiple parallel 
computing elements, with no one unit considered the "center", and process the information by a 
distributed interconnected set  of  processors.  Each processor is specified as a layer of networks 
of augmented finite state machines (353). Such architecture implies that the cognizing agent 
does not rely on an internal, symbolic description of the environment, but rather on a non-
representational model of the interactions between the agent and its local environment. 
Simulating artificial agents in a natural or virtual environment requires AI loops, i.e. simulation 
technologies of the entire process that goes from perceiving an environmental stimulus to an 
action on the environment. The role of external factors in driving cognitive processes 
implemented by situated robots is twofold: 
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1. They causally affect the robot's sensory system without involving intermediate levels 
of representation, thus influencing the robot's internal information processing and behavior. 
2.  They can be manipulated or modified through the robot's behavior, for they are linked 
with the robot in a dynamic interaction loop. 
The most significant characteristics of situated artificial systems as   compared   to   
classical   AI are (i) a refined internal organization, in particular in terms of computational 
cheapness and information-processing speed; and (ii) a refined capacity of behaving and acting in 
a dynamic environment. Similar characteristics can be detected also in environment-dependent 
cognizing in living organisms. For instance, heuristic-based decision-making has turned out to be 
computationally less expensive and to produce faster and more accurate behavioral patterns than 
classic computational decision-making (366).  
 
At the Origins of Cognitive Externalism: Evolutionary Hypotheses  
 
Characteristics like optimization and output accuracy, have led authors such as Rowlands 
(2003), Clark (2002, 2008), and Gigerenzer (2007) to advance the hypothesis that embodied and 
ecological cognition are adaptations, i.e. phenotypical traits evolved by natural selection. Geary 
(2005) and Striedter (2005) have set a list of adaptive criteria that a certain cognitive faculty 
should meet in order to make its selection evolutionary predictable. These include, among 
others, optimization in system internal organization, optimization in input processes, and 
positive feedback on other system faculties. 
Internal organization is central not only in the assessment of the evolutionary 
predictability of a cognitive process but also in the assessment of its functional organization. 
From an evolutionary perspective, both in the sense of evolutionary biology and evolutionary 
computation, the ability to extend some cognitive processes to the external environment might 
determine an optimization in our internal system organization in three important ways. First, it 
may produce a better metabolic equilibrium. 
Cognitive systems are dissipative systems that get pushed into operation by harnessing 
energy from a variety of metabolic pathways. The human brain, in particular, is one of the most 
dissipating system of the biosphere, for it claims only 2% of our body mass, but is responsible 
for approximately 20% of our body oxygen consumption (367). For a cognitive system, 
therefore, energy must be constantly available for work (e.g. mechanical work) or for other 
processes (such as chemical synthesis and anabolic processes). However, energy is not always 
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easily available for a system. Food, for instance, humans’ best resource to assimilate some of the 
essential nutrients that our cells convert in energy, is often scant. For this reason, authors have 
argued that evolution might have favored those organisms capable to spark their life-
maintaining processes with the lowest possible expenditure of chemical energy. According to a 
principle in bioenergetics, all living systems try to execute their biological processes with the 
smallest effort/profit ratio, namely to obtain the best possible outcome with the lowest possible 
energy expense (368).  One possible way for the nervous system to reduce such effort/profit 
ratio might have been by transferring some processes from neurons or single processing units to 
external resources, as the latter do not draw on internal energy supplies. 
Optimization of the internal organization does not operate exclusively at the biochemical 
level, but at the functional level too. In order for a system to be functionally optimized in 
evolutionary terms, and thus to have a high statistical probability of propagating itself to future 
generations, it must be able to (i) execute more functions than its unoptimized matching system; 
(ii) execute the functions of its unoptimized matching system more efficiently. In the case of 
environment-dependent cognition both conditions seem to be satisfied. In the first place, through 
extending to the external environment, the cognitive system might be able to execute more 
cognitive functions than if it were confined within the original boundaries. This functional 
advantage might not only pertain to couplings with sophisticated technologies, but also to simple 
artifacts and even to parts of the physical body too. For instance, McClelland (1989) and Clark 
(1989) observed that, thanks to the use of pen and paper, students can perform complex 
arithmetical and geometrical operations that they could not solve if they would only lean on 
internal resources (369).  
The same goes for children counting fingers on their own hand (370). In addition, 
extended systems have sometimes been observed to be more efficient than non-extended ones, as 
they are able to process information faster and to produce more accurate outcomes. Kirsh & 
Maglio (1994), for example, calculated that the physical rotation of a shape in the computer 
game Tetris goes about three times faster than the mental rotation of the same shape, precisely 
300 milliseconds of 1000 milliseconds to rotate the same shape through 90 (371). This reveals 
external processing to be, at least under some conditions, dramatically faster than internal 
processing. The same can be said, again, for mathematical operations. If one compares the 
performance of mathematical exercises both with and without a calculator (or pen and paper set), 
one would suddenly notice a dramatic difference in the time it takes to work them out. 
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In addition, leaning on external supports might not only increase the processing speed, but the 
outcome accuracy too. This phenomenon is particularly common among people with cognitive 
disorders, especially older adults with dementia. In fact, deficits in the accuracy of beliefs 
caused by insufficient internal cognitive resources have been observed in patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease and frontotemporal dementia (372). In these patients, memory reduction 
caused by loss of neurons and synapses in the cerebral cortex systematically leads to a deficit in 
belief accuracy. For example, a patient more prone to forget, say, the name of his daughter 
Amy, will also be more prone to have the false belief that his daughter's name is Laura. 
 
The Extended Mind 
Extended Mind (hereafter EM) is the thesis, first proposed by Clark & Chalmers (125), 
according to which the mind should not be limited to internal information-processing in the 
nervous system of cognizing organisms (or internal hardware of an artificial system) but 
extended to include some functionally isomorphic processes whose local position is outside the 
nervous system, and even the body of cognizing organisms, or internal hardware of an artificial 
system. More succinctly, EM is the view according to which the mind of a biological 
organism or artificial system may extend outside that organism or system. 
From the perspective of EM, the only parameter that defines the components of a 
cognitive process is the act of playing a causal role in a cognitive network, regardless of 
whether these components are physically located inside or outside the organism or artificial 
system (373).  
Not all external (bodily, technological and environment-dependent) processes count as 
mind-constituent. Rather, in order to be considered extensions of the mind, external processes 
must satisfy two basic conditions: (I) functional equivalence, and (II) reliability of coupling. Let 
us see what this means. 
According to a basic principle of EM, called 'Parity Principle', if an external system 
performs a process functionally equivalent to a process that (i) could be executed by an internal 
cognitive system, and (ii) if executed by an internal cognitive system would be regarded as 
cognitive without doubt, then the external process should be regarded as cognitive as well. 
Therefore, according to this view, cognition is not bounded by the nervous system of the 
organism, but may extend into processes that are realized by systems physically located outside 
that organism. The boundary of the nervous system becomes thus arbitrary and explanatory 
vacuous in determining the boundary of the implementation medium of cognition, as cognition 
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might be implemented by entities located outside the nervous system of the organism. As Clark 
and Chalmers (1998) famously put it: 
„If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in 
the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, than 
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't 
(all) in the head!“  (125). 
The reliability of coupling criterion introduces a further restriction to the EM cases. 
According to this criterion, not all external processes that are functionally equivalent to internal 
cognitive processes should be regarded as mind-constituent. Rather, functionally isomorphic 
processes are considered mind-constituent only if they couple with the internal cognitive 
processes that they are isomorphic to in a reliable way. Reliability is a complex property. In the 
EM debate, it is commonly thought to involve the following sub-properties: availability, 
portability and design.  
Availability requires the external process to be coupled with the internal one in a manner 
that the external process can be easily and quickly accessed by the internal system. An example 
of an external process that meets this requirement is the use of smartphone technology, as these 
external resources provided by these handheld devices are usually constantly available to the 
cognizing human being during her every-day-life. 
Portability requires the external process to be coupled with the internal one in a manner 
that is easily transferable in space and over time. An external process is said to be portable if it 
does not get decoupled when the internal system changes its local position in space nor when 
minor alterations affect the local environment itself. Sun-based communication in honey bees 
meets this requirement too, as the sun position continues to be coupled with the sun also when 
the bee changes its local position. A human-scale example is the use of wearable technology 
(e.g. smart   watches), as these resources can be taken with the cognizing human beings who 
wear them in a more reliable and robust manner compared to other device types such as desktop 
computers. In fact, their portability is guaranteed even in case of macroscopic changes in the 
user’s local position or minor environmental changes (e.g. seasonal change or change in 
weather). It is worth considering that portability is not an all-or-nothing property but a 
continuum. For example, handheld devices are more portable than desktop computers, 
wearables are more portable than handheld devices and implants are more portable than 
wearables. The element of portability is particularly important for assistive technologies 
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developed for people with memory impairments. In fact, these patients often forget to bring their 
devices with them, hence need devices that exhibit a high degree of frictionless portability. 
To these two criteria, which are widely discussed in the literature, I add a third 
requirement, i.e. design. Design requires that the internal-external coupling is not random, but 
designed to execute the cognitive function that it actually executes. For instance, hardware and 
software interfaces are non-random in the strong sense that they are designed, built and 
programmed by technicians precisely to execute the function that they actually execute. 
Similarly, smartphone technologies are designed, built and programmed precisely to provide an 
accessible, portable and useful support to internal cognition in humans. Of course, in order to be 
designed, external objects do not necessarily need to  be artifacts  or manipulated objects, such 
as tools. Non-manipulated objects in the natural environment can be also regarded as cognitive 
extensions, as long as they are co-opted by the cognizing organism for the function they actually 
execute in the integrated cognitive loop. This cooptation is multiply realizable, as it does not 
necessarily involve the physical modification of the object, but simply a change of function. For 
instance, the sun is coopted by the honey bee as vehicle of meaning regarding the position of 
food resources. Similarly, a tree can be coopted by humans as an external memory support (e.g.  
as a path-tracker sign). 
Some authors (125, 126) suggest a stronger criterion of design. According to this 
stronger criterion it is not sufficient that the external system is designed by the internal system 
to be coupled with it and execute the function it actually executes in the integrated cognitive 
loop. Rather, the internal system should also be designed to be coupled with external systems 
and integrate them in the cognitive loop. In other words, the dependence relation between the 
internal and the external system should not be unidirectional (from the internal to the external 
system) but bidirectional (form the internal to the external system and the other way round). 
This stronger criterion of design is self-evidently satisfied by artificial agents, such as situated 
intelligent robots. These agents do not simply redesign external objects in order to co-opt them 
for cognitive functions useful to the robot and couple them with the internal system, but they are 
themselves designed,  built  and  programmed  to  couple  with  external objects and co-opt them 
for cognitive functions useful to the robot (374). According to Clark & Chalmers (125) and 
Rowlands (126) the strong criterion of design is satisfied by living organisms too. Based on the 
evolutionary explanations summarized in the previous section, these authors claim that the 
cognitive systems of living organisms are designed by (in the sense of 'selected for') natural 
selection to couple with external objects in the environment and co-opt them for cognitive 
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functions useful to organism. This conjecture is logically linked to the empirical hypothesis of 
environment-involving processes to be adaptations. If this hypothesis turns out to be empirically 
correct, then cognizing living organisms satisfy the strong criterion of design too. 
As we have seen, the reliability of coupling is a crucial criterion to provide EM with a 
valuable ontology of the mind. In the absence of it mind-attribution would be ubiquitous (125).  
 
Extended Mind as a Theory of Human-Machine Interaction 
EM is particularly appealing to describe the class of cognitive interactions between 
humans and technological devices, hence the behavior of human-machine integrated systems. 
One classic example that EM proponents usually refer to is the every-day use of smartphones and 
personal computers to store and retrieve or simply access information. For instance, consider the 
case of a market trader saving on her smart-phone's phone-book her customers' phone numbers, a 
child searching on a web dictionary the meaning of the word 'idiosyncrasy',  a student using a 
calculator to do her math homework, a teen googling the lyrics of a song she can't recall, a 
teacher using an electronic calendar to memorize the course program, a tourist using geolocation 
to find her Hotel in Paris or a virtual translator to communicate with her French waiter. In all 
these cases, the internal cognitive system of the subject establishes an interaction with some 
external electronic devices that play an active causal role in driving a certain cognitive process -
respectively, in the cases mentioned above: memory storage, recall, learning, calculation, spatial 
navigation, language. Moreover, in all these cases the process executed by the external device is 
functionally equivalent to a process, or at least a phase of a process, executed, or that could be 
executed, by an internal cognitive system such as the human nervous system.  Finally, the 
coupling between the internal and the external system satisfies the condition of reliability, which 
is a critical requirement for the successful integration of human and machine. Other classical 
examples focus on the role of non-electronic technologies and cultural artifacts such as writing 
instruments, books, codes, etc.; and bodily components such as the hands when they are used to 
support mental calculation. From the point of view of EM, when people count along their fingers 
(process known as dactylonomy) there is no theoretical impediment to claim that this external 
calculation becomes part of a broader calculation process executed by the extended cognitive 
system composed by the nervous system and the hand. Similarly, when people use notebooks, 
books and encyclopedias to store or recall information, these external artifacts are regarded as 
processing units of an extended memory process (364). 
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One further privileged field of application of EM are clinical cases  of  impaired  
general  or  modular  cognitive  ability  (125). Dementia patients, such as Alzheimer's disease 
or vascular dementia patients, tend to compensate for their loss of cognitive ability by using 
external resources. For example, Alzheimer's patients in the early and moderate stage of the 
disease, typically display cognitive inabilities  such  as  inability  to  build  new  memories  or  
to  recall vocabulary ( 375 ) .   For this reason, they tend to note down the information that 
their brain is unable to store and recall it via external resources such as electronic devices or 
simple notebooks. Today, a broad spectrum of intelligent assistive technologies is available to 
provide and enhance such external cognitive assistance (6).  
From the point of view of EM, these external tools get integrated by the cognizing subject 
in such a way that they literally become constitutive components of the cognitive system 
responsible for the execution of the cognitive task. In the case of tool-using Alzheimer's patients, 
therefore, cognitive processes such as forming new memories or recalling vocabulary are not 
exclusively realized by the nervous system, but extend into the external resources exploited by 
the patient. In fact, the way intelligent assistive devices and notebooks perform (stages of) the 
memory process in Alzheimer's patients is functionally equivalent to cognitive processes that, in 
normal subjects, are usually executed by the brain (125). 
 
Externalism as a Framework for Cognitive Science and Artificial 
Intelligence 
In virtue of its high level of generalization across the human-machine continuum, the 
various externalist approaches described in above,  have  been proposed as a new paradigm or 
theoretical framework for the cognitive sciences ( 1 2 5 ,  1 2 6 ) . The reason for that stems from 
the fact that these approaches appear particularly suitable for integrating and making sense of the 
body of evidence in cognitive science and artificial intelligence regarding the role of external 
factors in cognition. In addition, they offer a suitable common ground for the many areas of 
cognitive science including cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, AI, cognitive 
linguistics and philosophy of mind. As a broad theoretical framework, externalism encompasses 
a large constellation of theoretical and empirical perspectives, which all recognize the causal 
(and, in the case of EM, even constitutive) role of external resources in driving, supporting or 
enhancing the internal cognitive capacity of biological organisms. 
From a theoretical point of view, externalism appears to unify virtually all approaches and 
perspectives to the study of cognition that do not underestimate the causal role of environmental 
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factors in driving cognitive processes. In particular, externalism is thought to integrate the 
embodied   cognition   approach, as,  according   to   EM,   cognition (particularly cognition that 
leads to competent action in the world) is not confined within the brain but extends to 
components whose local position is outside the brain and even the entire nervous system of a 
cognizing organism. Since the embodied cognition approach assumes cognition not to be 
restricted to information-processing in the brain but to extend to bodily components such as the 
musculoskeletal system and the sensory- motor mechanisms that are external to the organism’s 
nervous system, then embodied cognition is inherently externalist. More specifically, certain 
accounts of embodied cognition qualify as special instances of EM if such bodily factors are 
constitutively relevant to cognition.  
In addition, externalism is able to integrate all approaches and perspectives that recognize 
the causal role of external factors in driving cognitive processes. In particular, externalism is able 
to integrate the embedded, the situated and the distributed approach to cognition. All these 
approaches assume cognition not to be restricted to information- processing within the cognizing 
organism but to extend to processes partially implemented by objects in the organism's local 
environment, or at least to emerge out of the interaction between the organism, the intelligent 
machine and their local environment.  
 
Externalism as a Framework for Machine and Cyborg Ethics 
 
While there is a growing consensus that various forms of externalism might offer a 
valuable framework for the cognitive sciences, it is less intuitive to see how externalist 
approaches might valuably contribute to strengthening the theoretical foundations of machine 
and cyborg ethics.  
As we have previously stated, machine ethics is the branch of ethics concerned with the 
behavior of artificially intelligent systems. This discipline deals with problems such as 
determining the moral status of intelligent machines and designing machines that exhibit moral 
behavior. I argue that an externalist approach to cognition can provide a scientifically informed 
and philosophically innovative substrate for addressing these ethical questions.  The reason for 
that stems from a twofold consideration.  
First, while many authors recognize that cognitive faculties are critical for the attribution 
of moral status and moral responsibility (149, 351), yet the field of machine ethics lacks both (i) 
a uniform meta-ethical theory of what cognition is and (ii) a theoretical characterization of how 
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cognition is realized in intelligent machines. I argue that the externalist framework is 
epistemologically well-equipped to fill these gaps in the foundations of machine ethics.  
From an externalist perspective, cognition can be best understood as information 
processing that emerges out of the interplay between a cognizing agent (human or intelligent 
machine) and its physical, digital or social environment. This meta-ethical characterization is 
general enough to encompass both human and machine cognition, hence can harmonize the 
meta-ethical foundations of machines ethics with those of moral psychology and applied ethics. 
This also emphasizes how moral status is supervenient on the level of complexity of cognitive 
systems, i.e. it is a variable that can be gradually increased or decreased on a continuous scale 
based on the cognitive system’s degree of complexity.   
Additionally, since externalism admits that cognition is realizable through distributed 
systems consisting of various cognitive components (extended cognition), it provides a theory of 
realization that accounts not only for standalone intelligent agents but also for parallel and 
distributed systems. This characterization is particularly fruitful to frame the debate over the 
moral status and responsibility of emerging trends in computing and AI such as parallel and 
distributed computer systems (consisting of various networked and communicating 
components), distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems (i.e. systems composed 
of multiple interacting intelligent agents within an environment). These types of intelligent 
machines, in fact, in virtue of their distributed organization, are not accounted for by meta-
ethical theories that define cognition only in terms of mental representations implemented by an 
internal processor (e.g. the human brain or equivalent in silico).  
Second, externalist approaches provide a fruitful and informative scientific substrate for 
designing and developing intelligent machines that exhibit moral behavior. While traditional 
approaches to the design of moral machines have primarily focus on producing moral behavior 
by intervening on the internal cognitive resources, externalism poses the accent on the interplay 
between the machine and its environment. This theoretical shift and expansion is particularly 
valuable to account for intelligent machines such as social and companionship robots as well 
conversational agents. In fact, in these types of machines, the ability to competently interact 
with the social, digital and physical environment is absolutely critical. This increased attention 
on the interactive and interpersonal dimension is particularly valuable for social and assistive 
robots used for assisting frail seniors or people with cognitive disabilities as these patients are 
often vulnerable individuals, hence ensuring the moral behavior of care robots in an interactive 
dynamics is a priority (36).  
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With regard to cyborg ethics, the epistemological advantage of shifting the focus on 
extended cognitive networks is even greater. The reason for that stems from the fact that 
cyborgs are, by definition, cognitive agents consisting of both organic and mechatronic 
components. Therefore, the field of cyborg ethics is highly in need of a theoretical foundation 
that can account for the entire bio-mechatronic continuum, without arbitrary restrictions in the 
attribution of moral status and responsibility based on the type of physical realization of 
cognition within each component. Externalist approaches to the theoretical foundations of 
cyborg ethics have the advantage of providing a solid and comprehensive foundation to the 
ethics of all human-machine integrated systems, regardless of the physical realization of their 
components. Instead of focusing on the hardware architecture of each part of the cyborg, they 
can provide a comprehensive framework that encompasses the entire human-machine 
continuum. This epistemological shift is particularly important to account for the increasing use 
of integrated assistive technologies among people with physical or psychological disabilities 
such as brain-computer interfaces and neural prosthetics. Additionally, it can account for 
emerging phenomena where the relevant cognitive processing occurs across a reliable coupling 
of human and machine (e.g. information search across the brain-smartphone continuum).  
Additionally, at a more practical level, authors have noted that an externalist approach to 
the theoretical foundations of cyborg ethics can broaden our normative conception of harms to 
technological equipment and provide increased legal protection in the era of human-machine 
interaction (376). In their view, to the extent that externalist approaches are prioritized, 
intentional harm towards technological devices that have been appropriately integrated, should 
not be simply regarded as property damage, but as “extended personal assault” (ivi). In fact, the 
role played by these technologies within the extended cognitive process initiated by the user is 
such that their damage by malevolent third parties might qualify as personal assault. This 
normative advantage is particularly helpful to account for emerging dual-use risks in cognitive 
technology, such as malicious brain-hacking (377). With the pervasive diffusion of intelligent 
computing and its progressive integration into human life, ethics is increasingly required to 
provide a coherent normative ground to orient society across this historical transformation. 
Externalism is well positioned to accomplish this task and harmonize not only the theoretical 
foundations of, respectively, machine and cyborg ethics, but also the interoperability of these 
theoretical foundations as part of normative human-machine continuum. Authors have observed 
that technological innovation at the human-machine interface urges a new ethics of the post-
human or “more-than-human” moral world (378). As the boundaries between humans and 
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machines progressively blur, theories of cognition and moral status that rely on internalist, 
realization-specific accounts slowly become explanatory inadequate. In contrast, externalists 
approaches enable a shared and common grounding that accounts for all components and modes 
of realization of the human-machine entanglement.  
 
Conclusions 
Although machine and cyborg ethics are experiencing rapid growth ─urged by 
disruptive advances in artificial intelligence, robotics and human-machine interaction, yet their 
theoretical foundations remain undefined or even affected by conceptual muddles. In fact, most 
attention in machine and cyborg ethics has been devoted to normative and applied ethical 
questions concerning the moral status of artificially intelligent systems, the moral permissibility 
of their application in specific contexts, and the normative principles governing the interaction 
between artificially intelligent systems and humans. Machine ethicists have largely discussed 
whether artificially intelligent systems have the cognitive capacities necessary for the attribution 
of moral status as well as whether these systems are able to perform competent actions. 
However, it remains unclear what theory of cognition should better explain and assess these 
cognitive capacities or competent actions, especially in relation to human-machine interaction. 
This contribution has described an account of cognition in artificially intelligent systems and 
living beings from an externalist perspective.  
Given its capacity to explain cognition across the entire human-machine continuum, this 
externalist account of cognition provides a viable foundation for machine and cyborg ethics. In 
providing an elegant theory of how cognition is implemented in biological and artificial 
systems, this account also provides a more solid meta-ethical description of what cognition 
means in relation to functions or processes that enable (the attribution of) moral properties in 
artificial or hybrid intelligent systems. Functions or processes that enable (the attribution of) 
moral properties, in fact, can be realized not only via biological organisms (such as humans) but 
also by artificially intelligent systems and human-machine integrated systems. For this reason, 
the externalist account of cognition proposed by advocates of the extended mind thesis offers a 
more suitable and epistemically informative foundational framework for machine and cyborg 
ethics.  
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Abstract 
Population ageing and the global burden of dementia pose a major challenge for human 
societies and a priority for public health. Cognitive enhancement, i.e. the targeted amplification 
of core cognitive abilities, is raising increasing attention among researchers as an effective 
strategy to complement traditional therapeutic and assistive approaches and reduce the impact of 
 
32 Current Impact Factor: 1.386 (2016) 
 202 
 
age-related cognitive disability. In this paper, we discuss the possible applicability of cognitive 
enhancement for public health purposes to mitigate the burden of population ageing and 
dementia. After discussing the promises and challenges associated with enhancing ageing 
citizens and people with cognitive disabilities, we argue that global societies have a moral 
obligation to consider the careful use of cognitive enhancement technologies as a possible 
strategy to improve individual and public health. In addition, we address a few primary 
normative issues and possible objections that could arise from the implementation of public-
health-oriented cognitive enhancement technologies. 
 
Introduction: Global Ageing and Dementia 
 
Today, approximately 12 per cent of the world’s population is over the age of 60; by 
2050 this proportion is expected to have more than doubled (12). This trend is particularly 
recognizable in Europe as the proportion of ind iv idua ls  older than 65 years is e s t ima ted  
to  increase from 16.1 per cent in 2000 to 27.5 per cent by 2050, while the proportion of the 
population aged over 80 years (3.6 % in 2000) is expected to reach 10 per cent by 2050 (13). 
This demographic trend brings multiple health-related concerns, one of which is the rise in 
the number of older persons living with neurocognitive disabilities or experiencing age-
related cognitive decline. In fact, the probability of becoming cognitively impaired 
significantly increases with age. Cross-sectional comparisons have consistently demonstrated 
that increased age is associated with lower levels of cognitive performance, with some cognitive 
functions beginning to decline already in young adults and then worsening dramatically after the 
age of 60 (19). In addition, the prevalence of dementia-causing neuroprogressive disorders also 
correlates significantly with advancing age. For example, Alzheimer’s disease (AD), the most 
frequent type of age-related dementia, affects less than one per cent of the population under the 
age of 59, almost four per cent of the population segment aged 60-79, and over 11 per cent of 
those aged 80-89. With the ageing of the global population, the number of people with AD 
worldwide is expected to nearly triple by 2050 (26). 
Global ageing and the consequent increasing prevalence of cognitive decline pose a 
“priority for public health” in terms of financial management and caregiving burden (43). 
Estimates indicate that dementia and specifically AD are among the most expensive diseases 
for Western societies (35). According to the World Alzheimer Report 2015, the annual 
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societal and economic cost of dementia in the US has reached $818 billion, a 35 per cent 
increase compared to 2010. By 2018, it is expected to skyrocket to a trillion dollar (331).  
These significant costs a r i s e  primarily from long-term care at nursing homes and 
other health-care institutions; their burden affects not only public finances but also senior 
citizens, their non-professional caregivers (e.g. relatives) and the health-care system. At the 
family level, the problem of population ageing results in a caregiving burden on informal carers. 
In most countries, the primary source of care, assistance and support for older and disabled 
adults is informal caregivers, who are mostly family members such as spouses, children and 
grandchildren. This informal caregiving service is highly time-consuming and requires great 
effort from caregivers in terms of physical and mental energy. The provision of caregiving 
services frequently comes at high socioeconomic cost for caregivers, who often need to give up 
jobs, leisure time, and social activities to effectively take care of their loved ones. As research 
increasingly shows (38-40), the informal caregiving burden for older and disabled people is a 
significant source of psychological distress for carers, worsened mental health functioning, 
anxiety, perceived stress, and depression (38). As most caregivers of seniors with physical or 
cognitive disabilities are themselves growing older (average age 63), and one third of them are 
reported to be in fair to poor health (Administration on Ageing 2004), the reduction of 
caregiving burden could play a major role in the promotion of healthy and successful ageing 
within society at large. In spite of this multi-domain burden, informal care is neither accounted 
for nor reimbursed in the healthcare economy in most countries (Bhimani, 2014). Finally, at the 
individual level, older people with dementia or age-related cognitive decline experience 
diminished quality of life, reduced independence, and low work productivity (331).  
 
Cognitive Enhancement  
Cognitive Enhancement (CE) refers to the “amplification or extension of core capacities 
of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information 
processing systems (p.311” (379).  
Philosophers and scientists have long debated on what degree of improvement or 
augmentation of internal or external information processing systems qualifies as cognitive 
enhancement. Some authors, for example, have argued that a line can be drawn between 
enhancement and therapy (380), with the former only denoting improvements beyond the 
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norm33 and the latter denoting improvements aimed at restoring lower-than-normal function. In 
recent years, however, researchers have underscored the “elusive nature” of this line (382) and 
expressed skepticism regarding the conceptual validity (383) and “practical significance” (379) 
of the enhancement-therapy distinction. While a detailed description of the semantic and 
conceptual debate over enhancement is beyond the scopes of this article, our analysis will use 
the notion of CE to define any amplification of core mental capacities, encompassing 
interventions aimed at both restoring function towards the norm and improving it beyond it. 
CE via augmentation of internal information processing systems usually occurs through 
interventions that target the underlying neurobiology of the cognizing agent. This can occur 
either chemically or electronically. Chemical enhancement usually consists on the 
administration of cognition-enhancing pharmacological treatments. For example, the nootropic 
drug Piracetam, a cyclic derivative of GABA, has demonstrated benefits in treating neuro-
degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease by improving alertness and memory (384), 
and is also prevalent amongst college students seeking cognitive performance boosts (e.g. 
during exams preparation)34. Internal electronic enhancement usually occurs through the use of 
technologies that interface the brain of the cognizing agent. Neural prostheses are devices that 
can repair, replace or enhance motor, sensory or cognitive capacities that might have been 
damaged as a result of an injury or a disease (385). These include sensory prosthetics such as 
cochlear implants,35 motor-prosthetics such as bladder control implants36 and cognitive neural 
prosthetics stricto sensu. The latter are capable of recording the cognitive state of the subject, 
rather than just signals strictly related to motor execution or sensation. Using high-level cortical 
signals, cognitive prostheses can partly compensate for declining cognitive functions including 
intention, motor imagery, decision making, forward estimation, executive function, attention, 
learning, and multi-effector movement planning (386).  Restoration of function after brain 
damage using a neural prosthesis. Cognitive neural prosthetics stricto sensu need to be 
 
33 It is worth noting that much debated has also focused on the definition of normality. See for example: 
381. N. Daniels, Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, 309-322 (2000). 
34See:  https://www.newswithviews.com/Howenstine/james182.htm 
and http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/nicholas20120320  
35 Surgically implanted electronic devices that provide auditory function in persons who are profoundly 
deaf or severely hard of hearing in both ears.  
36  Devices implanted over the sacral anterior root ganglia of the spinal cord, controlled by an external 
transmitter, which deliver intermittent stimulation to improve bladder emptying.  
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distinguished from technologies that non-invasively (i.e. from outside the skull) enhance 
internal information processing, like non-invasive neuromodulation (387).  
Augmentation of external information processing systems usually occurs through 
interventions that do not directly target the underlying neurobiology of the cognizing agent but 
rather non-invasively modify the environment within which the cognizing agent interacts, alter 
the agent’s habits or provide external cognitive resources to support cognition from outside the 
skull. For example, after their extensive review of the literature, Halperin and Healey have 
concluded that strategies of “environmental enrichment”, i.e. environmental manipulations of 
the natural and social environment with the purpose of improving the agent’s cognitive 
capacities, have a powerful influence as cognitive enhancers (388). In fact, studies have shown 
that an array of neurodevelopmental processes facilitate efficient neurotransmission and are 
highly responsive to environmental influences. These influences include modifications of air 
pollution levels, urban planning strategies, home design, quality of parenting, creation or 
protection of large and reliable social networks such as family and friends etc. Interventions 
targeting the agent’s habits have also demonstrated effectiveness in enhancing cognitive 
functions. These include optimal amount of sleep, healthy nutrition, drug avoidance, regular 
physical exercise and sports, reading, brain-training etc. Finally, several digital (both hardware 
and software) systems are increasingly usable as external cognitive support tools or cognitive 
extensions in modern societies. A paradigmatic example is the smartphone which is pervasively 
used as additional memory storage space, spatial orientation and navigation assistant (through 
the use of mapping services and GPS-tracking apps), task reminder, activity planner, and verbal 
communication tool, hence supplementing critical intracranial cognitive functions (389). Today, 
a number of external hardware (e.g. robotic assistants) and software (e.g. mobile apps) 
applications “routinely give human beings effective cognitive abilities that in many respects far 
outstrip those of biological brains (p. 312)” (390). For example, cognitive processes such as 
arithmetic calculus and geolocalization are now prevalently and more effectively performed in 
humans through external software than through internal information processing (391). 
With advances in cognitive neuroscience, clinical neurology, neural engineering, and 
computer technology, the number of cognitive capacities that can be augmented through 
improvement of information processing systems (both internally and externally) is increasing. 
These include memory, sensory, perception, attention, language.  
CE raises a number of ethical questions. In 2008, an article appeared in Nature raised 
awareness among scientists about the ethical implications of CE and called for an evidence-
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based approach to the cost-benefit analysis of cognitive enhancers. The authors identified three 
major ethical issues: safety, fairness and coercion (392). Since then, the ethical debate over CE 
has largely focused on the theoretical permissibility of cognitive-enhancing interventions rather 
than on the applicability of CE to specific population segments to improve public health. As 
Shaw (2014) observes (p. 389), the CE literature “has focused on cosmetic neurology and 
restoring those of sub-par ability to the normal range”, paying very little attention to developing 
strategies for improving the physical and psychological health of the public via CE (393). One 
exception is represented by pediatric neuroenhancement, as some studies have explored the 
ethics of health-improving applications of CE. For example, Singh and Kelleher have proposed 
that the primary care clinic should be the relevant site where young people's use of enhancement 
technologies can be safely and objectively managed in a manner  that maximizes the benefits of 
these technologies while minimizing the risks (394).  
In spite of the growing prevalence of age-related cognitive decline, the applicability of 
CE for public health purposes remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we conduct a narrative 
review of the existing literature on CE solutions for older people and propose an ethical stance 
for the safe and effective implementation of CE in light of global population ageing. We argue 
that, in light of the current clinical, financial, and organizational burden of ageing and dementia, 
global societies have a moral obligation to consider the careful use of “cognitive enhancement 
technologies” (395) as a strategy to improve individual and public health. In addition, we 
address a few primary normative issues that could arise from the implementation of public-
health-oriented CE interventions with the purpose of preparing the normative ethical terrain for 
such future interventions. Finally, we respond to possible objections against the use of CE 
among seniors.  
 
Cognitive Enhancement for the Ageing World: Opportunities  
 
Research shows that the calibrated application of CE technologies has the potential to 
alleviate the global burden of population ageing and age-dependent cognitive decline. Recent 
findings in clinical neuroscience have demonstrated that neural and cognitive functions in older 
adults can be enhanced using cognitive training techniques (396). For example, several studies 
have focused on establishing the impact of exercise on the nervous system and the associated 
cognitive benefits. Daily aerobic exercise over a long period of time has been observed to 
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increase oxygen transport and energy resources by maintaining blood vessels of the brain and 
improving the growth and function of brain cells (397). Based on this evidence, Korean 
researchers have developed a CE gymnastics program for older people with dementia and 
verified its effects. Their results show that such enhancement programs improve gait capability, 
balance sense and the performance of activities of daily living in people with AD or vascular 
dementia (average age, 80.93±5.19 yr) (398). Similarly, European researchers have developed 
and tested a physical activity program that can significantly slow cognitive decline and improve 
quality of walking in older persons suffering from dementia (399). Besides physical training, 
environmental interventions have shown great potential too. In their extensive review, Park and 
Bishof (2013) have concluded that engagement in an environment that requires sustained 
cognitive effort facilitates cognitive function in older adults and that  modifications of the social 
environment such as social participation and engaged lifestyle increase behavioral performance 
on executive function tasks (396). In parallel, randomized controlled trials involving 
pharmaceutical neuroenhancers have also achieved promising results. A double blind trial 
involving 140 older individuals with Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) for a period of 6 months 
has shown that a cholinesterase inhibitor called donepezil improves gait performance and 
reduces the risk of falling (400, 401). Finally, advancements in micro-computing, mobile 
technology and artificial intelligence are also producing positive results. For example, tablet-
based tools have shown effectiveness as cognitive assistants for the augmentation of decision-
making capacities among senior citizens (402), reminiscence (403) and social interaction (404). 
Last year, the release of the 10-year findings from the Advanced Cognitive Training for 
Independent and Vital Elderly (ACTIVE) study showed that computer-based CE technologies 
can not only augment cognition but also reduce dementia risk among older adults (156). 
Through a large randomized-controlled design (2,785 participants at six trial sites in the U.S.) 
researchers detected a 33 per cent reduction (p=0.012) in the risk of developing cognitive 
decline or dementia over the next 10 years.  
Such rapid advancements in CE for senior citizens are particularly promising in the light 
of the current limited possibilities in geriatric medicine. Today, in spite of some promising 
applications of stem-cell-based epigenetic regulation in human cell line (405), reversing ageing 
is still scientifically impracticable. In addition, most neurogeriatric disorders such as 
Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease are currently incurable. Available therapeutic strategies 
can either delay disease progression or temporarily remediate to contingent symptoms (331). 
Given the current demographic regime of global population ageing, the consequent increased 
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prevalence of age-dependent neurocognitive disorders, and current limited therapeutic 
possibilities in geriatric medicine, the global burden of ageing is predicted to increase over the 
next few decades (331).  
As findings show that CE could be of great benefit for elderly and dementia care, we 
argue that there is a moral obligation to consider CE as one additional strategic avenue for 
addressing the global burden of population ageing worldwide and improve the lives of senior 
citizens. In fact, the careful and calibrated use of CE interventions could complement existing 
preventive and therapeutic strategies, resulting in better public-health outcomes. CE 
technologies, in fact, could help amplify core mental capacities of senior citizens in a manner 
that restores function towards the norm or even improves it beyond it. 
 
Challenges 
 
Four considerations are important in relation to this proposal. First, CE interventions are 
not and should not be intended to replace prevention and therapy. In contrast, they are and 
should be designed with the purpose of complementing existing strategies as part of a 
comprehensive public-health enterprise. Effective CE interventions that can mitigate cognitive 
decline, reduce the risk of neuroprogressive disorders and contribute to the promotion of healthy 
and successful ageing among senior citizens could successfully complement and enhance 
existing public health strategies.  
This continuity between CE and public health is confirmed by the consideration that, in 
the context of elderly care, the line between enhancement and treatment is, as previously 
observed, hard to draw. This is particularly evident in geriatric medicine. As Bostrom and 
Sandberg observed, CE of a person X with poor biological memory could leave that person with 
a memory that is still worse than that of a person Y who has retained a fairly good memory 
despite being recently diagnosed with an identifiable pathology, such as mild cognitive 
impairment or early-stage AD (379). In addition, as the ACTIVE study shows, CE strategies 
such as long-term computer-based cognitive training among healthy older adults, may be 
effective in preventing neurogeriatric pathologies (156).  
Second, the implementation of CE technologies should be guided by a procedural, 
evidence-based approach that prioritizes those interventions that have demonstrably higher 
clinical effectiveness and safety over other interventions. In addition, interventions that involve 
low financial costs should be prioritized over more expensive interventions, provided all other 
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parameters (clinical effectiveness and safety) are equal. For example, easy-to-implement and 
inexpensive measures such as environment modifications and low-cost brain-training programs 
should be prioritized -ceteris paribus- over costly high-tech interventions.  
Third, interventions should be non-coercive (406, 407). Mentally competent older adults 
should have the right and liberty to choose whether to use CE technologies or refuse to do so.  
Following public-health campaigns based on traditional CE technologies such as healthy 
nutrition and physical exercise, citizens should be thoroughly informed about the clinical and 
non-clinical benefits of adapting their habits to public-health goals. While under some 
circumstances, seniors may be implicitly oriented towards these goals through nudging, 
financial incentives, and other promotional strategies, we argue that CE interventions, unlike 
other forms of human enhancement such as immune enhancement via vaccination, should not be 
mandatory as a default position. The reason for that is twofold. First, because ageing and most 
neurological disorders that can be alleviated via CE are not communicable: in absence of any 
equivalent of herd immunity, the group of individuals that will choose to enhance will not 
increase in any significant sense the protection of those individuals who cannot do it. Second, 
because CE interventions should respect the individual right to cognitive liberty, an emerging 
fundamental right that comprises two intimately related principles: the right of individuals to use 
CE technologies, and the protection of individuals from the coercive and unconsented use of 
such technologies. Cognitive liberty has often been presented by scholars as the fundamental 
level of self-determination (408), because “the right and freedom to control one’s own 
consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is the necessary substrate for just about 
every other freedom” (406). It is worth noting, however, that the right to cognitive liberty may 
not be an absolute but a relative right. Therefore, while no form of coercion should be accepted 
as a default position, soft-paternalistic strategies (409) could be morally acceptable under 
certain circumstances. The use of nudging and soft paternalism ─use of maps on the floor and 
environmental alarm systems to avoid wandering installed in absence of explicit consent─ is 
currently accepted in the care of people with advanced dementia when this is considered in the 
best interest of patients. Similarly, temporary limitations to cognitive liberty for the purposes of 
CE might be morally accepted if these are in the best interest of patients (e.g. proportionally 
reducing suffering in absence of relevant adverse effects). However, we argue that soft 
paternalism may become ethically problematic if it leads to situations where CE is not 
mandatory but refusal of it leads to punitive financial consequences in terms of providing for 
one’s own care. 
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Fourth, CE strategies should be justice-oriented and prevent the exacerbation of pre-
existing socioeconomic inequalities. Shaw (2014) has examined the prospect of improving 
health outcomes through CE among sections of the population where health inequalities are 
particularly pronounced. He called this enhancement of the population health through CE 
‘neuroenhancing public health’ (393). In light of the considerations described above, elderly 
care might be at the core of this public health enterprise. 
 
Possible Objections 
The proposal of neuroenhancing public health measures to alleviate the global burden of 
population ageing and cognitive decline might be opposed on various grounds. First, it might be 
argued that it represents a form of ageism, i.e. discrimination against older people. For example, 
Hertogh has argued that the focus on successful ageing is a form of ageism that works out as a 
negative incentive to the care for the oldest-old (410). The reason for that stems from the 
consideration that CE strategies aiming at promoting successful ageing might fail to recognize 
the inevitable nature of ageing and age-dependent frailty or psychophysical decline. In addition, 
at the pragmatic level, focusing on preventing or delaying age-dependent decline might result in 
reduced support for frail older adults that need care. In response to this concern, we argue that 
CE technologies that aim to prevent or mitigate the cognitive effects of ageing are not more 
ageist than preventive or therapeutic interventions in geriatric medicine that aim to prevent or 
cure physical age-dependent disorders. Therefore, objecting to CE on this ground would thereby 
imply that geriatric medicine itself is ageist in character. Second, CE interventions that can help 
older adults maintain their cognitive capacities, physical skills, and social relationships can 
thereby empower them and protect their individual autonomy. Instead of being a form of 
discrimination, CE would enable seniors to maintain greater independence and promote their 
freedom to make choices and select courses of actions according to their intended plans, with 
fewer external constrains and limitations.  Finally, as it may delay or partly obviate the need for 
institutionalized care (2, 67), CE is predicted to alleviate the burden on the healthcare system. In 
a time when the provision of institutional care for the ageing population is increasingly 
threatened by financial and logistical limitations37, CE strategies might actually help allocate the 
available resources to those population groups −such as the oldest-old or elders with advanced 
dementia− that are in greater need of institutional care and skilled support. It could even be 
 
37 The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/may/03/aged-care-funding-nursing-
homes-cut-federal-budget (last accessed 10/27/16).  
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argued that it would actually be discriminatory to deny older people access to CE, given the 
disproportionate burden of mental problems that affects this group – particularly if CE for health 
reasons becomes more widespread among other age groups. 
 The point about resources is closely related to the possibility that CE plans for older 
people might be economically impracticable in a world where 12 per cent of the population is 
over the age of 60 (411). While this is an empirical question that can only be answered based on 
existing data and statistical predictions, it is worth considering that the costs of CE should not be 
considered in absolute terms, but proportionally to the costs that could be potentially saved on 
healthcare budgets through the effective implementation of CE strategies. In light of current to 
demographic trends, the rapid erosion of the caregiver-to-patient ratio, and the consequent 
financial and practical unsustainability of long-term institutional care for a growing older 
population in the near future, CE could offer a valuable complementary solution to existing 
public-health strategies. It is possible, however, that long-term care costs might actually increase 
if CE delays entry into care but prolongs time in care overall.  Future research should assess the 
financial sustainability of this proposal in the light of current and future demo-economic 
variables.  
 Some authors have observed that most common views on CE are paternalistic  (412), a 
problem that might become even more evident if these views are expressed through public-
health initiatives. However, we think that this risk applies only to cognitive enhancement plans 
that involve hard paternalistic and coercive measures or are misimplemented in a manner that 
illegitimacy violates the individual right to cognitive liberty.  
A more substantial concern is the risk that unevenly distributed CE technologies could 
generate a neurotechnological divide which might exacerbate pre-existing socioeconomic 
inequalities. In fact, while ageing and age-related cognitive decline are common to all 
socioeconomic classes, there is the latent risk that only certain socioeconomic groups could 
afford, and hence benefit from, CE technologies. This risk will be discussed in the following 
section.  
Preserving Fairness in Cognitive Enhancement 
In regard to costs and fairness, two considerations are important. First, several forms of 
CE for senior citizens with reported effectiveness such as physical exercise and environment 
modification do not involve costly equipment. Therefore, they could be implemented in a 
manner that minimizes socioeconomic divides. Second, with the average cost of care in 
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an assisted living facility in the United States reaching $3,293 per resident per month38, the 
current state of long-term care is a major threat to socioeconomic inequality in the ageing world. 
In fact, the negative impact of age-dependent cognitive and physical decline is greater among 
low-middle class people who hardly face the costs of institutional long-term care, or whose 
carers have to give up jobs and leisure time to care for their beloved ones instead of paying for 
skilled facilities. This problem has global relevance given that the greatest relative cost increases 
related to elderly care and age-dependent cognitive disorders are occurring in low-income 
African and in East Asia regions (413) where the provision of elderly care services will be 
seriously threatened due to the existing limitations of national budgets. In this global context, 
even the most sophisticated CE strategies are likely to improve current cost-effectiveness ratios 
if they have demonstrated efficacy.  
While prioritizing low-cost CE interventions might be an ethically sound kick-off 
strategy, there is a collateral risk of delaying the benefits of effective but higher-priced CE 
solutions. High-tech electronic neurodevices such as BCIs and portable neuromodulators have 
prices starting from over a hundred US dollars, pharmacological enhancers such as Donepezil 
cost over one US dollar per single pill, and app-based cognitive programs can be often free to 
download but require expensive hardware (smartphones or tablets) to work; assistive robots 
including cognitive assistants such as SoftBank’s Pepper (414) and companionship robot Paro 
(415) have prices ranging between two and six thousand US dollars39. In the absence of 
governmental interventions via targeted reimbursement plans there is a risk that high-tech CE 
tools might be accessed solely by middle-to-upper class citizens of industrialized countries. It 
might be observed that this unequal distribution is not an exclusive characteristic of 
enhancement, but common to the entire healthcare landscape; while this is likely the case, it is 
not a moral justification of inequality at the policy level. However, CE should not aggravate 
current geographical and socioeconomic inequalities but seek to mitigate them.  
To avoid the exacerbation of socioeconomic inequalities, we suggest that strategies that 
could maximize universal access by fair opportunity should be pursued. These include both 
technical and policy strategies. First, at the technical level, efforts need to be made to reduce 
hardware costs and promote open-software initiatives in the development of computer-based CE 
 
38 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: http://longtermcare.gov/costs-how-to-pay/costs-of-
care/ (last accessed 10/27/16).  
39 See: https://www.ald.softbankrobotics.com/en/Launch_Sales_of_Pepper; http://www.technorms.com/37552/top-
10-awesome-robots-you-can-buy-today (last accessed 10/27/16).  
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devices.  Open platforms such as Open-BCI and open source repositories for the development of 
m-health solutions for people living with dementia (416) are positive examples of these efforts. 
In parallel, inclusive health policies that maximize access, availability and distribution of 
effective and safe CE solutions across all socioeconomic groups should be designed. These 
policies might involve governmental subsidy and reimbursement schemes for health-promoting 
CE solutions, the inclusion of CE tools into basic health insurance plans, and financial 
incentives (e.g. tax reductions and credits) for virtuous developers.  
In developing such policies, those people who are socioeconomically most 
disadvantaged should be prioritized. As Shaw explains, this is because the greater beneficial 
impact of CE is likely to occur among the cognitively worse-off. In contrast, “those who already 
make good health decisions might benefit only slightly (p. 391)” (393). Such prioritization of 
the most disadvantaged shows that CE could not only avoid the aggravation of pre-existing 
socioeconomic inequalities, but holds the potential of reducing such inequalities by delaying or 
obviating the need for unequally accessible and geographically unevenly distributed services. As 
Shaw puts it (p. 391), successful CE “would ultimately mean that the cognitive gap between the 
most and least cognitively able citizens would decrease, just as health inequalities would 
decrease” (393).  
This aspect is particularly relevant in the light of what we call the recursive nature of 
cognitive enhancement. In fact, clinical evidence shows that lower intelligence (broadly 
defined), worse cognitive performance and poor health literacy are predictors of lower health 
outcomes and reduced longevity (417-422). Therefore, increasing intelligence and cognitive 
performance via CE will not simply improve public-health by reducing the global burden of 
age-dependent cognitive decline and related disorders; in addition, such measures are also 
predicted to recursively improve general health outcomes in a number of domains 
including cardiovascular disease (419), blood pressure (423), mental health (424), and others. 
This recursive character of CE acquires special ethical significance in relation to socioeconomic 
parameters. In fact, people with lower overall cognitive performance are more at risk of lower 
socioeconomic status, which recursively increases their risk of lower health literacy and, 
consequently, negative health-outcomes. For example, Morrow et al. have observed that 
functional health literacy scores are lower among older and less educated citizens, in particular 
when they had more comorbidities, or scored lower on all cognitive ability measures (425).  
 214 
 
Therefore, CE technologies that prioritize the most socioeconomically disadvantaged are 
likely to interrupt this cycle of “income inequality leading to educational inequality leading to 
health inequality” (426) and initiate a virtuous circle in which cognitive enhancement leads to 
increased socioeconomic equality and, consequently, increased health equality. As recently 
stated by The Lancet Commission Dementia Prevention, Intervention, and Care (p. 53), “we are 
a long way from achieving equity” (427). Consequently, CE should reduce inequities, not 
aggravate them. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that CE should be seriously considered as one viable solution to 
tackle the increased prevalence of age-related cognitive decline and promote healthy ageing. In 
light of the current clinical, financial, and organizational burden of ageing and dementia, we 
argue that global societies have a moral obligation to consider the careful use of CE 
technologies as a strategy to improve individual and public health. There do not appear to be 
any strong arguments against offering CE technologies on a voluntary basis to ageing citizens, 
especially those affected by or likely to be affected by dementia. The only substantive ethical 
issues arise with regard to cost, paternalism and fair access. First, it is possible that long-term 
care costs might actually increase if CE delays entry into care but prolongs time in care overall. 
Second, lightly paternalistic measures such as nudging may be ethically problematic, if they 
lead to situations where CE is not mandatory but refusal of it leads to punitive financial 
consequences in terms of providing for one’s own care. Finally, in order to avoid the 
exacerbation of a technology divide, effective deployment of CE technologies should aim at 
maximizing universal access and prioritizing the most socioeconomically disadvantaged.  
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Abstract 
Recent advances in military-funded neurotechnology and novel opportunities for misusing 
neurodevices show that the problem of dual-use is inherent to neuroscience. This paper 
discusses how the neuroscience community should respond to these dilemmas and delineates a 
neuroscience-specific biosecurity framework. This neurosecurity framework involves calibrated 
regulation, (neuro)ethical guidelines and awareness-raising activities within the scientific 
community.  
 
Introduction: Dual-use Neurotechnology 
In ethics of (bio)technology, the dual-use problem refers primarily to the cooptation of civilian 
technology for military aims. This expression is also used to refer to the possibility of utilizing 
the same technology for both beneficial (e.g. clinical) applications and harmful misuse (e.g. 
bioterrorism). While nearly any technology holds a potential for dual-use in the broad sense, 
recent reports for the British Royal Society and the Dutch Research Council have provided a 
 
40 Current Impact Factor: 14.024 (2016). As the author of this Elsevier article, I retain the right to include 
it in a thesis or dissertation, provided it is not published commercially. Permission is not required, but 
please ensure that the journal is referenced as the original source. 
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narrower definition and distinguished “intentional misuse” from the general domain of 
repurposing activities with unintended harmful consequences. Dual-use technologies are 
originally designed and developed for a wide spectrum of civilian purposes, among which 
biomedical research and healthcare often play a prominent role.  
Until recent times most attention to dual-use technology emerged in the fields of 
molecular and cell biology, especially in those areas involving research on pathogens such as 
virology, bacteriology, and other subdivisions of microbiology. Security-sensitive research in 
these fields of science is classified as Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). DURC is a 
United States Government’s oversight label identifying research in the life-sciences that can be 
anticipated to provide informational or technical resources for the development of threats to 
public health, individual safety or national security. The DURC label was introduced to prevent 
the malicious application of life science research, and although this framing has recently faced 
criticism among researchers (e.g. for not clearly demarcating the range of dual-use applications 
and providing only limited oversight), it is still in place as a guidance mechanism among 
national and international organizations.   
In the past two decades, new concerns have been raised as several emerging 
neurotechnologies have shown dual-use potential, causing the inclusion of various areas of 
neuroscience into the DURC-domain. Tennison and Moreno (2012) have extensively reviewed 
the domain of neurotechnology tools with applications in both civilian and national security 
contexts with special focus on projects funded via the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA). Their state-of-the-art review identified three main categories of 
dual-use neurotechnology: brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), neurotechnologies for warfighter 
enhancement, and neurotechnological systems for deception detection and interrogation (428). 
The first category encompasses systems that establish a direct connection channel between the 
human brain and an external computer device, bypassing the peripheral nervous and muscular 
system. Medical applications of BCI have shown clinical effectiveness in repairing, assisting or 
augmenting cognitive or sensory-motor functions in patients experiencing neurological 
impairments including spinal-cord injury, stroke, motor neuron disease and, more recently, even 
though with significant limitations, age-related cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease (AD). 
Outside the clinics, non-invasive direct-to-consumer BCIs are gaining increasing popularity as 
portable (often smartphone-compatible) tools for device control, self-neuromonitoring and 
personalized entertainment.  
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Using the same technological paradigm, national security uses of BCI include the 
acquisition of neural information gathered from warfighters’ brains to adaptively modify their 
equipment and the development of Threat Warning Systems that convert subconscious, 
neurological responses to danger into consciously available information (429). Warfighter 
enhancement applications include pharmacological and non-pharmacological (especially 
transcranial direct current stimulation-tDCS) technologies for selective cognitive enhancement 
in targeted brain-areas. Finally, the deception detection domain encompasses devices such as the 
so-called “brain-fingerprints” capable to access concealed information in response to a stimulus. 
While these applications, especially those based on functional-magnetic resonance (fMRI) and 
electroencephalography (EEG) hold a great potential for medical diagnostics, they are powerful 
surveillance and enhancement tools for national security, judicial and military purposes due to 
their dual-use character. Although no deception detection technology is being currently used in 
official security operations, several devices are either directly DARPA-commissioned or are 
able to market their services to national security and law enforcement agencies 
(http://www.truthfulbrain.com/martkets/).  
The dual-use problem is often presented as an ethical dilemma since it identifies a 
conflict between two fundamental ethical duties: the promotion of good and the prevention of 
possible collateral harm, e.g., between the promotion of health through effective clinical 
applications and the provision of resources for the killing of civilians through military 
operations. Marchant and Gullant have noted that, in some research contexts including 
neurotechnology, the complexity of the dual-use dilemma is increased by its bidirectional 
character. While classical dual-use problems are concerned with the cooptation of beneficial, 
civilian technology for military or nefarious purposes, neurotechnology also raises the reverse 
problem as several neurotechnologies developed by the military for national security purposes 
are likely to spill over into the civilian sector with a disruptive impact on healthcare, 
communication or other fields (430).  
The dual-use character of neurotechnology makes it also a potential target for non-State 
actors. In fact, as many neurotechnologies are based on computation and information 
processing, they are potentially vulnerable to cyber-risks. Even though there are no confirmed 
cases of malicious attacks in non-experimental settings, information security researchers have 
experimentally demonstrated the actual feasibility of performing side-channel attacks and 
extracting private information from users of EEG-based BCIs without their authorization (431). 
These experiments have shown that neurotechnology is subject to similar privacy vulnerabilities 
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and cyber-risks as other computer systems. In response to that, neuroengineers have called for 
enhancing the security of current neurodevices and incorporating protective measures such as 
encryption technology into the product design (142).  
 
The Bidirectional Character of Dual-Use in Neurotechnology  
As dual-use appears inherent to neurotechnology, the progressive increase in the number 
of civilian ─both clinical and consumer-grade─ neurotechnology applications, will likely 
determine a proportionate increase in dual-use opportunities.  
With global population aging, an important portion of neurotechnological applications is 
being developed with the purpose of assisting or providing novel therapeutic, diagnostic and 
assistive solutions for older adults with cognitive or physical disabilities. Researchers have 
observed that the number of technology applications for older adults and people with dementia 
is nearly tripling every five years (6). In parallel, a growing number of portable diagnostic tools 
are under development. For example, virtual reality techniques and mobile apps 
(http://www.seaheroquest.com/site/en/) can be used to detect navigational  deficits in 
cognitive aging and AD.  
Many technologies currently used for seniors and the cognitively disabled have a 
dual-use potential. Notably, near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) is used in medical and 
physiological diagnostics to assess loss of functional hemispheric asymmetry or verbal fluency 
in AD, as well as to comparatively measure cognitive function in, respectively, normal cognitive 
aging and prodromal dementia. Similarly, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) techniques 
can help enucleating the neurophysiological profile of vascular dementia and understanding 
the role of different neurotransmission pathways. Today, DARPA-funded NIRS applications 
are being tested for military purposes to detect deficiencies in a warfighter’s neural processes 
and feed that information into a device utilizing in-helmet or in-vehicle transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) to suppress or enhance individual brain functions (428).  
Vice versa, given the bidirectional character of dual-use in neurotechnology, several 
applications have shown reverse dual-use potential. A paradigmatic example is the DARPA-
funded Restorative Encoding Memory Integration Neural Device (REMIND) program. Under 
this program, researchers were able to detect patterns of functional brain connectivity in the 
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex associated with successful memory encoding and retrieval. 
After identifying hippocampal firing patterns associated with correct encoding of a specific 
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event, they translated these outputs into electrical stimulation in animal models with rodents. 
Their results show that, when applied to the hippocampus during memory encoding, the 
stimulation significantly improved the ability of rodents to subsequently remember an event 
(432). These promising results, obtained in the context of military-oriented neuroengineering 
research, hold the potential of leaking into the civilian sector with beneficial impacts. With 
recent unmeet expectations in pharmacological research on memory restoration, 
neurostimulation studies could complement or even create new avenues of therapeutic research 
for memory disorders such as AD and other dementias, post-traumatic amnesia, and even 
normal aging.  
In some circumstances, dual-use in neurotechnology can generate a circular dynamic. As 
mentioned previously, several non-invasive, direct-to-consumer BCIs have made their way onto 
the consumer market. However, as Miranda et al. (2015) observed, “the signal-to-noise ratio of 
these systems is often too low to reliably detect many EEG components of interest for 
neuroscience efforts aimed at improving human training and performance, particularly when 
single trial analysis is required” (429). DARPA-funded programs such as the CT2WS aim 
precisely at developing reliable EEG-based BCIs for applications such as threat detection and 
non-invasively recording of operators’ neural activity (429). These efforts are an example of a 
civilian technology that is coopted for military research and may subsequently spillover into the 
civilian sector through more reliable clinical or commercial applications. 
A Global Ban on Dual-Use Neurotechnology? From Applied Ethics to Policy 
 
 The problem of dual-use in neurotechnology is exacerbated by the fact that national-
security and military applications are not the only way to repurpose civilian neurotechnologies. 
As mentioned before, misuse by malevolent individuals or groups is likely to become a concrete 
risk in the near future. Proliferation of both civilian and military neurotechnology is increasing 
the chances that neurodevices could land in the wrong hands. As neuroethicist James Giordano 
put it: “It’s not a question of if non-State actors will use some form of neuroscientific techniques 
or technologies, but when, and which ones they’ll use” (433). Malevolent uses of 
neurotechnology could be potentially performed not only by individual actors, but also in the 
context of organized criminality, terrorist organizations and other State and non-State actors, 
hence raising global security concerns.  
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The emerging risks associated to dual-use issues in neurotechnology have led scholars to 
take a critical stance against national defense and security involvement in neuroscience research. 
For example, it was argued that ‘[m]ost rational human beings would believe that if we could 
have a world where nobody does military neuroscience, we’ll all be better off’’ (434). These 
evaluations have led policy makers to consider the possibility of introducing a moratorium 
against military neuroscience. For example, in 1999 the European Parliament Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy (rapporteur: Maj Britt Theorin) called for a global 
ban of research “which seeks to apply knowledge of the chemical, electrical, (…) or other 
functioning of the human brain to the development of weapons which might enable any form of 
manipulation of human beings”. However, given the reverse dual-use potential of 
neurotechnology, the claim that we would be better off in a world without military 
neurotechnology is likely to be an inaccurate prediction. Defense-funded research enables 
increased funding opportunities for accelerating development in neurotechnology, and can 
spillover into civilian applications for the benefit of society. It cannot be ruled out a priori that 
military neurotechnology could follow a similar historical trajectory as geographic positioning 
system (GPS) surveillance and the Internet—examples of originally military-oriented 
technologies that eventually leaked into the civilian sector and today “pervade society’s daily 
life, mostly with beneficial impacts” (430). Risks of misuse are common to nearly all ICTs, 
including those that are regularly used in daily activities such as mobile computing and social 
media. The long terms effects of these technologies might be hard to predict. In addition, these 
systems can be realistically repurposed for malicious activities including cyberwarfare and 
cyberterrorism. Nonetheless, a global ban on these technologies would likely be perceived by 
many as a disproportionate policy response as their foreseeable benefits outweigh the 
conceivable harms. A global ban on military neurotechnology would prevent any spillover-
effect into civilian applications and could delay technological innovation for people in need 
including older people and patients with neurological disorders.  
In light of population aging, the global burden of neurological disorders and the 
bidirectional dynamics of dual-use issues in neurotechnology, we identify a strategic and global 
health benefit in continuing research in defense-funded neurotechnology to successfully meet 
the grand challenges ahead in mental health and neurological care.  
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The Need for a Neurosecurity Framework 
 
Although a global ban or moratorium on military neurotechnology appears ethically unjustified 
at present, softer and more calibrated regulatory interventions might be necessary to mitigate the 
risks of a disproportionate weaponization of neuroscience. In particular, we identify an urgent 
need for increased monitoring and careful risk-assessment in the context of dual-use 
neurotechnology. Even though, at the moment, benefits seem to outweigh the risks, preventive 
mechanisms should be in place to promptly detect future variations in the risk-benefit ratio. 
Building upon the experience of biosecurity frameworks developed in other areas of the life 
sciences might be a viable strategy to tackle the emerging problem of dual-use in 
neurotechnology. However, adaptive adjustments to the specific challenges of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology are required. The reason for that stems from the fact that the misuse of 
neurotechnology might have a more direct impact on the mental dimension of individuals, hence 
pose specific ethical, legal and social challenges. As neurodevices have the capacity to access 
and modify the neural correlates of mental processes, their misuse by malevolent actors could 
expose individuals to greater risks associated to their mental dimension.  
To this purpose we identify a need for developing a neuro-specific biosecurity 
framework, the neurosecurity framework. Following biosecurity strategies in cell biology and 
other life sciences, such neurosecurity framework should be designed and implemented to 
maximize security across the whole translational continuum between scientific research and 
society (and reverse). Furthermore, it should be particularly sensitized to anticipate and 
promptly detect neurotechnology-specific threats, especially those that concern the mental 
dimension. This neurosecurity framework should include, at least, three main levels of 
safeguard: calibrated regulatory interventions, codes of ethical conduct and awareness-raising 
activities. In the following, we provide a non-exhaustive characterization of these requirements.   
First of all, calibrated and neuro-specific regulatory approaches are needed to ensure 
neurosecurity for individuals and groups. Currently, military neurotechnology falls into a 
regulatory chasm. The two existing U.N. treaties —the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)— that de iure should limit abuses within the 
neurotechnology domain, only focus on biological and chemical bioweapons but contain no 
provisions for electrophysiological applications (435). Additionally, the CWC does not prohibit 
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the use of chemical weapons in riot control, leaving open the possibility that riot control tools 
might be coopted as neurochemical weapons for offense. These regulatory gaps and loopholes 
could allow opportunities for misuse and offence, especially in war zones. Experts have already 
emphasized the limited scope of the CWC and called for their urgent update, warning the 
treaty’s exclusive focus on national authorities and neglect of individuals, revolutionary groups, 
factions in civil wars and terrorist cells that can exert a detrimental influence on global security 
(436). Such expansion of the weapons conventions should also aim at preventing detrimental 
misuses of neuroelectric applications. Legal scholars have argued that certain neuroweapons 
might be incompatible with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as they “ultimately disrupt 
the premise of responsibility under IHL” (437). Consequently, national governments and 
international organizations are under obligation to consider how neuroweapons would relate to 
IHL norms. Similarly, it should be considered how dual-use neurotechnology relates to human 
rights such as autonomy, privacy and mental or physical integrity. 
In the context of nefarious misuse by State and non-State actors, emerging collateral 
risks associated with the widespread use of neurotechnology such as malicious hacking, 
neuroimaging-based intelligence interrogation as well as hazardous uses of medical 
neuromodulation are likely to require neurospecific security safeguards. Adequate regulatory 
responses by governmental and intergovernmental organizations might require the evolutive 
interpretation of existing rights (e.g. updating privacy rights to account for mental privacy) or 
even the creation of new neuro-specific rights (407). A possible candidate is the protection of 
mental integrity. Although mental integrity is protected by the EU's Charter of fundamental 
rights (Article 3), this right is conceptualized as a guarantee for accessible mental health 
services. No specific protection, however, is stipulated against unauthorized intrusions into a 
person’s neural computation through the use of neurotechnology, even if such intrusions result 
in physical or mental harm to the victim. Other possible candidates include the right to 
psychological continuity, which intends to protect the continuity of personal identity from 
unconsented exogenous alteration (407). These regulatory updates could be operationalized 
within the general schemes set by existing declarations such as the Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights adopted by UNESCO, but with specific focus on the challenges 
raised by neurotechnology –similarly to how the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights or the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data addressed specific 
normative issues raised by genetic testing and engineering.  
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Second, codes of ethical conduct need to be developed to maximize the benefits of 
military neuroscience while minimizing the risks for individuals and communities. If research 
on selective memory manipulation (restoration or erasure) will ever reach human 
experimentation, it must guarantee the highest safety and research ethics standards. In particular, 
clinical trials must (i) be preceded by corroborated evidence of safety and effectiveness in 
animal, in vitro and computational models, (ii) prioritize subjects with treatment-resistant 
conditions, whose symptoms elude conventional therapies, (iii) demonstrably exclude 
unintended collateral consequences on non-targeted brain functions, and (iv) follow rigorous 
procedures for the obtainment of informed consent and IRB approval. Furthermore, to protect 
the autonomy of users, military neurotechnology applications, including those that leak into the 
civilian domain, should be non-coercive. Soldiers and civilians should keep their right to 
cognitive liberty, i.e. the right to competently choose or refuse to use neurodevices. In the 
context of military applications, it should be determined whether defense bodies and armed 
forces can legitimately require combatants to use brain-altering or brain-reading neurodevices as 
part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which requires soldiers “to accept medical 
interventions that make them fit for duty” (428). This question is particularly sensitive since the 
principle of cognitive liberty protects not only from explicitly coercive uses but also from 
“implicit coercion”, namely when an individual is not directly forced to use a technology by 
formal coercive rules but is compelled to conform to a social equilibrium in which not using that 
technology creates a significant disadvantage. At the same time, in order to fulfill the need for 
responsible innovation in neurotechnology, data security measures should become a critical 
component of neurotechnology design and development. To this purpose, regulations should 
incentivize manufacturers to equip neurotechnologies with encryption, especially those 
technologies that can record and/or manipulate privacy-sensitive aspects of neural processing.   
Finally, a neurosecurity framework should raise awareness among neuroscientists, 
neuroengineers and clinicians about dual-use. In fact, although several neurotechnology 
applications, including applications in geriatric neurology and psychiatry, have demonstrated 
dual-use potential, yet awareness of dual-use is reportedly low among researchers. As Tennison 
and Moreno have observed, although “they may receive funding from national security 
agencies, neuroscientists may not consider how their work contributes to warfare” (428). This 
consideration is consistent with the observation that the two-volume, 200-page report on the 
ethical implications of the BRAIN Initiative, does not include the terms “dual use” or 
“weaponization” (433), in spite of the fact that the initiative receives significant funding from 
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DARPA for defense and military applications. Further research, especially in the form of survey 
questionnaires and interviews, is required to monitor and accurately assess the level of 
awareness of dual-use issues in neurotechnology among researchers and clinicians. 
Concurrently, potential conflicts of interest linked to military funding should become a 
deontological concern also among neuroscientists and must be systematically disclosed at the 
level of research funding, IRB approval and scientific publication. In parallel, public 
engagement strategies such as citizen science initiatives, hackathons and open-development 
platforms like Open BCI (http://openbci.com/) must be sustained and incentivized.  
A first promising step in the direction of awareness-enhancing strategies is the recent 
participation of representatives of the European Commission flagship initiative Human Brain 
Project (HBP) in a webinar on “dual-use and neuroscience. HBP researchers recognized that “a 
significant proportion of modern neuroscience research (not the research conducted by the HBP 
partners) receives funding from sources associated with the military”, hence requires ethical and 
policy assessment.   
Another positive example is a pledge drafted in 2010 and signed by neuroscientists in 17 
different countries. The pledge was designed “as a course of action” for neuroscientists who 
share dual-use concerns. Their signers commit to two programmatic obligations:  
I. “Making themselves aware of the potential applications of their work and that of 
others to applications that violate basic human rights or international law such as 
torture and aggressive war” 
II. “Refusing to participate knowingly in the application of neuroscience to 
violations of basic human rights and international law” (438) 
In addition, the pledge emphasizes the importance of raising awareness in the neuroscience 
community “through education and discussion”, for example by introducing neuroethics courses 
into neuroscience curricula, as well as through the creation of appropriate regulatory bodies such 
as “committees or working groups” that might provide guidance or advise to neuroscience 
projects with identifiable dual-use potential (438). In February 2012, a committee of the British 
Royal Society issued a report on “Neuroscience, Conflict & Security”. The main tenet of the 
report was that “neuroscientists have a responsibility to be aware from an early stage of their 
training that knowledge and technologies used for beneficial purposes can also be misused for 
harmful purposes” (439). Additionally, the report included ten specific recommendations for 
oversight of neurotechnology applications to military and law enforcement agencies. While the 
British example is encouraging, more needs to be done to expand this paradigm to other 
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countries and to better root it in the neuroscience community, especially among “neuroscientists 
at an early stage of their training” (439).  
 The International Neuroethics Society (INS) can play a key role in raising awareness and 
promoting responsible innovation in an international context. The mission of the INS is 
precisely to “encourage and inspire research and dialogue on the responsible use of advances in 
brain science”.  
 
Conclusion 
Dual-use dilemmas are inherent to neuroscience. Building upon the experience of 
biosecurity frameworks developed in other areas the life sciences might be a viable strategy to 
tackle the emerging problem of dual-use neurotechnology. However, adaptive adjustments to 
the specific challenges of neuroscience and neurotechnology are required. While a global ban of 
neurotechnology appears ethically unjustified, dual-use trends in this domain require increased 
monitoring, careful risk-assessment, and evidence-based normative interventions. A 
neurosecurity framework could help anticipate future threats and maximize security in the 
neurotechnology domain through calibrated regulatory interventions, (neuro)ethical codes of 
conduct and awareness-raising activities across the scientific community and the public. 
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Nearly 1 in 6 of world’s population suffers from neurological disorders. Disorders of the 
nervous system, from Alzheimer and other dementias, Parkinson disease, multiple sclerosis and 
epilepsy to strokes, brain and spinal cord injuries, affect people in all countries, irrespective of 
sex, education or income. The global prevalence of neurological disorders poses a major 
problem for public health and the health-care services in terms of care provision, caregiving 
burden and financial management. Availability of appropriate care is frequently constrained by 
the effectiveness and limitations of present neuropharmacological treatments, and the non-
integration of neurological care into primary care. Informal caregivers who assist chronically 
disabled neurological patients are reported to face a major physical, psychological and financial 
burden. Health-care systems face correspondingly high economic costs. These include not only 
the cost of treatment, but also the lost productivity of patients and their caregivers. Only in 
Europe, the total cost of neurological disorders is estimated to be 798 billion per year (of which 
60% was attributable to direct costs and 40% to lost productivity) - twice the estimated cost of 
cancer.  
A promising approach in response to this global crisis is the development and 
deployment of cutting-edge neural engineering devices for the treatment, rehabilitation and 
assistance of neurological patients. With the current capability in microtechnology and 
computational neuroscience, there is the opportunity to develop devices that can effectively 
 
41 No Impact Factor currently available for this journal.  
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establish a connection pathway between the human nervous system and interfaced 
electromechanical systems. Brain-controlled computer systems, robotic limbs, neuroprostheses, 
brain-stimulators, cognitive orthotics, memory aids, hearing and visual implants, are no longer 
domain of science-fiction; they are already commercialized medical technologies or well-
corroborated research prototypes. These devices could provide a triple-win effect as they could: 
(I) provide more rapid and effective treatment, rehabilitation and assistance, thus improving 
t h e  quality of life of patients; (ii) reduce caregiving burden; (iii) save significant costs to the 
healthcare system. While neural engineering can have a groundbreaking impact on neurological 
care and radically improve the quality of life of neurological patients, it raises the issues of dual-
use and information security. The reason for that stems from the fact that neural devices, 
similarly as personal computers, are potentially vulnerable to be manipulated by malicious 
actors for nefarious purposes. This emerging breach for information insecurity can be labeled as 
neurocrime since it enables criminal activity which target neural information.   
 
Neurosecurity 
In order to establish a communication pathway with the nervous system, neural devices 
such as brain stimulators and brain-computer interfaces are designed to allow computer 
systems to access and process neural computation. While the accessibility of neural 
information is crucial for the effective functioning of the device,  this feature raises the issue 
of privacy and information security, as neural information is carrier of private and sensitive 
data whose access or manipulation by malicious actors may cause significant physical 
(including life-threatening), psychological or social harm to technology users. With the rapid 
increase in distribution of neural devices it is expected that neural information will irrigate the 
digital ecosystem from innumerable sources with an unprecedented quantity of data flows and 
at an unprecedented velocity. Neural implants for clinical patients, at-home neurostimulators 
for cognitive enhancement, brain-computer interfacing applications for smartphone and a 
myriad of other devices are becoming access points of neural information, often connected to 
the internet. This will also multiply the quantity of data and the number and type of devices 
that are potentially exposed to neurocriminality.  
 
Brain-Hacking 
Neurocrime can target neural information either indirectly or directly. Indirect crime is when 
the attack is aimed at limiting, modifying or disrupting function in the devices that interface 
 228 
 
brain information -with neural computation from the users’ brain not being accessed or 
manipulated in any significant sense. This type of risk is already critical at the current level of 
deployment of neural engineering technologies. With neurally controlled devices (e.g. brain 
stimulators and brain-computer interfaces) being available as medical technologies as well as 
commercialized products, present neurocriminals may abuse of the users by disrupting or 
terminating function in their devices without the users’ permission or consent. For example, 
already commercialized brain-computer interfacing headsets for smartphones could be 
mechanically destroyed by malicious actors. Direct crime is when the attack cracks the users’ 
neural computation to access and/or manipulate neural information for criminal purposes. I 
call this special type of neurocrime “brain-cracking” or “brain-hacking” as it exploits the 
neural device to get illicit access to and eventually manipulate information in a manner that 
resembles how computers are hacked in computer crime.  
Some forms of brain-hacking have proven to be actually feasible in experimental setting. 
Studies have shown that brain-computer interfaces can be coopted to detect concealed 
autobiographical information from users with a significantly high accuracy rate (440). More 
strikingly, brain-computer interfaces to reveal private and sensitive information about the users 
such as their pin codes, bank membership, months of birth, debit card numbers, home location 
and faces of known persons (441). In addition, first proto-examples of brain-hacking have been 
also reported outside the experimental setting. A striking case is the so-called Cody’s Emokit 
project through which the hacker Cody Brocious managed to crack encrypted data directly from 
a consumer-grade brain-computer interfacing  headset (442). A sci-fi future where people can 
access and manipulate information in other people’s brains is approaching at a very high speed 
and their prodromes are already here. Therefore, all direct and indirect implications of this 
emerging trend should be urgently assessed.   
 
The dual-use dilemma of neural engineering 
The peculiar dual-use dilemma of neural engineering can be summarized as follows: the 
same neural device has the potential to be used for positive (e.g.  assisting  cognitive  function  
in  neurological  patients)  as  well  as  negative  purposes  (e.g. identity theft and other forms 
of brain-hacking). It is worth noting, that the attributes “positive” and “negative” with regard to 
technology use are hardly definable in an objective and non-contextual way. While the 
disambiguation of these terms remains an open philosophical question, a minimal 
characterization of positive in terms of “intended by design” and negative in terms of 
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“unintended by design” may be helpful to address the issue. Unlike dual-use dilemmas in 
personal computer technology, the dual-use dilemma of neural engineering is more radical as 
the object of dual-use (especially in the case of brain-hacking) is neural computation. Neural 
computation underlies life-maintaining processes (such as nutrition and respiration) as well as 
faculties such as consciousness, perception, thinking, judgment, memory and language and is 
primarily responsible for our behavior and our self-identification as persons – all the things 
that make us human. Therefore, misusing neural devices for cybercriminal purposes may not 
only threaten the physical security of the users but also compromise fundamental faculties of 
human beings, influence their behavior and alter their self-identification as persons. This 
dilemma is primarily faced n o t  o n l y  by researchers and technology developers, but also 
by governments as they are committed to promoting health and security of their citizens. 
 
Neuroprivacy, Neuroconfidentiality and Information Security 
The possibility of extracting private and sensitive information from the brain of users 
represents a significant treat to privacy and data protection. Users that are victims of brain-
hacking m a y  lose the ability to seclude confidential or inherently sensitive information 
about themselves, thus experience an intrusion of their private sphere. For example, hackers 
could extract information about the character traits or sexual preferences of users. This sensitive 
type of information is potentially of interest not only to criminals involved in harmful activities 
such as blackmail but also to employers and insurances. For example, health insurance 
companies may be interested in extracting information about the medical records of the user to 
accept or reject her enrollment into an insurance plan or to determine her insurance premiums. 
This ethical problem is particularly significant because privacy is a priority issue in a free 
society, closely linked to civil liberties, democracy and human rights (see, for instance, the 
American Bar Association 2004). A famous adagio in information and computer security 
states: “the best antivirus software is your brain”. This is meant to stress that the conscious 
choices made by the user are the most important determinants of the security of the user’s 
computer system. The possibility of brain-hacking questions the adagio since it removes 
precisely this intermediate level of protection between the information and the hacker. In brain-
hacking there is no external brain exerting control over the information through rational choices 
since that brain consists of the exact same type of information under potential attack: neural 
information. The users choices are exposed to the same risks to which is exposed the sensitive 
information that the user wants to seclude; sometimes they are that information.  
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Autonomy and Personal Identity 
The possibility for an external control over the user's future behavior seems to substantially 
conflict with the moral principles of individual autonomy and agency and may even interfere 
with the self-determination of personal identity or personhood. Individual autonomy is generally 
understood as the capacity of someone to deliberate or act on the basis of one’s self-chosen plan 
and not as the product of manipulative or distorting external forces (443). By contrast, 
potential victims of brain-hacking may see their deliberation and action being constrained, 
controlled or manipulated by malevolent others. This problem is critical from an ethical 
perspective as the respect for autonomy is often considered (most notoriously by Beauchamp 
and Childress 2008) the paramount principle of biomedical ethics. In fact, any notion of moral 
decision-making assumes that rational agents are involved in making informed and voluntary 
decisions. Autonomy also plays a key role in several legislations as a prerequisite for liability. 
For example, the USA Model Penal Code (MPC), Section 2.01, states that a person is not guilty 
of an offense when his liability is based on an involuntary act such as “a bodily movement that 
otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or 
habitual’’. Users that are victims of brain-hacking would precisely fit in this description.  
 
Physical and Psychological Safety 
Brain-hacking and general neurocrime may not only threaten the security and confidentiality of 
brain information; they can also result in severe physical and psychological harm (e.g. 
traumatic experiences) to users. The degree of harm is proportionate to the level of benefit 
produced by the neural device in assisting the user's physical and psychological performance. 
For example, patients using BCIs to control wheelchairs may suddenly loose their reacquired 
spatial mobility and be led back to their original condition of impairment (prior to the BCI). 
Similarly, robotic limb users and patients using vision BCIs may lose respectively their 
reacquired motor capacity and visual perception. In addition, sophisticated forms of brain-
hacking such the partial or full hijacking of the user’s neural computation by the hacker, may 
cause direct physical and psychological harm to the user as they could result in self-violence and 
other detrimental activities.  
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Conclusion 
A Matrix-like future where people can access and manipulate information from other people’s 
brain is approaching rapidly. As neural engineering technologies become more and more 
widespread there is a fiduciary responsibility of experts to educate the population about what is 
reasonable to do. Collaborative research at the intersection between criminal law, cybersecurity, 
neurotechnology and neuroethics is urgently required to assess these challenges and protect 
present and future users of neural devices. 
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Abstract 
Brain-computer interfacing technologies are used as assistive technologies for patients as 
well as healthy subjects to control devices solely by brain activity. Yet the risks associated 
with the misuse of these technologies remain largely unexplored. Recent findings have shown 
that BCIs are potentially vulnerable to cybercriminality. This opens the prospect of 
“neurocrime”: extending the range of computer-crime to neural devices. This paper explores a 
type of neurocrime that we call brain-hacking as it aims at the illicit access to and manipulation 
of neural information and computation. As neural computation underlies cognition, behavior 
and our self-determination as persons, a careful analysis of the emerging risks of brain-hacking 
is paramount, and ethical safeguards against these risks should be considered early in design and 
regulation. This contribution is aimed at raising awareness of the emerging risk of brain-
hacking and takes a first step in developing an ethical and legal reflection on those risks. 
 
Introduction 
The term brain-hacking refers to the emerging possibility of coopting brain-computer 
interfaces (BCI) and other neural engineering devices with the purpose of illicitly accessing or 
manipulating neural information from the brain of users. This paper offers an overview of the 
possible sorts of brain-hacking to which BCIs are or may become subject in the near future and 
provides an inventory of  the  specific  ethical implications of brain-hacking. We will proceed as 
follows: first, we will discuss the main features of computer crime. Second, we will discuss the 
main features of neurocrime and brain-hacking. Third, we will offer a brief description of the 
BCI cycle. Fourth, we will identify what specific types of brain-hacking can occur at each phase 
of the cycle. Finally, we will delineate the major ethical implications emerging out of the 
 
42 Current Impact Factor: 1.500 (2016) 
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phenomenon of brain-hacking. Although the ethical concerns we discuss in relation to brain-
hacking may be found in relation to other technologies as well, we suggest that their particular 
combination with respect to BCI warrants a separate discussion, especially given the current and 
to be expected progress in BCI research and applications. Therefore, our aim is to provide a 
systematic treatment of the various ways of brain-hacking in relation to the different 
components of BCI. This contribution is aimed at promoting a public debate over the potential 
threats to neurosecuri ty related to the potentially widespread availability of BCIs among 
the general public, and takes a first step in developing a systematic ethical and legal reflection 
on brain-hacking. Future research is required to extend this analysis and to develop a 
comprehensive ethical, legal and regulatory framework.  
 
Computer Crime 
The number and quality of human activities enabled or mediated by computers is increasing 
rapidly. Emerging trends in information and computer technology such as big data, ubiquitous 
computing, and the Internet of Things are accelerating the expansion of computer use in our 
societies. Today, computers are used to perform or facilitate an enormous variety of tasks and 
activities of daily living including, but not restricted to, banking, trading, scheduling and 
organizing events, learning, entertaining, gaming and communicating. Computer use does not 
restrict solely to the social and economic domain. Several activities that are considered inherent 
to our psychological and biological dimension are now supported or facilitated by computing. 
Examples include the use of GPS systems in geolocation and spatial navigation, the use of 
wearables in monitoring bodily processes such as calories intake, heart beat rate, and weight 
loss, and the use of personal computers in performing cognitive tasks such as arithmetic 
calculus, writing, and memory.  
As the uses of computers in human life have increased both in volume and in richness, the 
security threats to computing have also increased significantly. Notoriously, computer and 
information technologies can be used by actors for nefarious purposes such as cracking, fraud, 
identity theft, financial theft, and information warfare. The broad range of criminal activities 
that result from misusing computers and networks is referred to as cybercrime. Halder & 
Jaishankar (2011) define cybercrime as: "Offenses that are committed against individuals or 
groups of individuals with a criminal motive  to  intentionally  harm  the reputation of the victim 
or cause physical or mental harm to the victim directly or indirectly, using modern 
telecommunication networks” (444). Originally, cybercriminal activities were restricted to 
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personal computers and related computer networks. With the dramatic expansion of the digital 
ecosystem many new opportunities for malicious exploitation should be expected. It is 
predicted that the current number of devices connected to the Internet will increase from 9 
billion in 2011 to 50 billion in 2020, generating a flow of 50 trillion GBs of data (445). 
Devices such as watches, TVs, eye-wears, home-appliances, automobiles and medical devices 
are increasingly becoming sources of computational information and will irrigate the digital 
ecosystem with an unprecedented quantity of data flows and at an unprecedented velocity. 
This will also multiply the quantity of data and the number and type of devices that are 
potentially exposed to cybercriminality.  
Many of the technologies responsible for this dramatic expansion of the digital ecosystem 
fit in the category of disruptive technologies as they make a lasting change to the 
technological landscape.  Although disruptive technologies are designed to positively impact 
individuals and society, their technological novelty also opens 'breaches' for criminals. These 
breaches, as Dupont points out, are often “the result of a defective legal or regulatory coverage 
and provoke rapid increases in offenses” (446). In fact, regulation upgrade occurs at a much 
slower rate than technology upgrade and present security regulations are often incapable to 
effectively account for the accelerating changes generated by technology in human activities 
and infrastructures.   
In this rapidly changing context, the goals of computer security, namely the protection of 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information become more difficult to achieve 
(296). This increased difficulty does not arise exclusively from the quantity and velocity of 
data. Rather, the quality of information introduced into the data flow is crucial too. The more 
pervasive computing technology becomes, the more intricately it is interwoven into the 
everyday life. While this has the significant benefit of minimizing interaction friction between 
humans and machines, hence making computer-use effortless and more personalized, it also 
multiplies the classes of information that become accessible, hence potentially exposed to 
cybercriminal risks. Among these classes of information, biological information is critical43. 
 
43 The notion of biological information is used in this paper to extensively refer to information 
expressed in the processes characteristic of living organisms at various levels, i.e. at the levels of 
molecules, cells, organs, circuits etc. This definition is in accordance with the statistical definition of 
information formulated by Claude Shannon and used in mathematical information theory 447. C. 
Shannon, The mathematical theory of environments. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. 
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Medical computer technologies such as artificial cardiac pacemakers as well consumer-grade 
technologies such as wearable heart rate monitors are designed with the purpose of accessing 
and processing biological information –in this case, information about the beating of the heart. 
As the use of bioengineering devices is rapidly increasing, the amount of biological 
information irrigating the digital ecosystem will increase as a consequence. This raises the 
issue of privacy and information security, as biological information is carrier of private and 
sensitive data whose access or manipulation by malicious actors may cause significant 
physical (including life-threatening), psychological or social harm to technology users. An 
example of this emerging risk was provided by Halperin et al. (2008) who experimentally 
demonstrated that a hacker could wirelessly compromise the security and privacy of an 
already commercialized implantable cardiac defibrillator. In their experiment, hackers could 
use homemade and low-cost equipment to change a patient‘s therapies, disable therapies 
altogether, and induce potentially fatal processes such as ventricular fibrillation (449).  
 
Neurocrime 
The problems of technology misuse and security of biological information are particularly 
critical in the context of neurotechnology as this type of technology applies (either directly or 
indirectly) to a very important organ in the human body, the brain. The brain not only 
contributes significantly to life-maintaining processes (such as nutrition and respiration) but 
also to faculties such as consciousness, perception, thinking, judgment, memory and language 
and is of great importance to our behavior and our self-identification as sentient-beings or 
persons. Therefore, misusing neural devices for cybercriminal purposes may not only threaten 
the physical security of the users but also influence their behavior and alter their self-
identification as persons. We call the realm of cybercriminal activities enabled by the misuse 
of neural devices neurocrime.  
It is worth noting that neurocrime does not necessarily involve direct access to the brain 
and to brain information. Rather, neurocriminal activities are most likely to occur, at present, 
in a manner that affects the brain only indirectly, for example by limiting, modifying or 
 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1-93 (1949). . In Shannon’s sense, “anything is a source of 
information if it has a range of possible states, and one variable carries information about another to the 
extent that their states are physically correlated”. For a comprehensive understanding of the notion of 
biological information see: 448. P. Godfrey-Smith, K. Sterelny, Biological information.  (2007). 
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disrupting function in the devices that interface brain computation. This type of risk is already 
critical at the current level of deployment of neural engineering technologies. With neurally 
controlled devices (e.g. brain stimulators and brain-computer interfaces) being available as 
medical technologies as well as commercialized products, present neurocriminals may abuse 
of the users by disrupting or terminating function in their devices without the users’ 
permission or consent. For example, neurally controlled robotic limbs used to compensate for 
the motor deficits of amputated patients are potentially vulnerable to being mechanically 
destroyed by malicious actors, which would deprive the users of their re-acquired motor 
abilities. This type of neurocrime affects the brain only indirectly since the users’ neural 
computation is not directly accessed or manipulated in any significant sense during the attack. 
Nonetheless, criminal activities of this type may affect significantly the mental life of the 
victims, because these activities can limit and constrain their behavior, generate emotional 
responses such as panic, fear, and psychological distress, and leave traumatic memories. In the 
light of this and in accordance with the previously reported definition of computer crime, we 
define the emerging phenomenon of neurocrime as offenses against individuals or groups of 
individuals with a criminal motive to intentionally cause direct or indirect physical and mental 
harm to the victim as well as harm to the victim’s reputation and property by accessing or 
manipulating neural information through the use of neural devices. It is worth noting that, under 
some circumstances, the attacker and the target of the attack may be the same person. For 
example, mentally unstable users of prosthetic limbs may choose to damage their devices in an 
attempt to perform self-imposed harm.  
From the perspective of neurocrime two types of neural devices are particularly critical at 
present: brain stimulators –especially Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and transcranial direct-
current stimulators (tDCS)44- on the one hand, and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) on the 
other hand. The reason for that stems from three basic facts common to both types of neural 
 
44 Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an invasive neurostimulation technique which involves the 
neurosurgical implantation of a medical device into the brain. This implanted device sends electrical 
signals into targeted subcortical areas with the aim of eliciting activity. DBS is an increasingly used 
therapy for several neurological conditions such as Parkinson’s disease, dystonias, essential tremor, and 
chronic pain syndromes when patients are not responding to less invasive approaches 450. V. M. 
Tronnier, D. Rasche, in Textbook of Neuromodulation. (Springer, 2015), pp. 61-72.. 
Transcranial direct current stimulation is a neuromodulatory intervention which uses constant, low 
electrical current delivered to the cortical area of interest via small electrodes placed on the skull with the 
aim of changing neuronal excitability in that area 451. A. R. Brunoni et al., Clinical Research with 
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS): Challenges and Future Directions. Brain stimulation 5, 
175-195 (2012).. This change of neuronal excitability may influence, and in certain cases enhance 
cognitive performance for a brief period of time on a number of different  cognitive tasks .  
 237 
 
device: (i) they potentially enable direct access to neural computation, although in diametrically 
opposite ways - brain stimulation vs. reading of brain activity; (ii) their use is widespread as 
they are both available not exclusively as medical technologies but also as commercialized 
products for healthy users (iii) they have the potential to generate safety and security concerns45. 
Being the only type of neural devices whose hackability has been proven in experimental and 
real-life settings, BCIs will be the only neural technology at stake in this paper. Further research 
is required to explore the specific neurocriminal risks associated with DBS, tDCS and other 
forms of neurostimulation.    
 
Brain-Computer Interfacing 
In contrast to neurostimulators, brain-computer interfaces are not used to stimulate the 
brain but establish a direct communication pathway that allows BCI-users to control an 
external computer device exclusively with brain activity, bypassing the peripheral nervous and 
muscle systems (181). BCIs originally developed in clinical medicine as a therapeutic or 
assistive technology for neurological patients. In clinical settings, BCI-applications are directed 
at repairing, assisting  or  augmenting  cognitive or sensory-motor functions in patients 
experiencing cognitive or sensory-motor impairments including spinal cord injury, stroke, and 
motor neuron disease such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and muscular dystrophy (181, 
453). For example, BCI-based motor prostheses have successfully been trialed in animal models 
and patients to enable direct brain control on artificial limbs, wheelchairs and other devices 
(454). To date, BCI-applications are available not only within clinical settings but also to the 
general public. Several commercial applications of EEG-based BCI devices have made their 
way onto the market and are becoming increasingly popular among healthy individuals for 
gaming and supporting everyday activities. For example, companies Emotiv 
(http://emotiv.com/) and Neurosky (http://www.neurosky.com) have pioneered the 
commercialization of consumer-grade non-invasive and easy-to-wear BCIs for  gaming, 
interactive television, or as hands-free control systems. The electronic telecommunication 
industry is providing consumer-grade BCIs that are available for potential mass adoption. For 
 
45  See, for example, the following two magazine reviews: 442. M. Conner, Hacking the brain: 
Brain-to-computer interface hardware moves from the realm of research. EDN 55, 30-35 (2010); 452.
 E. Strickland, Brain hacking: Self-experimenters are zapping their heads. IEEE Spectrum 51, 23-
25 (2014).. Although concerns expressed by popular media may at times be exaggerated, they still may 
require appropriate responses by scientists and ethicists, if only to diminish or forestall unrealistic 
worries amongst the general public. 
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instance, iPhone accessories such as Xwave© allow the headset to plug directly into compliant 
iPhones and read brainwaves. Meanwhile, prototypes of next-generation Samsung Galaxy 
Tabs and other mobile or wearable devices have being tested to be controlled by brain activity 
via EEG-based BCI (455) In addition, neuromarketing companies such as Nielsen are using 
BCI-applications to better assess customer needs and preferences46. Given the significant 
potential benefits of brain control in computing —e.g. immediacy, hands-free control, 
portability etc.— Yuan and colleagues predict that BCIs will gradually replace the keyboard, the 
touch screen, the mouse and the voice command device as humans’ preferred ways to 
interact with computers (456). Finally, a number of military and warfare BCI-applications are 
currently in development. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is 
currently funding a broad spectrum of BCI projects with two major purposes: (1) restoring 
neural and/or behavioral function in warfighters, and (2) enhancing training and performance in 
warfighters and intelligence agents (429, 457). For example, the Neurotechnology for 
Intelligence Analysts (NIA) has developed BCI systems utilizing non-invasively recorded EEG 
to significantly increase the efficiency and throughput of imagery analysis (429).  
While the potential benefits and predicted distribution of clinical and non-clinical 
applications of BCI technology are significant, the neurosecurity risks associated with the 
widespread availability of this technology remain largely unexplored.  
 
From Neurocrime to Brain-Hacking 
Denning et al. (2009) provide prototype-examples of neurocrime. These include the 
wireless hijacking of a prosthetic limb, the malicious re-programming of neurostimulation 
therapy (e.g. the wireless alteration of the device settings to generate unsafe brain stimulation) 
and the eavesdropping of a brain implant’s signals to reveal private information. These 
examples describe very specific neurocriminal phenomena where the attack is not simply 
directed at disrupting the neural device but at getting direct access to brain information. 
Neurocriminal activities of this type appear more specific than general neurocrime as (i) can 
only be performed on neural devices that establish a direct connection pathway with the brain 
such as tDCS, neural implants and BCI, (ii) involve the direct access to and manipulation of 
neural information, (iii) influence directly neural computation in the users. We call this special 
type of neurocrime “brain-hacking” as it exploits the neural device to get illicit access to and 
 
46  http://www.nielsen.com/us/en.html (last accessed May 3, 2015). 
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eventually manipulate brain information in a manner that resembles how computers are hacked 
in computer crime. As in general neurocrime, also in brain-hacking the attacker and the target of 
the attack may be the same person. For example, a user may hack his or her own 
neurostimulation device to self-prescribe elevated moods or increase activation of reward 
centers in his or her brain (296). 
Li et al. (2015) have provided an inventory of possible malicious brain-hacking based on 
the type of BCI application. They distinguish four types of BCI applications: (i) neuromedical 
applications, (ii) user authentication, (iii) gaming and entertainment, and (iv) smartphone-based 
application (458). For each of these application families they presented the current attack 
scenario and suggested possible countermeasures. Some forms of brain-hacking have already 
proven to be actually feasible in experimental as well as in real-life settings. Rosenfeld at al. 
(2010) have shown that brain-computer interfaces can be coopted to detect concealed 
autobiographical information from users with a significantly high accuracy rate (440). More 
strikingly, Martinovic et al. (2012) have successfully used brain-computer interfaces to reveal 
private and sensitive information about the users such as their pin codes, bank membership, 
months of birth, debit card numbers, home location and faces of known persons (441). We will 
discuss these possibilities in more detail below in section 2.2.1.  
A sci-fi future where people can access and manipulate information in other people’s brains 
is approaching and their prodromes are already here. Therefore, unless appropriate safeguards 
are considered early in the design of the neural devices that will be deployed in the next future 
(5–20 years), concerns of malicious misuse in the form of brain-hacking could become 
paramount for public safety.  
 
The BCI cycle 
 BCIs can be distinguished into two types: invasive and non-invasive. Invasive BCIs record 
brain signaling via surgical implantation of electrode arrays in or directly connected to the 
central nervous system. Non-invasive BCIs interface brain signaling via neuroimaging 
technologies such as electroencephalography (EEG) and electromyography (EMG) that record 
brain activity through electrodes placed on the outside of the skull. As said previously, both 
invasive and non-invasive BCIs establish a direct interaction between the user's brain and a 
computer device. This interaction is usually described as a 4-phase cycle (459). See Figure 14: 
(adopted, with permission, from J. Farquhar/Braingain). 
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Figure 14- The BCI Cycle 
 
The first phase concerns the input, i.e. the generation of specific brain activity by the user in 
response to a stimulus. This brain activity is generated when the BCI-user is in a certain 
cognitive state or performs a mental task.  For example, when a BCI user is controlling a 
wheelchair a matrix of possible itinerary choices is presented on the interface that the user is 
watching. A frequent brain activation pattern used in BCI are the so-called event-related 
potentials (ERPs), i.e. measured brain responses that are the direct result of a specific sensory, 
cognitive, or motor event. Among these ERPs, increasing interest is surrounding the P300 
wave, an ERP component usually elicited in the process of decision making(460). In our 
example, when the desired itinerary is presented (e.g. by highlighting or ‘flashing’ it) at the 
interface, the user’s brain signals will contain a P300 signal that can be picked up by the BCI.  
The second phase concerns the measurement and recording of brain activity. At this stage, 
patterns of brain activity in the user's brain are detected and measured by the interface during a 
cognitive process or the performance of a mental task. For example, when a certain itinerary 
option upon which the BCI-user is focusing is flashed (say, a specific end-location, or an 
instruction to turn left), the BCI can detect the P300 wave elicited at that moment. The 
measurement can be implemented in several ways according to the type of BCI in use. The 
most frequent type of BCI is based on electroencephalogram (EEG); other measurement options 
include magnetoencephalography (MEG), a n d  functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). 
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In order to be usable for the BCI and generate appropriate outputs  (i.e. those expected by 
the user), the raw data measured in the second phase should be decoded into its main features 
and classified. This decoding and classifying process typically occurs in the third phase of the 
BCI cycle. In this phase, data are processed in order to 'clean' the brain signals, namely to 
increase the signal-to-noise ratio (i.e. a measure of strength of the desired signal relative to 
background noise) and to filter the most relevant aspects of each signal for further processing. 
This processing is necessary  to  extract  the  relevant  features  from  the  signal  and  
distinguish  them  from non-relevant features, especially  from the background  noise due to  
the underlying  brain activity that is not directed at the execution of that specific mental task (in 
our example, the activity that is not directed at moving the wheelchair, e.g. processes involved 
in color perception).  
Once the signals are decoded, they can be translated into output. The output is usually the 
performance of the action initially intended or desired by, or deemed beneficial for, the user 
through the control of the applications interfaced by the BCI (in our example, turning left with 
the wheelchair). Controllable applications include motor devices (e.g. wheelchairs and 
robotic limbs), sensor devices as well as several software and hardware applications (including 
apps for smartphones). Once each cycle is completed the user can perceive the feedback 
resulting from the previous cycle (e.g. notices the wheelchair turning left) and the next cycle can 
start. 
 
Brain-hacking 
Brain-hacking can in principle occur at each of the different phases of the BCI-cycle. In the 
following, we will provide an overview of the sorts of brain-hacking to which BCIs are subject 
at present or may be subject in the near future according to the phase of the BCI-cycle at 
which the attacks may occur. For each sort of attack it will discuss the corresponding criminal 
activities that can be committed and the type of moral values and norms that are at stake. 
 
Input Manipulation 
Brain-hacking via input manipulation occurs when the hacker attacks the BCI user at the 
moment of providing input, i.e. at the first phase of the BCI cycle47. Input information can be 
 
47 It is worth noting that there are two potential meanings of input here: (i) the user provides input to the BCI 
through brain activity; (ii) the interface provides information (e.g. a screen with commands) to the user. To 
 
 242 
 
manipulated by altering the stimuli presented to the user. For example, brain-hackers may 
preselect target stimuli to elicit specific responses in the user that may facilitate the access the 
user’s neural information. This type of hack has been proven to be actually feasible by recent 
research in computer security and human-computer interaction. For example, Rosenfeld at al. 
(2006) and have developed a P300-based protocol to detect concealed autobiographical 
information from users with a significantly high accuracy rate (461). Van Vliet et al. (2010) 
have used the N400 component of ERP to detect what a BCI user is 'thinking about' without 
using explicit stimuli (462)48. Particularly striking are the results by Martinovic et al. (2012). In 
this study, researchers presented EEG BCI-users with six classes of stimuli: (I) PIN code 
digits, (ii) photos related to banks, (iii) names of the months, (iv) debit card digits, (v) locations, 
and (vi) faces. For each class, one target stimulus (i.e. stimulus eliciting sensitive information 
known to the user) was inserted in the randomly permuted sequence of non-target stimuli (441). 
For example, in the bank experiment, the target stimulus was the picture of an ATM machine 
from the user's bank whereas the non-target stimuli were a series of pictures of ATMs from 
other banks. The goal of the study was to detect a P300 signal in response to private and 
sensitive information about the users (their pin codes, bank membership, month of birth, debit 
card numbers, home location and faces of known persons) and extract that information. Since 
this information is usable for monetary transactions, home banking and log-in to private on-line 
accounts, extracting this information may enable hackers to perform offenses against BCI users. 
The results show that this sort of input-manipulation can turn the BCI against users in order to 
reveal some private information with a significant chance of success: in fact, the Shannon 
entropy of the private information was decreased on the average by approximately 15%-40% 
compared to random guessing attacks49 (Martinovic et al. 2013, p. 1). Such sorts of malware 
resemble the function of computer spyware as they aid in gathering information about a user, in 
sending it to another entity, or in asserting control over a computer or computer-driven device 
without the user's permission or consent. Unlike common spyware, however, the malware 
 
disambiguate, in this section we will refer exclusively to the latter as this type of input is the only one 
whose hackability was proven in the experimental setting.  
48 The ambiguous term ‘thinking about‘ is defined by the authors as ‘being primed on‘. Since the 
priming effect occurs for many types of stimuli (e.g. words, sounds, and images) the authors assumed 
that a subject can prime himself by being told to think about an object. See van Vliet et al. (2010, p. 183).   
49 In order to quantify the information leak that the BCI attack provides, the researchers compared the 
Shannon entropies of guessing the correct answers for the classifiers against the entropy of the random 
guess attack. The entropy difference directly measures the information leaked by an attack; see 
Martinovic et al. (2012, p. 11).  
 243 
 
involved in brain-hacking extracts information directly from brain signaling, hence the name 
'brain-spyware'.  The potential set of applications of brain-spyware in future cybercrime is large 
and may involve several criminal activities such as password cracking, identity theft, phishing 
and fraud. 
An additional breach for brain-hacking via input-manipulation is authentication via EEG 
signal. Li et al (2015) have reported an attack model by impersonating the thoughts of subjects 
using EEG generative model based on the historical EEG data from a subject (458).  
It is worth to point out that at the current level of development of BCI technology three major 
technical limitations prevent the diffusion of brain-hacking cases outside the clinical setting:  (i) 
measurement accuracy, (ii) processing speed, and (iii) distribution. As we have seen in the 
previous Chapter, in the decoding phase of the BCI cycle data must be processed in order to 
increase the signal-to-noise ratio and segregate relevant from non-relevant information. For 
today’s hackers, decoding brain signals with a level of accuracy and at a speed comparable to 
cracking computer codes is still impossible outside the experimental settings. This is 
exacerbated, by the limited commercial distribution of portable BCI-applications. Given the 
limited readability of brain signals and the current level of maturity of the market, for today’s 
hackers the reward may not be worth the risk. However, as technology advances and the BCI-
market rapidly expands, brain data will reveal more and more and their level of readability will 
rapidly increase. 
 
Measurement Manipulation 
Brain-hacking can also occur when the hacker attacks the BCI user during the phase of the 
measurement in order to generate - without the user’s permission - outputs that are different 
from those expected to be generated by regular processing. Attacks of this type may differ with 
regard to their purpose. Three main criminal purposes are foreseeable: cracking the BCI’s raw 
data, disrupting BCI’s function, and hijacking the BCI. A real-life protoexample of BCI-
cracking is the so-called Cody’s Emokit project, developed by the hacker Cody Brocious. 
Brocious cracked the encryption of a consumer-grade BCI produced by Emotiv (called EPOC) 
and built a decryption routine. Subsequently, he created an open-source library for reading 
encrypted data directly from the headset, and posted about his project on the Emotiv user forum. 
As Conner explains: “his library of code hacks to the device just pulls raw data from the unit; 
there’s no ability to filter the signals or tell which sensor corresponds to each data stream”(442). 
It is worth to highlight that Brocious’ hack had no malicious motive. In contrast, it was designed 
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to open EPOC’s source code and open up the device to development (hence with the ethical 
purpose of accelerating secure new products and research). However, malevolent agents can use 
similar strategies to illicitly crack information as a form of dual-use. 
Attacks by BCI disruption may occur when the hacker aims at manipulating the measuring 
process in order to confuse, sabotage or delay the function of the BCI application. The function 
of a BCI can be disrupted, at the level of measurement, by adding noise to make the 
measurement inaccurate. Hijacking may occur when the hacker tries to monitor and alter the 
BCI communication channel with the purpose of diminishing or even replacing the user’s 
control of the BCI application. During hijacking the system is given other commands than those 
intended or desired by the user, for the benefit of the hacker. Brain-hackers could manipulate the 
measurement by adding noise in order to diminish or eliminate control of the user over the BCI 
application. For example, a frustrated caregiver could hijack a BCI-enabled speech production 
device to silence a cognitively impaired user or a wheelchair to force the user to follow a certain 
itinerary. More generally, measurement manipulation by hijacking may result in several 
criminal activities aimed at limiting, harming or taking advantage of the BCI-users' behavior. 
 
Decoding and Classifying Manipulation 
Brain-hacking at the level of decoding and classification is also aimed at generating 
outputs that are different from those intended or desired by the user, and expected to be 
generated by regular processing. This criminal goal may be achieved in three ways: (I) by 
adding noise to simply make the decoding process unduly difficult; (II) by intervening with the 
machine learning component (so strictly speaking, moving to the feature classification phase) in 
order to manipulate the classification of the brain signal; or (III) overriding the signal sent by the 
BCI to the output device50. Each of these hacking strategies will have peculiar pros and cons. 
For example, the noise-adding hack will have the advantages (from the perspective of malicious 
actors) of being more easily performable and less easily detectable than the other two but it will 
also make it more difficult for the hackers to have the BCI application do what they want. In 
contrast, the other two hacking strategies will be more difficult to perform and more easily 
detectable than the former but they will, in principle, enable the hackers to have more control 
over the BCI system. Similarly, as in measurement-manipulation, brain-hackers can intervene at 
 
50 It is worth noting that the first strategy (adding noise) is similar to the one discussed at page 210 
with regard to measurement manipulation. However, at this level, the consequence we discuss may be 
different as the aim of the intervention here is to delay or complicate the decoding process. 
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the level of decoding and classification with the criminal motive of hijacking the BCI-
application. The peculiarity of attacks at this phase of the cycle, however, is that the hijacking 
may not be simply aimed at diminishing or expunging the control of the user over the 
application, but also at replacing control. Brain-hackers may try to monitor and alter or inject 
messages into the BCI communication channel with the purpose of replacing the user’s control 
of the BCI application. During hijacking, the system is given other commands than those 
intended or desired by the user, for the benefit of the hacker. Successful hijacking will result in 
the hacker having partial or full control over the BCI application and the BCI user having 
diminished or no control on the application. This would expose the user to perils directly or 
indirectly induced by the hijacker. For example, a criminal actor could hijack the BCI-controlled 
smartphone of a BCI-user without the user’s permission to extort payments, erase sensitive 
information or communicate with third parties by masquerading his or her identity under the 
identity of the user (hence performing offences including fraud, theft and identity theft). In 
addition, as we have seen before, hijacking strategies could also become sources of threat to the 
personal safety of third parties, as the hijacked device could harm third parties either 
accidentally or as an explicit command of the hijacker.  
Although no confirmed real-life or experimental reports of hacking via measurement or 
decoding and classifying manipulation are available at present, these types of brain-hacking 
deserve particular monitoring in the context of security, surveillance and public health. The 
reason for that stems from the fact that their potential nefarious outcomes are not exclusively 
restricted to actions involving the access to sensitive information (e.g. identity theft and fraud) 
but extend to more detrimental activities involving the physical and psychological harm of the 
users.  
 
Feedback Manipulation 
Brain-hacking by feedback manipulation would occur when the hack is aimed at altering 
the feedback perceived by the user at the end of each cycle. This type of hack would aim at 
manipulating the perception that the user has of previous actions performed or the self-
perception of previous cognitive states generated through the BCI. The criminal motive 
underlying these hacks would be to induce –without the user’s permission- particular cognitive 
states or actions in the subsequent cycle of the user for the advantage of the hacker. For 
example, brain-hackers could perform a sort of “brain-phishing” in which the user is required by 
the hacker to insert a password or another type of authentication information before the 
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originally intended process can continue (e.g. a user could be asked for a password to actually 
start the program she has mentally commanded).  Through the same mechanism, traumatic 
experiences could be induced in the user to his or her detriment. Criminal activities performable 
through this hack may include fraud, phishing, identity theft, and physical or psychological 
harm.  
These different sorts of hack with their related type of malware, and potential criminal 
activities are presented in Table 9:  
 
Tab. 9- Synoptic view of malicious brain-hacking 
 
Ethical Implications 
These four sorts of brain-hacking have several ethical and legal implications. Some of these 
implications are cross-categorical, i.e. apply to all forms of brain-hacking, whereas some others 
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are peculiar to a specific category of hack. In this section an inventory of the ethical 
implications of brain-hacking will be provided. Further research is required to develop each of 
these implications into a detailed ethical and legal analysis to inform future regulatory strategies 
for the prevention of neurocrime. 
 
The Dual-Use Dilemma of Brain-hacking 
Cross-categorical ethical implications involve the general problem of dual-use and the 
obtainment of informed consent. By dual use it is meant the fact that the same beneficial 
scientific knowledge or technology can be used for good as well as for nefarious purposes 
(463). Dual-use is a particularly crucial ethical concern in computer, telecommunication and 
information technology, since computers and networking technologies are frequently used by 
actors for cybercriminal purposes. Therefore, the ethical implications of dual-use, in particular 
the dual-use dilemma, also apply to BCI technology and the phenomenon of brain-hacking.  
The peculiar dual-use dilemma of brain-hacking can be summarized as follows: the same 
neural device (e.g. the same BCI) has the potential to be used for good (e.g.  assisting  cognitive  
function  in  neurological  patients)  as  well  as  bad  purposes  (e.g. identity theft, password 
cracking and other forms of brain-hacking). This dilemma is primarily faced n o t  o n l y  by 
researchers and technology developers, but also by companies because of their potential 
product liability and by governments as they are committed to promoting health and security of 
their citizens. 
At  the  current  level  of  diffusion  and  sophistication  of  brain-hacking,  the  benefits 
produced by BCI development for patients and society significantly overwhelm the costs 
associated to brain-hacking and other neurocrime. Although some mild forms of brain-hacking 
have been proven feasible in experimental settings or in real-life tests (as in Cody’s Emokit 
project), there is no confirmed report of criminal and/or detrimental activities involving BCI to 
date. However, the phenomenon of brain-hacking should be constantly monitored and 
appropriate safeguards should be considered early in the design and deployment of the neural 
devices as the opportunities for criminal offense and malicious exploitation related to BCI are 
predicted to significantly increase in the near future. These safeguards may include:  
• The development of mechanisms and methods for anonymizing neural signals. A promising 
example of this is the Brain-Computer Interface Anonymizer (patent US 20140228701 A1), 
a method to generate anonymized neural signals by filtering features to remove privacy-
sensitive information (464). 
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• The deployment and integration of security mechanisms to detect uncharacteristic increase 
of noise in BCI-processing at the level of measurement as well as at the level of decoding 
and classification.  
• The deployment of feedback mechanisms for users to allow them to signal clearly undesired 
or uninitiated output of the device. In vulnerable (e.g. physically disabled or cognitively 
impaired) users these feedback mechanisms may be connected to alarms and/or location 
services that allow the hacked-users to automatically alert a response center (e.g. their 
caregivers or public safety authorities) and receive prompt support.  
• The deployment of machine learning self-control mechanism for detecting severe 
inconsistencies in the classification of features. These self-consistency check mechanisms 
could detect criminal circumstances where the brain-hack occurs at the level of decoding 
and classification of features. 
• The provision of specific training sessions for clinical BCI-users to train the users’ 
resistance to brain-hacking, especially brain-hacking via input-manipulation. These trainings 
could include the instruction of specific responses to potentially unsafe stimuli such as those 
related to banking and authentication methods and could be directly provided by the health-
care institution where the user is allocated. 
• The inclusion of free neurosecurity demos into the BCI-package for general users. Future 
commercially available BCI-packages may include a small introduction software package 
containing a brief serious game demo with instructions and safety-guidelines related to 
brain-hacking.  
It is a major role for current neural engineering and information security organizations to call 
for awareness regarding the dual-use risks associated with brain-computer interfacing and 
design regulatory mechanisms that could enhance the safety and security of present and future 
BCI applications. In addition, it is  important to raise awareness among the general public on 
the ethical implications associated with the phenomenon of brain-hacking and to stimulate the 
understanding and practical application of guidelines aimed at protecting and promoting the 
privacy, autonomy and integrity of the individual.  
 
Informed Consent 
Ethical issues with respect to informed consent for BCI-use interventions especially 
focus on the ratio between the high expectations that BCI technology may generate and the 
possible vulnerability of potential BCI users (465). For example, in the case of severe 
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neuromuscular patients such as LIS patients, high expectations on the liberating effect of BCI 
technology may represent a major ethical challenge, since these expectations could undermine 
patients’ evaluation of risks and benefits, including the risks associated with the phenomenon of 
brain-hacking. Vulnerable patients may be more likely to accept a higher risk of information 
insecurity, hence become more exposed to brain-hacking. To prevent this, accurate monitoring 
and reporting of the phenomenon of brain-hacking is recommended not only for scientists and 
ethicists but also for technology producers and the media. Inaccurate or insufficient reporting 
may result in generating unrealistic expectations in patients and reducing their perception of 
risk. In addition, more rigorous procedures for informed consent should be implemented to 
increase the user’s understanding of the risk-benefit ratio. It is worth remembering that getting 
informed consent is especially challenging when communicating with severely paralyzed target 
users such as those suffering LIS. Impaired communicative capacities of LIS patients require 
paying attention also to some characteristics of information and communication that are not 
reducible to verbal communication (e.g. eye blinking). As Clausen (2011) note, this is especially 
important for the questions whether the patient understands the information correctly, and 
whether there are any questions left for him/her (465). 
 
Privacy, Confidentiality and Security 
Particular ethical problems are posed by each single sort of hacking. Two major ethical 
problems are associated with hacking through input-manipulation. The first one is privacy. 
The possibility of extracting private and sensitive information from the brain of users represents 
a significant treat to privacy and data protection. Users that are victims of this sort of brain-
hacking typically lose the ability to seclude confidential or inherently sensitive information 
about themselves, thus experience an intrusion of their private sphere (466). This ethical 
problem is particularly significant because privacy is a priority issue in a free society, closely 
linked to civil liberties, democracy and human rights ( 4 6 7 ) . The protection of privacy 
and confidential data is a primary commitment in the United States as well as in the European 
Union where there is a collaborative push for modernizing the current data protection principles, 
strengthening the data protection mechanisms, ensuring police and criminal justice cooperation 
and a proper enforcement of the rules on privacy and confidentiality (468). 
The second problem is security. As experimentally shown by Martinovic et al. (2012), 
brain-hacking via input manipulation exposes BCI users to the risk of losing surveillance over 
their p e r s o n a l  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t y . Additionally, the opening of a breach into 
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private and confidential information implied by input-manipulation also exposes users to 
physical and psychological insecurity. The reason for that stems from the fact that the sort of 
information potentially extractable from a user's mind does not limit to financial information but 
may extend to information about the health condition of  the  users,  their  profession,  location, 
psychological capacities, sexual preferences, religious beliefs, routine activities etc. For 
example, Martinovic at al. (2012) have proved the feasibility of extracting information about the 
user's place of residence and date of birth, two types of information that are directly involved in 
personal security. It is expected that other types of equally complex information can be extracted 
in a similar manner  (466). This type of information is potentially of interest not only to criminals 
involved in harmful activities such as blackmail but also to employers and insurances. For 
example, health insurance companies may be interested in extracting information about the 
medical records of the user to accept or reject her enrollment into an insurance plan or to 
determine her insurance premiums. Similarly, employers could extract information about the 
user’s political views or sexual preferences and commit political or sexual orientation 
discrimination.  
 
Physical and Psychological Safety 
Brain-hacking via measurement-manipulation, decoding-manipulation, and feedback-
manipulation pose a problem for physical and psychological safety. These types of hacking 
may result in severe physical and psychological (e.g. traumatic experiences) harm to users in a 
way that is proportionate to the level of benefit of the BCI in assisting the user's physical and 
psychological performance. For example, patients using BCIs to control wheelchairs may 
suddenly lose their reacquired spatial mobility and be led back to their original condition of 
impairment (prior to the BCI). Similarly, robotic limb users and patients using vision BCIs 
may lose respectively their reacquired motor capacity and visual perception. This sort of 
attacks require immediate monitoring in the context of security, surveillance and public health 
as they may not need to involve sophisticated malware development, hence can performed also 
in absence of specific cybercriminal skills.  
In addition, BCI users that are victim of these types of attack may experience 
psychological distress as a result of their incapacity to perform the actions that they are 
mentally inducing. This distress would be particularly significant in LIS patients who use 
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BCIs as the only available connection to the external world51. As the primary goal of 
implementing neurotechnologies in health-care is promoting the benefit of the patient, the 
development of regulatory mechanisms for protecting physical and psychological safety will be 
required. Equally strict and rigorous regulatory mechanisms should protect healthy people who 
use consumer-grade BCI for entertainment, gaming and communication.  
 
Autonomy, Agency and Personhood 
Particularly critical ethical and legal implications are posed by brain-hacking through 
decoding and feedback-manipulation. The reason for that stems from the fact that these types of 
brain-hacking, as previously mentioned, would not simply enable malevolent actors to access 
information but may cause changes  in  the  user's decision-making and/or behavior.  This 
possibility for an external control over the user's future behavior seems to substantially conflict 
with the moral values of personal autonomy and free agency and may even interfere with the 
self-determination of personal identity. Personal autonomy is generally understood as the 
capacity of someone to deliberate or act on the basis of one’s own desires and plans and not as 
the product of manipulative or distorting external forces (469, 470). Autonomous individuals 
are those that are able to act freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan. By contrast, potential 
victims of brain-hacking may see their deliberation and action being partially limited, controlled 
or interfered by malevolent others. From this perspective, the way brain-hackers influence the 
users' decisions and behavior seems to substantially undermine their individual autonomy. The 
threat to autonomy posed by brain-hacking will be exacerbated in the clinical context as it 
would affect an extraordinari ly  vulnerable class of individuals such as patients with severe 
neurological disorders. In medical ethics, autonomy, conceived at minimum as a “self-rule that 
is free from both controlling interference by others and from limitations” (Varelius, 2006), is 
usually considered a fundamental requirement for the respect of patients and the protection of 
their dignity (118, 237). It is important to stress, however, that although hacked BCI-users with 
severe neurological conditions would be exposed to the risk of diminished autonomy if 
compared to non-hacked users with the same condition, they may, nevertheless, achieve greater 
overall autonomy than equally impaired patients who do not have access to BCI whatsoever. 
This fact is worth extensive philosophical reflection, since the counterintuitive situation that the 
 
51 Here too, there is a difference between hacking by disruption and hijacking, as the psychological stress 
involved in doing something different from what the user intended may differ from the traumatic 
experience of losing control over oneself. 
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same technology can both increase and diminish autonomy requires quite detailed analysis of the 
benefit-risk ratios in different scenarios. 
The challenge to autonomy posed by these types of brain-hacking also raises the issue of 
coercion, i.e the exercise of a constraining power on another party (besides the use of force, 
violence, and threats thereof) with the purpose of forcing him or her to act in a non-voluntary 
manner (471). As such, brain-hacking could raise a novel, more subliminal (since performed 
below the victim’s threshold of consciousness) form of coercion which adds to extortion, 
blackmail, torture and other currently performed forms of coercion.  
Strictly related to the notion of autonomy is the notion of agency, i.e. the capacity of an 
agent to act, and the capacity to distinguish between events that are self-initiated versus simply 
occurring (i.e. experiencing the difference between doing something and having something 
happening to you). The sense of agency serves to identify the range of one’s actions (i.e. 
activities actively performed by agents) from those events that are passively caused by 
external forces. For example, jumping into the water is considered an action if the jump is 
performed by the agent without being caused by external forces (e.g. being forced into the water 
by another person or by the wind). Similarly, controlling a wheelchair via BCI is an action if it 
is performed intentionally by the agent. In itself, BCI already contains the possibility to result 
in considerable uncertainty of the BCI user about whether or not the user actually did or did not 
perform a BCI mediated action, e.g. in case of error (472). When another agent, e.g. a remote 
hacker, gains control over the application and determines the actions of the user, the agency of 
the BCI user diminishes and the uncertainty of ascribing the action to the user increases 
significantly. This is ethically problematic for three major reasons. First, because the detachment 
of the intention-action causal link prompted by brain-hacking may result in psychological 
distress and for the user. Second, because it generates uncertainty about the voluntary character 
of the user’s actions. Third and consequently, because in Western jurisprudence the 
capacity for voluntary control over one’s own actions is consider a requisite for legal liability. 
Therefore, diminished or absent voluntary control over one’s own actions would result in 
diminished or absent legal liability of the user with regard to those actions.  This intimate link between 
agency and legal liability is explicitly expressed by the USA Model Penal Code (MPC), 
Section 2.01, which states that ‘‘(1) a person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is 
based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is 
physically capable”. The MPC also provides a list of examples of non-liable acts which 
includes: “(a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; 
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(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that 
otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or 
habitual’’ (473). The performance of an act as a consequence of brain-hacking via output 
manipulation seems to fit in at least three of the four above mentioned explicative categories, as 
the act is not a product or determination of the BCI user but of the hacker. Problems of uncertain 
legal liability are expected to arise. Collaborative research at the intersection between criminal 
law, cybersecurity, neurotechnology and ethics will be required in the next future to assess these 
problems in a manner that facilitates the judicial circuit and protects BCI users. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper took a first step in addressing the issue of brain-hacking and raising awareness 
on the ethical and security implications associated with the malicious use of BCI technology. An 
overview of the possible vulnerability sources of BCIs and their related sorts of brain-hacking 
was offered. Additionally, an inventory of the major ethical implications of brain-hacking via 
BCI was provided. Further interdisciplinary investigation is required to extensively analyze 
those implications and to develop a n o rm at iv e  a nd  regulatory framework that allows 
maximizing the benefits of BCI technology while minimizing its potential risks. 
BCI applications have the potential of significantly improving life quality in patients 
(especially in patients suffering severe neuromuscular disorders) and enabling enhanced and 
more personalized user experience in communication, gaming and entertainment for general 
users. However, the potential benefits of this technology may be tempered if security issues 
and ethical-legal considerations remain unaddressed. Ideally, this debate should involve the 
collaboration of ethicists, neuroscientists, engineers, computer scientists, cybersecurity experts, 
lawyers and other significant stakeholders and inform regulators and policy-makers.  
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One Sentence Summary: Greater safeguards are needed to address the personal safety, security 
and privacy risks arising from increasing adoption of neurotechnology in the consumer realm. 
 
Rapid advances in neuroscience, clinical imaging, digital health and the internet of things (IoT) 
are propelling neurotechnology from the exclusive domain of the medical clinic to an ever-
increasing number of direct-to-consumer (DTC) applications. Today, numerous 
neuromodulatory devices and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are becoming available to 
consumers, with associated accessories, mobile applications, software frameworks, and online 
services. 
 
52 Current Impact Factor: 46.223 (2016). Ownership of copyright in original research articles remains 
with the Author, and provided that, when reproducing the contribution or extracts from it or from the 
Supplementary Information, the Author acknowledges first and reference publication in the Journal, the 
Author retains the following non-exclusive rights: To reproduce the contribution in whole or in part in 
any printed volume (book or thesis) of which they are the author(s). The author and any academic 
institution, where they work, at the time may reproduce the contribution for the purpose of course 
teaching. To reuse figures or tables created by the Author and contained in the Contribution in oral 
presentations and other works created by them. To post a copy of the contribution as accepted for 
publication after peer review (in locked Word processing file, of a PDF version thereof) on the Author's 
own web site, or the Author's institutional repository, or the Author's funding body's archive, six months 
after publication of the printed or online edition of the Journal, provided that they also link to the 
contribution on the publisher’s website. 
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DTC headsets allow individuals to engage in various activities without medical 
supervision, such as monitoring cognitive health and wellbeing, optimizing brain fitness and 
performance or playing virtual games. Companies, such as Neurosky and Emotiv Systems, offer 
assortments of smartphone-compatible DTC neurodevices; large electronics and social media 
companies, such as Samsung (Seoul) and Facebook (Menlo Park), are testing future products 
controlled via electroencephalography (EEG) detected brain signals.   
As neurotechnology becomes more common outside of the clinical sphere and in the 
consumer market, brain derived data will increase in quantity and will require new solutions that 
are both capable of effective storage and sharing and that also ensure protection of privacy and 
security. Brain recordings in connection with other types of online information will add to the 
increasing proliferation of comprehensive electronic user profiles. These developments raise 
two fundamental questions for society and the biomedical community: Are our current digital 
infrastructures adequate for this upcoming proliferation of consumer-generated neurological 
data? And what legal and ethical safeguards need to be put in place to ensure individual rights, 
such as privacy and data security, are protected? 
An expanding DTC universe 
According to a recent review by neurotechnology market research firm SharpBrains, the 
number of patent classifications related to DTC neurotechnology has more than doubled in the 
past 10 years(474). Currently, over 8,000 active patents are focused on neurotechnology, with 
just as many pending applications. Another market research report by Neurotech Reports 
projects that the overall worldwide market for neurotechnology products will be $8.4 billion in 
2018 and will reach $13.3 billion in 2022. Indeed, at last year’s ‘NeuroGaming’ conference in 
San Francisco, the hyperbole rose to fever pitch, with delegates heralding the dawn of “the 
pervasive neurotechnology age” in which everyday wearable technologies will be non-
invasively connected to brains.  
DTC neuromodulatory and imaging devices open new opportunities for self-monitoring 
and cognitive training in fields as diverse as mental health and education. And as neurodevices 
increase in portability and affordability, neurotechnology is likely to become increasingly 
pervasive. Three types of neurotechnology that are entering the consumer products market pose 
the greatest concern for privacy and security: BCIs for device control or self-monitoring; 
devices for non-invasive neurostimulation; and neuromarketing applications of neuroimaging 
technology.  
 256 
 
Self-monitoring, home therapy and neuromarketing  
As yet, only a few of these three different types of neurotechnology device relevant to the DTC 
space have been published in the peer-reviewed literature. We discuss each in turn to exemplify 
the types of privacy and security issues that arise when applied in the DTC market.  
Self-monitoring using BCIs. Portable EEG headsets like Emotiv Epoc+ and Neurosky 
Mindwave are available in the consumer market with prices ranging between $99.99 and 
$799.99. These products enable access to raw EEG data with proprietary software subscription 
for a variety of purposes including monitoring attention levels or controlling virtual objects. 
However, their privacy and security standards are questionable. In 2013, researchers used a 
consumer headset to demonstrate that EEG-measurements of an event-related potential elicited 
in decision making (the ‘P300’) can be successfully used to extract financial and identity-related 
information from BCI-users without their knowledge or consent(441). In this experiment, users 
were exposed to various classes of visual stimuli (e.g., bank cards, PIN (personal identification) 
numbers, area of living and the knowledge of known persons) through ad hoc designed ‘brain-
spyware’; that is, software intentionally designed to extract private information from brain 
recordings. For each class of stimuli, one target stimulus (i.e., stimulus eliciting sensitive 
information known to the user) was inserted in a randomly permuted sequence of non-target 
stimuli. Through the analysis of the captured EEG-signal, researchers were able to detect which 
of the presented stimuli were related to the user’s private or secret information, such as the 
user’s home address and PIN code digits. Such information leakage from the user revealed a 
significant chance of successful extraction of sensitive data. Compared with random guessing 
attacks, the EEG information can enhance identification accuracy of private information by 
~15–40 % on average.  
Similarly, researchers at the University of Washington have developed a BCI game, 
called ‘Flappy Whale,’ in which players are presented with overt visual stimuli while EEG and 
electromagnetography (EMG) signals are recorded. The results of the experiment confirm the 
feasibility of extracting private and sensitive information from BCI-users through subliminal 
stimulation. Although Flappy Whale was designed to measure responses to relatively innocuous 
information (e.g. logotypes of commercial brands), its creators claimed during the Enigma 
Conference 2017 in Oakland, CA, that the same model has the potential to extract more 
sensitive information, such as financial information or even personal beliefs(475).  
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Devices for non-invasive neurostimulation. Security breaches might be also enabled 
by another type of neurotechnology: transcranial current stimulation (tCS), which encompasses 
various techniques, such as tDCS (transcranial direct current stimulation), tACS (transcranial 
alternating current stimulation) and tRNS (transcranial random noise stimulation). Thus far, 
mechanisms for these approaches have yet to be completely defined: tDCS applies a constant 
electric field dependent on polarity that is thought to have short-term effects on neuronal 
excitability likely through cell membrane polarization; tACS applies an oscillatory electric field 
with a specific frequency and phase that modulates brain oscillations supposedly through 
‘entrainment’; and tRNS applies white noise (1–640 Hz) to modulate cortical excitability likely 
though ‘stochastic resonance’. A related set of neurostimulatory devices use transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (tMS) to influence cortical activity.  
An increasing number of the above devices are being approved by the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) for use under prescription. But many of these neurodevices are also 
being marketed in the DTC realm. Commercial applications of tDCS device kits, such as 
Neuroelectrics’ StarStim8,http://www.neuroelectrics.com/products/starstim/starstim-8/ are of 
particular concern because they often rely on wireless (Bluetooth) connections between a home-
computer and the device, allowing unsecured data transmission that can be intercepted by third 
parties. For tMS, Neuronetics and eNeura have FDA-approved devices for depression and 
migraine, respectively; other tMS devices are also entering the consumer market. Other products 
are available without FDA certification.   
In addition to privacy and data security issues, researchers have also questioned the 
safety of these neurostimulation techniques, arguing that some longer-term side-effects (e.g. 
build-up of stimulating effects in non-target areas) are poorly known, and expressed concern 
that the adjective “non-invasive” may mislead non-expert users into the belief that the effect of 
the technique is by definition mild.(476)  These concerns become particularly relevant in the 
context of widespread and unsupervised uses of advertised DTC products, especially when some 
claims, such as improving cognitive performance and mental wellbeing, are not sufficiently 
substantiated by validated scientific evidence.(477)  
Neuromarketing and neuroimaging. The combination of neuroimaging techniques, 
such as functional magnetic resonance (fMRI), and machine learning also presents new 
concerns regarding breaches of mental privacy.(478) In a study conducted at the University of 
California, participants were shown movie trailers while undergoing an fMRI scan. Decoding 
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fMRI data, the researchers used a machine learning algorithm to reconstruct the videos(479). 
Although the reconstructed videos remained blurry, researchers effectively proved the feasibility 
of reconstructing visual content from neural data. Given the self-improving capacity of the 
algorithm and the increasing accuracy of neuroimaging scans, the brain-reading potential of 
such technology is likely to increase substantially in the near future.  
In parallel, the development of innovative magnetoencephalography (MEG) techniques 
that do not require superconducting technology could lead, in the near future, to a new 
generation of lightweight wearable neuroimaging headsets.(480)  
Although the neuroimaging tools above are not currently applied in the DTC context 
stricto sensu due to their limited portability, the increasing application of similar devices in 
commercial settings opens new possibilities for collection and analysis of neural information 
outside the clinical or research domain. This information can be used by neuromarketing 
research companies to study −and possibly influence−consumer behavior and perception. 
Neuroimaging applications in commercial settings, especially in neuromarketing, are of 
particular ethical concern because they are not required to comply with the same ethical 
guidelines as clinical research. Unlike clinical research, neuromarketing companies are free to 
conduct neuroimaging studies of humans in the consumer space without formal approval from 
an ethics committee and rigorous informed consent from study participants. Furthermore, once 
DTC neuromonitoring becomes sufficiently widespread, big data analytics can be performed on 
large-scale datasets of user-generated neural data without explicit user consent.  
 
Privacy and information security risks 
Historically, at the early stages of technological innovation security risks are common because 
of a lack of stringent security measures integrated into the technologies and unprepared legal 
frameworks. Notoriously, “technology innovates faster than the regulatory system can adapt” 
and disruptive technological advancements can make current privacy and security norms 
obsolete (481).  
For example, the frequency of cybersecurity threats has increased substantially with the 
disruptive emergence of smartphone-controlled pervasive and ubiquitous computing(482). 
Given the high sensitivity of neural information, neurotechnology must not be allowed to follow 
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a similar historical trajectory. Privacy and security breaches should be proactively anticipated 
and prevented.  
The combination of three distinctive features inherent in DTC neurotechnology poses 
important ethical and legal challenges. First, the expansion of commercial neurodevices and 
neuromarketing applications produces large volumes of data (both raw EEG data and their 
associations with user-data, demographics, social media information etc.) in an unprotected and 
loosely regulated manner. Second, the control of EEG data is only partially voluntary and may 
be tapped without the knowledge of the subject. Moreover, access to these raw data enables a 
more direct detection pathway of the neural correlates of mental processes, such as interests, 
intentions, silent speech, moods and preferences, compared with other digitally available sensor 
data(483). And third, the data collected includes rich and personally identifiable sources of 
information that could be aggregated by data-handlers to capture or predict elements of health 
status, preferences and behavior.  
The comprehensive collection of both personal and non-personal information is common 
to most DTC neurotechnology actors. For example, the Emotiv Privacy Policy states that the 
company exercises the right to gather “personal information” from users that can be associated 
with them, including their EEG-data, usage information, specific interactions with applications, 
as well as “information that may be inferred from the foregoing sources, either alone or in any 
combination”.53 In addition, if Emotiv or Neurosky customers use their social network log-in to 
create a user-profile, information associated with the social network account, such as 
demographics, IP address and interests will be collected and linked to the EEG-data.  
With the growing proliferation of neurotechnology-related online databases available for 
analysis and their association with digitally available profiles, it will be increasingly hard for 
users to selectively isolate intended information (e.g., parameters relevant for cognitive self-
monitoring and training) from information that they wish to keep private like preferences, 
interests or abnormalities. Anonymization techniques are useful but vulnerable to re-
identification. Consequently, unintended disclosure of private information is a tangible 
risk(484). 
Brain privacy and security risks can arise in multiple ways. First, as the brain-spyware 
and Floppy Whale examples show, raw neural data, such as EEG-recordings, can be gleaned 
 
53 https://id.emotivcloud.com/eoidc/privacy/privacy_policy/ (last accessed: Aug 8, 2018) 
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directly from the neuroheadset through subliminal stimulation, without authorization from the 
user. These activities are forms of ‘brain-hacking’ and can exploit different phases of the BCI 
cycle(377).  
As technology advances, the accuracy and informational richness of hacking primary 
brain data sources are set to increase, opening novel possibilities for unintended and 
unconsented decoding of mental information. In non-cybercriminal scenarios, EEG-recordings 
and neuroimaging data collected in neuromarketing studies can be used to reveal information 
(e.g. biomarkers of mental illness or personal beliefs) from participants. Similarly, variations in 
EEG responses to Facebook interests, demographic data and other online activities could be 
gleaned from users of Internet-connected consumer-grade BCIs, without explicit consent of the 
user.  
What’s more, data can be accessed from platforms of sensor data storage, analysis and 
visualization. Most DTC companies including Emotiv, Neurosky and Muse Interaxon use 
private cloud services for data storage in which users outsource their data to an in-house or 
third-party cloud provider. Notoriously, cloud services are vulnerable both to insider threats and 
cyberattacks, especially Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). In addition, they are 
characterized by lack of customer support, standardization issues (absence of clear-cut 
guidelines unifying cloud providers), and unclear legal liability in case of security breaches. The 
attractiveness and therefore risk of hacking data storage sites by nefarious and criminal actors 
will be greatly increased when large population EEG-databases are stored and linked for 
analysis to other databases containing medical, social-media or other sensitive information. 
Even though most DTC companies, anonymize the collected EEG data, these data can be easily 
combined with other informational sources to re-identify a user. It is notable that DTC 
neurotechnology companies actively encourage users to outsource their data. For example, if 
users of most DTC services choose not to upload their data on the cloud, a more limited set of 
features is made available to them. Most data can also be hacked during transmission from the 
recording device to other platforms. This breach of security can be facilitated by unsecured uses 
of data gathering and sharing services. This phenomenon has already been observed in the 
context of mobile health, with many health professionals sharing patient-related clinical data via 
unsecured wireless channels like smartphone messaging apps(485). Outside the clinical context, 
in the DTC sphere, the use of unsecured data-sharing services is widespread and the exposure to 
unauthorized access even higher(486).  
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The risk of unauthorized disclosure of brain information is particularly perilous among 
people with medical and psychological conditions. For example, the unintended disclosure of 
information revealing cognitive deficits and neural signatures predictive of disorders (e.g. 
depression or bipolar disorder), substance addiction or personality traits that the person wants to 
keep private, can lead to discrimination and social isolation(484, 487). 
The possibility of brain leaks is not limited to criminal hackers or other malevolent 
agents, and does not necessarily involve the use of malware. With the growing availability of 
large datasets of brain-related data, anonymous EEG and fMRI data can be legally mined for 
commercial and marketing purposes to reveal more information about a certain user group than 
the individual user intended to provide or share. As long as people accept their terms of use, 
companies are free to use data-mining and big-data analytics to extract associations between 
sensor data, demographic information and online behavior or to share the data with third parties 
for further reuse.  
Recycling of user data is a real possibility—and could become highly profitable— for 
private providers of DTC neurotechnology services. For example, by accepting the terms of use 
of most direct-to-consumer BCI-providers, users grant the companies a right to re-use and 
disclose non-personal information to advertisers and other third parties. These data can be used 
for a variety of purposes including identifying peer groups based on their overall cognitive 
performance relative to age or other characteristics. When companies like Facebook will be able 
to collect large volumes of brain-derived data, these policies will allow them to re-use this 
information for microtargeted psychographic ads or other commercial purposes. 
Finally, neuromonitoring techniques are also being tested by national security agencies 
for surveillance, investigation and predictive policy purposes,(140, 488) making governments an 
additional actor potentially interested in the access and reuse of personal neurological data. This 
possibility projects a future in which “thoughts and images in our brains could become the target 
of future government investigations”(489). To the extent the information is available in private 
firms, the government could, in principle, obtain access to the firms’ information through search 
warrant, subpoena, or simple request. This is explicitly reported in Emotiv’s and Muse 
Interaxon’s Privacy Policy, where it is stated that the company may be required to share 
personal information to comply with with applicable law or respond to governmental requests. 
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Inadequate safeguards 
Because of the socio-technological novelty of consumer neurotechnology trends, current ethical 
and legal safeguards are inadequate to guarantee the protection of brain information in this 
rapidly changing digital environment. In the United States, federal law protects medical 
information. And yet, no specific laws or guidelines govern access to brain data outside of the 
clinical realm. If a consumer neurotechnology or associated app is provided by an hospital or 
business associate, then HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) (490) 
regulation applies. However, HIPAA does not apply if the neuroheadset is just purchased online 
by an individual without a prescription and the apps are downloaded from an app store, as usual 
in the DTC realm.  
Consumer neurotechnology highlights the problem of regulations focusing on where the 
data originate rather than the nature and use of such data. In parallel, FDA regulation provides 
guidance for digital health and mobile medical apps(491). However, the current FDA 
framework has been criticized for creating simultaneously under-regulation and over-regulation. 
On the one hand, it is relatively easy for DTC manufacturers to elude FDA compliance due to its 
limited bandwidth. On the other hand, it is difficult for responsible innovators to invest in 
neurodevices that require a premarket approval path from the FDA due to the significant delays 
in approving new devices.  
It is important to highlight, that expanding HIPAA and the FDA’s scope might not be 
possible without new legislation, because those regulations can only go as far as the statutes (i.e. 
Congress) allow. Therefore, reforming policies for the digital health era almost certainly 
requires new legislation and not just agency-initiated changes in regulations. 
Indeed, DTC neurotechnology applications often remain in an undefined ethical and 
regulatory space. For example, while neuroimaging studies in the neuroscience and clinical 
research setting require institutional review board (IRB) approval and follow specific guidelines 
for data usage, consumer neurotechnology companies are not subject to the same standards. 
Neuromarketing companies can run studies involving human subjects without formal approval 
from an ethics committee, while DTC companies can transmit data to third parties such as social 
media or other apps. This makes it possible to collect substantial volumes of user-generated data 
and distribute them to third parties, even when the purpose of such reuse (e.g., marketing 
analysis) could be different from the intent of the user or the function advertised by the company 
when selling the product (e.g., self-monitoring of mental wellbeing)(492).  
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With the volume of personal neurological data rapidly increasing and security-by-design 
not being the focus of companies, such defective legal and regulatory coverage allows unsecure 
uses of brain information. As stated by Nita Farahany during the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland: “There are no legal protections from having your mind involuntarily read”. 
Not surprisingly, security experts consider BCI and other neurotechnologies to be among the 
nine disruptive technological trends that “are likely to shape the cybersecurity environment over 
the next decade”22.   
In light of these inadequate ethical and legal safeguards, the US National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) has recently released a request for information, soliciting input to identify a set 
core of ethical issues associated to emerging neurotechnology. These include considerations 
associated with novel neuromodulation and neuroimaging technologies, informed consent issues 
in the context of neurotechnology research and the problem of “the evolving breadth of neural 
data” with associated issues of data ownership, data storage and access, unintended uses of data 
and privacy concerns; including “protection from discrimination for those whose neural data are 
shared”.(493) This is helpful, but is limited to the research setting.  More importantly, the NIH 
has authority to regulate research conducted with its funds, but does not have the authority to 
regulate the DTC market for neurodevices. 
 
Proposing safeguards 
In response to this emerging scenario, a proactive effort is needed to increase the privacy and 
security of brain-related data outside the medical and research context. Safeguards are needed at 
three levels: individual users; neurotechnology producers or service providers; and policy and 
regulatory bodies.  
At the user level, robust and valid informed consent is critical. With the growing market 
of DTC self-monitoring, neurodevices and medical crowdsourcing platforms, individuals will be 
increasingly motivated to acquire and share their brain data as part of their quantified self, 
seeking interpretations of the relationship between their data and health variability—a 
phenomenon that has already been observed with DTC genetic testing. Given the informational 
richness, versatility, psychological relevance, near-endless reusability and partial voluntary 
control of brain data, current requests for accepting the service’s terms and conditions are 
insufficient to protect users. In addition, the possibility that users unreflectively trade their brain 
data for behavior analysis or monetary compensation in neuromarketing or other services must 
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be prevented. Research shows that most users do not fully read online terms of service 
(ToS)(494), hence are likely to click away their data privacy rights in an uninformed manner.  
For service providers, standard practice should include the following: adopting 
procedures and practices similar to routine informed consent for research and stored biological 
samples, companies must disclose in their terms of use: (1) how and where brain-data are stored; 
(2) whether and by whom brain-data are re-used and shared; (3) what anonymization and 
information security measures are implemented; (4) how individuals will be informed if their 
data are hacked or inadequately transmitted; and (5) who is legally liable under those 
circumstances. In addition, service providers should give users the ability to easily withdraw or 
erase their data at any time. This would also require the incorporation into the product’s license 
of a transparency statement of what rights and duties different parties have with respect to the 
data. Replacing the current click-to-accept modus of ToS with designs that involve bullet 
summaries of companies’ agreements and require users to explicitly consider their options is 
necessary.  
Although companies might be granted a license to use, reproduce, display, and prepare 
derivative works of the user’s brain-related data, they should not be automatically allowed to 
transmit and distribute those data to third parties. The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scenario 
should not be permitted for neuro-derived information.  Similarly, the linkage of sensor data 
with social-media profiles and other online information should be not be permitted by 
companies through opt-out strategies, but allowed only upon explicit affirmative permission 
from users via opt-in approaches. Institutional measures including independent IRB for every 
use of data for non-research purposes should also be considered. As the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal illustrates, online service providers like Facebook are often unwilling and unable to 
limit data collection, which makes it possible for third parties to access data no one gave 
authorization for. This risk could exacerbate when companies will store large datasets of brain-
related data.  
Data security needs to be a primary concern of manufacturers and sellers of pervasive 
neurodevices. Proactive safeguards for the selective protection of brain-information should be 
incorporated into product design. One promising example is the BCI Anonymizer, a system 
capable of pre-processing neural signals before their transmission and storage with the purpose 
of removing all redundant information except the specifically intended BCI commands(142). 
Distributed ledger computing (blockchain) and differential privacy techniques should also be 
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considered as ways to improve the security and transparency of data processing. In parallel, 
recommendations for secured data transmission should be included by service providers in the 
user manual. An example of the desired standard in terms of use is Soterix Medical, which 
notifies users to the “risk of relying on a wireless connection with a computer to control and 
monitor the device”. All apps −including both those bundled in the neuroheadset starter kit and 
those freely downloadable from an app store− should have to comply with data security best 
practices such as the European Network and Information Security Agency’s guidelines. In 
parallel, as Bonaci et al.(495) have suggested, “platforms should be immunized for apps that 
third parties submit” to incentivize policies against abusive apps. 
Finally, the often-hyperbolic claims made by some DTC manufacturers need to be 
substantiated by more solid scientific evidence to avoid generating unrealistic expectations. 
Currently, companies are not required and have no incentive to wait for their products to go 
through expensive and time-consuming clinical or performance trials and cybersecurity tests 
before they market their products and make marketing claims.(496) Therefore, regulatory 
interventions might be required to incentivize evidence-based and user-centered development 
and facilitate the incorporation of efficacy, safety and security-enhancing capabilities into future 
prototypes.  
Conclusions 
In the DTC context, neurotechnology promises to improve the diagnosis and treatment of 
neurological disease, enable new opportunities for human-machine interaction, open 
possibilities for training and education, and make brain data accessible for public use. That said, 
cooperative, interdisciplinary efforts are urgently needed to proactively develop and implement 
strategies that can help maximize the benefits of pervasive neurotechnology for society at large 
while minimizing the privacy and security risks.  
Like any other digital health subdomain, the market of consumer neurotechnology is 
global. Therefore, effective governance strategies should be able to harmonize national 
regulations. A step in the right direction is being taken in the European Union, where a new 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became enforceable for all member States on May 
25, 2018. The GDPR requires explicit consent (opt-in) for the data collected and the purpose 
data are used for “in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language” 
on pain of not being binding (Art. 7,2). It obligates data controllers to meet the principles of 
privacy by design and by default (i.e. from the onset of the designing of systems) and to notify 
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users in case of data breaches. Organizations in breach of GDPR can be fined up to 4% of 
annual global turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater). The positive impact of GDPR on 
consumer neurotechnology is already visible. For example, some DTC companies such as 
Emotiv no longer grant themselves an “irrevocable, perpetual license” to use, transmit and 
distribute user-generated neurological data (as stated in their Terms of Use prior to GDPR) and 
will inform users about their right to withdraw their consent at any time. 
Creating an ecosystem that enables technological innovation while making sure that 
citizens have control over their data is critical for neurotechnology. All relevant stakeholders 
including researchers/developers, companies, regulatory agencies and end-users should make 
security of personalized brain information a priority. Near term solutions include enhancing the 
privacy and security standards of current hardware and software, fostering evidence-based 
approaches to product development, reforming consent procedures for DTC products and raising 
awareness among individual users and developers. Long term solutions include enforcing 
responsible governance and opening a public debate on what rights individuals are entitled to 
exercise in relation to their neural domain. Ignoring these issues could not only result in harm to 
individuals or groups but also fuel public distrust in the entire neurotechnology enterprise. 
Therefore, proactively securing brain-related data is the clear and present challenge to ensure 
continuing application of these devices in the consumer sector. 
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Abstract 
The collection of a large volume and variety of physiological and behavioral data is critical for 
the effective development, deployment and implementation of assistive technologies and for the 
subsequent effective support of older adults with dementia.  Yet it raises privacy and security 
issues. In this Chapter we review the major privacy and security implications associated with the 
use of three major families of intelligent assistive technologies for dementia: ambient assisted 
living systems, wearable devices and service robotics, especially telepresence robots.  After 
exploring a number of both category-specific and cross-categorical ethical and legal 
implications, we propose a list of policy recommendation with the purpose of maximizing the 
uptake of assistive technologies while minimizing possible adverse effects on the privacy and 
security of target users.  
 
54 Edited volume under contract. Expected release in 2019.  
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Introduction 
A key functional component of most intelligent assistive technologies (IATs) for 
dementia is the capacity to sense, track and monitor patients and their activities. The process of 
tracking and monitoring adults with dementia and their activities may have various purposes. 
These include: alarming in case of detected abnormalities, conveying or facilitating the 
supervision or intervention of caregivers, generating data flows useful for diagnostics and 
therapy, favoring a more adaptive and personalized interaction with other assistive technologies. 
In a nutshell, monitoring and tracking tools are primarily instrumental to collecting relevant 
information for increasing the patients’ safety and enhancing the effective support of users in the 
completion of activities of daily living (ADLs). The capacity of tracking and monitoring is 
enabled by sensors, which convert physical parameters (for example: temperature, blood 
pressure, CO2 levels, speed, etc.) into a signal that can be measured electrically. Such 
electrically measurable signals may contain various types of information about the patients, the 
most common being behavioral and physiological information. Behavioral monitoring 
technology collects information about the user’s behavior, such as movements, actions, and 
sounds. In contrast, physiological monitoring systems track and record patient physiological 
data such as heart rate, breathing rates, blood pressure, electrocardiogram (ECG) and 
electroencephalography (EEG) signals, and blood chemistry information. Both behavioral and 
physiological records are likely to contain private and sensitive information. Behavioral records, 
for example, may contain information about the patient’s habits, locations and daily activities in 
their private sphere. Physiological records, on the other hand, may contain information about 
physiological correlates of a person’s health as well as biometric information. While the 
collection of such private and sensitive information is critical for the effective development, 
deployment and implementation of assistive technologies and for the subsequent effective 
support of older adults with dementia, yet it raises privacy and security issues. Having others 
know intimate details about a person’s life such as their behavior or their medical records may 
infringe that person’s right to privacy as well as cause a loss of autonomy.  
In this Chapter we will describe and discuss the major privacy implications associated 
with the use of intelligent assistive technologies in the context of dementia care. In particular, 
we will focus on the three classes of IATs that most largely rely on the monitoring and tracking 
of personal data: ambient assisted living systems, telepresence robotics and wearable 
technology. Both general and class-specific issues will be discussed.  
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We will proceed as follows. First, we will present the notion of privacy, its role in our 
current ethical and legal discourse, and its relation to other notions such as medical beneficence 
and data protection. Second, we will explain how certain classes of IATs may generate novel 
issues for privacy and data protection. We will focus on three major families of monitoring and 
tracking technologies for dementia: ambient assisted living, telepresence robots and wearables. 
Third, we will discuss the implications of defective privacy protection in the context of IATs 
and highlight the need for unambiguous privacy standards in IATs for dementia care. Finally, 
we will conclude by providing preliminary insights into privacy-enhancing regulatory solutions.  
 
Informational Privacy, Beneficence and the Goals of Care 
The need to set limits to the public dissemination of information relating to a person's 
private life was firstly defended by Warren and Brandeis (1890). In their seminal analysis, the 
emergence of novel technologies was seen as an increased risk of intrusion into a person’s 
private domain and a potential breach for unintended public disclosure of personal information 
(497). The notion of informational privacy, i.e. the control over information about oneself, was 
further developed by authors such as Westin (1967), Fried (1970) and Parent (1983). Westin, for 
example, described privacy as the ability to determine for ourselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about us is communicated to others (498). Such an account of privacy 
became central to the legal discourse after the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly ruled that privacy 
is a central reason for Fourth Amendment protection. Consequently to that deliberation, 
informational privacy has been frequently extended as to include the protection against 
unwarranted searches, eavesdropping, surveillance, and appropriation and misuses of one's 
communications. With the emergence of digital computers and the Internet, novel debates arose 
about the privacy and security status of personal records of information. The reason for that 
stems primarily from the fact that people may not know what information is stored about them 
or what parties have access to it  ̶ a problem that has been recently exacerbated by cloud 
computing. The possibility for service providers to access and link databases containing 
personal information, with few controls on how those data are used, shared, or exploited, has 
hindered individual control over information about oneself in an unprecedented manner. 
In the ethics tradition, the notion of privacy has often been attributed moral value based 
on the argument that it is necessarily associated to certain basic freedom, independence and 
other moral values. For example, Bloustein (1964) stated that invasion of privacy is best 
understood, in sum, as affront to human dignity (499). In a similar fashion, Allen (1988) has 
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argued that a degree of privacy is required by the liberal ideals of personhood, civil liberty and 
the participation of citizens as equals (500). In the light of the informational privacy account at 
its interconnectedness to core moral values such as equality, liberty, personhood and dignity, it 
becomes questionable to what extent it is legitimate to monitor and track activity from older 
adults with dementia, hence to access control of their physiological and behavioral information. 
To properly appreciate this philosophical problem, however, it is necessary to balance privacy 
with another value in the moral spectrum, i.e. the principle of beneficence in biomedical ethics.  
Beneficence is the principle of biomedical ethics which requires that any procedure or 
intervention be provided with the intent of doing the best interest of the patient involved and to 
promote their welfare. Under some circumstances, privacy and beneficence may be in mutual 
conflict. One common ethical issue arises when the patient’s informational privacy conflicts 
with the physician’s beneficent duty to look out for the patient’s best interests.  For example, the 
doctor of a patient with dementia may gain valuable treatment-related information from 
monitoring the patient’s everyday behavioral habits even without the patient’s consent. 
However, this unauthorized monitoring would represent an intrusion into the patient’s privacy. 
In these situations the protection of the patient’s informational privacy conflicts with the 
physician’s duty of beneficence and following each principle would lead to different courses of 
action.  
In the light of this complex dynamics among potentially conflicting principles it results 
clear how the healthcare system and healthcare professionals do have an obligation to prevent or 
mitigate harms, and weigh and balance possible benefits against other principles (e.g. privacy 
and autonomy) as well as against possible risks of an action.  
In the context of IATs, there is an undisputable obligation to use monitoring and tracking 
technologies to prevent and mitigate harms. For example, smoke detectors employ sensor 
technology to detect unusually high levels of carbon dioxide in the home environment and send 
alarms to prevent harms such as intoxication or fire. Analogously, fall detectors employ sensor 
technology to detect falls and prevent the arms of delayed assistance. Beyond this undisputable 
obligation, however, specific clauses on the legitimate conditions for the recording, storage, 
access, and reuse of behavioral and physiological information remain to be unequivocally 
determined. In fact, a weighed and balanced calibration of the various moral values at stake 
would automatically exclude any account that disproportionally sacrifices one value over the 
other. For example, renouncing to the implementation of monitoring and tracking technology 
altogether in dementia care on the grounds of privacy rights would dramatically hamper the 
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quality of care, obstacle improvements to the quality of life of the patient and stop technological 
innovation. At the same time, however, allowing any uncontrolled and unrestricted beneficence-
motivated collection and dissemination of highly sensitive physiological, behavioral and other 
personal information from elders with dementia without their knowledge and consent, would 
result in harming the patient’s privacy and ultimately producing injustice.  
 
Current Legal Coverage on Privacy, Security and Data Protection  
Potential benefits of IAT systems for dementia care include (i) extending the time people 
can live in their preferred environment by increasing their autonomy, self-confidence and 
mobility; (ii) supporting the preservation of health and functional capabilities of the elderly, (iii) 
promoting a better and healthier lifestyle for individuals at risk; (iv) enhancing security, 
preventing social isolation and supporting the preservation of the multifunctional network 
around the individual; (v) supporting carers, families and care organizations; and (vi) increasing 
the efficiency and productivity of used resources in the ageing societies. While the long term 
positive impact of this technological turn in neurogeriatric care is massive, the intrusion into the 
patient’s private sphere enabled by IATs needs to be counterposed to the protection of two main 
fundamental rights: the right to privacy the right to data protection. 
In Europe, there are two legal systems that guarantee the protection of fundamental 
rights: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an international agreement between 
the 47 members of the Council of Europe (CoE); and the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (EU CFR) that became binding and primary law after the Lisbon treaty in 2009 (Art. 6.1 
Treaty of the European Union, TEU). Inspired by the article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), and the article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), both corpuses protect the “right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence”, so as to say privacy (art. 8 ECHR and art. 7 EUCFR 
respectively). With regard to the processing of personal data, however and unlike the United 
States, Europe has extensively developed another right, the data protection right either within 
CoE (through the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, also called “Convention 108” (14)) or within the EU with the 
95/46/EC Data Protection Directive [soon to be replaced by the General Data Protection 
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Regulation (GDPR) and the Directive for the criminal judicial cooperation, two proposals made 
in January 2012] 55. 
Privacy and data protection are “twins, but not identical” (5) and both are narrower and 
broader than its former at the same time: while privacy extends to the entire private dimension 
of the person, data protection focuses solely on the processing of personal data; on the other 
side, personal data may refer to “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual” (data subject), which makes it broader than privacy because it may encompass 
information that does not contravene privacy. Indeed, while the process of personal data for a 
concrete purpose with the obtaining of a valid consent for it would make no interference to the 
right to data protection, the collection, storage or disclosure of such data could interfere with 
private life (18).  
It is worth noting that although the current data protection directive grants protection “to 
all persons”, it only includes within its scope “living being[s]” (23). The rest of persons are 
covered nowadays by the right to privacy (24). Moreover, this directive does not cover 
anonymous data even though it may interfere with the private sphere of citizens (25), e.g. data 
such as traffic and location data – as those increasingly collected by ambient assistive living 
technologies can infringe the privacy of the citizen, especially when they steer the conduct of 
the citizens invading their individual’s privacy and autonomy (26). In the end, “the processing 
of data that is not qualified as personal might also constitute an unlawful infringement of the 
right to respect for private life” (61). 
In any case, both rights are not absolute and need to be considered “in relation to its 
function in society” (19), and they need to be balanced with other rights (20-21), e.g. in the case 
of dementia care, the degree of intrusiveness of a certain assistive technology should be in 
proportion to their contribution to achieving the goals of good care and promoting the patient’s 
best interest. Furthermore, interferences to these rights in special occasions (e.g. to pursue 
terrorist attacks) are lawful if they are “provided for by law and respect the essence of those 
rights and freedoms [and] subject to the principle of proportionality […]” (Art. 52 EU CFR) 
(22).  
In dementia care, the respect of both rights is of paramount importance because the 
patient might not be capable to understand what data are processed, to what extent they are 
 
55 See Reform of EU data protection rules: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/reform/index_en.htm 
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processed, and, accordingly, might not be able to give appropriate consent. Furthermore, the 
collected information is huge and very sensitive. To this regard, the General Data Protection 
Regulation expected to enter in force in 2018 aims at reinforcing the current data protection 
schema offering an easier access to the collected data, the right to data portability, the right to be 
forgotten and the right to know when the information has been hacked.56 Issues of informed 
consent in elderly people, privacy post mortem, third uses of the collected data or cognitive 
privacy in neurotechnology applications are still under discussion. 
 
Privacy and Security in Ambient Assisted Living Technologies  
Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) or Ambient Assistive Technologies (AAT) are a family 
of assistive systems that incorporate pervasive and ubiquitous computing into the design of 
housing facilities for the elderly as well as for people with physical and cognitive disabilities. 
These technologies “seek to aid people, particularly the elderly, live independently for a longer 
time period than would otherwise be possible” (83). A large number of AAL systems have been 
tested effective also in the support and assistance of older adults with dementia and their 
informal caregivers. AATs are normally focused on the prevention and management of chronic 
conditions, the preservation of social interaction, the facilitated completion of ADL, the 
compensation of specific functional deficits (80), the delivery of medical and rehabilitative 
interventions, and the fulfillment of the oft-stated wish of older adults to age-in-place. In 
addition, AATs seek to active ageing (89), and improve the quality of life of the patients. AATs  
work on a distributed cloud-of-care basis allowing smart integrated technology to track, 
monitor, supervise, guide and support the elder’s behavior in a relatively non-invasive way (90). 
 In 2008, a Study Report of the European Commission addressed a number of general 
ethical and legal issues linked to e-Health (84). In 2014, the AALIANCE research group 
identified a core set of specific ethical and legal issues associated with the implementation and 
use of AAT (501). In this document, researchers identified the major legal corpuses relevant for 
AAL and in accordance to which every AAL system should be designed, developed, produced 
and implemented. These corpuses include: data protection regulation (transparency, legitimate 
purpose and proportionality), patient safety and medical device regulations (85), consumer 
protection (fair treatment, products which meet acceptable standards and a right of redress if 
something goes wrong) (92), and the legislation regarding services (e-commerce) (93). In 
 
56 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ 
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addition, they identified some legislative gaps on a number of regulatory issues including (i) 
broadband access (addressing the question of whether the access to the Internet should become a 
right in the near future), (ii) data mining and the automatic decision making process 
(highlighting the responsibility issues after an automatic wrong decision), (iii) the integration of 
new technologies into AAL system (e.g. mHealth, robots, biometrics, smart homes and 
nanotechnologies), (iv) the accessibility of different goods and services (96) and, finally, (v) the 
quality of services. 
  To date, many data protection-related issues associated with the use of AATs remain 
largely unexplored, e.g. the intertwinement of the mental capacity of elderly people with 
dementia and their capacity to give informed consent or the third uses of the collected data (see 
infra). It also remains unclear where the line between privacy and competing interest should be 
drawn and by which actor (e.g. manufacturer vs user) or who is the data controller/processor, 
especially in the case of different service/device providers that need to share information to give 
a coherent response in AAL. In addition, the collection of non-personal data from the AAT 
could generate personally identifiable information, information about the user’s patterns of 
behavior and, potentially, release these data to third parties without the user’s consent and 
awareness as with Samsung Smart TVs (502).  
Researchers have suggested some pre-requisites for promoting privacy protection and 
user acceptance.  These include: the use of non-invasive sensors, the implementation of 
sustainability measures, the possibility of home-based data storage (106) and the obtainment of 
informed and dynamic consent. Of course, technical limitations constrain the applicability of 
such protection. For example, home-based platforms for data management   are very expensive 
and require external access by the manufacturing company in case of system failure. Similarly, 
dynamic consent is easier to obtain in research contexts than in the context of IAT 
implementation. More research is needed to explore how dynamic consent could be obtained 
when implementing in-home technologies for  ADL (503).  In addition, from an ethical and 
legal perspective, there privacy-enhancing protections must  be balanced to emerging  rights 
such as the right to be forgotten (Art. 17 GDPR) and the right-not-to-know in relation to 
accidental findings (e.g. if the system detects any disease that could affect his/her emotional or 
psychological integrity). As stated previously, there is a need for “finding appropriate balances 
between privacy and multiple competing interests” (91).  
Privacy protection comes along with security issues (91). These are related to the 
physical security such as preventing any breach, allowing authorized access, no delay on leaving 
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the house in case of danger, but also the prevention of falls (107), external threats (in the event 
of fire or flood, the system should respond safely), electronic data security, and theft prevention 
technology. The prevention of other users commanding the house of the dementia patient is of 
paramount importance (100). The dwelling of the person should be a “fail-safe” environment; 
data should be always secured even though the broadband access is not yet solved although it 
has been recognized as a human right by United Nations (504). In any case, any unauthorized 
access should be prevented. This would go in line with the protection of the physical integrity of 
the person, although safeguards concerning the mental integrity should be also considered. 
Some authors believe that offering perfect transparency, making the user the master and fighting 
laziness should be taken into account (106). However, dementia patients might not have the 
capacity to be the master of the AAL system. Delegation issues are of crucial importance. 
 
Privacy and Security in Service Robotics: The Case of Telepresence robots 
Service robots differ from industrial robots because they are designed for non-expert 
usage.  They perform multi-tasks in unstructured environments and their level of human-robot 
interaction (HRI) is very high. In dementia care, telepresence robots have been used to support 
doctor-patient interaction through videoconference, but also as autonomous robots providing 
companionship, handling objects or exchanging information (1-3). Some of them have been 
used along with AAL technologies (4).  
These robots normally provide a two-way audio and video communication, a user 
interface, an integrated map, multiple cameras and sensors, and the possibility to autonomously 
navigate around the house (5). They differ from AAL or wearable technology because they 
provide the capacity of third users to sense and interact with remote environments, leading to an 
overall sense of extended agency in that environment (6-7). The capacity of sense, together with 
their mobile physical appearance raises privacy concerns both in respect for private and family 
life and data protection either in telepresence or autonomous mode.  
Concerning the protection of data collected by the robot, although the processing of 
sensitive data is lawful for “health security, monitoring and alert purposes, prevention or control 
of communicable diseases and other serious threats to health” (8), and it is deemed necessary in 
dementia care, appropriate safeguards need to protect how the collection, transmission and 
storage of the dementia patient’s sensitive data is carried out. As FBI stated “if the device is 
capable of remote operation or transmission of data, it could be a target for malicious actor”. 
Robots lacking security capabilities provide criminals with opportunities to access the robot and 
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steal personal data, broadcast images on the Internet, control health data collection and monitor, 
or remotely control the robot, which could also interfere with their physical safety (9). In fact, 
“robotics combines […] the promiscuity of information with the capacity to do physical harm” 
(10). Under the new GDPR, the data controller has the obligation to inform both the supervisory 
authority and the patient if the robot has been hacked or a data breach has occurred (Art. 31-32 
GDPR) although it remains unclear how these notifications can be done to dementia patients, if 
they should be directly done to their proxy or what should be appropriate to do such a case: to 
get rid of the system, to change the access keys, etc. 
Teleconferences between the patient and the care provider as well as with patient’s 
relatives or friends, should remain private and confidential in any case, as eavesdropping 
represents an interference with the right to privacy (11), and only stored in the cases necessary 
for the monitoring. Access to stored information should be granted to those in charge of the 
patient upon signing confidentiality agreement. In teleconference mode, moreover, it should be 
clear in which cases the pilot (e.g. the doctor) can access the camera and establish a 
conversation with the patient, as in some cases elderly prefer to pilot a mobile robotic platform 
system rather than receiving a visit via the robot system (7). Oral contracts or agreements 
performed through teleconference system should be subject to the patient’s capacity so as to 
avoid any abuse. In any case, consent should be unambiguous, clear, affirmative and explicit. 
In autonomous or companionship mode, the robot will have to process a lot more 
quantity of information, not only to be capable to deal with pitfalls but also because the 
spontaneous HRI in telepresence mode will turn into a life-long relationship once the robot 
reaches personal environments and needs to provide company (12). The use of cloud robotics to 
process all that information, lighten the weight of the robot and decrease response timing will 
challenge data protection. First, it will create confusion on the identification of the data 
controller and data processor by the patient, which would imply difficulty on the allocation of 
responsibilities (13-14). Second, the contract between the healthcare provider and the cloud 
provider should meet all the requirements of the cloud computing contracts such as avoidance of 
unfair terms and conditions (15), the establishment of a right to switch (in accordance with the 
right to data portability, Art. 18 GDPR) (16) or liability in case of non-availability of the 
service. Third, it should be clear who would have to carry out a data protection impact 
assessment, a new obligation of the GDPR when a large scale of special categories of data will 
be processed (Art. 33.2.b) GDPR). And fourth, special attention should be drawn to the 
collection of co-habitants of the patient (or visitors)’s personal data. 
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Extensive research has investigated how to transform HRI into a Human-Robot Safe 
Interaction (HRSI) trying to standardize on the robot’s spatial behavior in response to human 
presence, the robot’s noise level for robots in human environment, the perception for HRI, the 
establishment of some generic and some high-priority commands for HRI, gestures across 
different cultures, etc. (17). Nurses, physiotherapists and physicians should be given a map in 
order to safely navigate in the patient’s dwelling, as they might not be familiar with this private 
environment as well as a set of rules on how should this access be performed. The HRSI should 
be combined with all the by-design principles (privacy, transparency) but also with some code 
of ethics (that would include empathy, social awareness and proxemics) to make the life-long 
relationship not only safe but also pleasant. 
 
Privacy and Security in Wearable Technology 
Wearable systems  “are designed to be permanently useful and usable in a wide range of 
mobile settings” (505).  Wearables differ from other types of mobile technology (e.g. 
smartphones or tablets) because they are not, or only rarely, handheld and enable direct 
interaction between the system, the user and the environment (505). Wearable computing 
devices may be worn under, over or in clothing or may also be themselves clothes (28); and they 
are capable of collecting a wide range of information from the user’s body (e.g. health status, 
habits or mood) and environment (e.g., images, temperature, location, sounds or even third 
parties’ personal data) (49).  
Wearable technology is being increasingly used in neurogeriatric care including sleep 
measurement and enhancement (34); assistive tool for caregivers of elders with Alzheimer’s  
(36) or Parkinson disease (39). While the potential benefit of wearable technology in dementia 
care and, more generally, in healthcare is disruptive, it also raises privacy concerns (204, 506). 
Indeed, the collection of massive quantity of data may clash with the principle of data 
minimization enshrined in the data protection regulations. In addition, it raises several related 
legal issues including information security, consent, data ownership, and control. While these 
emerging ethical and legal issues apply also to other categories of IATs such as robots and 
distributed systems, the permanent usage and friction-free design of wearable devices may 
elevate these issues to a great order of magnitude. In particular, the high level of integration 
between the wearable device and the user may reduce the user’s awareness of the ongoing data 
collection and processing (507). In addition, wearables can collect a larger variety of 
physiological and other health-related data than most other families of IAT, including sensitive 
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data such as heart-beat rates, blood pressure, sugar levels, and podometrics. Even more 
remarkably, neurowearables such as consumer-grade brain computer interfaces (BCI) can record 
brain-waves, a form of personally identifiable data. A viable strategy to guarantee privacy and 
protection of data when implementing wearable technology into dementia care is to carry out a 
Wearable Impact Assessment (WIA) (41). This methodology could help proactively identify the 
precise context of implementation, the appropriate characteristics or capabilities of the device, 
the target user population, the potential unintended risks involved and the associated safeguards. 
Following the Art. 33 GDPR, we suggest to incorporate a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) as 
well as to introduce privacy-enhancing and data-protection safeguards early in the design of 
wearable assistive devices.  
 
Recommendations 
While different in architecture, usability, and functionality, AAL systems, telepresence 
robots and wearables have the common denominator of collecting and processing large volumes 
of data from the user with the purpose extracting valuable information on their health 
conditions, monitoring or assisting their activities, supervising or facilitating the completion of 
everyday tasks, enhancing their overall quality of life and quality of care.   
Based on the previous technical, ethical and legal analysis, we argue that in the context 
of AAL technology for elderly adults with dementia, eight fundamental privacy-related 
questions must be addressed: (i) what data can be legitimately monitored or tracked (ii)  in what 
volume and variety, (iii) what degree of intrusion into a person’s privacy is legitimated by the 
goals of dementia care, (iv) from which subjects can the data be collected (v) where these data 
are stored, (vi) who has ownership over and access to those data, (vii) what are the appropriate 
procedures for informed consent (viii) what third uses of the collected data are legitimate.  
The first three questions are strictly connected. AAL and other distributed systems 
usually collect behavioral, physiological and environmental data in a quantity and quality that 
vary depending on the specific goals of the system. For example, fall detecting systems collect 
primarily behavioral data with the purpose of detecting anomalies in the resident’s motion to 
alert caregivers about fall or similar domestic accidents. In contrast, smoke detecting systems 
collect primarily environmental data from (i.e. CO2 levels) from the resident’s domestic 
environment with the purpose of detecting anomalies that correlate with an increased risk of fire 
or suffocation. We argue that, the quality of data being collected should be coherent with the 
purpose explicitly stated in the system’s specifications. Producers should include into the 
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product package clear statements about what types of data and in what volume are collected by 
the system, as well as motivate the reason for their collection from the perspective of care. 
Anomalous patterns of data collection should be prevented by design and users should be 
informed about anomalies in the data collection process Circumstances where the system 
collects volumes and varieties of data that were not explicitly stated in the product package 
should be prevented by specific regulations.    
 It is important to note, however, that since for most AAL systems this monitoring of 
activity levels is a continuous process, it may be hard to determine what volume of data is 
coherent with the assistive goals of the system. In addition, the increasing use of big data 
predictive analytics may extremely benefit from the collection of large volumes of data and 
utilize them not only to automatically generate post-event alerts but also to predict upcoming 
risk situations. For this reason, we recommend that privacy and data-protection regulations in 
the context of assistive technologies for dementia provide sufficient elasticity for maximizing 
the benefits of technological progress while minimizing the risks of technology misuse. 
Excessive regulatory restrictiveness may harm not only current technology-assisted dementia 
care, but also temper the future development of technological innovations.  
Issues of data volume and variety are subsumed by the problem of determining the 
degree of intrusion into a person’s privacy that is legitimated by the goals of dementia care. A 
possible solution to address this problem is the appeal to a special application of the principle of 
proportionality. As previously mentioned, the degree of intrusiveness of a certain IAT 
intervention should be in proportion to their contribution to achieving the goals of good care and 
promoting the patient’s best interest. The patient’s best interest, in turn, is determined by the 
severity of their medical condition and their specific care needs. This application of the 
proportionality principle is one viable resolution of the conflict between the bioethical principles 
of privacy and beneficence presented in the first Chapter. As we have already seen, the principle 
of beneficence states that any procedure or intervention be provided with the intent of doing the 
best interest of the patient involved and to promote their welfare. Therefore, IATs systems can 
legitimately operate intrusions into the patient’s private domain (e.g. domestic environment and 
continuous activity levels) if these partial sacrifices of the patient’s privacy are in the best 
interest of the patient. For example, the continuous gait monitoring of a patient with mild to 
moderate dementia may be justified by the prevention of falls and other mobility-related 
accidents.  
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The appeal to the principle of proportionality, however, requires technology producers 
and manufacturers to make explicit claims about the goals and capabilities of their marketed 
devices. General goals of IAT systems for dementia care include (i) extending the time people 
can live in their preferred environment by increasing their autonomy, self-confidence and 
mobility; (ii) supporting the preservation of health and functional capabilities of the elderly, (iii) 
promoting a better and healthier lifestyle for individuals at risk; (iv) enhancing security, 
preventing social isolation and supporting the preservation of the multifunctional network 
around the individual; (v) supporting carers, families and care organizations; and (vi) increasing 
the efficiency and productivity of used resources in the ageing societies57. The degree of 
intrusiveness of iAT interventions should be in proportion to their contribution to achieving 
these goals as well as to promoting the best interest of the patient.  
With regard to the subjects whose data can be legitimately collected, specific focus 
should be diverted to the elder with dementia. Data from third parties should only be collected if 
the third party explicitly consents to their collection. As we have discussed previously, in fact, 
most jurisdictions allow the third-party data processing under specific circumstances. Third 
parties should be aware that their data are being processed, for what purposes, and by whom. In 
addition, they need to provide explicit informed consent.  
Standards for correct data storage also must be clarified. As AAL systems, telepresence 
robots, wearable technologies and other IATs may collect highly sensitive and personal 
identifiable information, safe and secure storage of that information must be guaranteed. 
Following the Art. 23 GDPR, we suggest enacting the following safeguards: (I) The immunity 
of systems to abusive third-party apps should be secured by design; (II) The access to the data 
should be limited and the cloud provider should not (except for exceptional circumstances) 
retain access; (III) Cloud storage must be either avoided or supported by cloud encryption and 
free support services in case the patient, their caregivers or responsible health professionals 
require additional information or have special needs.  
Data ownership is a complicated legal issue not only in the assistive and medical context 
but also for commercial uses. In the corporate sector, governmental entities have already tried to 
claim the holder of documents (i.e. the cloud provider), is the one responsible and therefore 
legally obligated to turn over documents 58. The emergence of similar scenarios in the context of 
 
57AAL Europe, see:  
http://www.aal-europe.eu/about/objectives/#sthash.j7SyeY8N.dpuf (last accessed 02/02/2016).  
58  See for instance the USA patriot act: https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/ 
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IATs should be prevented. Elderly adults with dementia should be able to claim ownership over 
their data. Wherever they can no longer exercise their ownership right due to the progression of 
their disease, data ownership should be extended by proxy (e.g. to the closest family caregiver). 
It is also important to establish clear roles between controllers and processors. 
As we have seen in multiple occurrences throughout this Chapter, issues of legitimate 
degree of intrusion into privacy, data access, storage, ownership and the role of third parties, all 
presuppose the enforcement of formal procedures for the attainment of informed consent.  
Informed consent can be obtained from people with dementia in three ways: (i) directly, 
(ii) proactively through advanced directives, (iii) or through proxy decision making. Direct 
consent can be obtained when the patient explicitly shows competence and cognitive capacity. 
Advanced directives are (usually written) externalizations of a person’s decisions and wishes 
regarding future medical courses of action. Through these directives, patients at early stage of 
AD or other dementias can spell out decisions about their future choices ahead of time, i.e. 
before the progression of the disease makes them incapable to take autonomous and competent 
choices. Proxy decision making is when the decision is (partly) made by a person different that 
the patient (proxy) who was previously appointed by the patient or is relevant to the patient in 
some significant sense. Alzheimer Europe has produced several recommendations for the 
obtainment of informed consent from persons with dementia.  
When providing information for the purpose of consent during the installation of a certain 
IAT, healthcare professionals and caregivers should communicate it in a manner adapted to the 
patient, respond to questions, use visual and other aids if necessary, and facilitate the 
communication of the decision by the patient. If consent is being sought for the purpose of 
installing and using a robot in the patient’s home, it must be ensured that the user understands 
the basic functionality of the robot and its potential usefulness for their daily life.  
A crucial requirement of consent among dementia patients is that it should be obtained at 
various intervals throughout the study, following an iterative model usually described as 
“ongoing consent”. Due to the progressive and mood-changing character of the disease, patients 
may revoke their initial consent and must be free to withdraw from using the technology at any 
time. In the institutional setting, health professionals should be attentive to signs of distress 
linked to technology use and if necessary check with the participants whether they wish to 
withdraw from using the specific IAT that caused their distress. In the in-home setting, 
caregivers should be attentive to signs of distress linked to the use of the IAT or to its presence 
in the house (as in the case of environmental sensors and distributed systems).  
 282 
 
 
Conclusions 
In this Chapter, we have described the major privacy and security issues associated with 
the use of Intelligent Assistive Technologies in dementia care with special focus on three major 
families of assistive applications: ambient assisted living technology, telepresence robots and 
wearables. After presenting the philosophical and legal framework on privacy and data 
protection, we have analyzed in detail each of the three aforementioned technological families 
and their peculiarities from the perspective of informational privacy and data protection. Based 
on this analysis, we have produced general policy recommendations for enacting or enhancing 
privacy safeguards in the context of technology-assisted dementia care. Future research is 
needed to adapt these general recommendations to specific case scenarios of IAT use and to 
specific patient populations. In addition, future normative studies are required to explore 
potential conflicts among competing moral values. While the potential of IATs for improving 
dementia care is disruptive, the ethical use and social uptake of these technologies risk to be 
tampered if privacy protections are not integrated early in the design and development of such 
assistive applications. 
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Abstract  
The increasing number of older adults being diagnosed and living with dementia poses a major 
challenge for global health. The integration of robotics into both formal and informal dementia 
care has a great potential for improving the life of patients and alleviating the burden on 
caregivers and the healthcare services. However, ethical, legal and social implications should be 
considered early in the development of assistive and social robots for dementia to prevent slow 
social uptake, incorrect implementation and inappropriate use. This paper delineates the ethical 
landscape and provides recommendations for design and use aimed at protecting users and 
maximizing the benefit in assisting such vulnerable population.  
 
Keywords: Dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, robotics, ethics, informed consent, 
recommendations. 
 
 The Global Burden of Dementia and Ageing  
According to current projections, there will be over 130 million people with dementia 
worldwide: 1 in 85 world inhabitants (508, 509). The increasing prevalence of dementia poses a 
major problem for public health and the health-care services in terms of financial management 
 
59 Current Impact Factor: 2.559 (2016) 
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and caregiving burden. Alzheimer’s disease (AD), the most common form of dementia, 
is among the most expensive diseases for human societies, with a total estimated worldwide cost 
of US$818 billion (161, 508). Such significant costs arise primarily from long-term care at 
nursing homes and other institutions (510), whose burden affects not only public finances but 
also the elders, their informal caregivers (e.g. relatives) and the healthcare system.  
The disabling condition of dementia patients progressively undermines their capability to 
live independently at home, interact with other members of society and perform activities of 
daily living (ADLs). In most countries, the primary source of care, assistance and support for 
dementia patients is represented by informal caregivers, mostly family members such as 
spouses, children and siblings. This informal caregiving service is highly time-consuming and 
requires great effort from caregivers in terms of physical and mental energy. The provision of 
caregiving services frequently comes at high socioeconomic and psychophysical costs for 
caregivers (511). Increasing evidence shows that informal caregivers of dementia patients may 
experience negative psychological consequences in the form of emotional and psychological 
stresses, mood disturbances such as anxiety and depression and other psychological conditions 
(511, 512). In spite of this multi-domain burden, informal care is, in most countries, neither 
accounted for nor reimbursed in the healthcare economy (513).  
From the perspective of the patient, the burden of dementia results in a dramatically 
reduced quality of life (QoL), depression and other mood disturbances as well as in an increased 
risk of social isolation (514, 515).  
 
Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias  
Dementia is an umbrella term used to identify a syndrome  “usually of a chronic or 
progressive nature, in which there is disturbance of multiple higher cortical functions, including 
memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, learning capacity, language, and 
judgment” (516). According to the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (ICD) of the World Health Organization, in order to be classified as dementia such 
condition of decline in mental ability should be severe enough to interfere with a person’s daily 
life (516). 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common form of dementia as it accounts for 60 to 80 
percent of dementia cases worldwide (161). AD is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder 
with distinct neuropathology characterized by the presence of plaques and tangles in the brain 
(517). The prevalence of AD worldwide is rapidly increasing over time as a consequence of the 
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demographic trend known as population ageing. The probability of developing AD, in fact, 
dramatically increases with age. A U.S. study found that dementia affects 5% of people aged 71 
to 79, rising to 37.4% of people aged 90 and older. Among this population, AD was the cause of 
dementia for 46.7% of people in their 70s and for 79.5% of people in their 90s (518).  The 
neurodegenerative progression of AD is described in three macro-stages — mild (early-stage), 
moderate (middle-stage), and severe (late-stage). Mild Alzheimer's disease (≤ 1 according to the 
Clinical Dementia Rating Scale) is the stage when the patient still largely retains independence 
in spite of frequent memory lapses. During moderate Alzheimer's disease (CDR-2), in contrast, 
the patient usually needs greater care to compensate for severe impairments in the short-term 
memory and other functions. Finally, during severe Alzheimer’s disease (CDR-3) patients 
require full-time care as they experience severe cognitive deficits, reduced awareness and 
personality change (517, 519).  
These epidemiological and neuropathological facts are crucial to produce technology designs 
that better match the specific needs of people living with dementia. In particular, knowledge of 
the specific cognitive deficits or emotional and behavioral disturbances caused by AD and other 
dementias is essential to produce robotic devices that can effectively alleviate or compensate for 
those deficits and disturbances. In addition, knowledge of the correlation between dementia and 
age is crucial to take into consideration not only the specific deficits of dementia but also the 
general motor and learning deficits that are typical of the old age (520). Finally, knowledge of 
the progressive character of AD and other dementias is fundamental to recognize the importance 
of adaptive designs that can cope with the progressive intellectual and physical decline of users, 
as well as to identify the specific technological needs of users at each stage of the disease.  
 
Robotics for an Ageing World: Social and Ethical Challenges  
Given the current limited possibilities for pharmacological treatment, a promising approach in 
response to the emerging global crisis of AD and other dementias is the development and 
deployment of Intelligent Assistive Technologies (IATs) that compensate for the specific 
physical and cognitive deficits of people with dementia, and there by, also reduce caregiver 
burden related to long-term care and institutionalization (2). In fact, technologies that can help 
dementia patients to continue living independently at home or maintain independence 
in skilled facilities would provide a triple-win effect (67, 73). IATs could aid in: (I) saving 
significant costs to the health-care system by delaying or obviating the need for institutional 
long-term care (521), (II) reducing the burden on informal caregivers (522), and (III) improving 
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the quality of life of patients by improving their autonomy, social interaction and help fulfil their 
wish to age in place (523). The potential of IAT for dementia care has been recognized also by 
the European Commission, whose Information Society Policy Link (ISPL) initiative emphasized 
that “[…] home-based care is much more cost-effective than care in a hospital or care home. As 
demand for these services increases, effective use of ICT technologies and services offers an 
attractive alternative to the costs and disruptions of early and unnecessary institutionalized 
care.” (524).  
Robotics constitutes a major component of the IAT spectrum. Research has shown extensive 
applicability and effectiveness of various robotherapy interventions targeted at older adults with 
dementia both in the in-home and the residential setting (525-527). In particular, four categories 
of robots are increasingly being implemented into dementia care: rehabilitation robots, service 
robots, telepresence robots and companion robots. Rehabilitation robots such as the 
Cyberdyne’s HAL system are mainly used in physical rehabilitation and can support or assist 
several physical or cognitive functions of the user, especially locomotion and motor control. 
Service robots are primarily used to deliver direct care to patients with dementia, hence 
replacing or integrating the care delivered by human caregivers. For example, Fraunhofer IPA’s 
Care-o-bot (now at its 4th generation, Care-O-bot 4), has been successfully tested to assist the 
specific memory deficits of older adults with dementia and assist them in the completion of a 
number of activities of daily living. Telepresence robots, such as Giraff and VGo, have proven 
effective in providing remote monitoring of adults with dementia and enabling long-distance 
control or interaction between patients and caregivers, often in combination with telephony and 
long-range remote control. Finally, companion robots such as Paro (now at its 8th generation) 
provide a wide spectrum of psychosocial support including the elicitation of positive (e.g. 
calming) emotional responses.  
While robots open up the prospect of improving the quality of life of the elderly and reducing 
the financial, logistical and professional burden on the healthcare system, yet their distribution 
and uptake is still very low (2). One reason for that stems from a multi-level gap in the cross-
section of technology and healthcare (107). This gap does not arise exclusively from current 
strategies for the implementation of robots into neuro-geriatric care but concerns 
three inherent dimensions of the relationship between technological products 
and  target  users:  the  societal,  the  legal  and  the  ethical dimension.  
In the following sections, we will delineate the major ethical, social and legal implications of 
robotics in dementia care. This analysis aims at proactively integrating ethical considerations 
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into the design of robots for dementia care, hence maximizing the benefits of these technologies 
for dementia care, preventing unintended pitfalls, and favoring their acceptance and ethically 
appropriate use among target users. This ethical analysis does not pretend to be exhaustive but 
only to identify some core issues with the purpose of guiding individual use and healthcare 
practice. Further research is required to expand this analysis into a general framework.     
 
The Societal Dimension and the Information Gap  
At the societal level, the low distribution and uptake of robots is generally ascribed to an 
information gap in the cross-sections of technological development, healthcare and society (107, 
528). According to Kramer, this information gap is a major cause of the lower-than-expected 
acceptance of robots and other IATs among the senior population (107). At present, limited 
information is available to designers and developers regarding the specific needs, wishes, and 
expectations of their target population. Reviews report that several devices are developed 
without or with limited involvement of people with dementia and their carers (2). The reason for 
that is threefold. First, research on the use of robots among elderly and cognitively 
disabled users is at a germinal stage of development and current knowledge is far from being 
extensive, generalizable and theoretically systematic. In addition, methodological quality of 
studies has been often reported to be low (529, 530). Second, research trials that directly involve 
older adults with dementia or other disabilities is time-consuming and requires extremely high 
standards of ethical rigor. With direct information from target users being hard to achieve, 
prototypes are often developed in absence of systematic knowledge about the users’ needs. This 
risks to generate a vicious circle since unmet users’ expectations are a major indicator of low 
societal uptake and use.  
Third the implementation of robots among target users is subject to several structural 
limitations. In fact, patients learning to work with new devices are hindered by several factors 
including (i) memory, learning and orientation problems, (ii) limited understanding of verbal 
instructions, (iii) problems with execution of purposeful activities, (iv)  poor recognition of 
audio-visual prompts, and (v) other cognitive or physical limitations. As a response to this triple 
challenge we recommend the establishment of platforms for knowledge dissemination, the 
creation of incentives for user-driven research and the promotion of user-centered functional 
designs.  
Knowledge dissemination is a key concept to favor interaction and information sharing 
among all relevant stakeholders involved in the care and management of robots for dementia 
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care, in particular: designers, software developers, hardware engineers, manufacturing 
companies, geriatricians, neurologists and other healthcare professionals, healthcare institutions, 
regulatory agencies, informal caregivers, and, most importantly, patients. Healthcare institutions 
and individual professionals should increase their awareness about available technological 
opportunities that may be beneficial for the patient and favor their introduction into care. To 
achieve this goal, the organization of cross-disciplinary workshops and other shared activities 
should be encouraged. In addition, the exploratory introduction into residential care (e.g. 
geriatric hospitals) could increase the perception of robots as standard care practice; hence favor 
the introduction also in the in-home setting.  
User-driven research is a framework or paradigm according to which research is driven by 
the needs and wishes of end users (531). The shift to this research paradigm is crucial to favor 
the development of user-centered technology designs. By producing large-scale or personalized 
knowledge about the needs and wishes of end-users, researchers can create prototypes whose 
functional specifications better match these needs and wishes. User-driven research conducted 
to date has identified several functional requirements that are particularly needed among elders 
with dementia. These include (i) user-friendly, simple-to-use and intuitive interfaces, (ii) high 
degree of personalisability (according to the user’s preferences), (iii) usefulness in daily life. 
More specific functional requirements can be identified by investigating the users’ perceptions 
about their own needs in relation to available services. A large-scale interview-based study has 
investigated the needs of 231 community-dwelling persons with dementia and 321 caregivers 
and assessed them according to the Camberwell Assessment of Need in the Elderly (CANE) 
(532). Results show that the highest proportions of unmet needs reported by persons with 
dementia concern the support for memory problems, the availability of information about 
dementia, the access to care and treatment, and the compensation for isolation and psychological 
distress; in contrast, the highest proportion of unmet needs reported by informal carers concern 
issues of memory, daytime activities and company (532, 533). Following Niemeijer et al. and 
Robinson et al., we call for a rapid transition to a user-centered model of technology design and 
development where the specific needs of persons with dementia and of their carers are carefully 
identified, considered, and integrated into the robots’ functionality (533, 534). A similarly 
participatory model should be implemented at the stage of technology assessment and 
evaluation. A good example in this direction is an exploratory study by Heerink et al. in which 
researchers interviewed professional caregivers of older adults with dementia to identify a list of 
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functional requirement perceived by them as suitable for therapy and subsequently used such list 
to assess commercially available robotic pets (535).  
 
Informed Consent  
Before enrolling people with dementia as research subjects into user-driven research, 
researchers have an ethical and legal obligation to obtain informed consent. This obligation also 
partly applies to installing and utilizing a robot both in the in-home and residential setting with 
the purpose of interacting with an adult with dementia. The obligation to informed consent, 
postulated in numerous codes and declarations such as the Declaration of Helsinki (1964-2008) 
and the Additional Protocol on the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning 
Biomedical Research (2005), is an essential mechanism for the protection of a person’s 
wellbeing and self-determination (536). In the context of AD and other dementias, the problem 
of obtaining informed consent is exacerbated by the increased difficulty to determine whether a 
person has the capacity to give informed consent as a consequence of the cognitive and 
emotional deficits caused by the disease. Competence, in fact, is to a great extent -but not 
exclusively- linked to cognitive capacity. 
Informed consent can be obtained from or on behalf of people with dementia in three ways: 
(i) directly, (ii) proactively through advanced directives, (iii) or through proxy decision making. 
Direct consent can be obtained when the patient explicitly shows competence and cognitive 
capacity, usually at the early stage of AD or in the case of mild cognitive impairment. Advanced 
directives are (usually written) externalizations of a person’s decisions and wishes regarding 
future medical courses of action. Through these directives, patients at early stage of AD or other 
dementias can spell out decisions about their future choices ahead of time, i.e. before the 
progression of the disease make them incapable to make autonomous and competent choices 
(537). Proxy decision making occurs when the decision involves a person other than the patient 
(called proxy), usually the patient’s legal representative according to the local law or a person 
who was previously appointed by the patient. Alzheimer Europe has produced several 
recommendations for the obtainment of informed consent from persons with dementia (537). 
Although designed for guiding research, such recommendations are largely applicable to the 
implementation and use of robots too. Alzheimer Europe’s recommendations are articulated into 
seven main tasks: capacity and willingness assessment, provision of information, ongoing 
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consent and withdrawal, capacity loss, third-party involvement, advanced directives, further use 
of data 60.  
At the level of capacity assessment, it is important to know that required cognitive levels 
vary depending on the complexity of the decision to be made. In general, a diagnosis of 
dementia should be considered as reasonable grounds for doubt concerning a person’s capacity 
to consent and to justify the assessment of their capacity; however, it should never be considered 
alone a sufficient justification. While a person with mild dementia might be competent for many 
medical decisions, the symptoms at this stage of the disease could already interfere with 
competency for very complex situations. For any type of more advanced dementia, physicians 
would need to argument actively why they evaluated a patient as competent for a given decision. 
Cognitive testing alone may be insufficient (538). In the context of enrolling people with 
dementia for research, researchers must ensure that potential research subjects agreed to 
participate freely and willingly after having been given all relevant information, having 
understood this information, having received satisfactory responses to questions and without 
undue pressure from third parties. Similar external pressures should also be prevented at the 
level of domestic or residential use of robots. In particular, scenarios where family members or 
other informal caregivers force a patient with capacity to consent to have a service robot in the 
house ─e.g. because they want to reduce their time-investment and caregiving-workload should 
be prevented. We suggest that the combination of advanced directives, behavioral observation 
and confirmation by proxy may offer a triple protection. A scenario where (i) a patient at the 
early stage of the disease makes advanced directives to the use of the device while still mentally 
competent, (ii) shows enjoyment and no observable sign of distress during the continuative use 
of the device after the disease progresses, (iii) a proxy confirms the advanced directives based 
on behavioral observation, should be considered the optimal model.  
When providing information for the purpose of consent, researchers or healthcare 
professionals should adapt their communication to the patient, respond to questions, use visual 
and other aids if necessary, and facilitate the communication of the decision by the patient. If 
consent is being sought for the purpose of enrollment in research, it should be ensured that 
potential participants with dementia understand the difference between treatment and research, 
emphasizing the fact that the direct objective of research is not to benefit the individual 
 
60 Our recommendations on informed consent are largely based or further elaborated upon Alzheimer 
Europe’s report „The Ethics of Dementia Research.“ 537. A. Europe, The ethics of dementia 
research.  (Alzeheimer Europe, 2011). 
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participant. If consent is being sought for the purpose of installing and using a robot in the 
patient’s home, it must be ensured that the user understands the basic functionality of the robot 
and its potential usefulness for their daily life.  
A crucial requirement of research involving dementia patients is that informed consent 
should be obtained at various intervals throughout the study. Due to the progressive and mood-
changing character of the disease, patients may revoke their initial consent and must be free to 
withdraw at any time. In the research setting, researchers should be attentive to signs of distress 
linked to participation and if necessary ask the participants if they wish to withdraw from the 
study. In the implementation setting, caregivers should be attentive to signs of distress linked to 
the use of the robot or to its presence in the house.   
If a person loses capacity during the study, and did not express prior to the study a wish to 
continue, should be withdrawn from the study. For this reason, clauses regarding the 
continuation of participation as well as regarding future use of data should be early included in 
the informed consent process when the person is still competent. In contrast, in the case of using 
a robot in the in-home or institutional setting, the use can continue after the patient loses 
capacity if the application provides a recognizable therapeutic or assistive benefit and no signs 
of distress are observable.  
Ideally, third parties, especially spouses or partners, should be involved in the consent 
process. If the third party opposes the will of a person with dementia who has the capacity to 
consent, their opposition is not sufficient to override the will of that person. To prevent such 
conflicts and to avoid risks associated with sudden loss of capacity, the practice of writing 
advanced directives to externalize future preferences should be encouraged. While in the context 
of research enrollment such directives should state explicitly whether the person with dementia 
would or would not like to take part in research, in the context of technology use they could 
contain more specific preferences about everyday life and social activities: instead of either yes-
robot or no-robot choices, users should be able to externalize what features, functionalities or 
activities of the robot they wish to continue or interrupt.  
In the research context, researchers should be encouraged to include a clause on the 
consent form where participants can state whether or not they agree to their data being used for 
possible future studies. In the in-home and institutional setting, data should be only collected 
from users for the purposes that have been clearly explained to the user and to which the user 
has consented. Any additional use of the data should require additional consent. For example, 
monitoring data collected by telepresence robots for the purpose of increasing safety and 
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conveying the presence of caregivers should not be used for additional (research, marketing etc.) 
purposes unless (i) the person with dementia has previously and explicitly consented to this 
further use, (ii) the reuse of that information can provide a recognizable therapeutic or assistive 
benefit for the patient.    
It may be observed that, from the perspective of research, the promotion of user-driven 
studies and the strict criteria for consent in research delineated above pose an ethical dilemma. 
In fact, while large-scale enrollment of patients with dementia is highly desirable to maximize 
the benefits of robotics for people with dementia worldwide, strict procedures for informed 
consent limit and strictly regulate this enrollment process among individual participants. The 
major ethical challenge is to resolve this dilemma by promoting user-driven research in a 
context of rigorous application of ethical standards for informed consent. 
 
Privacy and Data Security  
Privacy is originally described as the right to be let alone (497). Within the context of 
social robotics for dementia it is crucial to determine what specific components of the right to 
privacy are at stake. Niemeijer and Hertogh proposed to distinguish four types of privacy: (i) 
informational privacy, (ii) physical privacy, (iii) attentional privacy, (iv) and decisional privacy 
(539). Informational privacy pertains to the capacity to seclude sensitive, confidential or private 
information. Physical privacy pertains to the capacity to demarcate one’s personal physical 
space. Attentional privacy pertains to the capacity to retain one’s attention from unsolicited 
prompts such as mail or telephone calls. Finally, decisional privacy pertains to the ability to 
choose a particular course of action without intrusion or interference from other agents. 
Informational privacy is particularly relevant in the context of telepresence robots. Robots such 
as Giraff and VGo may create a problem for informational privacy since they can be used as a 
24-hour videosurveillance and recording system. Following the EU Data Protection Directive 
(540), we recommend that the collection and usage of visual information from elderly people 
with dementia meets the conditions of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality.  
Transparency implies that the patient who is controlled is aware of being monitored and 
has given informed consent both to the installation of the robot and to the monitoring process. In 
addition, it also implies that the data collector and manager (e.g. the responsible informal or 
formal caregiver) has stated why data are being collected and processed. This procedure may be 
perceived as redundant from the perspective of family members whose goal is to increase safety, 
interaction, or conveying a sense of personal presence. However, it serves to prevent illegitimate 
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third parties from managing those data. Exceptions should be allowed for monitoring 
interventions that prevent patients from being harmed (especially patients in the moderate to 
severe stages of the disease), following similar regulatory standards to those regulating 
monitoring technology for severely ill and incompetent patients in residential care (e.g. 
Intensive Care Units).  In addition, data collectors should be reasonably informed about the 
potential risks associated with the illicit access to the data by malicious agents. Legitimate 
purpose is when the monitoring is performed for a specific purpose that is in the best interest of 
the patient and to which the patient or caregiver has previously consented.  Legitimate purposes 
for videomonitoring include increasing safety, reducing risks and facilitating communication. 
Illegitimate purposes, in contrast, may include unauthorized surveillance or spying. Finally, the 
principle of proportionality requires that the videomonitoring is not disproportionate to the real 
therapeutic, assistive or emotional needs of the patient. For example, a non-stop video 
surveillance of an otherwise independent patient with mild to moderate dementia might not be 
proportionate to the needs of the patient and their condition.  
Further ethical and legal reflection is needed within a twofold framework. In particular, 
from the perspective of criminal law, there is a need for a proactive and rigorous definition of 
the conditions for legal responsibility and culpability in both patients and robots. In emerging 
scenarios where the person with dementia has lost the capacity to consent, neither the patient nor 
the robot can be considered fully competent agents, hence fully responsible and ultimately 
culpable for their actions. To face these scenarios, unequivocal standards are required. For 
example, in case the robot harms the user in a non-programmatic way or the user harms another 
agent through the robot, unequivocal standards of accountability, responsibility and liability for 
both the robot and the user will be needed. Interdisciplinary work at the intersection between 
roboethics, neuroethics, criminal law, and forensic psychology should be encouraged to produce 
those standards.   
 
Safety, Beneficence, Non-Maleficence and Autonomy  
Good system safety norms require that a robot used in health care or as a commercial 
application is safe and that its use does not cause any increased risk of harm for users. Safety 
should be achieved through scientific, technical, and ethical-social strategies of risk 
identification, risk analysis, and elimination, control, or ongoing management of risks 
throughout the life-cycle of the robot and its activities. In ethical language, safety largely 
translates into the concept of non-maleficence, i.e. the principle of avoiding (preventing and not-
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inflicting) harm. This ethical principle is usually paired with the principle of beneficence, i.e. the 
principle of promoting what is in the best interest of the user (118). In the context of robocare, 
the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence require a careful assessment of the balance 
between therapeutic, assistive or psychosocial benefit, on the one hand, and potential risks or 
distress, on the other hand. The promotion of the best interest of the user would also require a 
careful and continuative evaluation of their positive and negative experiences, with the 
knowledge that the user’s preferences and experiences may change over the progression of the 
disease and that their ability to communicate those preferences and experiences may decrease 
over time. In addition to safety, data security must be taken into account too. In fact, the more 
data the robot is capable to collect and process, the higher the risk that such data can be used for 
unintended purposes, including purposes that are malicious or detrimental for the user and/or 
third parties. Data security standards are particularly relevant for monitoring and tracking 
devices, as well as for devices that can access and process personally identifiable and medical 
information of the users.  
 Robotic interventions that are in the best interest of the patients are those that prevent the 
patient from being harmed, and protect or promote the patient physical, cognitive, emotional and 
social wellbeing. Preventing harm and protecting or promoting wellbeing must be the common 
goals of robotic applications in dementia care, in ways that are specific of and appropriate to 
each type of robot. For example, telepresence robots are mainly designed for preventing harm, 
rehabilitation robots for promoting physical and cognitive wellbeing, and social or companion 
robots for emotional and psychosocial wellbeing. As previously stated, under specific 
circumstances, the best interest of the patient may reasonably justify partial exceptions to 
competitive moral rights such as privacy or consent. For example, when a robotherapy 
intervention supports life-maintaining functions in a patient with advanced dementia, this 
intervention may be delivered also in absence of explicit consent from the patient or the proxy to 
pursue the best interest of the patient ─unless previously rejected by the patient via advanced 
directives or assessed as futile by the local medical team and ethics committee.    
 Some authors have argued that the use of robots in dementia care, especially robotic pets 
and other companion robots, raises the moral and psychological risk of making patients more 
infantile and dehumanizing care by reducing human interaction (541, 542). These risks could be 
avoided by increasing the awareness and active decisional role of patients. The patient should 
not be overridden but constantly included in the decision making process about the use of a new 
robotic application. This will not only reduce the risk of infantilization but also ─and most 
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importantly, promote their perception of the robotic application as empowering, hence as a 
valuable instrument for the promotion of their autonomy and independence.  
 
Justice, equity and fair distribution 
Until now, social justice and distributive justice have not been considered as primary concerns 
in the introduction of robotics into healthcare. Neither attaining fairness, nor applying 
substantive principles in allocating robotic applications are an easy task. A one-size-fits-all 
policy could be inadequate because of the specific functional characteristics of each application, 
and the fluctuation in the costs for their provision caused by the current level of maturity of their 
market. Moreover, the healthcare systems of different countries follow different principles of 
justice and answer to dissimilar needs surging from social structures and diverse cultures in each 
country. Universal access by fair opportunity to assistive technologies should be the target in 
the long run, but in the early stages their fair distribution has to be prioritized. 
Distributive justice is not a matter of chance or plain equality. Its principles are guidelines for 
providing rightfulness, fairness, and redress in institutional settings. One option for healthcare 
institutions and robot manufacturers to attain these principles is to curb the costs by promoting 
the development of low-cost robot technologies. To this purpose, the dissemination of open-
source initiatives for affordable devices such as the OpenBionics (http://www.openbionics.org/) 
should be encouraged.  
From a regulatory perspective, robots for dementia are often in a gray zone between the 
regulation of medical applications and that of general ICT applications. A striking example is 
Paro, who is classified as Class 2 medical device by the U.S. FDA regulation but not in the EU. 
Therefore, a principle of justice in disseminating innovation should take into account the dual 
nature of these robot types as well as the differences in local regulations. Emphasizing each of 
these aspects –respectively the medical and the commercial- has both regulatory advantages and 
disadvantages. A privileged focus on the medical aspects would favor the application to care 
robots of standard medical practices, the implementation of safeguards that are specific for 
medical applications, and the development of more welfarist plans for technology access and 
distribution. As a downside, it could slow down the increase in performance (as implied by the 
Moore’s law) as well as the price fall over time. In contrast, a privileged focus on the 
commercial aspects would accelerate the decrease in price and increase in computational power 
of future application. As a downside, however, it would decrease the level of safeguards; hence 
increase the vulnerability of future applications to technical, ethical, legal, and social risks.  
 296 
 
When developing robotic applications for dementia it is fair to recognize the special needs of 
patients, their differences from healthy users, and the fact that they are not responsible for their 
health conditions. Some corrective measures could help reduce inequality and provide redress 
such as the promotion of experimental settings with assistive robots in state owned retirement 
houses, the establishment of State incentives for developing better technologies (when is the 
case, for example in the EU), and the promotion of user-centered research involving patients and 
caregivers. Patient well-being should not exclusively rely on their economic resources.  
Conclusions  
Robotics opens the prospects of providing a triple-win effect on the management of the 
global crisis posed by dementia and population ageing. Nonetheless, such potential benefits risk 
to be tampered if social, legal and ethical questions remain unaddressed. We took a first step 
into delineating the ethical, legal and social landscape of robotics for dementia care. Further 
interdisciplinary research is required to extensively address each specific issue and develop a 
systematic framework to maximize the benefits of these emerging technologies while 
minimizing the unintended risks. In particular, further cross-cultural empirical research 
involving older adults with dementia and their caregivers is required to better inform technology 
producers about the specific needs of this vulnerable target population. In parallel, translational 
research at the intersection between robotics, geriatrics, gerontology and the nursing sciences 
should be conducted to increase the implementation and uptake of robotic applications in 
dementia care. Finally, further research in bio- and neuroethics is required  to promote the 
ethical development and responsible application of future applications.  
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Abstract 
Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented 
possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human 
brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be 
addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging 
neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that 
existing human rights may not be normatively sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. 
After analysing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new 
rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, 
the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological 
continuity. 
 
Introduction 
The quotation in the epigraph is from the play Comus, written by John Milton in 1634. The 
piece, an exhortation to virtue, follows the story a young noblewoman who has been abducted 
by a sorcerer called Comus. He has bounded her to an enchanted chair and tried to seduce her 
with arguments about the charm of bodily pleasure. Despite all his rhetorical assaults, the 
woman repeatedly refuses his advances and claims that, no matter what he does or says, she will 
continue asserting her freedom of mind, which is beyond his physical power. In the end, she is 
rescued by her brothers, who chase off Comus.  
 
61 No Impact Factor currently available for this journal. This article is distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give 
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license, and indicate if changes were made. 
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The quoted sentence conveys the idea that the mind is a kind of last refuge of personal 
freedom and self-determination. While the body can easily be subject to domination and control 
by others, our mind, along with our thoughts, beliefs and convictions, are to a large extent 
beyond external constraint. Yet, with advances in neural engineering, brain imaging and 
pervasive neurotechnology, the mind might no longer be this unassailable fortress. As we will 
explain in this paper, emerging neurotechnologies have the potential to allow access to at least 
some components of mental information. While these advances can be greatly beneficial for 
individuals and society, they can also be misused and create unprecedented threats to the 
freedom of the mind and to the individual capacity to freely govern her behaviour.  
In the research context, brain imaging techniques are widely used to understand the 
functioning of the human brain and detect the neural correlates of mental states and behaviour. 
Clinical applications of brain imaging as well as other neurotechnologies are significantly 
improving the well-being of patients suffering from neurological disorders, offering new 
preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic tools. Outside the clinics, pervasive commercial 
applications are rapidly providing new possibilities for self-quantification, cognitive 
enhancement, personalized communication and entertainment for normal users. Furthermore, a 
number of neurotechnology applications are becoming of major interest in the legal domain, 
especially tort law, criminal law and law enforcement.  
On the other hand, these same technologies, if misused or inadequately implemented, risk 
creating unparalleled forms of intrusion into people’s private sphere, potentially causing 
physical or psychological harm, or allowing undue influence on people’s behaviour.  
This paper makes the case that the possibilities opened up by neurotechnological 
developments and their application to various aspects of human life will force a 
reconceptualization of certain human rights, or even the creation of new rights to protect people 
from potential harm.  
In 2013, US President Obama called attention to the potential impact of neuroscience on 
human rights, emphasising the need to address questions such as those 
“(…) relating to privacy, personal agency, and moral responsibility for one’s actions; questions 
about stigmatization and discrimination based on neurological measures of intelligence or other 
traits; and questions about the appropriate use of neuroscience in the criminal-justice system” 
(543). 
This article begins by exploring the current possibilities and challenges of neurotechnology, 
and considers what neurotechnological trends will drive this ethical and legal 
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reconceptualization. After carefully analyzing the relationship between neuroscience and human 
rights, this paper identifies four new rights that may become of relevance in the coming decades: 
the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the 
right to psychological continuity.  
 
THE NEUROTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 
For a long time, the boundaries of the skull have been generally considered the separation line 
between the observable and unobservable dimension of the living human being. In fact, 
although primitive forms of neurosurgery used in ancient societies, including pseudo-scientific 
procedures such as trepanation, could allow for the observation and even manipulation (e.g. 
selective removal) of brain tissue, yet the neural and mental processes run in the brain and 
underlying emotions, reasoning and behavior remained at length unobservable. In contrast, 
modern advancements in neuroscience and neurotechnology have progressively allowed for the 
unlocking of the human brain and provided insights into brain processes as well as their link to, 
respectively, mental states and observable behaviour. In 1878 Richard Canton discovered the 
transmission of electrical signals through an animal's brain. Forty-six years later the first human 
electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Since then, a neurotechnology explosion has 
occurred inside and outside the clinics. In the 1990s, sometimes referred to as the ‘decade of the 
brain’, the use of imaging techniques for neurobehavioral studies had increased dramatically 
(544).   Today, as a wide and rapidly expanding spectrum of neuroimaging technologies has 
become clinically and commercially available, the non-invasive recording and display of 
patterns of brain activity (often associated with the completion of physical or cognitive tasks) 
has become standard practice. For example, EEG recordings are being widely used to non-
invasively measure electrical activity of the brain and detect voltage fluctuations. In addition, 
derivatives of the EEG technique such as evoked potentials (EPs) and event-related potentials 
(ERP) allow to average EEG responses to the presentation and processing of stimuli, hence to 
read brain signalling during the performance of specific sensory, cognitive or motor processes. 
Another technique, functional Magnetic Resonance Technology (fMRI), allows to measure 
brain’s electrical activity indirectly, i.e. by using hemodynamic responses (cerebral blood flow) 
as indirect markers. Current fMRI techniques can localize brain activity, graphically display 
patterns of brain activation, and determine their intensity by color-coding the strength of 
activation. fMRI techniques are implemented for a variety of purposes including pre-surgery 
risk assessment, and functional mapping of brain areas to detect abnormalities (e.g. left-right 
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hemispherical asymmetry in language and memory regions) or to observe post-stroke or post-
surgery recovery, as well as the effects of pharmacological and behavioral therapies. In addition, 
a number of neurological conditions including depression and Alzheimer’s disease can now be 
diagnosed with the use of fMRI (545).  
The capacity of neuroimaging techniques to map brain functioning has been tested effective 
also in gaining insights into people’s intentions, views and attitudes. For example, scientists 
were able to infer from decoded brain activity which actions participants in their trial were 
intending to perform. The task in question was to decide whether to add or subtract two numbers 
and to covertly hold their intention for a few seconds. During that delay, it was possible for 
scientists to determine with 70% accuracy which of two tasks the subjects were covertly 
intending to perform (546). In another study, participants toured several virtual-reality houses, 
and then had their brains scanned while touring another selection. By identifying certain patterns 
of brain activity for each house, scientists were able to determine which houses their subjects 
had been to before (547). Brain scans do not only allow to “read” concrete experiment-related 
intentions and memories. They appear even able to decode more general preferences. A US 
study has shown that fMRI scans can be used to successfully infer the political views of the 
users by identifying functional differences in the brains of respectively Democrats and 
Republicans (548). Similarly, men’s frequent preference for sport cars has been correlated with 
specific functional differences in the men’s vs the women’s brain (549).  
The possibility of non-invasively identifying such mental correlates of brain functional 
differences is of particular interest for marketing purposes. Over a decade ago, McClure et al. 
(2004) used fMRI to show functional differences (increased activation in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, hippocampus and midbrain) in the brain of people knowingly drinking Coca 
Cola as opposed to the same people drinking unlabeled Coke. Their results showed that 
marketing strategies (e.g. the Coca Cola label) can determine different responses in the brain of 
consumers (550). These results have pioneered the establishment of a new spin-out branch of 
neuroscience at the intersection with marketing research called neuromarketing, which has 
expanded rapidly over the past decade. Today, several multinational companies including 
Google, Disney, CBS, and Frito-Lay use neuromarketing research services to measure consumer 
preferences and impressions on their advertisements or products. In addition, a number of 
specialized neuromarketing companies including EmSense, Neurosence, MindLab International 
and Nielsen, routinely apply neuroimaging techniques, mostly fMRI and EEG, but also Steady 
State Topography (SST) and physiological measurements (e.g. galvanic skin response) to study, 
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analyze and predict consumer behavior. This possibility of mining the mind (or at least 
informationally rich structural aspects of the mind) can be potentially used not only to infer 
mental preferences, but also to prime, imprint or trigger those preferences. For example, 
company Neurofocus has tested subliminal techniques —for instance embedding stimuli shorter 
30 milliseconds, hence under the threshold of conscious perception — with the purposes of 
eliciting responses (e.g. preferring item A instead of B) that people cannot consciously register 
(551). In view of these developments, authors have stressed the need to establish ethical and 
legal standards for neuromarketing practices (552). 
Brain imaging techniques were originally developed and are still mostly implemented within the 
context of clinical medicine and neuroscience research. In recent years, however, a number of 
neurotechnology applications have made their way onto the market and are now integrated into 
a number of consumer-grade devices for healthy users with various non-clinical purposes. The 
umbrella term usually used to encompass all these non-invasive, scalable and potentially 
ubiquitous of neurotechnologies is “pervasive neurotechnology” (474), a notion borrowed from 
the most widespread notion of pervasive computing. Today, pervasive neurotechnology 
applications include brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) for device control or real-time 
neuromonitoring, neurosensor-based vehicle operator systems, cognitive training tools, 
electrical and magnetic brain stimulation, wearables for mental wellbeing, and virtual reality 
systems.  
Most of these applications use EEG recordings to monitor electrical activity in the brain for 
a variety of purposes including neuromonitoring (real time evaluation of brain functioning), 
neurocognitive training (using certain frequency bands to enhance neurocognitive functions), 
and device control. EEG-based BCIs are being increasingly used as wearable accessories for a 
number of everyday activities including gaming, entertainment, and smartphone’s remote 
control. For examples, companies Emotiv and Neurosky offer a large assortment of wireless 
headsets for everyday use that can be connected to compliant smartphones and personal 
computers (281). Brain-control can be used to remotely control several types of devices and 
engage in several activities including gaming and other forms of entertainment, marketing, self-
monitoring and communicating.  
The possibility of non-invasive brain control has raised the attention of the mobile 
communication industry. Several leading companies including Apple and Samsung are 
incorporating neurogadgets into the accessory assortments of their major products.  For instance, 
iPhone accessories such as the XWave headset already allow to plug directly into compliant 
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iPhones and read brainwaves. Meanwhile, prototypes of next-generation Samsung Galaxy 
Tabs and other mobile or wearable devices have being tested to be controlled by brain activity 
via EEG-based BCI (553). In the light of these trends, Yuan and colleagues predicted that 
neurodevices will gradually replace the keyboard, the touch screen, the mouse and the voice 
command device as humans’ preferred ways to interact with computers (456).   
Not only neuroimaging devices and BCIs fit into the category of pervasive neurotechnology. 
Several electrical brain stimulators fit into this category too. Unlike neuroimaging tools, 
neurostimulators are not used for recording or decoding brain activity but rather for stimulating 
or modulating brain activity electrically. Portable, easy-to-use, consumer based transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) devices are the most widespread form of consumer-grade 
neurostimulator. They are used in a number of low-cost direct-to-consumer applications aimed 
at optimizing brain performance on a variety of cognitive tasks, depending on the brain region 
being stimulated.62 Recently, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) — a magnetic method 
used to briefly stimulate small regions of the brain for both diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, 
has also evolved into portable devices, which resulted effective in the treatment of migraine 
(554). Finally, an invasive surgical technique called deep brain stimulation (DBS) involving the 
implantation of a neurostimulator in the ventrointermediate nucleus of the thalamus has obtained 
FDA approval and is now increasingly used as a treatment for essential tremor, Parkinson's 
disease, dystonia and obsessive–compulsive disorder.  
In sum, if in the past decades neurotechnology has unlocked the human brain and made it 
readable under scientific lenses, the upcoming decades will see neurotechnology becoming 
pervasive and embedded in numerous aspects of our lives and increasingly effective in 
modulating the neural correlates of our psychology and behavior. While welcoming continuing 
progress in neurotechnology development, in this paper we argue that the ethical and legal 
implications of the neurotechnology explosion should be considered early and in a proactive 
manner. More in detail, we argue that the legal system has to be adequately prepared to deal 
with these new challenges that might emerge out of emerging neurotechnology, in particular in 
the context of human rights. As neurotechnology advances, it is critical to assess whether our 
current human rights framework is conceptually and normatively well-equipped to face the 
novel challenges arising at the brain-computer-society entanglement, hence to provide 
 
62 For example, the website The Brain Stimulator offers a wide assortment of affordable tDCS devices, 
with prices ranging between 60$ and 200$. See: https://thebrainstimulator.net/shop/  
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simultaneously guidance to researchers and developers while providing protection to individuals 
and groups.     
  
BRAIN TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 
Neuroscience and the law intersect on many levels and on various different issues. This is not 
surprising. While neuroscience studies the brain processes that underlie human behaviour, legal 
systems are quintessentially concerned with the regulation of human behaviour. It is therefore 
reasonable to claim that both disciplines are destined to be “natural partners” (555). The 
underlying idea of the new field called “neurolaw” is precisely that better knowledge of the 
brain will lead to better-designed laws and fairer legal procedures. Examples of potentially 
legally relevant applications of neurotechnology are numerous. Brain imaging techniques, for 
instance, might possibly contribute to more evidence-based decisions in criminal justice, from 
investigation and the assessment of criminal responsibility, to punishment, rehabilitation of 
offenders, and the evaluation of their risk of recidivism. The tools offered by neuroscience could 
potentially play also a role in civil law procedures, for example, in the assessment of an 
individual’s capacity to contract, or of the severity of the plaintiff’s pain in compensation 
claims. New and more reliable lie detection technologies based on our knowledge of the brain 
functioning might help to assess the reliability of witnesses. Memory erasure of recidivist 
violent criminals and of victims of especially traumatic offences (e.g. sexual abuse) is also 
mentioned as another possibility opened by our new knowledge of the brain (555). 
A possibly game-changing use of neurotechnology in the legal field has been illustrated by 
Aharoni and colleagues (2013). In this study, researchers followed a group of 96 male prisoners 
at prison release. Using fMRI, prisoners’ brains were scanned during the performance of 
computer tasks in which they had to make quick decisions and inhibit impulsive reactions. The 
researchers followed the ex-convicts for four years to see how they behaved. The study results 
indicate that those individuals showing low activity in a brain region associated with decision-
making and action (the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, ACC) are more likely to commit crimes 
again within four years of release (556). According to the study, the risk of recidivism is more 
than double in individuals showing low activity in that region of the brain than in individuals 
with high activity in that region. Their results suggest a “potential neurocognitive biomarker for 
persistent antisocial behavior”. In other words, brain scans can theoretically help determine 
whether certain convicted persons are at an increased risk of reoffending if released. 
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This prospect evokes Philip Dick’s 1956 science fiction story “The Minority Report”, which 
was adapted into a movie in 2002. The plot is about a special police unit (“Precrime Division”) 
which is able to identify and arrest murderers before they commit their crimes. The system is 
believed to be flawless until an officer from that same unit is mistakenly accused of a future 
murder (557). This dystopian scenario, which could result from the new knowledge about the 
brain, raises important ethical and human rights questions. How much evidence is needed to 
prove that brain scans are likely to flag only the truly high risk offenders? Can neurotechnology-
generated data, which have a probabilistic nature, be straightforwardly applied to predict the 
criminal behaviour of a particular individual? Can these preliminary findings, which were based 
on a very specific cohort, be generalized to other groups? In any case, it is clear that much more 
work is needed to ensure the reliability of the technique before authorising its use by courts, 
certainly not as a substitute for current methods for dangerousness assessment, but maybe as an 
additional, complementary tool.  
Other brain technologies that may be relevant for the legal system are lie detectors, mental 
decoders, and brain printers. Lie detectors are devices capable to record and measure brain 
responses associated with the retrieval of memories, with the purpose of ascertaining the truth-
values of statements relative to those memories. Traditional lie detectors, like the polygraph, 
measure some bodily markers such as blood pressure, heart rate, and muscular reactions. 
Despite their low reliability, they are regularly used by some government agencies to screen 
their employees. However, they are very rarely accepted as evidence in US courts. The new 
generations of lie detectors, which are EEG-based and fMRI-based, are regarded as much more 
reliable than the polygraph, as they detect the lie at its source: the brain. In the United States, at 
least two companies –No Lie MRI and Cephos Corp– are currently offering fMRI lie-detection 
services (558). A study published in 2005 by a research group linked to Cephos, claimed that 
fMRI-based lie detection has a reliability of around 90%. The study predicted that the procedure 
will be further improved and ready to be used in courts in the not too distant future (559). 
Today, recent studies have confirmed the higher reliability of fMRI-based lie detectors 
compared to polygraphy (560). In parallel, mental decoders are capable of decoding mental 
states and translating them into observable outputs such as text, verbal signals or graphic 
images. For example, Herff et al. (2015) and Mirkovic et al. (2015) have independently 
demonstrated the effectiveness of a decoder capable of reconstructing speech from brain waves 
(561, 562). Such devices have a great potential for beneficial clinical applicability as they could 
benefit several classes of neurological patients, especially those suffering from locked-in 
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syndrome and paralysis. Such patients, who have lost their capacity to produce verbal 
communication, would be enabled to re-interact with the external world by producing speech 
solely by brain activity. Outside the clinical setting, such decoders are tested to enhance mobile 
communication through thought-to-text converters. Not all mental decoders are designed to 
enhance users’ autonomy. Some devices are currently tested for monitoring brain states with the 
purpose of guiding the individual’s behavior. For example, NASA and Jaguar are jointly 
developing a technology called Mind Sense, which will measure brainwaves to monitor the 
driver’s concentration in the car (563). If brain activity indicates poor concentration, then the 
steering wheel or pedals could vibrate to raise the driver’s awareness of the danger. This 
technology can contribute to reduce the number of accidents caused by drivers who are stressed 
or distracted. However, it also opens theoretically the possibility for third parties to use brain 
decoders to eavesdropping on people’s states of mind. 
Similar implications are raised by brain printers. These are prototypical devices that are 
currently tested as brain-based authentication methods. For example, researchers at Binghamton 
University in the state of New York have devised a way to verify a person's identity based on 
how their brain responds to certain words. The researchers observed the brain signals of 45 
volunteers as they read a list of 75 acronyms, such as FBI and DVD, and recorded the brain's 
reaction to each group of letters, focusing on the part of the brain associated with reading and 
recognizing words. It turns out that participants' brains reacted differently to each acronym — so 
that a computer system was able to identify each volunteer with 94% accuracy (564). This 
technology, which could in the short term replace passwords and fingerprints as authentication 
tool for personal accounts, raises novel privacy and security issues.  
As neurotechnology advances and opens novel opportunities monitoring and controlling 
cognitive function, there is uncertainty on how the law should cope with such advancements. In 
particular, it remains debatable whether emerging trends in neurotechnology call for a revision 
or even a replacement of existing legal concepts at various levels including civil law, tort law, 
business law and legal philosophy.  While increasing attention is being devoted in the literature 
to emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of criminal law or to the increasing use 
of neuroscience evidence in courts, little focus has been directed to the implications of 
advancing neuroscience and neurotechnology for human right law. This neglected component of 
the neurolaw discourse is of particular relevance since the universal nature of the human right 
framework could provide a solid foundation for this emerging “jurisprudence of the mind”.  
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Neuroscience and Human Rights 
Overview 
While neurotechnology has the potential to impact human rights such as privacy, freedom of 
thought, the right to mental integrity, the freedom from discrimination, the right to a fair trial, or 
the principle against self-incrimination, yet international human rights law does not make any 
explicit reference to neuroscience. In contrast to other biomedical developments, which have 
already been the subject of standard-setting efforts at the domestic and international level, 
neurotechnology still largely remains a terra incognita for human rights law. Nonetheless, the 
implications raised by neuroscience and neurotechnology for inherent features of human beings, 
urge a prompt and adaptive response from human rights law.  
The adaptive ability that human rights law has shown in responding to the challenges posed 
by genetic technology may help to anticipate how this branch of law could evolve in the coming 
years in response to new issues raised by neuroscience. Since the end of the 1990s, the 
international community has made significant efforts to address a great variety of issues that 
result from the increasing access to human genetic data. In 1997, the Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR) was adopted to prevent that genetic 
information is collected and used in ways that are incompatible with respect for human rights, 
and to protect the human genome from improper manipulations that may harm future 
generations. The principles contained in this instrument were further developed in 2003 by the 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (IDHGD), which sets out more specific rules 
for the collection of human biological samples and genetic data. It is interesting to note that 
from the interaction between genetics and human rights resulted entirely new rights, such as the 
“right not to know one’s genetic information”, which is formally recognized by the UDHGHR 
(Art. 5(c)) and the IDHGD (Art. 10), as well as by other international and national regulations. 
In addition to the recognition of new rights, “old” rights –such as the right to privacy and the 
right against discrimination- were specifically adapted to the novel challenges posed by 
genetics. This close connection between life sciences and human rights was further strengthened 
by the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, which comprehensively 
addresses the linkage between both fields (565). This latter document sets out principles that are 
applicable not only to genetics but to other biomedical and life sciences issues.  
In this paper we claim that, similarly to the historical trajectory of the “genetic revolution”, 
the ongoing “neuro-revolution” will reshape some of our ethical and legal notions. In particular, 
we argue that the growing sensitivity and availability of neurodevices will require in the coming 
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years the emergence of new rights or at least the further development of traditional rights to 
specifically address the challenges posed by neuroscience and neurotechnology. This argument 
is in accordance with the observation of how human rights have historically emerged and 
developed in modern societies. Human rights, in fact, have always arisen as specific responses 
to recurrent threats to fundamental human interests (566), to human dignity (567), or to what is 
required by a “minimally good life” (568). As we attempt to show in this paper, the individual 
quest to exert control over one’s own neuro-cognitive dimension as well as the emergence of 
potential threats to basic human goods or interests posed by the misuse or inadequate application 
of neurotechnological devices may require a reconceptualization of some traditional human 
rights or even the creation of new neuro-specific rights.  
It goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss the different theories about the foundations 
of human rights, or to take a position in this regard. For the purposes of our investigation we 
chose to adopt a broad practical conception of human rights, like the one proposed by Beitz 
(2011, p. 109), who argues that they are “requirements whose object is to protect urgent 
individual interests against predictable dangers (‘standard threats’) to which they are vulnerable 
under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states” (569). In 
general terms, it can be said that the scope of human rights is to guarantee both the necessary 
negative and positive prerequisites for leading a minimally good life (570). 
A common objection against the recognition of new rights is that it leads to the so-called 
“rights inflation”, which is the objectionable tendency to label everything that is morally 
desirable as a “human right”. The unjustified proliferation of new rights is indeed problematic 
because it spreads skepticism about all human rights, as if they were merely wishful thinking or 
purely rhetorical claims. Rights inflation is to be avoided because it dilutes the core idea of 
human rights and distracts from the central goal of human rights instruments, which is to protect 
a set of truly fundamental human interests, and not everything that would be desirable or 
advantageous in an ideal world.  
A frequently accepted way to avoid rights inflation is to impose justificatory tests for 
specific human rights. For example, according to Nickel (2014), it could be required that a 
proposed human right should not only deal with some very important good but also respond to a 
common and serious threat to that good, impose burdens on the addressees that are justifiable 
and no larger than necessary, and be feasible in most of the world's countries (571). The 
international law scholar Philip Alston (1984) has suggested a list of criteria that a given claim 
must satisfy in order to qualify as a “human right” in terms of international law (151). In his 
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view, the proposed new human right must “reflect a fundamentally important social value”; “be 
consistent, but not merely repetitive, of the existing body of international human rights law”; 
“be capable of achieving a very high degree of international consensus”, and “be sufficiently 
precise as to give rise to identifiable rights and obligations”.  
For the reasons we give below, we think that the new rights advocated in this paper −the 
right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right 
to psychological continuity− fulfill these requirements and therefore do not raise the risk of 
rights inflation.  
This proposal of neuro-specific human rights is consistent with Glen Boire’s advocacy of a 
“jurisprudence of the mind” that “takes account of the latest understandings of the brain” and 
“which situates these within our country’s tradition of embracing individual, self-determination 
and limited government” (Boire 2003, p10). As brain technology is rapidly reshaping the 
infosphere and the digital infrastructures in our societies, there is an urgent need to proactively 
assess whether our current ethical and legal frameworks are ready to face this emerging 
scenario.  
It is also worth noting in limine that many of the issues discussed in this paper are not unique 
to cutting-edge neurotechnology but have precedents in more traditional interventions. For 
example, breaches for mental privacy emerged before the invention of neuroimaging and 
neuromonitoring technologies through more rudimental techniques such as interrogation and 
polygraph-based lie detection. These interventions, however, do not target neural processing 
directly but only via proxy-processes such as speech, behavior, and physiological indices (e.g. 
pulse and skin conductivity). In addition, the degree of accuracy and resolution of such 
techniques is remarkably low (572), hence often insufficient to support epistemologically 
justified inferences about mental information. Similarly, threats to mental integrity and 
psychological continuity were posed by non-computational interventions such as psychoactive 
drugs and hypnotic inductions way before the invention of neurostimulation and brain-machine 
interfacing. However, these techniques are often characterized by limited efficacy and reliability 
in purposively manipulating mental activity as well as low degrees of selectivity in targeting 
neural processes. Based on these considerations, we argue that advanced neurotechnology 
enables a degree of access into and manipulation of neural processes significantly higher than 
other techniques. Therefore, while we consider the ethical and legal analysis presented in this 
paper applicable to the entire spectrum of both computational and non-computational brain 
interventions, we argue that the degree of perturbation of advanced neurotechnology on the 
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current ethical-legal framework is quantitatively higher than non-computational techniques. For 
this reason we situate neurotechnology as the focus of our proposed normative upgrade.  
 
Cognitive Liberty 
A first, essential step towards the creation of a neuro-oriented human rights framework has been 
the recent debate over the notion of cognitive liberty. According to Bublitz (2013), this complex 
notion, often also referred to as mental self-determination, comprises two fundamental and 
intimately related principles: (a) the right of individuals to use emerging neurotechnologies; (b) 
the protection of individuals from the coercive and unconsented use of such technologies. As he 
concisely put it, cognitive liberty is the principle that guarantees “the right to alter one’s mental 
states with the help of neurotools as well as to refuse to do so” (Bublitz 2013).  
Proponents of cognitive liberty suggest considering it a “fundamental human right” as 
well as “a central legal principle guiding the regulation of neurotechnologies” (408). The reason 
of its fundamental function stems from the fact that “the right and freedom to control one’s own 
consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is the necessary substrate for just about 
every other freedom” (406). In fact, as Bublitz argued, “it is hard to conceive any conception of 
a legal subject in which the mind and mental capacities (e.g. acting from reasons, deliberation) 
are not among its necessary constitutive conditions” (408). Cognitive liberty, therefore, is 
necessary to all other liberties, because it is their neuro-cognitive substrate. As such, cognitive 
liberty resembles the notion of ‘freedom of thought’ which is usually considered the essential 
justification of other freedoms such as freedom of choice, freedom of speech, freedom of press, 
and freedom of religion. Not surprisingly, Sententia (2004) presented cognitive liberty as a 
conceptual update of freedom of thought that “takes into account the power we now have, and 
increasingly will have to monitor and manipulate cognitive function” (Sententia 2004). Some 
legal scholars such as Boire and Sententia have interpreted the right to cognitive liberty with 
special focus on the protection of individual freedom and self-determination from the State. For 
example, Sententia has claimed that “the State cannot, consistent with the First Amendment of 
the Constitution, forcibly manipulate the mental states, and implicitly the brain states of 
individual citizens”. 
Given its conceptual complexity, cognitive liberty is multi-dimensional. Bublitz 
recognizes at least three “interrelated but not identical dimensions” (Bubliz 2013). These are: (i) 
the liberty to change one’s mind or to choose whether and by which means to change one’s 
mind; (ii) the protection of interventions into other minds to protect mental integrity, and (iii) 
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the ethical and legal obligation to promoting cognitive liberty.  These three dimensions 
configure cognitive liberty as a complex right which involves the prerequisites of both negative 
and positive liberties in Berlin’s sense (573): the negative liberty of making choices about one’s 
own cognitive domain in absence of governmental or non-governmental obstacles, barriers or 
prohibitions; the negative liberty of exercising one’s own right to mental integrity in absence of 
constrains or violations from corporations, criminal agents or the government; and finally, the 
positive liberty of having the possibility of acting in such a way as to take control of one's 
mental life.  
Being the neurocognitive substrate of all other liberties, cognitive liberty cannot be 
reduced to existing rights, hence is immune to the risk of rights inflation. In addition, since 
cognitive life, although in various forms and degrees, is inherent in all human beings, cognitive 
liberty is consistent with a definition of human rights as inalienable fundamentals rights "to 
which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being” (574), 
regardless of their nation, location, language, religion, ethnic origin or any other status. 
Consequently, its integration into the human right framework would enable the protection of 
constitutive features of human beings that are not being entirely protected by existing rights.   
For the purposes of our analysis, in this article we will focus exclusively on the negative 
formulation of the right to cognitive liberty, namely as the right to refuse coercive uses of 
neurotechnology.  In addition, while we welcome the introduction of the right to cognitive 
liberty, we argue that this notion is not sufficient alone to cover the entire spectrum of ethical 
and legal implications associated with neurotechnology. Rather, the establishment of cognitive 
liberty as a human right should be coordinated with a simultaneous reconceptualization of 
existing rights or even the creation of other new neuro-specific rights. These are the right to 
mental privacy, the right to mental integrity and the right to psychological continuity.  
 
The right to mental privacy 
Today’s infosphere is more intrusive than at any other time in history. Websites regularly 
use cookies to record store visitors’ information such as browsing activities, preferences, 
personal data, visited pages, passwords, credit card numbers, etc. Big and small corporations 
engage in data-mining activities that capture massive amounts of data about users. Much of this 
information is about daily activities: what was purchased, when, where and how much was paid. 
E-mail accounts are stuffed with advertisements and unsolicited offers. Phone numbers and 
personal addresses are captured in databases and sold to corporations and government agencies. 
 311 
 
In addition, video surveillance, facial recognition technology, spyware are opening up people’s 
daily activities for public consumption. As Moore (2010) puts it, today “informational privacy is 
everywhere under siege” (575). 
The widespread availability of neurotechnology applications will provide multiple 
opportunities for individuals to access and exert control over their brain-activity, hence resulting 
in a number of potentially beneficial activities such as self-monitoring, neuro-enhancement, and 
brain-controlled computer use. However, these same tools will disseminate an unprecedented 
volume and variety of brain information outside the clinical domain and potentially increase the 
availability of such information to third parties. As pervasive applications of neurotechnology 
are introducing brain data into the infosphere, they are thereby exposing them to the same 
degree of intrusiveness and vulnerability to which is exposed any other bit of information 
circulating in the digital ecosystem. At present, no specific legal or technical safeguard protects 
brain data from being subject to the same data-mining and privacy intruding measures as other 
types of information. In the words of Nita Farahany, “there are no legal protections from having 
your mind involuntarily read”.63 The reason for that stems from the fact, as Charo observes, that 
“technology innovates faster than the regulatory system can adapt” (481).    
A large number of ethical, legal, and social questions arise from these neurotechnological 
possibilities. These include: For what purposes and under what conditions can brain information 
be collected and used? What components of brain information shall be legitimately disclosed 
and made accessible to others? Who shall be entitled to access those data (employers, insurance 
companies, the State)? What should be the limits to consent in this area?   
Although a first attempt of response to these questions can be made by appealing to existing 
legal norms, we claim that specific legal notions and provisions have to be developed. The first 
notion involved in these debates is that of privacy. International human rights law formally 
recognises the right to privacy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that 
“no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks” (Article 12). Similarly, the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) stipulates that “everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence” (Article 8 para 1). It is 
 
63 Speech at Panel on “What If: Your Brain Confesses?” World Economic Forum – Annual Meeting, 
Davos, 20-23 January 2016. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-
annual-meeting-2016/sessions/what-if-your-brain-confesses/ 
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interesting to note that the right to privacy is one of the few rights that was recognised by 
international law as a broad, umbrella right before it was included in any state constitution 
(576). 
At the European level, the right to privacy recognised by the ECHR was developed by the 
1995 EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which specifically aims at protecting individuals 
with regard to the processing and transfer of personal data. Currently, the EU is planning to 
adapt the data protection rules to the challenges to privacy posed by the new digital 
environment. The overall goal of the upcoming Directive and Regulation is to empower 
individuals with more control over their personal data.64 Also the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, adopted in 2000, states the general right to protection of private life in Article 7 and 
specifies in Article 8 that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her” (para 1). According to paragraph 2 of the latter provision,  
“[s]uch data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of 
the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of 
access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified”. 
The first question that arises in the context of the current privacy protection standards is 
whether the traditional right to privacy also covers the data contained in and generated by our 
minds. An answer to this dilemma is not immediately available, not least because there is no 
consensus in the legal literature on a definition of privacy. This can be explained by the 
disparate content of this right, which includes not only the right to control access to personal 
information, but also to our bodies and to specific private places. In their seminal article, 
published in 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis articulated the right to privacy as “a right 
to be let alone” (497). Their primary concern was the increasing interest of the yellow press in 
gossiping and revealing personal information about individuals, including pictures of private 
persons without their consent. This specific instance of privacy was further developed by Alan 
Westin and other authors into the broader notion of informational privacy, i.e. the control over 
information about oneself. According to Westin, privacy can be described in terms of our claim 
to determine for ourselves when, how, and to what extent information about us is communicated 
to others (498). Today, the “right to be let alone” delineated by Warren and Brandeis more than 
one century ago has clearly become relevant to areas far removed from their original concerns. 
The various facets of the modern understanding of privacy continue to expand as technological 
 
64 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm 
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developments continue. Neuroscience is very likely to become in the near future one of the new 
areas in which the right to privacy is called to play a fundamental and unexpected role. 
 
The emergence of a right to mental privacy  
Science fiction can be very helpful to anticipate the challenges that science and technology 
may pose in the future, as well as the possible responses to them. In a Star Trek novel written in 
1990, Captain Kirk has been informed that a dangerous spy has surreptitiously joined one of the 
groups that are visiting the spaceship Enterprise. Kirk desperately wants to identify the intruder 
and to know more about him and his plans. By appealing to one of his staff members who has 
telepath abilities, Kirk wants to read the minds of all the visitors. However, the Captain is 
reminded by one of his assistants that, according to the law, “the right to mental privacy is an 
inalienable right of all Federation citizens and shall not be abrogated without due process of 
law” (577). Moreover, “to find one guilty individual in either of those groups means there is a 
large probability of invading the privacy of a number of innocent people” (Ibid., p. 150). The 
kind of dilemmas described in this futuristic scenario, which is set in the 23rd-century, may 
become a reality much earlier than expected. Developments in neuroimaging, like those 
mentioned above, have raised concerns about the ethics and legality of ‘mind-reading’. It is true 
that functional brain imaging cannot really “read” thoughts, but can only highlight differences 
between brain activations during different cognitive tasks, and to infer from such differences 
certain conclusions about an individual’s thoughts. However, the fact remains that, even if in an 
indirect manner, the new tools are increasingly able to determine with a high degree of accuracy 
certain brain data that belong to the private sphere and deserve to be protected from public 
scrutiny.  
In modern societies, privacy and data protection norms cover the use and disclosure of 
various kinds of personal information. Since the data decoded from an individual’s brain can be 
regarded as “personal information” −or “personally identifiable information”, as it is called in 
the US−, there is in principle no reason why such data could not be covered by existing privacy 
and data protection regulations. If one has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”65 regarding the 
identifying information derived from one’s blood or saliva samples, surely one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding the data decoded from one’s own mind (578). 
 
65 The expression "reasonable expectation of privacy” was coined by the US Supreme Court in 1967 to 
distinguish legitimate police searches and seizures from unreasonable ones in the light of the Fourth 
Amendment that protects privacy rights. 
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However, the special nature of brain data, which relate very directly to one’s inner life and 
personhood, and the distinct way in which such data are obtained, suggest that specific 
safeguards will be probably needed in this domain. It should be noted that traditional privacy 
rules seek to safeguard “external” information about people.  
The particularity of brain data is that the information to be protected is not easily 
distinguishable from the source itself that produced the data: the individual’s neural processing. 
This is what we can call the “inception problem”, which complicates the analysis of the issues at 
stake when traditional approaches to privacy are used. In other terms, the neurotechnological 
future we are approaching will require us to guarantee protection not only to the information we 
record and share, but also to the source of that information since they may be inseparable. In 
order to implement this we would need wider privacy and data protection rights that can be also 
applied at a higher and chronologically antecedent level: our neural activity. 
An additional reason for concern about privacy in this domain is that brain signals allow to 
distinguish or trace an individual‘s identity and are potentially linkable to that individual. Some 
brain records (e.g. EEG-recorded signals) can be used as a unique biometric identifier, similarly 
to fingerprints or DNA. Back in 2007, Palanippan and colleagues developed a 
EEG based biometric framework for automatic identity verification (579). Since then, a huge 
number of unobtrusive EEG-based biometric systems have been developed for the purposes of 
individual recognition (580, 581), person authentication (582, 583), and person identification 
(584, 585). However, unlike other identifiable information, brainwaves can be potentially 
recorded without individual’s awareness, and therefore in absence of a real ability of the person 
to consent to the collection and use of that information. With the growing market of portable 
EEG-based neuroheadsets and in absence of a real possibility for obtaining informed consent for 
the processing of the records they generate, there is a need for the law to lay down new 
protective responses to the processing of brain data. The need to protect information generated 
below the threshold of voluntary control demands for the recognition of a new right that is 
specifically tailored on the characteristics of brain information and the new possibilities opened 
by mind-reading technologies.  
In the light of the emerging neurotechnologies, it is also necessary to explore the –technical 
and legal– possibility of applying a filter to the flow of brain information with the purpose of 
distinguishing the information we consciously want to keep private from the one we want to 
disclose publicly. In the current information society we are constantly required to draw a 
distinction between private and public information: for example, when we set up the contact 
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page on our website or when we decide with whom to share our mobile phone number. The 
basic psychological assumption that underlies this phenomenon is that competent adults have 
the psychological capacity to consciously filter the information flow and reasonably identify the 
bits of information that must be kept private. Privacy, in fact, is both a right and an ability. As 
an ability, it enables individuals or groups to seclude themselves, or information about 
themselves, and thereby express themselves selectively. This idea has been widely imported into 
the information technology sphere, where privacy is often described as the ability (or perceived 
ability) to control submitted personal information -especially when using the Internet (586). In 
order to exercise this ability meaningfully we need a rational medium that is capable to filter the 
information flow and decide what to disclose. This medium is thought, as well captured by the 
famous adagio in computer security “the best anti-virus software is the brain”.  
Based on these specific challenges, we argue that current privacy and data protection rights 
are insufficient to cope with the emerging neurotechnological scenarios. Consequently, we 
suggest the formal recognition of a right to mental privacy, which aims to protect any bit or set 
of brain information about an individual recorded by a neurodevice and shared across the digital 
ecosystem. This right would protect brainwaves not only as data but also as data generators or 
sources of information. In addition, it would cover not only conscious brain data but also data 
that are not (or are only partly) under voluntary and conscious control. Finally, it guarantees the 
protection of brain information in absence of an external tool for identifying and filtering that 
information. In short, the right to brain privacy aims to protect people against illegitimate access 
to their brain information and to prevent the indiscriminate leakage of brain data across the 
infosphere.  
It is worthy of mention that violations of mental privacy can occur also in absence of direct 
intrusion into the victim’s neural processing. For example, brain data collected for research 
purposes are usually stored for analysis on externally located EEG-databases and repositories. 
Similarly brain-data generated by consumer-grade brain-computer interfaces (BCI) are sent to a 
connected app and can be stored in the cloud or other data store end points. In either case, these 
data can be accessed also in absence of the person who generated those data and without 
intervening into the person’s brain signaling.   
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Is the right to mental privacy an absolute or a relative right? 
Most human rights, including privacy rights, are relative, in the sense that they can be 
limited in certain circumstances, provided that some restrictions are necessary and are a 
proportionate way of achieving a legitimate purpose.66 In specifically dealing with the right to 
privacy, the European Convention on Human Rights states that this right admits some 
restrictions “for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Art. 8, para 2). Only very few rights, such 
as the freedom of thought, freedom from slavery, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment are regarded by international human rights law as not subject to any exceptions and, 
therefore, as absolute rights. In which of both categories should the right to mental privacy be 
placed? Can nonconsensual intrusions into people’s brain data be justified in certain 
circumstances or should be unconditionally banned? More concretely, does the right to mental 
privacy protect individuals from being compelled by courts or the state to brain-based 
interrogations?  
Paul Root Wolpe has suggested that due to fears of government oppression, we should draw 
a bright line around the use of mind-reading technologies: 
“The skull should be designated as a domain of absolute privacy. No one should be able to 
probe an individual’s mind against their will. We should not permit it with a court order. We 
should not permit it for military or national security. We should forgo the use of the technology 
under coercive circumstances even though using it may serve the public good” (587). 
Similarly, it has been argued that “nonconsensual mind reading is not something we should 
never engage in” (588). The claim is that mind-reading techniques constitute “a fundamental 
affront to human dignity” (Ibid). Consequently, “we must not let our civilization’s privacy 
principles degrade so far that attempting to peer inside a person’s own head against their will 
ever become regarded as acceptable” (Ibid). 
Are these calls for an unconditional ban on compulsory mind-reading justified? Or could 
this procedure be acceptable in certain circumstances (for instance, when faced with a serious 
crime or a terrorist attack)? As mentioned above, privacy rights are not absolute, but relative. 
 
66 “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society” (UDHR, Article 29.2). 
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The collection, use and disclosure of private information is permissible when the public interest 
is at stake. For example, in many jurisdictions, compulsory genetic testing can be undertaken to 
attempt to identify criminal offenders. Considering the non-invasive and painless nature of 
brain-scans, there are prima facie good reasons for thinking that their nonconsensual use would 
be justified, with a court warrant, under special circumstances when there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that an individual has committed a serious crime or is involved in the 
planning of a serious crime. 
However, this dilemma becomes more intricate when it is seen not in connection to privacy 
issues, but in the light of the principle of prohibiting coerced self-incrimination. This problem 
particularly arises when the results of brain scans are regarded not as mere information about 
individuals (such as buccal or blood-derived DNA, fingerprints, etc.), but as a testimony because 
in this latter case the self-incrimination clause would enter into play.  
The ban on coerced self-incrimination is widely recognized across the democratic world as 
being an integral component of a fair criminal justice. This privilege is a logic consequence of 
the presumption of innocence, which places the burden of proof of guilt on the prosecution. In 
other words, people suspected of a crime do not have any obligation to assist in providing 
evidence against themselves. The privilege against self-incrimination is very closely related to 
the right to remain silent and can overlap with it. However, there is a conceptual difference 
between them: while the former concerns the threat of coercion in order to make an accused 
yield certain information, the latter concerns the drawing of adverse inferences when an accused 
fails to testify or to answer questions (589). 
This privilege is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
stipulates that “in the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled (…) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt” (Art. 14(3)(g)). A 
similar provision can be found in the American Convention on Human Rights and in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.67 Although the European Convention on Human 
Rights does not explicitly refer to the privilege against self-incrimination, the European Court of 
 
67 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2)(g): “Every person accused of a criminal offense has 
the right (…) not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty”; Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, art. 55(1)(a): “In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person: (a) 
Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt”. Paragraph 2(b) of the same 
Article 55 adds that the person suspected of having committed a crime has the right “to remain silent, 
without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence”. 
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Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly asserted that this principle is implied in the general right 
to a fair trial, which is guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.68 In the US, the Fifth 
Amendment protects against “coercion [to] prove [a] charge against an accused out of his 
mouth”. Interpreting this clause, the US Supreme Court introduced in 1966 the distinction 
between being compelled to provide real or physical evidence (which is allowed) and being 
forced to give self-incriminating testimony (which is forbidden).69  
The ECtHR draws a more subtle distinction when it differentiates between compelling “real 
evidence which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect” (ex. documents 
acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissues for the 
purpose of DNA testing) and evidence which is “not truly independent of the will of the 
suspect”.70 Answers to questions are the most obvious examples of this second category because 
they are inconceivable without the will of the subject. However, in the case of Funke v. France, 
the ECtHR has considered that also being compelled to produce certain documents (in the case, 
bank statements from accounts in foreign banks, and which might serve to incriminate the 
individual for tax evasion), would amount to an infringement of the privilege. 
Therefore, the lecture of the privilege made by the ECtHR can been understood in the sense 
that the key issue is not so much whether the evidence is real or oral (i.e. physical as opposed to 
answers to questions), but whether the evidence requires the active co-operation of the 
individual or not (590). In other words, “the privilege only covers assistance from the suspect 
which could not be substituted by employing direct force” (591). 
If we accept this understanding of the privilege, the question then becomes whether the mere 
record of thoughts and memories –without any coerced oral testimony or declaration– is 
evidence that can be legally compelled, or whether this practice necessarily requires the “will of 
the suspect” and therefore constitutes a breach of the privilege against forced self-incrimination. 
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to give a clear-cut answer to this dilemma. In our 
opinion, the issue has to be the matter of public discussion in order to find an adequate balance 
between the private and public interests at stake. The dilemma is particularly arduous because, 
on the one hand, it could be argued that thoughts and memories are purely internal operations 
that per se cannot be forced, and consequently the non-incrimination clause would not be 
applicable to them. However, on the other hand, if mind-reading techniques are allowed in 
 
68 Funke v. France, 256 ECtHR (ser. A) (1993); John Murray v. United Kingdom, 1996-I ECtHR 30. 
69 US Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
70 Saunders, 1996-VI 
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criminal proceedings, there is in the long term the risk to completely water down the privilege 
against self-incrimination, especially if the techniques become more reliable and efficient than 
they are at present. People might still be formally protected against self-incriminatory oral 
statements, but not against the very source of such testimonies: their own thoughts. As Nita 
Farahany puts it, self-incrimination may occur silently just as aloud (592). 
      
The right to mental integrity 
Intrusions into people’s brains cannot only result in a violation of their mental privacy, but 
may also have a direct impact on their neural computation and result in direct harm to them. 
Ienca and Haselager (2016) have introduced the notion of malicious brain-hacking to refer to 
neurocriminal activities that influence directly neural computation in the users of neurodevices 
in a manner that resembles how computers are hacked in computer crime (281). Focusing on 
brain-computer interface (BCI), they identify four types of malicious brain-hacking based on the 
various levels of the BCI cycle where the attack can occur. Three of these types, i.e. when the 
attack occurs at the level of measurement, decoding and feedback, may involve direct 
manipulation of a person’s neural computation. Malicious agents may add noise or override the 
signal sent to the device with the purpose of diminishing or expunging the control of the user 
over the application, or even hijacking the victim’s voluntary control. For example, a criminal 
actor could override the signal sent by the users and hijack the BCI-controlled device (e.g. 
smartphone, electronic wheelchair) without the user’s permission.   
In this kind of cases, the users’ mental privacy and the protection of their brain data are not 
the only rights at risk. Rather, the physical and mental integrity of the victim are at stake too. In 
fact, the forced intrusion into and alteration of a person’s neural processes pose an 
unprecedented threat to that person’s mental integrity.  
The right to personal physical and mental integrity is protected by the EU's Charter of 
fundamental rights (Article 3), stating that “everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
physical and mental integrity.” Understandably, the Charter emphasizes the importance of this 
right in the fields of medicine and biology, because of the direct impact that biomedical 
technologies may have on people’s physical and mental integrity. The provision focuses in 
particular on four requirements: free and informed consent, the non-commercialization of body 
elements, and the prohibition of eugenic practices and human reproductive cloning. No explicit 
reference is made to neurotechnology-related practices. This silence is understandable if we 
consider that the Charter was adopted in 2000, when the discussion on the ethical and legal 
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implications of neuroscience was at a very early stage. Today however, potential applications of 
neurotechnology open the prospects of impacting personal integrity in a manner that is 
comparable to that of genetics and other biomedical practices. For this reason, the normative 
framework should keep up with neurotechnological advances and extend the protection of 
people’s integrity to this new area.  
We propose to fill this normative gap by calling for a reconceptualization of the right to 
mental integrity. In fact, while the ECHR and ECFR consider mental integrity as a right to 
mental-health, pendant of the right of physical integrity understood as physical health, a more 
complex dimension of mental integrity is elicited by neurotechnology. Mental integrity in this 
broader sense should not only guarantee the right of individuals with mental conditions to access 
mental health schemes and receive psychiatric treatment or support wherever needed. In 
addition to that, it should also guarantee the right of all individuals to protect their mental 
dimension from potential harm.  
This reconceptualized right should provide a specific normative protection from potential 
neurotechnology-enabled interventions involving the unauthorized alteration of a person’s 
neural computation and potentially resulting in direct harm to the victim. For an action X, to 
qualify as a threat to mental integrity, it has to: (i) involve the direct access to and manipulation 
of neural signaling (ii) be unauthorized –i.e. must occur in absence of the informed consent of 
the signal generator, (iii) result in physical and/or psychological harm. As neurotechnology 
becomes part of the digital ecosystem and neural computation rapidly enters the infosphere, the 
mental integrity of individuals will be increasingly endangered if specific protective measures 
are not implemented.  
Threats to mental integrity do not limit to malicious brain-hacking and similar illicit 
activities. Unauthorized alterations of a person’s neural computation could also emerge out of 
military applications of BCI technology for warfighter enhancement. Lebedev et al. have 
described that a neurologically controlled prosthetic could send tactile information back to the 
brain in nearly real time by using intracortical microstimulation (ICMS), essentially creating a 
“brain-machine-brain interface” (593). Such interventions may directly modify neurological 
activity and can be used to exert some degree of control over ground troop soldiers. For 
example, the Committee on Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications of the 
National Research Council of the National Academies has investigated the use of portable 
technologies such as near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) to detect deficiencies in a warfighter's 
neurological processes and utilizing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to suppress or 
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enhance individual brain processes (594). Similarly, mental integrity rights should be included 
among the rights of war prisoners to prevent the use of invasive brain-washing interventions.  
Brain stimulation is an additional domain where the right to mental integrity may play a role. 
With the growing number of portable neurostimulators available on the market or assembled do-
it-yourself devices, the risk that people may misuse these devices with consequent negative 
impact on their neural functioning should be avoided. For example, while consumer-grade 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) are designed to safely function in a certain 
frequency band, little safeguards prevent users or third persons from manipulating the device’s 
frequency.  
The medical domain is not exempt from the possible application of the right to mental 
integrity. Invasive neurotechnology interventions such as deep-brain stimulation (DBS) involve 
the alteration of the patient’s neural processing by electrode-delivered electrical impulses. While 
this procedure provides therapeutic benefits for otherwise treatment-resistant neurological 
patients, there is also the potential for neuropsychiatric adverse-effects including apathy, 
compulsive behavior and hallucinations (595). In addition, being a surgical procedure, there is a 
risk of infection, bleeding and rejection of the implanted neurostimulator. Therefore, although in 
such medical procedure informed consent is always obtained based on minimal medical ethics 
requirement, still there is a risk that the alteration of neural computation enabled by DBS may 
cause a disproportionate harm as compared to the therapeutic benefit. This high potential for 
adverse effects is the reason why, although having proved some effectiveness in the treatment of 
conditions such as obesity and anorexia nervosa, DBS is still not approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment of those conditions. In this context, mental 
integrity rights stand to prevent from harm, absolutely conceived, but to prevent to a 
disproportionate relative harm compared to the potential therapeutic benefit.   
Finally, the growing field of memory engineering will likely represent a paramount 
challenge to the right to mental integrity. Several techniques have been developed to engineer 
(e.g. boost or selectively erase) memories from a person’s mind. For example, Nabavi and 
colleagues used an optogenetics technique to erase and subsequently restore selected memories 
by applying a stimulus via optical laser that selectively strengthens or weakens synaptic 
connections (596). While they have not reached yet the level of human experimentation, these 
findings may hold big potential for the treatment of such diseases as Alzheimer's and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). At the same time, however, the misuse of these techniques by 
malevolent actors may generate unprecedented opportunities for mental manipulation and brain-
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washing. For example, criminally motivated actors could selectively erase memories from their 
victims’ brains to prevent being identified by them later on or simply to cause them harm. On 
the long term-scenario, they could be used by surveillance and security agencies with the 
purpose of selectively erasing dangerous, inconvenient from people’s brain as portrayed in the 
movie Men in Black with the so-called neuralyzer. The potential motives of illicit memory 
alteration are various, including increasing national security or exerting control over individuals 
or groups.  
Like the right to mental privacy, also the right to mental integrity may not be absolute. For 
example, it might be argued on utilitarian grounds that controlled and temporary violations of 
the right to mental integrity should be allowed as a form of moral enhancement for persistent 
violent offenders. For example, Savulescu and Persson (2008) have argued that if safe and 
effective biomedical moral enhancements were developed then they should be compulsory 
(597). Similarly, Ellegaard and Kragh have argued that it is not only morally permissible, but 
morally required to force persistent violent offenders to undergo morally enhancing treatments 
provided the demonstrated effectiveness of such interventions (598). These possible exceptions 
to the right to mental integrity would obviously require broad societal discussion to determine 
whether –and when– such compulsory manipulations of the deepest dimension of the self could 
be justified for the greater benefit of society.  
While taking a position in the long-standing debate over moral enhancement is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to consider that the postulation of the rights to mental privacy 
and mental integrity does not ipso facto implies the absolute character of these new rights.  
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The right to psychological continuity 
In addition to mental privacy and mental integrity, also people’s perception of their own identity 
may be put at risk by inadequate uses of emerging neurotechnology. As we have seen in the first 
section, neural devices can be used not exclusively for monitoring brain signals but also for 
stimulating or modulating brain function. For example, transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) devices apply constant, low current delivered to the brain area of interest via electrodes 
on the scalp with the purpose of modulating brain function. Since it causes neuron’s resting 
membrane potential to depolarize or hyperpolarize, this stimulation causes alterations in brain 
function that are potentially beneficial for patients. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
and deep brain stimulation (DBS) open the possibility of intervening into brain function even 
more substantially. Given the increasing therapeutic effectiveness of tDCS, TMS and DBS, and 
the rapid advancement of the technology, brain stimulation devices are likely to expand to wider 
psychiatric groups and, in the case of the first two ones, also to the general population. 
However, changes in brain function caused by brain stimulation may also cause unintended 
alterations in mental states critical to personality, and can thereby affect an individual’s personal 
identity (599). In particular, it has been observed that brain stimulation may have an impact on 
the psychological continuity of the person, i.e. the crucial requirement of personal identity 
consisting in experiencing oneself as persisting through time as the same person (600). Several 
cases have been reported in the scientific literature in which DBS has led to behavioral changes 
such as increased impulsivity and aggressiveness (601, 602) or changes in sexual behavior 
(603). A study involving patients treated with DBS showed that more than half of them 
articulated a feeling of strangeness and unfamiliarity with themselves after surgery (“I do not 
feel like myself anymore”; “I feel like a robot” or “I have not found myself again after the 
surgery”) (604). More recent studies have evidenced personality changes in the direction of 
increased impulsivity  (605, 606). In parallel, memory engineering technologies may impact a 
person’s identity by selectively removing, altering, adding or replacing individual memories that 
are relevant to their self-recognition as persons.   
Surely it is an empirical question to determine the frequency and magnitude of these psycho-
behavioral changes and it is a question for criminal and tort law to assess the impact of these 
changes on liability and responsibility. But the question we are interested in here is whether 
such personality changes induced by neurostimulation or memory manipulating technology 
could constitute in some circumstances a violation of a basic human right. This might 
theoretically be the case, for instance, if the patient is legally incompetent (for instance, a child) 
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and the personality change turns out to be psychologically disturbing for him or her. In such 
circumstances, if the patient’s legal representatives refuse to consent to the removal of the 
device on the grounds that it has reduced the neurological disorder symptoms, they could be 
regarded as acting against the individual’s right to psychological continuity.   
However, threats to this right are more likely to happen outside clinical settings. For 
instance, in the context of intelligence and military agencies, it has been reported that over the 
last decades violations of human rights might have taken place in experiments involving brain 
electrodes, LSD, hypnosis, the creation of Manchurian candidates71, and the implantation of 
false memories and creation of amnesia. Many of these experiments were conducted on 
unwitting civilians and in the absence of any external review, or representation for the 
experimental subjects, or any meaningful follow-up (607). The new knowledge and 
technologies in the field of neuroscience clearly offer new and more efficient possibilities for 
carrying out unconsented personality changes. For example, Pycroft et al. (2016) recently 
reported the concern that brain implants like DBS are vulnerable to attack by third parties who 
want to exert malicious control over the users’ brain activity. They called this risk of 
modification of a person’s brain activity through unauthorized use of neurodevices by third 
parties ‘brainjacking’ (608). Negative consequences of brainjacking include (i) information 
theft, which would result in a violation of the right to mental privacy; (ii) cessation of 
stimulation, draining implant batteries, inducing tissue damage, and impairment of motor 
function, which would result in violations of the right to mental integrity. However, some 
possible consequences of brainjacking such as alteration of impulse control, modification of 
emotions or affect, induction of pain, and modulation of the reward system could be achieved 
even in absence of any violation of mental privacy and integrity. In those circumstances of 
unauthorized modification of the cognitive-emotional-affective dimension a different type of 
human right violation seems to be at stake: the violation of the right to psychological continuity.  
In short, the right to psychological continuity ultimately tends to preserve personal identity 
and the coherence of the individual’s behavior from unconsented modification by third parties. 
It protects the continuity across a person’s habitual thoughts, preferences, and choices by 
protecting the underlying neural functioning. As Paul Tiedemann points out, we understand 
ourselves as personal unities and as subjects and source of attitudes as long as these attitudes 
 
71 The expression “Manchurian candidate” refers to “a person who is (or is believed to be) brainwashed 
into becoming a subversive agent, especially an assassin” (Oxford Dictionary). The expression was 
popularized by the 1962 film The Manchurian Candidate, adapted from the 1959 novel of the same name 
by Richard Condon.   
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have a minimum level of coherence. This is why a serious lack of coherence makes it 
impossible to understand oneself (609). 
The right to psychological continuity can be seen as a special neuro-focused instance of the 
right to identity. The right to identity was developed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) from the right to private life included in Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights."72 As we have seen in the first section, Article 8 protects against unwanted 
intrusion and provides for the respect of an individual's private space. However, privacy and 
personal identity should be distinguished. What the right to psychological continuity aims to 
prevent is not the unrestricted access to brain information but the induced alteration of neural 
functioning.  
The UDHR also addresses the right to have and develop a personality. Article 22 states: 
"Everyone is entitled to the realization of the rights needed for one’s dignity and the free 
development of their personality." In addition, Article 29 states: "[e]veryone has duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible." 
According to Mănuc (2012), personality rights can be defined as those expressing the 
quintessence of the human person, and are intrinsic to being human (610). In here analysis, these 
rights recognize the "spirit" within an individual and have developed from the issues of privacy. 
It is questionable, however, if current personality rights are well-equipped to address the 
problem of stimulation-induced alterations in one’s personality.  
However, it is questionable whether current personality rights can fully account for the 
threats posed to psychological continuity. In fact, while this family of rights protects the 
translation of mental states into action, psychological continuity guarantees protection at an 
antecedent level: at the level of raw neural functioning. In the risk scenario presented above, 
misused brain stimulation does not impact the link between mental processes and action, i.e. the 
expression of mental states, but the mental processes themselves. To provide this more intimate 
level of protection, there is a need for a new right that preserves the continuity of a person’s 
mental life from external abusive alteration or disruption. 
The right to psychological continuity is closely related to the right to mental integrity, 
and may factually overlap with it. Both rights stand to protect people from abusive and 
unconsented alterations of their mental dimension. However, they differ to the extent that the 
right to psychological continuity also applies to emerging scenarios that do not directly involve 
 
72 Goodwin v the UK (2002) 35 ECHR 18 at 90. 
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neural or mental harm. In contrast, as we have seen in the previous section, the presence of harm 
is a necessary condition for an action to qualify as an offence to a person’s mental integrity.  
To appreciate this difference, it is important to consider that psychological continuity 
could be threatened not only by misused brain stimulation but also by less invasive, even 
unperceivable interventions. A good example is unconscious neural advertising via 
neuromarketing. As we have seen in the first section, neuromarketing companies are testing 
subliminal techniques such as embedding subliminal stimuli with the purpose of eliciting 
responses (e.g. preferring item A instead of B) that people cannot consciously register. This has 
raised criticism among consumer advocate organizations, such as the Center for Digital 
Democracy, which have warned against neuromarketing’s potentially invasive technology. Jeff 
Chester, the executive director of the organization, has claimed that “though there has not 
historically been regulation on adult advertising due to adults having defense mechanisms to 
discern what is true and untrue”, it should now be regulated “if the advertising is now purposely 
designed to bypass those rational defenses” (611). We argue that a right to psychological 
continuity can provide the conceptual basis be a viable solution to overcome the problems 
addressed by Chester.  
Potential threats that could be prevented by the right to psychological continuity also include 
new forms of brain-washing. Hoolbrook et al. (2016) used transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to neuromodulate the brain regions responsible for social prejudice and political and 
religious beliefs (612). Their results show that by temporarily turning off the posterior medial 
frontal cortex via TMS it was possible to make participants more positive towards criticisms to 
their country, than the participants whose brains were unaffected. Using the same technique, 
they could enhance the participants’ belief in afterlife. While their experiment was designed to 
mapping the precise neural mechanisms of high-level attitudes and beliefs, their results show 
that the same technique could be used to trigger a wide spectrum of alterations of a person’s 
attitudes and beliefs. Malicious agents, for example, could use neuromodulation to exert 
malevolent forms of mind control. These potentially include religious leaders and coordinators 
of religiously inspired terrorist groups who want to achieve effective indoctrination and 
recruitment of youngsters, as well as leaders of authoritarian regimes who want to enforce 
political compliance and prevent rebellion. More mildly, marketing companies could use these 
techniques to modulate customers’ preferences and attitudes towards their products.  
 Just like the previous two rights we advocate for, it is a matter of discussion whether the 
right to psychological continuity should be considered absolute or relative. It could be argued 
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that some neurotechnologically-induced personality changes could be tolerated with regard to 
persistent violent offenders (for instance, serial rapists, killers and pedophiles). The need to 
protect the public from potentially dangerous individuals who are very likely to reoffend if 
released would justify such measures. This would even be a good alternative for those 
individuals themselves, who could avoid in this way spend their whole lives in prison. However, 
extreme caution and broad public discussion is imperative before authorizing such intentional 
intrusions into people’s personality.  
  
Conclusions 
The volume and variety of neurotechnology applications is rapidly increasing inside and outside 
the clinical and research setting. The ubiquitous distribution of cheaper, scalable and easy-to-use 
neuroapplications has the potential of opening unprecedented opportunities at the brain-machine 
interface and making neurotechnology intricately embedded in our everyday life. While this 
technological trend may generate immense advantage for society at large in terms of clinical 
benefit, prevention, self-quantification, bias-reduction, personalized technology use, marketing 
analysis, military dominance, national security and even judicial accuracy, yet its implications 
for ethics and the law remain largely unexplored. We argue that in the light of the disruptive 
change that neurotechnology is determining in the digital ecosystem, the normative terrain 
should be urgently prepared to prevent misuse or unintended negative consequences. In 
addition, given the fundamental character of the neurocognitive dimension, we argue that such 
normative response should not exclusively focus on tort law but also on foundational issues at 
the level of human right law.  
In this context, we have suggested that emerging trends in neurotechnology are eliciting 
coordinate amendments to the current human right framework which will require either a 
reconceptualization of existing human rights or even the creation of new neuro-specific rights. 
In particular, we have argued that emerging collateral risks associated with the widespread use 
of pervasive neurotechnology such as malicious brain-hacking as well as hazardous uses of 
medical neurotechnology may require a reconceptualization of the right to mental integrity.  In 
fact, although mental integrity is protected by the EU's Charter of fundamental rights (Article 3), 
this right is conceptualized as a right to accessing and protecting mental health and is 
complementary to the right physical integrity. We suggest that in response to emerging 
neurotechnology possibilities, the right to mental integrity should not exclusively guarantee 
protection from mental illness or traumatic injury but also from unauthorized intrusions into a 
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person’s mental wellbeing performed through the use of neurotechnology, especially if such 
intrusions result in physical or mental harm to the neurotechnology user.  
 In addition to such reconceptualization, we have argued that the creation of neuro-
specific may be required as a coping strategy against possible misuses of neurotechnology as 
well as a form of protection of fundamental liberties associated with individual decision-making 
in the context of neurotechnology use. With this respect, we have endorsed the recognition of a 
negative right to cognitive liberty as a right for the protection of individuals from the coercive 
and unconsented use of such technologies. In addition, as a complementary solution, we have 
proposed the recognition of two additional neuro-specific rights: the right to mental privacy and 
the right to psychological continuity. The right to mental privacy is a neuro-specific privacy 
right which protects private or sensitive information in a person’s mind from unauthorized 
collection, storage, use, or even deletion – in digital form or otherwise. In contrast to existing 
privacy rights, the right to mental privacy stands to protect information prior to any extra-cranial 
externalization (e.g. in verbal or printed format) as well as the generator of such information (a 
person’s neural processing). As such, it protects a person’s mental dimension as the ultimate 
domain of information privacy in the digital ecosystem. In coordination with that, the right to 
psychological continuity will protect the mental substrates of personal identity from 
unconscious and unconsented alteration by third parties through the use of invasive or non-
invasive neurotechnology.  
 All these proposed neuro-focused rights are mutually linked and stand in an intimate 
family relationship. Being the substrate of all other freedoms, cognitive liberty in its positive 
sense is a prerequisite of all other neuro-focused rights. As such, it is to mental privacy, mental 
integrity and psychological continuity in a very similar relation as freedom of thought is to 
privacy, integrity and identity rights. However, in its negative sense of protection from coercive 
use, cognitive liberty can only partly account for unintended uses of emerging neurotechnology. 
In fact, illicit intrusions into a person’s mental privacy may not necessarily involve coercion, as 
they could be performed under the threshold of a persons’ conscious experience. The same goes 
for actions involving harm to a person’s mental life or unauthorized modifications of a person’s 
psychological continuity. Given the ability of emerging neurotechnologies to intervene into a 
person’s neural processing also in absence of the person’s awareness,  
 This proposal of neuro-specific human rights in response to emerging advancements in 
neurotechnology is consistent with and a logical continuation of the proposal of developing 
 329 
 
genetic-specific human rights in response to advancements in genetics and genomics as set out 
by the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (IDHGD).  
 Extensive future debate is required to test the normative solidity of this proposed 
expansion of the human right framework to the neurotechnology dimension. In parallel, future 
research is required to investigate the implications of such proposed human rights on other 
levels of law such as international humanitarian law, criminal law, tort law, property law and 
consumer law. Ideally, this debate should benefit from the active and cross-disciplinary 
participation of legal experts, neuroscientists, technology developers, neuroethicists and 
regulation bodies.  
 
Competing interests: None of the authors have any competing interests in the manuscript.  
Authors' Contribution: MI and RA jointly developed the conceptual structure, logical 
articulation and equally contributed to the draft of the manuscript. Each author revised the 
manuscript critically for important intellectual content. All authors read and approved the final 
manuscript. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 330 
 
2.14 –Preserving the Right to Cognitive Liberty*  
 
*A version of this article was published in Scientific American73 
Full Reference: Ienca, Marcello, “The Right to Cognitive Liberty”, Scientific American, Volume 
317, Issue 2, p. 10 (2017). doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0817-10   
 
In a masque written by John Milton in 1634 a young woman is bounded to an enchanted chair 
by a debauched named Comus. Despite being restrained against her will, she claims: “Thou 
canst not touch the freedom of my mind”, confident of her capacity to protect her mental 
freedom from any external manipulation. This idea of the human mind as the ultimate domain of 
absolute protection from external intrusion has persisted for centuries. Still in 1913, historian 
John Bagnell Bury wrote: “A man can never be hindered from thinking whatever he chooses so 
long as he conceals”. Today, this presumption might no longer hold. Cutting-edge neurodevices, 
such as sophisticated neuroimaging and brain-computer interfaces (BCI), enable to record, 
decode and modulate the neural correlates of mental processes. Research shows that the 
combination of neuroimaging technology and artificial intelligence allows to “read” correlates 
of mental states including hidden intentions, visual experiences or even dreams with an 
increasing degree of accuracy and resolution.  
While these advances have a great potential for research and medicine, they pose a 
fundamental ethical, legal and social challenge: determining whether, or under what conditions, 
it is legitimate to gain access to, or to interfere with another person’s neural activity.  
This question has particular social relevance since many neurotechnologies have moved 
away from a solely clinical setting and into the commercial domain, where they are no longer 
subject to the strict ethical guidelines of clinical research. Today, companies like Google and 
Verizon use neuroimaging technology and other neuromarketing research services to detect 
consumer preferences and hidden impressions on their advertisements or products.  
Attempts to decode mental information via neuroimaging are also occurring in court 
case, sometimes in a scientifically questionable way. For example, in 2008, an Indian woman 
was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment on the basis of a brain scan 
showing, according to the judge, “experiential knowledge” about the crime. The potential of 
neurotechnology as a forensic tool has raised particular attention in relation to lie detection for 
interrogation purposes. In spite of experts’ skepticism, commercial companies such as No-Lie-
 
73 Current Impact Factor: 1.316 (2016) 
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FMRI and Government Works Inc. are marketing the use of FMRI- and EEG-based technology 
to ascertain truth and falsehood via brain recordings. In parallel, armed forces are testing 
neuromonitoring techniques to detect deficiencies in a warfighter’s brain activity and utilizing 
brain stimulation to increase their alert and attention. 
In 2015, the journal Science released a special issue titled “The End of Privacy”, 
highlighting how new technological trends from big data to ubiquitous Internet connections, 
make “traditional notions of privacy obsolete”. In a sense, neurotechnology can be seen as just 
another technological trend that might erode our privacy in the digital world and there is little 
we can do about it. However, given the intimate link between mental privacy and subjectivity 
we might not be so willing to accept this conclusion. In his famous 1984, George Orwell 
projected a future where “nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your 
skull.” In fact, when mental information is no longer secluded, nothing is secluded, and the very 
notion of subjectivity –the quality of existing in someone's mind rather than the external world- 
becomes empty.  
We are facing a societal challenge: determining what rights individuals are entitled to 
exercise in relation to their mental dimension. This challenge might require the 
reconceptualization of existing human rights and even the creation of new neurospecific human 
rights. 
A right to cognitive liberty, widely discussed among neurolawyers, would entitle 
individuals to make free and competent decisions regarding their use of neurotechnology. A 
right to mental privacy would protect individuals against the unconsented intrusion by third 
parties into their brain data as well as against the unauthorized collection of those data. Breaches 
of privacy at the neural level could be more dangerous than conventional ones because they can 
bypass the level of conscious reasoning, leaving individuals without protections from having 
their mind involuntarily read. This risk does not apply only to participants in predatory 
neuromarketing studies and disproportionate uses of neurotechnology in courts, but to general 
individuals as well. With the growing availability of Internet-connected consumer-grade brain-
computer interfaces, more and more individuals are becoming users of neurodevices.  
In April 2017, Facebook unveiled a plan to create brain-computer speech-to-text 
interface to translate thoughts directly from brain signals to a computer screen, bypassing speech 
and fingertips. Similar attempts are being made by major mobile communication providers, 
Samsung in particular. In the future, brain control could replace the keyboard and speech 
recognition as a primary way to interact with computers.  
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With interconnected neurotools becoming potentially ubiquitous, novel possibility for 
misuse will arise –cybersecurity breaches included. Computer scientists have already 
demonstrated the feasibility of hacking attacks aimed at extracting information from BCI-users 
without authorization. In addition, research shows that connected medical devices are vulnerable 
to sabotage. Neuroscientists at Oxford University suggest that the same vulnerability affects 
brain implants, a phenomenon labeled “brainjacking”. Such possibilities of misuse might urge a 
reconceptualization of the right to mental integrity. This right, recognized by international law 
(Article 3 of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights) as a right to mental health, should not 
only protect from mental illness but also from illicit and harmful manipulations of people’s 
neural activity through the misuse of neurotechnology. Finally, a right to psychological 
continuity might preserve people’s personal identity and the continuity of their mental life from 
unconsented external alteration by third parties. Psychological continuity is an important issue 
in the context of national security, where mandatory personality-changing interventions might 
be justified in light of greater strategic goals. Brain interventions that reduce the need for sleep 
are already in use in the military, and it’s easy to imagine interventions that make soldiers more 
belligerent or fearless. These possibilities have already raised attention among legislators. Back 
in 1999 a European Parliament committee called for a global ban of research “which seeks to 
apply knowledge of the chemical, electrical, (…) or other functioning of the human brain to the 
development of weapons which might enable any form of manipulation of human beings”.  
Calibrated normative approaches should guarantee the alignment of neurotechnology 
development and personal freedoms. At the same time, they should avoid fear-mongering, 
unrealistic narratives that might harm scientific progress. An open debate involving 
neuroscientists, legal experts, ethicists and general citizens is required to maximize the benefits 
of advancing neurotechnology while minimizing unintended risks.  
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Abstract 
Cognitive technology is an umbrella term sometimes used to designate the realm of technologies 
that assist, augment or simulate cognitive processes or that can be used for the achievement of 
cognitive aims. This technological macro-domain encompasses both devices that directly 
interface the human brain as well as external systems that use artificial intelligence to simulate 
or assist (aspects of) human cognition. As they hold the promise of assisting and augmenting 
human cognitive capabilities both individually and collectively, cognitive technologies could 
produce, in the next decades, a significant effect on human cultural evolution. At the same time, 
due to their dual-use potential, they are vulnerable to being coopted by State and non-State 
actors for non-benign purposes (e.g. cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare and mass surveillance) or in 
manners that violate democratic values and principles. Therefore, it is the responsibility of 
technology governance bodies to align the future of cognitive technology with democratic 
principles such as individual freedom, avoidance of centralized, equality of opportunity and 
open development. This paper provides a preliminary description of an approach to the 
democratization of cognitive technologies based on six normative ethical principles: avoidance 
of centralized control, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, user-centeredness and 
convergence. This approach is designed to universalize and evenly distribute the potential 
benefits of cognitive technology and mitigate the risk that such emerging technological trend 
could be coopted by State or non-State actors in ways that are inconsistent with the principles of 
liberal democracy or detrimental to individuals and groups. 
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Cognitive Technology 
Cognitive technology (CT), also referred to as cognition-related technology, is an 
umbrella term used to designate the realm of technologies that assist, enhance or simulate 
cognitive processes or that can be used by humans “for the achievement of cognitive aims” 
(Dascal & Dror 2005).  
The notion of CT was originally coined in the context of educational psychology to 
describe strategies and tools that could facilitate cognitive processes such as learning and 
problem solving (613). With advances in personal computing, the notion of CT has been 
increasingly used to refer to “virtual environments, new computer devices and software tools” 
(614) or other “informational artifacts” (615) that can support or expand human cognition. An 
important step towards the establishment of CT as an area of scientific investigation was the 
creation in the late 1990s of a Cognitive Technology Society (616) and the subsequent 
organization, during the early 2000s, of various CT-focused international conferences where 
experts from various fields of the cognitive sciences gathered to discuss “the impacts these 
technologies will have on human cognitive and social capacities” (614)75.  
In the last decade, in parallel with advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), the label of 
CT has gained momentum in computer science and in the ICT industry to describe information 
technologies capable of performing cognitive tasks traditionally performed by humans (617, 
618), in particular when they are used to “assist and influence humans’ mental activities” (619). 
Among other companies, IBM has put CT at the center of their business transformation in what 
they called the “cognitive era”76.  
CT is a macro-domain encompassing, at least, two major sub-domains:  
a. Neurotechnologies:  Systems or devices that interface human nervous systems to 
assist, enhance or monitor natural cognitive processes. 
b. Artificial Intelligent Systems:  Artificial systems that simulate (aspects of) 
intelligence and exhibit it across a wide range of processes including reasoning, 
planning, learning, natural language processing, perception and the ability to 
move and manipulate objects in the physical space.  
Neurotechnologies include brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), electrical and magnetic 
brain stimulation, neurosensor-based vehicle operator systems, real-time neuromonitoring, 
 
75 In 2001, the Coventry University organized a conference called “Cognitive Technology: Instruments of 
Mind” which marked an important milestone in the study of CT 614. M. Beynon, C. L. Nehaniv, K. 
Dautenhahn, Cognitive Technology: Instruments of Mind: 4th International Conference, CT 2001 Coventry, 
UK, August 6-9, 2001 Proceedings.  (Springer, 2003), vol. 2117..  
76 See IBM’s best practices for cognitive technology: https://www.ibm.com/watson/advantage-reports/getting-
started-cognitive-technology.html 
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neural prosthetics and others. These technologies are capable of establishing either invasive or 
non-invasive connection pathways between (human) nervous systems and computing devices 
for a variety of purposes. For example, medical applications of BCI technology have shown 
clinical effectiveness in monitoring, repairing, assisting or  augmenting  cognitive or sensory-
motor functions in patients experiencing cognitive or sensory-motor impairments including 
spinal cord injury (620), stroke (621), motor neuron disease such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(ALS) and muscular dystrophy (622, 623), and, more recently, age-related cognitive decline 
(624), and dementia (182). In parallel, direct-to-consumer applications of electroncephalogrphy-
based neuromonitoring are gaining increasing commercial interest as tools for self-monitoring, 
self-quantification as well as tools for physical and mental training.  
Artificial intelligent systems include virtual personal assistants, question answering 
computer systems (such as IBM Watson), intelligent robots, self-repairing hardware and others. 
These systems mimic (components of) functions that humans usually associate with cognitive 
agents such as flexibility, automatic self-improvement through experience (as in the case of 
machine learning algorithms), perception of the external environment (e.g. speech recognition, 
facial recognition, object recognition etc.), motion and manipulation (e.g. mapping, motion 
planning, path planning and localization) and knowledge representation.  
Both neurotechnologies and artificial intelligent systems fall into the category of CT 
when they are utilized with the purpose of influencing, assisting, or augmenting human 
cognitive capacities. However, these two subdomains tend to differ with regard to how such an 
influence on cognition is realized. In most cases, neurotechnologies mostly affect cognition by 
intervening on “internal information processing systems”, i.e. by mapping or electrically 
modifying its underlying neurobiology. In contrast, artificial intelligent systems mostly 
intervene at the level of “external processing systems” (379), that is they emulate (aspects of) 
human intelligence and provide external cognitive resources to support human cognition without 
any direct interface with the nervous system, a phenomenon known as environmental 
enrichment (388). Since the external processes enabled by artificial intelligent systems are, 
under some circumstances, functionally similar ─according to some researchers, even 
equivalent─ to internal processing, authors have argued that these technologies might be 
considered, under such circumstances, extensions of the human mind (125, 625, 626). For 
example, Clark (p.4) has argued that CTs “do far more than merely allow for the external 
storage and transmission of ideas” and rather “constitute […] a cascade of mindware upgrades: 
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cognitive upheavals in which the effective architecture of the human mind is altered and 
transformed” (627). 
In recent years, these two domains have experienced a strong convergence. In fact, AI 
features have been increasingly embedded in most advanced neurotechnologies. For example, 
most current BCIs use components of artificial intelligence, especially classifiers based on 
machine learning (ML) algorithms, to extract, classify and decode brain signals (56). At the 
same time, several artificial intelligent systems are provided with the capacity of being 
controlled via direct brain-machines interfaces or are designed to mimic the functioning of the 
human brain. These include smartphones and wearables (553), semi-autonomous cars (628), 
unmanned aerial vehicles (629), and assistive robots (630). This convergence is also occurring 
at market level with the increasing involvement in the neurotechnology sector of major players 
in artificial intelligence. For example, IBM, a major producer of artificial intelligent systems and 
developer of the famous intelligent digital assistant Watson, has entered the neurotechnology 
market and is among the top-15 patent holders in pervasive neurotechnology (474). This market 
integration has even led to the creation of entire new research and business ventures precisely 
designed with the mission of accelerating the convergence of neurotechnology and artificial 
intelligent systems. An example of this trend is a newly launched venture called Neuralink. 
During the Code Conference 2016, entrepreneur Elon Musk announced a plan to accelerate the 
convergence between neurotechnology and artificial intelligence systems, followed by great 
media coverage. Although Musk himself remained cryptic about this project, he initially dubbed 
it “neural-lace” to emphasize the element of entwining brains and artificial systems together. In 
March 2017, Musk unveiled his project and launched Neuralink, a company whose stated 
mission is to “merge the human brain with AI” (631).  
It is worth to point out that CT is a functional characterization; hence it is not based on 
the type of hardware or software but on the type of function that a certain technology executes, 
namely assisting, supporting or expanding human cognitive capacities. Therefore, CT is creating 
an increasing need for addressing the ethical and social implications of CTs regardless of their 
hardware/software realization, but based on how these technologies influence human cognition.  
This consideration has generated more interaction and dialogue among two main 
research communities: the Neuroethics community ─primarily concerned with the ethics of 
neurotechnology (103, 159, 632)─ and the Computer Ethics community ─primarily concerned 
with the ethics of computer systems and AI (633). The more technologies interface, assist and, 
possibly, expand human cognition, there higher the need for comprehensive conceptual and 
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normative approaches that study (the ethics of) cognition across the entire bio-digital 
continuum. Some early signs of convergence at the level of ethical and social assessment are 
already observable. For example, the 2016 Annual Meeting of the International Neuroethics 
Society in San Diego featured a public event on future and emerging technologies where a panel 
of experts discussed the ethical and social implications of both neurotechnologies and artificial 
intelligent systems such as care robots and intelligent digital assistants (634). Similarly, the 
2017 IEEE TechEthics Conference in Washington D.C. (https://techethics.ieee.org/events/dc-
2017) featured one keynote talk and one panel on neurotechnology. 
In light of the increasing convergence between these two main sub-domains, this paper 
will address the ethics and governance of cognitive technologies in a unitary manner.  
 
Ethics, Security and the Dual-Use Dilemma 
  
Some implications of cognitive technology have sparked ethical controversy. These include 
issues of cognitive enhancement and augmentation (406, 635, 636), superhuman intelligence 
(637), agency and identity (636, 638), human-machine hybridization (639), algorithmic bias 
(636, 640) and others. More recently, the application of CTs for purposes such as military 
dominance, surveillance, and cybercriminality has also associated CT to the ethical problem of 
dual-use (140, 641).  
Dual-use technologies are artefacts that can be coopted “for making things quite 
unrelated to their primary purposes” (642), in particular when these secondary purposes 
involve activities that are ethically questionable or potentially detrimental to individuals and 
groups such as military operations, terrorism, general criminality etc. In ethical terms, dual-
use potentials inherent in technological artefacts are often presented as ethical conflicts 
between opposing ethical duties (643); for example, between the promotion of good through 
free technological development versus the prevention of possible collateral harm resulting 
from the cooptation of such technological potential for new purposes. A common example is 
the conflict between health promotion through effective clinical applications of a civil 
technology X vs. the provision of resources for the harming of innocents through military 
operations involving X.  
Information technologies have instantiated a dual-use potential since their very first 
applications (644). During the Second World War, Alan Turing’s early work on computability 
was coopted for military purposes, especially for the cryptanalysis of Morse-coded radio 
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communications of the Axis powers enciphered using Enigma machines (645). The first 
contracts for packet network systems, including the development of the ARPANET, were 
awarded by the US Department of Defense as early as the 1960s and the first rogue program 
to spread through a network was created as early as in 197177. Today, several subcomponents 
of the digital revolution –sometimes referred to as the “4th revolution” (647), including 
networks, mobile communications technologies and robotics, demonstrably raise dual-use 
concerns.    
Reports show that cyber-attacks have been growing in frequency and size in recent 
years. According to the Europol’s 2016 Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA), 
cybercrime offences “remain on an upward trend and have reached very high levels” (648). In 
October 2016, a massive cyber-attack targeted one of the central nodes of Internet traffic in the 
US, striking Twitter, Paypal, Spotify and sites of an infrastructure company in New Hampshire. 
Such increase in volume, scope and material cost of cybercrime has dramatically affected public 
perceptions on information security. Survey data of the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk 
Report 2016, show that cyber-attacks are perceived among the top five risks globally (649). 
Increasingly, cyber-attacks have become a critical problem not only for private businesses, but 
also for public entities such as democratic governments (650), healthcare institutions (651), and 
national security organizations (652). Cyberterrorist acts have increased in number, magnitude 
and variety causing destruction and harm to personal computers, networks and the public 
Internet −including large-scale disruption of government systems, hospital records, and national 
security programs− for personal or ideological objectives (653). When occurring between State 
actors, cyberoffences have shown the potential to influence geopolitical scenarios and strategic 
equilibria (654, 655). A widely media-covered example is the role of cyber-attacks during the 
2016 US presidential election culminated in the unprecedented hacking of a presidential 
candidate’s email server and the following diplomatic crisis between the US and Russia (656). 
Concurrently, cyberwarfare concerns have emerged as a consequence of using CTs like artificial 
neural networks, gun data computers, secure cryptoprocessors, and robotics for military 
purposes (657, 658). The large-scale deployment of AI has been associated by experts with an 
increased risk to trigger a cyber arms race, which could ultimately escalate into conventional 
warfare (641). As Taddeo has observed, these emerging trends in cybercrime, cyberterrorism, 
 
77 The program was called the Creeper and spread through the early Bulletin Board 
networks 646. D. Ferbrache, in A Pathology of Computer Viruses. (Springer, 1992), pp. 5-30..   
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and cyberwarfare “remark on the extent to which our societies depend on ICTs” and show how 
information technology has changed “the very infrastructure on which our societies rely” (659). 
Following a socio-technological trend known as the Internet of Things (IoT), a large number of 
physical devices are becoming increasingly embedded with computing technology for a variety 
of purposes. Internetworked technologies embedded with electronics, software, sensors, 
actuators, and network connectivity are being tested or preliminary deployed by armed forces 
and governmental agencies (660).  
One common feature of these diverse cybercrime and cyberwarfare trends is that they 
often involve the use of computing systems with the deliberate purpose or unintended 
consequence of eroding basic democratic principles like individual freedoms, civil liberties, rule 
of law and democratic elections. This has raised the question of whether democratic principles 
and values will survive the digital era (661).  
This technology-mediated erosion of democratic principles is not exclusively caused by 
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare. Global surveillance programs reportedly run by national 
security agencies and other governmental actors are also fueling controversies over the violation 
of civil liberties and other democratic principles. Government agencies in various countries have 
proven able to deploy technology infrastructures for mass surveillance, enabling the collection 
of digital detritus — e-mails, calls, text messages, cellphone location data and a catalog of 
computer viruses, from individual citizens and groups. The government of China, for example, 
has reportedly installed over 20 million surveillance cameras across the country over the last 
few years and merged state surveillance with big data analytics to curb social unrest (662). In 
2014, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology ordered a major mobile 
telephone company, to put a real name registration scheme into effect and to "regulate the 
dissemination of objectionable information over the network" (663). In Russia, the Federal 
Security Service is legally allowed to use a system for Internet-based search and surveillance 
called SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities). Since 2000, FSB is no longer 
required to provide telecommunications and Internet companies documentation on targets of 
interest prior to accessing information and in 2014 SORM-usage was extended to monitoring of 
social networks, chats and online forums (664). In response to these attempts of invasive 
governmental control, unauthorized disclosures of national security documents –as in the 
famous case of Edward J. Snowden vs the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA)- 
have been advocated by some authors as a proportionate response to preserve personal privacy 
and set the limits of invasive State-based surveillance (665).  
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This paper will argue that cognitive technologies can further “jeopardize democracy” 
(666) if they are not adequately aligned with fundamental democratic values and principles. I 
will proceed as follows. First, I will review dual-use issues associated with CT. Second, I will 
argue that the preferable approach to the governance of CT in light of dual-use risk is neither 
strict regulation nor lassaiz-faire but rather proactive democratization. In particular, I will argue 
that the potential held by CT for influencing human cognition urges the development of 
inclusive strategies that can direct cognitive technology for the benefit of people and the whole 
democratic society, not just restricted groups. Based on these considerations, I will outline six 
possible steps towards the proactive democratization of cognitive technology in the upcoming 
decade.  
 
Dual-Use Cognitive Technology 
 
Cognitive technologies hold a promising potential for improving the life of human 
beings through a wide spectrum of non-hostile civil applications. For example, intelligent 
cognitive assistants are opening new possibilities for supporting people suffering from cognitive 
deficits such as older people and people with dementia (210, 667). Similarly, BCIs are 
becoming increasingly effective in enabling novel opportunities for communication in patients 
suffering from stroke, spinal cord injury or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) (620, 621, 623).  
 At the same time, however, these technologies have recently shown some malleability to 
dual-use, especially in the context of military applications. In recent years, several global 
players including USA, EU, Russia, Iran, India, China and Japan have been actively working on 
military applications of neurotechnology, especially BCI (668). Tennison and Moreno (2012) 
have comprehensively reviewed the spectrum of neurotechnologies with applications in military 
and national security contexts with special focus on projects funded via the United States’ 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Their review identified three main 
categories of dual-use neurotechnology: brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), neurotechnologies 
for warfighter enhancement, and neurotechnological systems for deception detection and 
interrogation (428). In a similar fashion, Miranda et al. have assessed DARPA-funded BCI-
applications for military purposes. Their review identifies two major avenues of ongoing 
research: (1) restoring neural and/or behavioral function in warfighters, and (2) enhancing 
training and performance in warfighters and intelligence agents (429). For example, the 
Neurotechnology for Intelligence Analysts (NIA) program was designed to develop BCI systems 
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utilizing non-invasively recorded EEG signals to significantly increase the efficiency and 
throughput of imagery analysis (429). Using the same technological paradigm, national security 
uses of BCI include the acquisition of neural information gathered from warfighters’ brains to 
modify their equipment accordingly and the development of a Cognitive Technology Threat 
Warning System (CT2WS) that convert subconscious, neurological responses to danger into 
consciously available information (669). 
Current military applications of artificial intelligent systems mostly focus on non-
cognitive applications such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs - commonly known as a 
drones), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) such as the MIDARS, a four-wheeled robot that 
automatically performs random or preprogrammed patrols, and other autonomous or semi-
autonomous robots such as Atlas, a bipedal humanoid robot designed for search and rescue 
tasks. In the near future, however, artificial intelligent systems will likely be used to augment 
physical and cognitive capacities of combatants. For example, by the end of 2017 the US 
Department of Defense is announced to launch the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (Talos), 
a military hardware that encloses soldiers within a computerized exoskeleton (670). In parallel, 
augmented reality (AR) systems are being tested with the purpose of enhancing attention, 
learning (671) and situational awareness (672). Particular ethical concern was raised by a special 
type of robotic applications, the so-called lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs). Unlike vehicles 
that are remote-controlled by a pilot or designed for non-combatting tasks such as 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and sniper detection, LAWs are designed to replace an important 
component of human cognition, namely decision-making.  
Besides State-funded military applications, cognitive technologies have proven to hold 
dual-use potentials also in relation to non-State cyberterrorism and general cybercrime.  Pycroft 
et al (2016) have illustrated the possibility of targeting attacks against users of invasive 
neuromodulation technologies –especially deep brain stimulation (DBS), where the attackers 
may take control of the user’s motor function, emotional dimension or simply disrupts the 
device’s functionality (608). In experimental settings, Martinovic et al. (2012) have 
demonstrated the actual feasibility of performing side-channel attacks against users of currently 
marketed BCIs to reveal private and sensitive information about the users such as their pin-
codes, bank membership, months of birth, debit card numbers, home location and faces of 
known persons (441). Hacking attacks have been proven feasible also against artificial 
intelligent systems, especially autonomous cars. The findings presented to the 2011 National 
Academies Committee on Electronic Vehicle Controls and Unintended Acceleration 
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demonstrated the possibility of taking control of a car’s computer system without direct physical 
access exploiting the car’s Bluetooth connection (673).   
Finally, several cognitive technologies can be used as powerful surveillance tools for 
national security, judicial and military purposes due to their dual-use character. While no 
deception detection technology is being currently used in official security operations, several 
devices currently in-development either are directly DARPA-commissioned (674, 675) or 
market their services to national security agencies including the Department of Homeland 
Security such as the No Lie MRI device (676). This evidence shows that CTs can be potentially 
coopted for a number of purposes that involve the possible diminishment or even violation of 
democratic principles and values.  
In this scenario, it is important for the future of democratic societies to anticipate 
possible challenges associated with the governance of cognitive technology and prevent that 
these systems can be coopted by malevolent governmental or non-governmental actors for anti-
democratic aims including the triggering of a cyber arms race, the limitation of individual 
liberties, disproportionate mass-surveillance, the exacerbation of intra- and intergroup 
differences in social dominance, or direct harm to individuals and groups. This risk is believed 
to be particularly cogent in light of the ongoing “shrinking” of Western democracy as a 
consequence of the recent rise of nationalism and authoritarian populism (677, 678). In such a 
rapidly changing global scenario, it is vital for democratic societies to prevent that cognitive 
technologies can be used to accelerate the crisis of democracy or to empower actors pursuing 
anti-democratic goals. In contrast, coordinated and proactive approaches are required to make 
sure that future developments of CT will be compatible with the principles of liberal democracy 
or even expand those principles through the human-centered permeation of such technologies in 
human societies. This paper proposes a preliminary characterization of the basic principles and 
safeguards to democratize cognitive technology in the upcoming decades.  
 
Democratizing Cognitive Technology  
  
Given their high dual-use potential, cognitive technologies have raised ethical concerns and 
elicited several proposals for policy response. Back in 2006, delegates of a workshop organized 
at Arizona State University addressed the issue of sociocultural risk in relation to cognitive 
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technology78. Their analysis identified in cognition-related technology a “capacity for 
sociocultural change” due to its potential to change human intelligence and performance 
capabilities, and anticipated that such potential could have destabilizing effects on individuals 
and groups (679). In the resulting white paper, experts delineated an entire spectrum of possible 
approaches to the governance and regulation of cognitive technologies that could prevent misuse 
and unintended risks. The two extremes of this spectrum were represented by the following 
options:  
a. Lassaiz-faire approaches – which emphasize the individual freedom of 
technology producers and end-users as well as the alleged capacity of financial 
markets to filter out potentially detrimental applications 
b.  Strict regulatory approaches – which emphasize the need for State-led 
regulatory interventions (often based on essentialist views on human cognition 
according to which the natural cognitive boundaries should not be trespassed 
through technology) 
 
Lassaiz-faire approaches are being often advocated by producers of commercial 
neurotechnologies with the purpose of reducing FDA oversight on novel commercial products, 
especially limiting the applicability of FDA regulations on mobile medical applications to 
neurodevices for mental wellbeing79. In contrast, particularly restrictive approaches were 
recently advocated by critics of dual-use artificial cognitive systems. The most restrictive of 
these approaches is the call for a collective ban or moratorium. While a collective ban is usually 
considered “much to extreme a response” in the context of dual-use neurotechnology (681), it 
has been advocated by a large number of experts in relation to LAW. Through the group 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/) over 1,000 experts in 
artificial intelligence signed an open letter calling for a global ban on LAWs arguing that it 
could trigger an arms race in military artificial intelligence and robotics.  
 
78 The workshop and the resulting white paper adopted the label “technologies for cognitive enhancement” to 
describe a large variety of technological applications holding “capabilities to enhance human cognition” 679.
 D. Sarewitz, T. H. Karas, "17 Policy Implications of Technologies for Cognitive Enhancement," 
Neurotechnology: Premises, potential, and problems  (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, 2012)..  
79 During the 2012 Neurotech Leaders Forum, leaders of the neurotechnology industry and venture capital 
professionals discussed the impact of FDA approval cycles on commercialization of neurotechnology devices 
and investment in neurotechnology startups. They stated that “it was very difficult for them to invest in 
devices that require a premarket approval path through the FDA” due to “FDA tardiness in approving new 
devices”680. J. Cavuoto, in Neurotech Business Report. (2012)..   
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This paper attempts to find a third way between these extreme approaches and argues 
that the best response to dual-use cognitive technology in a free society is a calibrated 
combination of technological freedom and risk-management strategies based on the principles 
of open development, responsible innovation and liberal democracy. I call this approach 
democratization of cognitive technology. In the following, I will describe this approach by 
delineating its core ethical principles and make a case for its implementation as a proactive 
strategy for the governance of CT and its accelerating impacts on human capabilities in a free 
society.  
By democratization of a technological domain, I mean, very generally, a process of 
group decision-making about a certain technology characterized by the possibility of fair access 
to the technology by all participants and a principle of equality among the participants across 
various stages of the collective decision-making process80. Consequently, democratizing 
cognitive technology implies a process of decision making about CT that will guarantee a 
possibility of fair access to CT for all users and a principle of equality among users during 
various stages of decision-making (including design, development and application).  
In its general definition, this democratizing approach has elements of analogy with both 
strict-regulatory and lassaiz-faire approaches. With the strict-regulatory approaches it shares the 
observation that (i) cognitive technology requires urgent ethical assessment and policy 
interventions to minimize the risks associated with its dual-use potential, and (ii) that markets 
alone may not be conceptually and practically equipped to provide such assessment and 
intervention. This observation is based on a threefold factor.  
First, novelty: cognitive technology is a relatively recent field of technological 
development. Consequently, it is still characterized by conceptual muddles and policy vacuums 
(684) that prevent the maximization of benefits of these technologies while minimizing the 
risks. Many of these muddles and vacuums facilitate new opportunities for malicious 
exploitation generated by rapid changes in the technological or social environment, unprepared 
technological infrastructures, defective legal coverage, and the increase in quantity, variety and 
velocity of data flows (133).  
 
80 This definition of democratization is built upon the broad definition of democracy developed 
by T. Christiano. See: 682. T. Christiano, The authority of democracy. Journal of Political 
Philosophy 12, 266-290 (2004); 683. T. Christiano, Social choice and democracy. The 
idea of democracy, 173-195 (1993). 
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Second, magnitude: CTs hold the potential of influencing human cognitive capabilities, 
hence determining a non-negligible effect on human cultural evolution and global equilibria. As 
observed by Moor (2005), neurotechnologies “could be the most revolutionary of all of the 
technologies” (684) given their capacity to reconstruct, manipulate or augment cognitive 
processes, and impact human societies in manners that are currently difficult to predict. In the 
military context, B.E. Moore, lieutenant colonel of the United States Air Force, has predicted 
that BCI technology «has the potential to revolutionize military dominance much the same way 
nuclear weapons have done» (668). Similar predictions have been made also in relation to 
artificial intelligent systems (59). Due to its novelty, this alleged revolutionary potential of CT is 
still largely unexpressed. To date, for example, artificial intelligent systems are still 
distinguishable (from the Turing’s test perspective) from human intelligence across many 
cognitive tasks, while current neurotechnologies enable only a small degree of access to and 
modification of human neural processing. However, on the long term, the dual-use potential of 
CTs could enable unprecedented levels of intrusion into personal privacy or modification of 
personal autonomy (206), concentration of economic power, and possibilities for offending 
individuals and groups (133, 685). As such, CTs could affect the fundamental mediators of 
human social interaction in the information era. Special oversight may be required to guarantee 
that these potentially revolutionary changes occur in accordance with the mechanisms and 
values of democratic societies.  
The third factor is timing: given their historical novelty, cognitive technologies are still 
at an initial stage of market maturity and societal adoption. During this introduction phase, a 
technological trend shows a higher degree of malleability (684). Therefore, control or change is 
less difficult to achieve compared to when the technology has become entrenched. Assumed that 
CT will be a critical component of our future, human societies are now at a historic juncture in 
which they can make proactive decisions on the type of co-existence they want to establish with 
these technologies. Privileging lassaiz-faire approaches at this stage of development would defer 
risk-management interventions to a time when cognitive technology is extensively developed 
and widely used, hence refractory to modification.  
At the same time, the democratizing approach shares with lassaiz-faire approaches the 
observation that over-regulation can (a) obliterate the benefits of cognitive technology for 
society at large, and, if managed by non-democratic or flawed democratic governments, (b) 
produce an undesirable concentration of power and control. In fact, if adequately implemented, 
CTs open the prospects of unparalleled improvement in the quality of life of human societies 
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across a wide range of domains: medical, economic, infrastructural, communicational etc. For 
example, Russel et al. project that, thank to AI, “the eradication of disease and poverty is not 
unfathomable” (637). Therefore, over-regulatory strategies that limit technological freedom and 
open development could constrain technological progress and the resulting benefits for 
individuals and society at large. Second, top-down approaches to regulation could concentrate 
the power generated by CT among restricted political or economic groups, hence exacerbate 
existing political and economic inequalities. This risk has accompanied many breakthroughs in 
the history of technology. For example, during the introduction stage of the computer 
revolution, US authorities debated “whether a central government database for all United States 
citizens should be created” (684). The creation of such government database would have 
produced a very different type of World Wide Web than the current one, with services 
distributed top-down, more concentration of power and control, and increased intrusion into 
individual privacy. The resulting decision not to create the data base contributed to the current 
informational landscape.  
In the next section, I will describe a proactive democratizing approach to cognitive 
technology by delineating its core ethical principles. In addition, I will list, as an ostensive 
description, examples of currently ongoing projects and cooperative efforts that go into the 
direction of democratizing cognitive technology. It is worth noting that this description should 
not be seen as an exhaustive characterization of the ethics of CT or as a complete solution to the 
problems posed by dual-use dilemmas in cognitive technology. Of course, the answer to specific 
ethical dilemmas rising within this technological domain (e.g. trolley dilemmas for artificial 
intelligent agents, the personal autonomy of BCI users or the moral desirability of artificial 
superintelligence) may not necessarily depend on the level of democratic openness of the 
domain itself. Rather, this description is aimed at providing a preliminary conceptual and 
normative clarification of the democratizing approach and opening a public debate on its 
realization.  
 
Paths to Democratization: The Six Principles 
This proposal for democratizing cognitive technology consists of the combination of six 
normative principles:  
I. Avoidance of centralized control 
II. Openness 
III. Transparency 
IV. Inclusiveness 
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V. User-centeredness 
VI. Convergence 
These six principles condense and accentuate recurrent normative stances in the 
literature on the link between computing technology and democracy (661, 686, 687), and set out 
a way forward towards for responsible and democratic development in cognitive technology. 
These principles can be used to guide the discussion on responsible innovation in CT at various 
levels of technology governance including individual researchers, funding agencies, as well as 
national and international regulatory bodies.  
Avoidance of centralized control is the principle according to which it is morally 
preferable to avoid centralized control on CT to prevent risks associated with unrestricted 
accumulation of capital, power, and control over the technology among organized groups such 
as large corporations or governments. This preventive measure is designed to mitigate two 
critical types of technological risk. Type one risk: reduction in number of actors within the 
technological domain. To appreciate this type of risk, consider by analogy the transformation of 
the Internet over time, especially the transition from Web 1.0 to 2.0. While Web 1.0 was 
characterized by a coexistence of many service generators, the increase in data volumes and 
users typical of Web 2.0 is counterbalanced by a contraction of the number of actors, with most 
online traffic being driven by a limited number of powerful actors such as Google, Facebook, or 
YouTube. In the context of CT, the centralization of technological power among certain State or 
non-State actors could result in monopolistic operations or even destabilize economic, 
geopolitical and military dominance. In parallel, at the intrastate level, it could centralize power 
among restricted groups or elites hence potentially enable disproportionate control over the rest 
of the population and their civil liberties. I call this second scenario type two risk and can be 
conceptualized as an asymmetry between the level of governmental surveillance of individual 
citizens and the level of surveillance of governments by individual citizens.  
Normative interventions aimed at limiting this risk of centralization may be 
conceptualized as cyberethical counterparts of anti-trust laws. Just like anti-trust laws are 
required to prevent monopolies and eliminate anti-competitive practices, proactive regulatory 
interventions may be required to prevent practices that restrain access to or development of CT, 
or cause the accumulation of power and control among restricted entities (688). Such safeguards 
should apply to all societal actors and levels (including design, coding, and physical 
manufacturing), and are intended to allow smaller actors such as small groups or single 
individuals to enter the domain of cognitive technology and take advantage of its benefits. 
According the principle of avoiding centralized control, decentralized development models 
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should be privileged over centralized models. Successful examples of decentralized 
development are open and participatory platforms such as the free encyclopedia Wikipedia, the 
open-source software operating system Linux (686) and the use of distributed ledger technology 
in trading and governance (689, 690). An interesting attempt to implement the principle of 
decentralized control in the context of CT is Nervousnet, a large-scale distributed platform using 
sensor networks “to measure the world around us and to build a collective data commons”, 
which is often presented as a “digital nervous system” (686). 
Openness is the principle of promoting universal access to (components of) the design or 
blueprint of cognitive technologies, and the universal redistribution of that design or blueprint, 
through an open and collaborative process of peer production. This principle also entails that the 
outputs of research in cognitive technology should be free of restrictions on access and use. 
Openness and the avoidance of control are critical requirements to make these same capabilities 
that will be recorded through or infused in cognitive technology — the cognitive capabilities — 
available to everyone. A good example in this direction is Microsoft’s effort to take those same 
capabilities infused in intelligent apps and made them available as a set of application 
programming interfaces (APIs) to every developer81. This attempt is a form of democratization 
because it enables everyone to use the same building blocks that Microsoft uses to 
build intelligent devices or to make existing applications more intelligent. Another important 
step towards the democratization of cognitive technology through openness is Microsoft-
sponsored research company Open AI. Open AI is a nonprofit company dedicated to precluding 
malicious AI, producing benevolent and safe AI, and ensuring that “AI's benefits are as widely 
and evenly distributed as possible” (691). Examples of successful application of the openness 
principle have also emerged within the domain of neurotechnology, especially brain-computer 
interfacing. A positive example is OpenBCI, an open source brain-computer interface platform 
created by Joel Murphy and Conor Russomanno in 2013. Open BCI’s mission is to “provide 
anyone with a computer, the tools necessary to sample the electrical activity of their brains” and 
“harness the power of the open source movement to accelerate ethical innovation of human-
computer interface technologies.”82 Today, Open BCI already offers an assortment of open 
source, versatile and affordable bio-sensing systems to sample electrical brain activity 
 
81 For more detailed information on Microsoft’s approach see Microsoft Cognitive Services’ 
Documentation: https://www.microsoft.com/cognitive-services/en-us/documentation. Last 
accessed: 30 January 2017.  
82 See: http://openbci.com/  
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(EEG), some of which can be 3D printed. Development is open and new discoveries are made 
and shared through “an open forum of shared knowledge and concerted effort, by people from a 
variety of backgrounds.” Openness of cognitive technology has been seen as a critical strategy 
for harnessing collective intelligence (661). In fact, a pervasive distribution of CT across all 
socioeconomic strata of society could empower people and enable a more informed and 
participative deliberation.  
In a more abstract sense, openness in CT involves the principle of infusing every 
application that we interact with, on any device, at any point in time, with (components of) 
cognitive technology. This process is currently ongoing. For example, an increasing number of 
routinely used applications incorporate (components of) artificial intelligence. These include 
search engines, social media, e-commerce services, video-games, medical devices and many 
others. At the same time, an increasing number of applications are designed to interface human 
cognition through neurotechnology. For example, several mobile communication companies 
including Samsung and Apple are testing brain-controlled handheld devices (553).  In this more 
general sense, openness is strictly linked to the avoidance of centralized control. In fact, the 
more cognitive capabilities are pervasively embedded and disseminated across the entire digital 
ecosystem, the harder it is for actors to centralize power and exert control over those systems. In 
the words of engineer and entrepreneur Elon Musk: “if everyone has AI powers, then there’s not 
any one person or a small set of individuals who can have AI superpower” (692). Therefore, the 
principle of openness incentivizes the infusion of cognitive capabilities into an increasing 
number and variety of technologies in order to prevent their uneven accumulation among 
restricted applications or tools.  
It is worth considering, however, that while “openness may reduce the probability of AI 
benefits being monopolized by a small group” (693) it could also cause unintended detrimental 
consequences. For example, Bostrom (2017) has argued that a high degree of openness could 
exacerbate a racing dynamic in which competitors trying to be the first to develop advanced AI 
may accept higher levels of existential risk in order to accelerate progress (693). Further 
research is required to assess which degree of openness would ensure the optimal balance 
between benefits sharing and individual, national or international security.  
Transparency is the principle of enabling a general public understanding of the internal 
processes of cognitive technologies. This is particularly challenging for approaches such as 
artificial neural networks, which learn or evolve to carry out a task in absence of clear mappings 
to chains of inference that are easy for humans to understand. This path to democratization 
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through transparency is critical for artificial cognitive systems. For example, the principle of 
transparency is at core of IBM’s “Guiding Ethics Principles for the Cognitive Era”, a recently 
released ethics framework characterizing IBM’s digital transformation. According to this 
framework, “for cognitive systems to fulfil their world-changing potential”, it is vital to ensure 
the trust of end-users in the systems through transparency enhancing strategies (694). In 
particular, there is a need for transparency in relation to (a) when and for what purposes AI is 
being applied in cognitive solutions, (b) the major sources of data and expertise “that inform the 
insights of cognitive solutions, as well as the methods used to train those systems and 
solutions”; (c) data protection and ownership. It is worth noting that the transparency principle 
has also educational relevance, since it allows making the necessary informational tools to learn 
and use cognitive technologies available for everyone, including students, workers and general 
citizens. Ideally, with advancing CT, such educational function will be institutionalized by the 
school system with the purpose of helping future citizens acquire the skills, knowledge and 
norms to engage successfully and securely with cognitive systems and use those skills and 
knowledge for achieving their life objectives. 
An example of practical realization of algorithmic transparency is Automatic Statistician, 
an intelligent software capable of spotting trends and anomalies in data sets and presenting its 
conclusion, including a detailed explanation of its reasoning (695). According to the researcher 
who created this software, such transparency is “absolutely critical” not only for applications in 
science but also for many commercial applications (ibid). At the policy level, authors have 
linked the principle of transparency to public trust and proposed that “in order to create 
sufficient transparency and trust, leading scientific institutions should act as trustees of the data 
and algorithms that currently evade democratic control” (661). This proposal would be 
particularly relevant in the context of data and algorithms related to reasoning and decision-
making as these could have a profound impact on individual deliberation and social cohesion.  
Inclusiveness is the principle of ensuring that no group of individuals or minority is 
marginalized or left behind during the process of permeation of cognitive technology in our 
society. For example, a 2012 study co-authored by a senior FBI technologist, found that face 
recognition algorithms of commercial vendors consistently performed 5-10% worse on African 
Americans than on Caucasians (696). As the use of face recognition technology is expected to 
progress significantly in the next years, it is fundamental to ensure that no ethnic group will 
benefit from this technology less than other groups. The inclusiveness principle is at the core of 
The Algorithmic Justice League (AJL) was launched by Joy Buolamwini in November 2016. 
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AJL provides a free platform to detect algorithmic bias that “can result in exclusionary 
experiences and discriminatory practices” and create “inclusive training sets.”83 
The principle of inclusiveness does not apply exclusively to facial or physiognomic traits 
but to any other ethically relevant social bias that may intendedly or unintendedly emerge during 
CT development. These include cultural, political and language bias etc. An example of 
minimization of cultural and language bias is the internationalization strategy outlined by Open 
AI’s Software Requirements Specification. As the specification states: modules should be 
internationalized, in the sense that they “need to conform to the local language, locales, 
currencies etc., according to the settings specified in the configuration file or the environment in 
which they are running in.”84 The principle of inclusiveness is strictly related to the transparency 
principle. In fact, building algorithms which explain their reasoning and decision making is the 
best way to guarantee that hidden biases will be understood and promptly eliminated. In 
addition, it is important to create larger, more inclusive and diverse data sets with which to train 
the algorithms. Pluralism and diversity are critical notions for implementing the principle of 
inclusiveness in cognitive technology.  
The principle of user-centeredness advocates that emerging cognitive technologies 
should be designed, developed and implemented according to the users’ needs and personal 
choices. User-centered approaches to the development of cognitive technology are necessary to 
guarantee that end-users (as widely as possible characterized, in accordance with the principles 
of openness and inclusiveness) are involved in the design, development and implementation of 
cognitive technologies on an equal footage. This principle has both methodological and social 
relevance. Methodologically, user-centered approaches have been observed to increase the 
capacity of cognitive technology to fulfill the needs and wishes of end-users, reduce friction in 
human-machine interaction, facilitate usability hence increase overall user satisfaction (210, 
697). User-centered approaches have been observed to increase technology uptake and social 
adoption among end-users (302). Furthermore, such approaches ensure that technology is truly 
designed for the benefit of users instead of making users passive buyers of novel commercial 
products. For example, Kübler et al. have showed that user-centered design is a viable and 
effective approach to evaluate the usability of BCI-controlled applications, including among 
vulnerable end-users severe impairment (697). Similar approaches have been pursued with BCIs 
 
83 See: http://www.ajlunited.org/the-coded-gaze 
84 See: http://openai.sourceforge.net/OpenAI-srs.html 
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based on event related potentials for brain spelling (698) and painting (699). User-centeredness 
is particularly important in relation to cognitive technologies developed for assisting patients 
with cognitive disorders. In fact, these people (e.g. older adults with dementia) are often frail 
and vulnerable individuals, hence entitled to outmost respect of their needs and wishes (225). At 
the level of technology implementation, the principle of user-centeredness would prescribe 
increased individual control over one’s own cognitive processing and the adaptation of cognitive 
technologies to the needs, wishes and capabilities of individual users.  
Finally, the principle of convergence can be described both in a narrow and in a broad 
sense. In the narrow sense, convergence is the principle of interoperability, intercommunication 
and ease of integration among all components of cognitive technology (i.e. the cognitive tools or 
modules): in order to reach the common goal of measuring, enhancing or emulating cognition, 
all cognitive tools must, at some important level, speak the same language and behave in a 
mutually consistent manner. It is worth noting, however, that excessive interoperability might 
result in increased data insecurity, hence must be carefully balanced over other ethical principles 
and technical safeguards. In a broader and more abstract sense, it is also the principle of 
converging different types of cognitive technology, especially neurotechnology, on the one 
hand, and artificial intelligent systems on the other hand. As described in the first section of this 
paper, such convergence is already occurring. For example, BCIs have been combined with 
artificial intelligent systems (environment-sensing, obstacle-avoidance and pathfinding 
capabilities) to achieve shared control and context based filtering of user commands, hence 
enhance the overall performance of the brain–machine combination (700, 701). In addition, a 
proposals to make this link closer and more reliable via brain-computer interaction are being 
pursued by various companies including Facebook, Neuralink, Kernel and Emotiv (702). 
Similar convergence-aimed solutions have been pioneered also at the microscopic level. A 
promising example is a minimally invasive three-dimensional interpenetration of electronics 
within artificial structures or biological brains (703). Such mesh-brain implants have already 
demonstrated the capacity to successfully integrate into a mouse brain and enable neuronal 
recordings (704). While convergence in the narrow sense is necessary to guarantee the 
successful functioning of cognitive technology, broad-sense convergence might, on the medium-
to-long term, empower individuals and provide ultimate control and protection against 
malevolent applications of cognitive technology.  
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Conclusions 
Cognitive technologies have the potential of accelerating technological innovation and 
providing significant benefit for human societies. At the same time, due to their dual-use 
potential, they can be potentially coopted by State and non-State actors for non-benign purposes 
including cybercrime, cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare and mass surveillance. In light of the recent 
global crisis of democracy, increased militarization of the digital infosphere, and concurrent 
potentiation of cognitive technologies, it is important to proactively design strategies that can 
mitigate emerging risks and align the future of CT with the basic principles of liberal democracy 
in free and open societies.  
In this paper, I described a proactive approach to the democratization of CT based on six 
normative ethical principles: avoidance of centralized control, openness, transparency, 
inclusiveness, user-centeredness and convergence. This approach is designed to universalize and 
evenly distribute the potential benefits of CT and mitigate the risk that such emerging 
technological trend could be coopted by State or non-State actors in ways that are inconsistent 
with the principles of liberal democracy or detrimental to individuals and groups. While this 
paper offered a preliminary and general characterization of how to democratize cognitive 
technology, future research is required to expand this proposal into a comprehensive ethical, 
legal and political framework.  
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Part 3: Limitations and Future Research 
This study presents several limitations. These include both general and Module-specific 
limitations. General limitations apply to the entire research project design while Module-specific 
limitations apply to each specific study component.  
 From the perspective of the overall study design, the ever-evolving nature of IATs and 
their market is a major limiting factor. In fact, as our results show, the IAT spectrum is rapidly 
expanding in size and variety. This implies that, at any given time, every attempt to provide an 
up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of this technology spectrum is affected by limited 
diachronic validity. For example, given the growth rates of the IAT spectrum observed in 
Module 1, the total number of available IATs is expected to have increased by an additional 
20% in the period between the publication of the study results and the submission of the present 
thesis. In addition, since this expansion is not occurring only in terms of size but also in variety, 
it is possible that novel types of IATs may generate new opportunities, challenges as well as 
ethical, legal and social implications that are not accounted for in this thesis. However, this 
limitation is not unique of IATs for dementia and elderly care but inherent to the study of any 
rapidly evolving technological trend. To minimize this problem, regular updates of the present 
research project in all its components will be required. These updates might involve the 
replication of each study component at various intervals of time and the constant monitoring of 
future and emerging trends in IAT. Our systematic methodology and the choice to make 
available the paper’s metadata (see Tab. 1-4 and the appendixes) offer a good basis for future 
replication studies.  
In addition, many features and implications recognizable in IATs for dementia and 
elderly care might not be exclusive to this field of application but common to IATs with 
different clinical purposes such as IATs for people with other neuropsychiatric illnesses (e.g. 
Parkinson’s disease) or suffering from traumatic brain and spinal cord injury. Future research 
should investigate the possibilities and challenges of using IATs in these other clinical domains. 
Concurrently, as Chapter 2.10 of this study shows, many IATs are making their way onto the 
commercial market and are becoming increasingly available to end-users as commercial 
products outside the institutional medical setting. This will urge to investigate IAT-use in a 
variety of sociocultural contexts, population groups and modes of application, hence require 
highly flexible and adaptive approaches to technology assessment and ELSI-evaluation.  
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Limitations of Module 1 
 Additional limitations apply to each Module of this research project.  
Module 1 is characterized by the additional limitation that certain IATs might have not been 
retrieved through the search algorithm we employed during the literature search. To minimize 
this risk, the query logic of our search was pilot-tested through multiple trials and adapted to the 
specific logic of each search engine or database. It is also possible that a certain number of IATs 
might have been developed without published results (for example because military classified or 
covered under trade secret), hence could not be retrieved through literature screening. 
Furthermore, it is possible that certain parameters such as the prevalence of user-centered 
approaches and ethical considerations were addressed by technology designers in an implicit 
manner, i.e. without being reported in the study protocols or reported in the absence of explicit 
terminology (1). To reduce this risk, software-guided keyword search was complemented with 
full-text review. Finally, various phases of the categorization process, especially classification 
and nomination (705), might have been affected by subjective biases of researchers. To 
minimize this risk, each phase of review was performed independently by at least two 
researchers, while the categorization strategy and language were critically discussed, adapted 
and formally approved by all researchers. These limitations are explained in detail in Chapter 
2.1.  
 
Limitations of Module 2 
The generalizability of the results from Module 2 is limited by its qualitative 
methodology and the small sample size. In fact, while the use of qualitative interviews allowed 
exploring a complex topic in depth, such qualitative design prevented statistically representative 
and generalizable conclusions. Furthermore, the study sample may not have represented the full 
range of health working in dementia and elderly care in the three target countries. In addition, 
selection biases might have occurred at the level of the recruitment process. In fact, a brief 
project description was included in the invitation email (see methods section) in order to provide 
participants with adequate information about the study. This description could have attracted 
health professionals who have previously worked on or reflected about IATs. In addition, this 
email could have prompted participants to reflect on the topic before the interview. Despite 
these limitations, the obtained findings already show diverse and distinctive attitudes which add 
significant knowledge about how health professionals’ attitudes towards IATs for elderly and 
dementia care. Most interviewees were working at leading European healthcare institutions and 
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had pioneer experience in the clinical implementation of smart solutions in dementia and elderly 
care, hence represented a very suitable informant population in light of the study objectives. 
Further research is required to provide (i) generalizable and statistically representative 
quantitative data on health professionals’ views and attitudes towards IATs, (ii) qualitative 
insights from different (ideally extra-European) cultural settings, and (iii) insights from different 
stakeholder groups such as older people with dementia or other cognitive disability, cognitively 
healthy seniors and technology designers.  
 
Limitations of Module 3 
Research shows that different IAT types might raise different ethical, legal and social 
implications (137, 706). Therefore, while it is important to develop a comprehensive and 
unifying ethical framework for the entire IAT spectrum, it is also important to address in depth 
type-specific issues associated with each IAT-subfamily. In this project, type-specific issues 
were addressed in relation to four main IAT-subfamilies: BCIs and other cognitive technologies, 
AALs, wearables and assistive robots. Further research is required to identify the ELSI of other 
IAT-subfamilies identified in Module 1. These should include: distributed systems, handheld 
devices, powered mobility aids, software tools and wearables. While our inductive approach to 
the ELSI of IATs was designed to minimize theory-induced biases, it cannot be ruled out a 
priori that implicit theoretical biases (707) might have affected the interpretation of results or 
that the framework and recommendations we delineate are underdetermined by the data (708). 
Finally, since most ELSI raised by IATs ─e.g. electrophysiological monitoring of the 
electromechanical underpinnings of human personality and behavior─ affect all human beings 
regardless of nationality, ethnic origin, sex, location of residence, political belief, language, or 
any other status, our legal analysis prioritized the perspective of international human rights 
law. However, further research is highly necessary to address the legal implications of IATs also 
at the level of national legislations as well as in the context of specific fields of jurisprudence 
such as health law, corporate and securities law, patent law, and personal injury law.  
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4.1. Overview of the General Discussion 
 
The aim of the present thesis was to provide an extensive analysis of the design, distribution, 
clinical applicability and ethical-legal impact of intelligent technology for dementia and elderly 
care. IATs are rapidly transforming the delivery of assistive services for the physically and 
cognitively disabled population and creating novel opportunities for technology-enhanced care. 
Concurrently, cognitive technologies are profoundly reshaping the dynamics and social 
significance of human-machine interaction. Detailed analyses of the possibilities and challenges 
of current intelligent technologies are highly needed to inform evidence-based approaches to 
their implementation and governance, thus guide informed decision-making in this emerging 
field. The technological novelty and heterogeneity of intelligent technology applications as well 
as the low level of maturity of their market generate uncertainty (75, 709). If not adequately 
addressed, this uncertainty risks to negatively affect the successful and responsible deployment 
of these technologies, hence to delay or obliterate their benefits for patients, care-providers and 
society at large.  
This thesis attempted to reduce uncertainty regarding medical uses of intelligent 
technology by generating new evidence about their current distribution, design, clinical 
applicability and ethical-legal impact in the context of dementia and elderly care. As such, this 
thesis configures as a comprehensive technology assessment of the intelligent technology 
domain, with special focus on IATs and cognitive technologies.  
This section aims to summarize the main findings, strengths, and implications of the studies 
conducted in throughout this research project. Since these findings also have societal relevance, 
their implications for policy, prevention and future research will be discussed. To avoid 
redundancies, only the main findings and implications will be discussed in this section and 
presented in a broader scientific context. For a more detailed analysis of type-specific issues 
please refer to the discussion section of each original contribution presented in section two.  
 
4.2. Technology Push and Current Distribution 
 
Our study findings show that the spectrum of IATs for dementia and elderly care is rapidly 
expanding in size and variety. With the total number of IATs nearly doubling every five years, 
more and more opportunities for technology-enhanced care are being opened. As the number of 
new IATs grows linearly, intelligent systems are likely to become increasingly pervasive in 
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elderly and dementia care and their distribution in both institutional and home-care settings is 
expected to increase accordingly. These findings indicate the presence of a technology-push in 
dementia and elderly care, namely a socio-technological trend in which “research and 
development in new technologies drives the development of new products”(710). With a total 
number of 539 devices, the current spectrum of IATs for dementia and elderly care is rapidly 
emerging as an important subfield of medical technology and digital health. In addition, the 
linear increase in the total number of IAT applications over time (fifteen-fold increase since 
2000) indicates that IAT has a potential for exponential growth and pervasive distribution. 
However, to translate this potential into a clinical reality, more focus on clinical validation and 
implementation is needed (see Chapter 4.4). 
 The IAT spectrum is not expanding only in size but in variety too. Our study findings 
indicate that, to date, at least seven main technological types are recognizable within the IAT 
spectrum (in order of prevalence): distributed systems, care robots, mobility and rehabilitation 
aids, handheld devices, software and mobile apps, wearables and human-machine interfaces. 
The high prevalence of distributed systems such as AAL technologies attests a technology push 
towards the creation of smart-environments for older people and/or people with cognitive 
disabilities. Such smart-environments can be installed in both institutional (e.g. nursing homes 
and hospice care facilities) and home-care settings with the purpose of enabling technology-
enhanced assisted living. This trend in aged care is consistent with a broader trend towards 
intelligent living and home automation recognizable also among the general healthy population 
(711). Intelligent interconnected devices are being progressively integrated into regular houses 
as a consequence of socio-technological trends such as domotics (712) and the Internet of 
Things (189) for purposes such as remote monitoring and control. According to recent 
estimates, the home automation market was worth US$5.77 billion in 2013, and is predicted to 
reach a total market value of US$12.81 billion by 2020 (713).  
Dementia and elderly care are among the sectors of society that are most likely to benefit 
from such smart-home trends in light of the physical and cognitive limitations of senior citizens 
and their consequent increased need for assistance. This is confirmed by our finding that 
assisting older adults during the completion of ADLs is the most common application of IATs 
(n=148). The results indicate that prolonging the independent living of older adults with 
dementia and assisting them during routine activities is a priority in current IAT development. 
This is further confirmed by the finding that independence is the most prevalent embedded value 
in IAT design. The current centrality of promoting independent living in the IAT enterprise 
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seems to meet the expectations of IAT pioneers during the initial phases of development of this 
technological trend. For example, in the early 2000s, authors expected that technologies capable 
of prolonging independent living at home or maintaining independence in healthcare facilities 
could exert a triple-win effect (67, 73), since they could (i) delay or obviate the need for 
institutional care, hence reduce healthcare costs, (ii) mitigate the burden on formal and informal 
caregivers, and (iii) improve the quality of life of patients and promote aging in place.  
 While the rapid expansion of the IAT spectrum generates hopes for novel technology-
assisted care solutions, it is questionable whether the significant technology push described 
above is balanced by comparable market pulls. Several studies show that the need for IATs is 
high among senior citizens, people with dementia and their carers (714-716). Nonetheless, 
adoption rates among these target populations remain reportedly low (105, 106). In light of this 
evidence, our findings identify a dynamic in which technology develops faster than end-users 
and medical infrastructures can adopt, with consequent sub-optimal uptake and clinical 
implementation of IATs in care settings.  
 
4.3. Capabilities  
 
Our study findings show that current IATs have wide applicability in a variety of domains of 
dementia and elderly care. These include (in order of frequency): assistance of patients during 
the completion of ADLs, remote monitoring, physical and cognitive assistance, interaction, 
engagement, rehabilitation, and emotional assistance. In addition, they are designed to assist, 
partly restore or compensate for a number of deficits caused by dementia and age-related 
disability. These include (in order of frequency): cognitive (especially memory) impairment, 
motor dysfunction, emotional and mood disturbances as well as social isolation.  
While the compensation for the afore listed specific deficits is important, most IATs 
appeared to be designed for general-purpose support (n = 250). This fact is likely to be a 
consequence of the complex disabling condition caused by dementia and age-related disability 
which simultaneously affects various facets of a person’s psycho-physical dimension. For this 
reason, it is possible that highly flexible and adaptive IATs that can promptly respond to 
multiple individual deficits and assist in a variety of care tasks, are most likely to produce better 
clinical outcomes compared to less flexible and adaptive ones. This possibility is corroborated 
by rapid advances in adaptive intelligence within the AI domain (717). On the long term, 
adaptive intelligent systems (AISs) are likely to play a predominant role within the IAT domain 
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as they will be able to cope with “situations that vary dynamically along several key 
dimensions” such as “different combinations of required tasks, different configurations of 
available resources, contextual conditions ranging from benign to stressful, and different 
performance criteria” (718) ─all factors of variability that are typical of dementia and elderly 
care contexts (719, 720).  
The relative frequency of IATs for cognitive assistance is a predictable consequence of 
the cognitive impairments caused by advancing age and/or progressive dementia. There is a 
longstanding debate among AI experts and neuroscientists about whether artificial intelligence 
is isomorphic to human natural intelligence, hence can adequately simulate aspects of human 
cognition (721, 722). The application of AI to dementia and elderly care poses the collateral 
question of whether rising artificial intelligence can (or will) compensate for declining human 
intelligence in the aging brain. While this question is empirical in character, hence 
experimentally testable, it also has philosophical implications. Therefore, both empirical studies 
and philosophical reflections need to be explored by future research to address these issues.  
It is worth to point out that cognitive faculties such as memory can be amplified or 
extended “through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing 
systems” (379). Our findings indicate that all current cognition-enhancing IATs are designed to 
augment cognitive faculties by augmenting external information processing systems, that is 
through interventions that do not directly target the underlying neurobiology of the older person 
but rather non-invasively provide external cognitive resources to support cognition from outside 
the brain. The reason for that stems from the fact that technologies for the augmentation of 
internal information processing systems (i.e. interventions that invasively target the underlying 
neurobiology of the older person) involve significantly higher risks for the patient (723, 724) or 
are outperformed by pharmacological interventions (725, 726). However, in the near future it is 
highly possible that implantable micro-IATs might improve cognitive function intracranially. 
Already today, several private tech-companies such as Neuralink (631) and Kernel are “building 
advanced neural interfaces to treat disease and dysfunction”85 by “connecting humans and 
computers”86 or even “merging the human brain with AI”(631). In parallel, preliminary findings 
from research on memory restoration are showing a promising potential. For example, a device 
called Restorative Encoding Memory Integration Neural Device (REMIND) has proven capable, 
in animal models, to detect patterns of functional brain connectivity associated with successful 
 
85 See Kernel’s mission statement: https://kernel.co/  
86 See Neuralink’s statement: https://www.neuralink.com/  
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memory encoding and retrieval, and to significantly improve the reminiscence of an event via 
electrical stimulation (432). In the future, similar applications could reach human 
experimentation and ultimately become available as medical devices for people with dementia 
and other memory disturbances. This will pose additional sets of ethical and legal questions.  
The high number of devices designed for providing physical assistance to older adults 
and people with dementia shows that current IATs (especially robots) have the potential to 
address not only declining cognition but also the physical limitations associated with age-
dependent frailty and disability. This is important from a clinical perspective since physical 
disability and frailty have been recognized as markers of reduced quality of life among 
community-dwelling seniors (727). It is worth considering, however, that the cognitive and 
physical dimension are intricately connected. For example, research has shown that impaired 
executive function (cognitive dimension) has a direct impact on gait stability (physical 
dimension) (728).  The low frequency of devices for emotional assistance attests the presence of 
greater theoretical and technical challenges in artificial emotional intelligence compared to other 
sub-fields of AI (729). Nonetheless, positive clinical effects associated with the use of socially 
assistive robots for alleviating mood disturbances in psychogeriatric care (48, 333), show a 
promising way ahead also in relation to this underrepresented subfield of IAT.  
The promotion of safety also appears as an important capability of current IATs. Our 
findings show that several AALs, monitoring systems as well as handheld devices and related 
apps were designed with the purpose of increasing the safety of older adults and people with 
dementia and protecting them across a wide spectrum of reported risks including falls (730, 
731), wandering (732) and home accidents (e.g. smoke inhalation). This capability is enabled by 
very diverse technological types including environmental sensors, wearable activity trackers, 
GPS devices, and camera-based monitoring systems.  
Finally, the relative proportion of IATs for supporting engagement and social interaction 
has a twofold implication. First, it attests the need to address the relational dimension of older 
adults and people with dementia, which is reportedly affected by loneliness, increased social 
isolation and other constrains (733, 734). This is consistent with previous considerations 
highlighting the multi-domain complexity of dementia. Second, it suggests that IATs are not 
only designed to compensate for the psycho-physical deficits of older adults and people with 
dementia but also to preserve their social networks and inter-personal dynamics. Our review 
identified both IATs for human-machine interaction (e.g. companionship robots and intelligent 
conversational agents) and intelligent systems for facilitating human-to-human interaction such 
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as telecommunication technologies and telepresence robots for promoting interaction between 
people with dementia and their family caregivers (735, 736). These results indicate that reported 
worries about the potential risk of dehumanizing care or weakening the patient-health 
professional relationship through technology (145, 193, 737) might be misplaced. IATs for 
human-machine and human-human interaction show that technology-enabled care is not in 
logical conflict with interpersonal dynamics and is not necessarily alternative to human-
delivered care but complementary to it. This idea, which can be summarized under the motto 
“complement-not-replace”, is consistent with similar conclusions from previous studies (48) as 
well as across the findings of all three study Modules.  
Overall, our study findings attest that IATs have a powerful potential for enhancing the 
delivery of care services among older people and patients with dementia in relation to a wide 
variety of care tasks. This is further confirmed by the generally positive attitudes of key health 
professionals towards their clinical deployment. However, major barriers in product design and 
development currently affect the clinical adoption of these technologies. This is further 
discussed in the next section.   
 
4.4. Models of IAT Design: Current Stand and Emerging Challenges 
 
4.4.1. User-centered design and Clinical Validation 
Design is a critical phase of technology development and product lifecycle (738). In this phase, 
a new technology is conceived, specified in terms of requirements, analyzed, tested, simulated 
and progressed to (in chronological order) prototype testing, pilot release and eventually full 
product launch (739). Therefore, the design phase shapes the functionality and future impact of 
a new technology. Our findings indicate that, at present, most IATs (59.9%) are developed in 
absence of user-centered approaches to design. Since involvement of end-users in the design 
phase is a constitutive feature of bottom-up models of technology design (740), this low 
prevalence of user-centered approaches also testifies a dominance of top-down design models in 
IAT for dementia and elderly care. While bottom-up approaches are primarily concerned with 
the user-driven validation of a new technology in real-world scenarios, top-down approaches are 
primarily concerned with high-level functional requirements (741). These findings cast doubts 
on the ability of current IATs to adequately address end-users’ needs. In fact, involving end-
users early on in the design phase has often been observed to positively contribute to system 
success and increase user satisfaction (742-744). Additionally, the low prevalence of UC design 
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has often been recognized as one major codeterminant of lower-than-expected adoption of IATs 
for dementia (199, 745). Therefore, IATs developed in absence of UCD are less likely to 
guarantee that the needs and wishes of patients, their caregivers and health professionals are 
adequately elicited, properly reflected into the product specifications, and verified thoroughly by 
tests and adequate clinical validation.  
 This consideration is corroborated by the finding that about one in every two IATs 
(50.65%) did not receive clinical validation through clinical trials involving human subjects. 
This finding confirms a lack of solid and generalizable clinical validation in current IATs. 
Additionally, it casts doubts and uncertainty about the clinical effectiveness of those devices 
among end-users. Even among the subset of IATs that received clinical validation (49.35%), 
flaws in the validation methodology were recognizable. In fact, most validation tests (95.5% of 
all IAT-studies involving clinical validation) were conducted with very small sample sizes (< 20 
participants). Furthermore, methodological limitations were also observed at the level of study 
design as randomized-controlled trials (RCTs) was reported in only 1.1% of all validation 
studies. This finding casts doubts about the presence of allocation biases and the balancing of 
prognostic factors in current validation studies. These problems are reflected in the concerns of 
the health professionals involved in the interview study. Virtually all stakeholders considered 
most current IATs inadequately validated, hence unfit for massive clinical deployment at care 
institutions or home-care settings. Absence of adequate clinical validation was presented as a 
“major barrier” to the clinical use of IATs at their institutions. While they all welcomed further 
investments in IAT-development, they recognized an urgent need for corroborating clinical 
evidence (746) in support of current products and facilitating their clinical implementation .  
In absence of adequate validation, health professionals are not equipped with the 
necessary knowledge about product safety and effectiveness required to implement new IATs in 
the clinical setting. Participants reported issues of poor clinical evidence, difficulties in 
replicating laboratory experiments in real-world settings, and uncertainty about product safety 
and effectiveness as major obstacles towards adoption of IATs among their patient groups. 
These findings reveal a signal-to-noise problem in the IAT market (747), i.e. the problem of 
distinguishing safe, effective and adequately validated IATs (the signal) from ones that do not 
provide sufficient clinical guarantees to users and health professionals (the noise). This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that, to date, there are no formal mechanisms in place to orient health 
professionals and patients across the ever-evolving IAT spectrum. Therefore, our findings 
indicate a need for developing mechanisms to support clinicians and primary users in the 
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process of filtering signal from noise in the IAT market, hence distinguishing safe, clinically 
effective, adequately validated and socially beneficial devices from those that do not meet these 
requirements. 
The signal-to-noise problem is not only caused by inadequate clinical validation or 
insufficient evidence of clinical benefit. As our interview findings indicate, product 
requirements and specifications play an important role too. Health professionals highlighted that 
many IATs they saw or tested were characterized by poor technical specifications, functional 
errors, and user-unfriendly interfaces. These technical limitations were often reported to result in 
diminished technology adoption among end users or even technology abandonment. The 
presence of unresolved technical limitations is likely to depend, at least in part, on the low 
prevalence of UCD. In fact, UCD approaches have been observed to effectively filter out 
technical imperfections of prototypes and improve their functionality by performing adequate 
testing among end-users in real-world scenarios (302). 
The high number of IATs developed in absence of end-user involvement in the design 
phase urges close ethical and clinical oversight to avoid possible drawbacks including ethical 
conflicts, misuse, discomfort or even distress among end-users, as well as ineffective clinical 
application. Our findings identify a need for more coordinated efforts to involve end-users in the 
design and development of IATs for dementia and elderly care. The need for accelerating the 
transition to UC models of IAT design is corroborated by the findings of our interview study, 
where virtually all participants expressed preferences for UCD and called for more user-driven 
research in the IAT field. Concurrently, further research involving both primary (e.g. older 
adults and people with dementia) and secondary (e.g. formal and informal caregivers) 
stakeholders is needed to test end-users’ satisfaction in relation to existing IATs.  
While accelerating the transition to UC approaches emerges as a scientific imperative, an 
ongoing trend in this direction is already observable. In fact, the results of our logistic regression 
indicate a progressive trend towards user-centeredness in the design of IATs. If this trend 
remains steady over time, it is predictable that UC approaches will characterize the majority of 
IATs for dementia by 2019 and two thirds of them by 2022. This trend testifies an ongoing 
transition in technology design which does not restrict only to IATs for dementia and elderly 
care but has also been observed in relation to other sectors of healthcare technology including 
eHealth, ambient intelligence and agile software development (748-750). If this trend is 
maintained, the clinical validity and applicability of IATs are likely to improve for the benefit of 
end-users and healthcare services.  
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4.4.2. Value-sensitive and ethical design 
VSD has been often recognized as a gateway to responsible technological innovation (751, 752).  
Our study findings indicate that VSD approaches in IAT for dementia and elderly care are 
remarkably rare as they characterize only one third of the IAT spectrum. This low prevalence 
casts doubts on the degree of ethical sensitivity and sustainability of current IATs for dementia 
and elderly care. In addition, since VSD approaches are believed to increase the benefits and 
reduce the harms of a technology among a stakeholder group (92), their low prevalence could 
negatively affect the outcomes of IATs among end-users.  
 The low prevalence of VSD raises particular concern in relation to ethical values. Our 
study findings reveal that ethical design ─the proactive incorporation of ethical values in IAT 
design─ is scarce. This fact poses a challenge for designers since ethical design, as previously 
discussed, is believed to prevent various forms of harm to technology users and other 
stakeholders including interpersonal, psychological, and social/societal harm (93). Deficient 
ethical design might undermine the ability of IATs to account for the ethical values of elderly 
people (including people with dementia), their caregivers as well as of health professionals 
involved in the delivery of care services. Consequently, it could possibly contribute ─together 
with the lack of user-centered design and adequate clinical validation─ to diminished user 
satisfaction, sub-optimal adoption, and delayed clinical implementation. This hypothesis is 
corroborated by the findings of our interview study, as many health professionals expressed 
ethical concerns in relation to the use of current IATs for dementia and elderly care.  
 Within the subset of IATs that do incorporate ethical values, the high prevalence of 
independence considerations confirms that a primary goal in IAT design is maximizing the 
capacity for independent living of older adults (2). This goal might be justified not only by the 
moral commitment to empower older adults and improve their QoL but also by financial and 
healthcare management motivations. This is consistent with repeated calls by gerontology 
experts for “maintaining and promoting functional independence in older adults” (753). In fact, 
maintaining the independent living at home of older adults and people with dementia or 
providing them with greater independence in skilled facilities is likely to delay the need for 
institutionalized long-term care, hence significantly reduce healthcare costs, and reduce the 
burden on formal caregivers (67, 75). The promotion of independence is also consistent with 
respecting the oft stated wish of elderly adults to age in place (75, 754), a wish that appeared 
widely respected and promoted by the health professionals involved in our interview study.  
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 In contrast, the low frequency of considerations and values related to fair access, equality 
and distributive justice underline a major ethical-societal challenge that could negatively affect 
the future of IATs for dementia. Our findings reveal that the number of IATs presenting low-
cost hardware and open-source software, hence designed to be affordable to end-users from 
various socioeconomic classes, is very low (<10%). Concurrently, the absence of considerations 
related to fair and universal technology access raise the concern that the adoption of IATs will 
be limited by socio-economic factors or could even exacerbate existing socio-economic 
problems. Unless immediate action is taken, there is a risk that the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged population segments (e.g. elderly adults living in poverty) will be excluded from 
the clinical and social benefits of IATs. This could cause the creation of a technology divide that 
mirrors or even deepens pre-existing wealth inequalities, a phenomenon that has already been 
observed in various other sectors of the information society (755). The need to take action and 
prevent unfair technology access is particularly relevant in light of the fact that the greatest 
relative cost increases are occurring in low-income African and in East Asia regions (279).  
 Finally, the rarity of privacy and security considerations, especially of those related to 
informational privacy and data protection (<5%), indicates that guaranteeing privacy and 
security by design (282, 756) is currently not a priority among IAT developers. In absence of 
adequate safeguards, breaches for privacy and security will emerge ─many of which already 
have (757), as Chapters 2.8-2.11 of this thesis report.  
 In summary, our findings indicate that although IAT innovation is proceeding fast and 
rapidly creating new opportunities for technology-assisted care, yet major challenges in IAT 
design can be observed. These include low prevalence of UCD and VSD, lack of adequate 
clinical validation, poor technical quality of devices and rarity of user-friendly interfaces. 
Additionally, the reported neglect of important ethical requirements cast doubts on the ethical 
sensitivity and social sustainability of current IATs for dementia and elderly care. For this 
reason, a comprehensive discussion of the major ethical, legal and social implications associated 
with IAT development and use is necessary. This will be discussed in the next section.  
 
4.5. Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) 
4.5.1. Dual-Use and Malicious Hacking 
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 Our findings attest that IATs for elderly care raise important ethical, legal and social 
implications. Among them, dual-use is critical. As our analysis indicates, IATs hold a potential 
for dual-use because they can demonstrably be coopted for different purposes than those 
originally addressed by designers, including malevolent purposes. Research shows that several 
IATs such as BCIs (142, 143), robots (758), exoskeletons (759), wearables (760, 761) and 
AALs (762) can be turned against their users or exploited to open breaches for privacy and data 
security. While the potential vulnerability to malevolent cooptation is common to any 
computing technology, this risk acquires particular relevance in relation to IATs for a twofold 
reason. First, users of IATs are usually vulnerable people who need assistance (hence the word 
assistive in the acronym) such as older adults and people with dementia or other psychophysical 
disability. According to the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki on the Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, vulnerable people are the most 
disadvantaged sub-segments of the community (763). Therefore, authors have argued that they 
should be entitled to “utmost care, specific ancillary considerations and augmented protections” 
(764). In light of their vulnerability, users of IATs might have a limited freedom and capability 
to protect themselves from intended or unintended risks associated with technology use. The 
second reason stems from the fact that most IATs operate in close proximity or direct physical 
contact with end-users (295, 320), manipulate instruments inside, worn upon or directly 
interfaced with their bodies, and might even have invasive or non-invasive connections with the 
human nervous system (295). For these reasons, they raise a need for increased ethical scrutiny 
as they might enable a higher degree of intrusion into and manipulation of the personal 
(behavioral and physiological) information of users. This need for increased ethical focus is 
consistent with public perceptions in relation to new technology. Survey results show that 53% 
of people in the United States think it would be a bad thing if “most people wear implants or 
other devices that constantly show them information about the world around them.” In contrast, 
just over one third (37%) think this would be “a change for the better” (327), hence showing a 
clear pattern of public concern that is proportional to the degree of access to personal 
information enabled by a new device.  
 Our descriptive and normative analysis indicates that the dual-use potential of IATs is 
strongly linked with their vulnerability to cyber risk, a phenomenon already observed in 
virtually all sectors of computing technology. In particular, the risk of malicious hacking 
─exploitation of computer technology and its information processing for malevolent purposes─ 
is critical. A recent cybersecurity report attests that robot technologies appear “to be insecure in 
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a variety of ways, and that insecurity could pose serious threats to the people they operate in and 
around” (765). Due to the vulnerability of their end-users, this risk is particularly significant in 
the context of IATs for dementia and elderly care. Of particular ethical relevance is the risk of 
malicious hacking associated with the subgroup of intelligent technologies that establish direct 
interfaces with the human nervous system such as BCIs and other neurotechnologies. The 
reason for that stems from the fact that these technologies enable a “direct connection pathway 
between the human nervous system and external computer devices” (181), hence an unmediated 
access to neural processing. As neural processes constitute the electrochemical underpinnings of 
human mental processes, these types of IATs “offer a powerful, alternative way to access a 
person's mental life” (138). If not secured through adequate safeguards, the malicious 
exploitation of or intrusion into a person’s mental life could result in unprecedented ethical and 
legal challenges.  
 Our analysis provided a comprehensive technical, ethical and legal assessment of 
malicious hacking risks associated with neurally-controlled IATs, a phenomenon that we have 
labeled malicious brain hacking (or neurohacking). This assessment identified four different 
types of cyberattacks based on the level of the BCI cycle at which the attack might occur. For 
each type of attack, we described the associated ethical problems and possible illicit activities. 
Our analysis reveals that hacking attacks to neurally-controlled IATs can occur at four phases of 
the BCI cycle: input processing, measurement, decoding and output processing. Cyberattacks at 
the level of input processing are most likely to occur in the form of generating misleading 
inputs, for example via subliminal manipulation of visual stimuli. The primary application of 
this kind of neurohacking model is the unauthorized extraction of information from end-users. 
This type of attack has already been proven feasible by a number of experimental studies using 
commercially available non-invasive BCIs (141, 143, 766). In all these experiments, researchers 
were able to manipulate input processing to extract private and sensitive information from end-
users without their consent. The practical feasibility of this form of cyber risk raises major 
implications for personal privacy and security (see next section). Cyberattacks at the level of 
measurement can occur in the form of noise addition or manipulation of the classification 
process. This type of attack might result in disruption or termination of the device functionality 
as well as in the risk of hijacking by malevolent third parties. The same risks apply to 
cyberattacks targeting the decoding phase, for example attacks aimed at overriding the signal 
sent to output. As our results illustrate, all these cyber activities might cause both physical and 
psychological harm to end-users, a risk that is exacerbated in case of vulnerable users such as 
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older adults. Additionally, the possibility of remote hijacking raises the problem of diminished 
agency. In fact, as our analysis suggests, users that are victims of this kind of hack might no 
longer qualify as agents given the traditional definition of agency as the capacity of someone to 
deliberate or act on the basis of one’s own desires and plans instead of being product of 
manipulative or distorting external forces (767). Finally, altering the signal’s feedback at the 
level of output processing might generate the additional risks of uncertain personhood and moral 
responsibility. The reason for that stems from the fact that the output of the BCI cycle is salient 
to users’ conscious perception. Therefore, manipulating output processing might result in 
manipulating a person’s conscious experience and introduce an alien degree of control into that 
person’s reasoning and decision-making. This problem is exacerbated in the context of cognitive 
technologies that use machine learning algorithms. In fact, in those circumstances, control might 
be distributed across three different agents: the end-user, the malicious hacker and the artificial 
intelligence. This raises the problem of determining and attributing the responsibility of actions 
arising from such triangular dynamics.  
 According to its standard definition (643), dual use risk does not apply exclusively to 
technology cooptation for (cyber)criminal purposes but also to military applications. As our 
analysis describes, intelligent technologies are of primary interest for military and national 
security agencies as these technologies might be applicable to various activities of warfare 
preparation and realization. Our review-based analysis reveals that a wide number of IATs with 
application to dementia and elderly care are currently being tested by military and national 
security agencies. These include EEG-based BCIs, non-invasive neurostimulation devices, 
autonomous robots and wearable exoskeletons. In the military, intelligent technologies 
originally developed for assistive purposes in the civilian sector can be used to provide 
assistance to physically injured or mentally disturbed veterans. In addition, they can be coopted 
for non-assistive purposes including the physical and cognitive enhancement of field 
combatants. It is notable, however, that the dual-use dynamics of IATs is not unidirectional. In 
fact, in parallel to the cooptation of civilian technology for military purposes, a spillover effect 
from the military to various civilian sectors ─especially the clinical sector─ is recognizable. Our 
analysis illustrates that a number of IATs currently under investigation in military research have 
potential applicability as assistive tools for civilians.  Furthermore, advances in military funded 
IAT research are likely to accelerate technological progress and result in more reliable and 
effective clinical applications. This bidirectional dynamics, known as reverse dual-use, 
highlights the complex nature of dual-use challenges in intelligent technology. This complexity 
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needs to be reflected also in ethical evaluations regarding the moral permissibility of dual-use in 
intelligent technology. In fact, overlooking the reverse component of dual-use in intelligent 
technology might result in obliterating the clinical benefits that are likely to result from the 
spillover of advancing military research into the civilian sector. This risk is particularly 
significant in light of global population aging and the increasing burden of dementia and other 
neurological disorders, as these trends are urging the development of innovative and scalable 
solutions. For this reason, we proposed an ethical stance for guiding decision-making in relation 
to dual-use problems in intelligent technology based on calibrated cost-benefit analyses. 
According to this proposal, regulatory and governance strategies should aim at maximizing the 
clinical benefits of IATs for the aging and cognitively disabled population, while minimizing 
unintended risks associated with the military proliferation of these technologies. This will 
require closer ethical oversight on military research and evidence-based approaches to cost-
benefit assessment with particular focus on the prevention of possible human rights violations 
(see next two Chapters). 
 
4.5.2. Informational Privacy and Security  
 
As reported in the previous section, our systematic review results reveal a lack of privacy and 
security by design approaches in current IATs. This finding is consistent with previous evidence 
reporting privacy and security vulnerabilities in various intelligent technology families such as 
care robots (133, 765), wearables (768), BCIs (133, 769), and AALs (133). For example, 
cybersecurity reports evidence that virtually all wearable devices are vulnerable to location 
tracking, data leakage, and other privacy or security weaknesses (768). This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that most of these devices did not have privacy policies (ibid). 
Therefore, the privacy and security of end-users is exposed by a twofold weakness: at the level 
of technology design and at the level of terms of use. As we have discussed in relation to 
malicious brain-hacking, the risks for privacy and security are directly proportional to the degree 
of intrusion into and manipulation of the personal (behavioral and physiological) information of 
users enabled by a certain technology. Consequently, IATs that enable direct connection 
pathways between the human and the machine are at greater risk because they process private 
and sensitive information of the user, including information that is below the user’s threshold of 
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conscious control. This risk is becoming of primary relevance because many human-machine 
interfaces87 and other cognitive technologies developed for assistive purposes have made their 
way onto the market and into the consumer sector. Today, an increasing number of private tech 
companies offer assortments of direct-to-consumer human-machine interfaces (e.g. BCIs and 
wearable activity trackers) that can be purchased without prescription and used without medical 
supervision. Market analyses show that the number of commercially available consumer-grade 
IATs is experiencing exponential growth as these technologies are becoming increasingly 
pervasive (474). In light of unresolved privacy and security vulnerabilities, this pervasive 
proliferation of unsupervised IAT applications is likely to generate insecurity and novel 
opportunities for privacy violation, especially in relation to technologies that process neural 
information or other forms of privacy-sensitive computation (see Tab. 4 at p. 49). For this 
reason, our ethical analysis devoted particular attention to the identification and prevention of 
privacy and security vulnerabilities in current pervasive neurally-controlled IATs. This analysis 
identified structural weaknesses in privacy and security protection at a threefold level: 
technology design, terms of use and international regulation. Overall, these findings attest a 
general unpreparedness of current digital and regulatory infrastructures for the pervasive 
expansion of the IAT market, especially in relation to neurally-controlled technology. 
Furthermore, they confirm a trend identified in the first study Module, namely that the pace of 
technological innovation is way faster than the adaptation of social infrastructures to such 
innovation. In absence of prompt upgrades in ethically sensitive technical requirements, terms of 
service, user policies and general laws, this structural lag risks tempering the social benefits of 
IAT development.  
 
4.5.3. Cognitive Liberty, Mental Privacy and Human Rights Protection 
 
 IATs that enable to record, monitor, decode and modulate electrophysiological activity 
(e.g. BCIs, neurally-controlled exoskeletons etc.) pose a fundamental ethical, legal and social 
challenge: determining whether, or under what conditions, it is legitimate to gain access to or to 
interfere with another person’s electrophysiological ─especially neural─ mechanisms. This 
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question is of primary relevance in the clinical setting. For example, there is controversy among 
researchers about the legitimate degree of interference with the neural activity of a person 
suffering from Parkinson’s disease dementia using deep-brain stimulation (465, 770). Similarly, 
devices that enable continuous non-invasive recording and monitoring of users’ 
electrophysiological activity ─e.g. BCIs, biosensors, physiological monitoring devices and other 
eHealth applications─ raise the question of determining the conditions for legitimate access to 
such activity by third parties. With the increasing commercial pervasiveness of IATs and their 
dual-use potential, these kinds of questions are also arising in extra-clinical contexts such as the 
consumer market and the military.  
 These questions need to be addressed at various levels of jurisprudence, the most 
fundamental of which is the level of basic human rights. In fact, IATs for electrophysiological 
monitoring enable an unprecedented degree of access to the electromechanical underpinnings of 
human personality and behavior, i.e. intimate aspects of the person that are inherent to 
all human beings regardless of nationality, ethnic origin, sex, location of residence, political 
belief, language, or any other status. Therefore, it is critical to determine whether this 
electromechanical dimension should be protected by rights inherent to all human beings 
regardless of their status. This is particularly relevant in relation to neural activity, since this 
type of electrophysiological processing is considered the major causal determinant of mental 
faculties such as memory, personhood, consciousness ─all qualities that characterize human 
identity (138).  
 Our ELSI analysis addressed the question of which rights users are entitled to exercise in 
relation to their private dimension when using activity-tracking IATs, especially those enabling 
neural monitoring. Based on comparative legal research and normative ethical analysis we 
concluded that current trends in IAT might require an evolutionary interpretation of existing 
human rights or even the creation of new human rights. These are: the right to cognitive liberty, 
the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological 
continuity. The right to cognitive liberty protects the right of competent individuals to make free 
and competent decisions regarding their use of IATs. In its negative connotation, it guarantees 
the protection of individuals from the coercive and unconsented use of such technologies by 
third parties such as via malicious hacking. In its positive connotation, vice versa, it protects the 
positive right of competent individuals to freely opt for technology adoption in absence of 
paternalistic constrains. The right to cognitive liberty is particularly important among 
cognitively healthy older adults and people in the early phases of dementia (MCI or AD in 
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CDR-1), since these end-user categories are usually still in possess of mental capacity. In 
contrast, the right to cognitive liberty might be legitimately overridden by health professionals 
in case of mentally incapacitated users, e.g. people with advanced dementia, if this right is in 
conflict with competing principles such safety or beneficence. This is the reason why the right to 
cognitive liberty was presented as a relative, not absolute right.  
 As we have seen in the previous section, the unconsented intrusion by third parties into a 
user’s neural data ─as well as against the unauthorized collection of those data─ open breaches 
for privacy violation. Therefore, our analysis suggests that current privacy rights need to be 
expanded to protect individuals from such intrusions and unauthorized collections. Users of 
neuromonitoring IATs should be entitled to selectively seclude their mental dimension and 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent their neural information can be 
accessed by others. In other words, they should be entitled to exercise a right to mental privacy. 
Similarly, the right to mental integrity, which is already recognized by international law (Article 
3 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights) in relation to the promotion of mental health, 
should be expanded to protect also against illicit and harmful manipulations of users’ mental 
activity such as those resulting from malicious hacking. Under the specific circumstance of 
malicious hacking via output manipulation, a right to psychological continuity might also be 
required to protect users’ personal identity. In fact, as our technical assessment revealed, victims 
of this type of hack might experience diminished conscious control of their behavior and 
unconsented external alteration of their mental life by third parties. In non-criminal contexts, 
this right is also applicable to IATs in which the AI components (e.g. machine learning 
algorithms) can override decisions intended by the user.  
 This proposal is consistent with the widely acknowledged obligation to guarantee that 
users of new technologies are afforded fundamental rights to protect themselves in the digital 
infosphere (647). In particular, it is consistent with Floridi’s proposal “to understand the right to 
informational privacy as a right to personal immunity from unknown, undesired or unintentional 
changes in one’s own identity as an informational entity” (152). Our proposal recognizes that, in 
light of new advances in cognitive technology, the act of collecting, storing, sharing and 
manipulating personal information “amounts now to stages in cloning and breeding someone’s 
personal identity” or “altering her or his nature as an informational entity without consent” 
(ibid). Our proposal should also be viewed in close continuity with repeated calls for adapting 
the human rights framework in response to new developments in cognitive technology, in 
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particular neurotechnogy. For example, CCLE founder88 Wrye Sententia argued that “in 
anticipation of even greater precision in understanding and manipulating higher cognitive 
processes, it is incumbent upon us as a society to anticipate individual rights in relation to these 
developments” (406). Along these lines, Bublitz has argued that this incumbent task should be 
pursued not only in the context of ethical analysis but also and foremost in relation to basic 
human rights (408). This need is urged by a twofold consideration. First, because, with the 
global diffusion of intelligent technology,  ELSI “do not characteristically emerge” only within 
specific “ethical and cultural traditions” (158), but apply to all global users as citizens of the 
digital society. Second, because as Sententia as observed, “the right and freedom to control one's 
own consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is the necessary substrate for just 
about every other freedom” (406). 
 Based on these considerations, this thesis prioritized a legal analysis at the level of 
fundamental rights. However, as already expressed in the Limitations (Chapter 3.3), further 
research should explore the legal significance of cognitive and other intelligent technologies 
also at the level of local jurisdictions and other areas of jurisprudence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics (CCLE) 
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Our findings reveal an urgent need for calibrated and coordinated regulatory strategies to keep 
up with the social impacts of advancing technology. These strategies should be deployed at 
various levels of technology governance including product design, terms of services, clinical 
guidelines, global health policy and international law.   
 At the level of product design, our analysis identified a need for accelerating the 
transition to UCD and VSD and promoting the incorporation of ethical values into technology 
design. For example, affordable hardware and open software were suggested as viable 
specifications that could promote the ethical principles of fairness, equality and distributive 
justice by intervening on technology requirements. Involving end-users in the design process 
through collaborative and participatory dynamics is a primary ethical obligation of IAT 
designers. This participative involvement should be incentivized through calibrated regulatory 
interventions aimed at removing all barriers that currently obstacle the successful realization of 
UCD and VSD in IAT. These include financial (771), conceptual (772), sociocultural (773) and 
logistic barriers (771, 774). IAT designers and manufacturers should be incentivized to develop 
new prototypes in adherence to the needs of end-users, involve them constructively into product 
design and seek adequate clinical validation. In particular, there is an urgent need to foster 
validation studies involving large population samples and clearly defined end-user groups, 
ideally through randomized control trials. To achieve such goal, this thesis has proposed to 
legally require FDA approval for more-than-minimally-invasive intelligent technologies, hence 
expand the FDA regulatory framework for mobile medical applications89. However, such 
calibrated regulatory intervention should be implemented in a manner that does not delay or 
obliterate technological progress. In fact, while quality control is highly required, this should not 
occur at the expenses of innovation.  
After reviewing various approaches to product development, this thesis proposed a 
framework for ethical design in IAT, which was called the Proactive Ethical Design for 
Assistive & Rehabilitation Technology (PED-ART) framework. This framework is 
characterized by four basic normative requirements: minimizing power imbalances in the design 
phase, increasing compliance with ethical norms and values, accelerating translation from the 
designing lab to the clinics and raising awareness at the societal level. This framework was 
conceptualized and firstly operationalized during the 2016 edition of the Cybathlon 
Competition, where the author of this thesis was invited by the event organizers to address 
 
89See FDA Regulation of Mobile Medical Applications: 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/MobileMedicalApplications/ucm255978.htm 
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ethical considerations among the community of IAT biomedical engineers. The event was 
followed by a number of activities for the promotion of ethical design in IAT and biomedical 
engineering. These included a seminar and a workshop held in February 2017 at the Department 
of Engineering Sciences at Uppsala University (Sweden), where the author of this thesis was 
invited to introduce ethical design to graduate students in electronic engineering, biomedical 
engineering and industrial design. Such activities represented an opportunity to operationalize 
the results of this research project as to produce an impact on technology design, development 
and governance.  
In light of the reported absence of protective mechanisms, our analysis also identified an 
urgent need for enhancing the privacy and security of current IAT infrastructures. We concur 
with Bonaci and associates (142), that this should be achieved though the incorporation of 
privacy and security-enhancing specifications in product designs. A closer collaboration 
between technology developers and cybersecurity experts is necessary to embedding privacy 
and security-enhancing safeguards into current products. These might include ─depending on 
the IAT type─ encryption, immunization and distributed ledger systems. Furthermore, 
mechanisms should be put in place by manufacturers to filter out privacy-threatening features 
such as unnecessary location tracking and data leakage. The principles of proportionality and 
legitimate purpose, which are recognized by the EU Data Protection Directive (775), appear to 
offer a useful normative basis to guide design requirements and general regulations. According 
to these principles, the volume and quality of data to be collected by each intelligent technology 
should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the objectives of to the assistive task for which 
that IAT was designed. A positive example of embedding privacy values in design through 
proportionality and legitimate purpose is the BCI Anonymizer, a patented system capable of 
decomposing the recorded neural signals into a collection of characteristic signal components in 
real time (464). From these components, the system can extract information that is necessary to 
a user’s intended BCI commands, while filtering out any unnecessary and disproportionate 
recording (e.g. private and sensitive information). Regulators should carefully consider the 
possibility of developing calibrated regulatory interventions to make basic immunization 
mandatory in future intelligent technologies or to incentivize those companies that prioritize 
immunization on a voluntary basis. This would be particularly important in relation to those 
technologies that enable access to and manipulation of highly private and sensitive information 
(see Tab. 4 at p. 49).  
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While privacy and security by design should be the golden rule, the “fundamental open-
loop characteristics” of most IATs “make inherent safety difficult to achieve” (776). Therefore, 
regulatory interventions at the level of terms of services are also required to prevent 
vulnerability. This is particularly relevant in light of recent evidence showing that most IATs 
lack privacy policies in their terms of use (482).  Therefore, this thesis identified a need for 
expanding and upgrading current terms of service with the purpose of enforcing higher 
standards for privacy and data security protection. Accepting the terms of use of an IAT should 
not expose users to privacy and security risks that are disproportionate to the assistive task of the 
IAT. For example, we have proposed that the terms of service of privacy sensitive intelligent 
technologies should not allow manufacturing companies to share data with third party apps or 
reuse those data for further purposes in absence of explicit consent from the users. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of technologies capable of recording electrophysiological 
signatures of disease or mental states, as this information can lead not only to a loss of privacy 
but also to stigmatization and discrimination. Additionally, we have suggested to eliminate 
forms of implicit coercion currently recognizable in the terms of use of several products. For 
example, companies should not entitle themselves the right to reduce service benefits or disable 
product functionalities if IAT-users refuse the cloud storage of their data, a phenomenon that 
appeared widespread among consumer BCIs. Upgrading the terms of service is a particularly 
important task in the context of direct-to-consumer products, since these are commercially 
available in absence of medical oversight and without provision of adequate information about 
their risks and benefits.  
 Clinical guidelines are also needed to orient ethically responsible implementation of 
IATs in the clinical setting. This thesis has provided a set of guidelines for health professionals 
using socially assistive robotics in elderly and dementia care. These guidelines include (i) 
obtaining iterative informed consent during technology installation and further use as 
recommended by Alzheimer Europe’s best practices, (ii) pursuing the principles of 
transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality when implementing IATs for clinical 
purposes, and (iii) carefully assessing the balance between therapeutic, assistive or psychosocial 
benefits, on the one hand, and potential risks or distress, on the other hand. This latter point also 
involves a continuative evaluation of the patients’ experiences, especially in light of the high 
variability of patients’ preferences and experiences throughout aging and/or dementia 
progression. This proposal is not only theoretical but in the process of translating into an 
actionable deliverable. In fact, the recommendations presented in this thesis have been included 
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by the Foundation for Responsible Robotics (FRR) and The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
into an open consultation document for the development of European standards for robots in 
healthcare. Furthermore, several recommendation presented in this thesis will be incorporated in 
a FRR white paper on the governance of healthcare robots and a related roadmap of guidelines 
for Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) in healthcare settings.  
 At the level of global health policy, this thesis identified a need for health policies that 
promote and facilitate the responsible uptake of IATs among end-users across various patient 
population groups, socioeconomic segments and world regions. These policies are required not 
only to prevent the technological potential of IATs from remaining underused, but also to 
intercept ramping inequalities in technology access and distribution. With the highest relative 
cost increases of dementia and elderly care occurring in developing countries (413) and with fair 
technology access not being a priority for manufacturing companies, there is a risk that the IAT 
revolution might result in exacerbating global inequality and digital divide.  
 Maximizing the benefits of IATs for individuals and society should be the guiding 
principle of technology governance and health policy. To achieve this aim, using technology 
with the aim of compensating for individual deficits should not be the sole legitimate application 
of IATs. In addition to that, the evidence collected in this thesis suggests that the responsible use 
of IATs for prevention and cognitive enhancement purposes could also have a positive impact 
on individual and public health. For example, it was observed that facilitating the use of AI-
mediated cognitive assistants and neuromonitoring IATs among healthy older adults could 
provide these people with increased physical and cognitive wellbeing, prolonged working 
productivity, preserve their social interactions and enable early diagnosis of dementia and other 
cognitive disturbances. Of course, as repeatedly stated in this thesis, such benefits should be 
balanced over the intended and unintended risks associated with IAT use.  
 Finally, at the level of international law, this thesis proposed to open a public debate on 
the evolutionary interpretation or even cautious expansion of international human rights law to 
account for disruptive technological innovation in IAT. This upgrade proposal, which was 
received with great attention from the international press90, would not be historically 
unprecedented since international human rights law has already experienced adaptive 
expansions in response to scientific and technological advances, e.g. in the field of genetic 
engineering (407). Echoing previous calls (406), this thesis argued that emerging trends in IAT 
 
90 Among others The Times, The Independent, and The New Scientist  
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such as neurotechnology, AI and autonomous robotics have a comparable if not superior 
disruptive potential, hence require increased oversight and inclusive approaches to policy and 
governance. This need is particularly relevant in light of recently demonstrated opportunities for 
technology misuse that can result in unprecedented forms of violation of basic rights such as 
privacy, integrity and personal identity. To this purpose, the present thesis has delineated a 
preliminary proposal for upgrading human rights in response to advancing cognitive technology. 
The operationalization of this proposal is currently being discussed as some relevant regulatory 
bodies have expressed interest in this respect. However, for this operationalization to be 
possible, it is necessary to involve more interdisciplinary experts in the debate. A positive step 
in this direction has been taken by Jamais Cascio, senior fellow at the Institute for Ethics and 
Emerging Technologies (IEET) and at the Institute for the Future. In commenting our proposal, 
Cascio has agreed that current digital infrastructures and regulations “are unsuited to this new 
era” and largely endorsed our bid for expanded human rights protection, observing that the new 
rights we propose “are already under threat”. However, he has observed that a number of 
collateral dilemmas arise and need to be promptly addressed, especially in relation to the legal 
permissibility of mandatory technology interventions that might guarantee significant social 
benefit. Therefore, he concluded that we “need to begin discussion now, before these 
technologies spread” (777). In accordance with Cascio’s conclusion, any contribution aimed at 
fostering this debate is welcomed by the author of this thesis.  
 While thoughtful regulatory approaches are highly desirable, this thesis warned 
against the risk of hyper-restrictive policy and governance. In particular, the many proposals for 
a global ban or moratorium against specific IAT types or against their dual-use (778, 779) strike 
as a disproportionate policy solution which risks obliterating the social benefits of IATs. 
Building upon the experience of biosecurity frameworks developed in other areas of science and 
technology, we proposed a framework for risk assessment involving increased monitoring, and 
evidence-based evaluation. Instead of seeking restrictions to technological innovation, policy 
makers should focus their efforts on preventing misuse, guaranteeing fairness and aligning the 
future of IAT with the basic principles of international law. Democratizing technology is the 
buzzword introduced in this thesis to refer to the need for leveraging technological innovation in 
a socially inclusive, ethically responsible, and lawful manner. To this purpose, an approach to 
the democratization of IATs was delineated based on seven normative ethical principles: 
avoidance of centralized control, pervasiveness, openness, transparency, inclusiveness, user-
centeredness and convergence. According the principle of avoiding centralized control, 
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decentralized development models should be privileged over centralized models. Distributed 
computing, especially distributed ledger systems, might represent useful tools to operationalize 
this principle at the technical level. This should be combined with guaranteeing an open and 
pervasive access to intelligent technologies and their computing capabilities for every citizen. 
This thesis has proposed that key components of the design or blueprint of cognitive 
technologies should be open-sourced to promote fairness and limit digital inequality. A virtuous 
example of this principle is Open AI, a nonprofit enterprise dedicated to ensuring that “AI's 
benefits are as widely and evenly distributed as possible”91. In a similar fashion, IBM’s 
“Guiding Ethics Principles for the Cognitive Era” provide a virtuous attempt to fulfil 
transparency and inclusiveness. Regulators should urgently recognize the need for spotting 
trends and anomalies in the algorithms employed in intelligent technology and providing a 
transparent explanation of their reasoning, wherever possible. Failing to do so might result in 
morally opaque human-machine interactions that are potentially detrimental to individuals and 
groups. Finally, increased inclusiveness is needed to avoid implicit biases that might lead to 
social discrimination. While user-centered design remains crucial, the additional creation of 
open platforms for the detection of algorithmic bias, such as the Algorithmic Justice League92, is 
encouraged. This approach was designed to universalize the potential benefits of IATs, ensure a 
fairer distribution and mitigate the risk that such emerging technologies could be coopted for 
malevolent purposes (103, 780). 
 In the near future, an increasing number of aging citizens will become users of intelligent 
technologies. Concurrently, these technologies will become more and more intricately 
intertwined in their life. Therefore, human societies have a moral obligation to make sure the 
benefits of intelligent technology will be fairly and evenly distributed.  
 
 
 
 
91 For further information see: https://openai.com/ 
92 See: https://www.ajlunited.org/ 
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Part 6: Appendixes 
6.1. Appendix 1 – Systematic Review Analysis – Variables Measured in R 
software 
 
▪ Publication year 
▪ Study Type 
▪ Device Type 
▪ Cognitive or Physical function being assisted 
▪ Activity supported/enabled 
▪ Target population 
▪  Publication Year 
o 2000 
o 2001 
o 2002 
o 2003 
o 2004 
o 2005 
o 2006 
o 2007 
o 2008 
o 2009 
o 2010 
o 2011 
o 2012 
o 2013 
o 2014 
o 2015 
o 2016 
▪  Study type 
o Design and/or development 
o Assessment and/or evaluation 
o Both 
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▪  Device types 
o Multimedia 
o Smartphone 
o Tablet 
o Other  
o Distributed System  
o Monitoring System  
o AAL/Smart Homes 
o IoTs 
o Sensor 
o Cognitive Prosthetics 
o Framework 
o Interface 
o Protocol 
o Software 
o Mobile App 
o Web App 
o Other 
o Robot 
o Locomotion system (is this a robot?) exoskeleton/wheelchair/ 
o Rehabilitation machine 
▪  Goal 
• Behavioral monitoring BM 
• Health monitoring HM 
• ADL ASSISTANCE - ADL A 
• MOBILITY – MOB 
• ORIENT NAVIG 
• ALARM 
• SOC INT 
• COG SUPP 
• EMOT SUPP 
Function being assisted 
o Memory 
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o Decision Making  
o Consciousness 
o Reasoning 
o Perception 
o Visual 
o Tactile 
o Auditory 
o Olfactory 
o Orientation and/or spatial navigation 
o Verbal and/or Non-verbal communication 
o Mood and emotional states 
o Locomotion and/or motor control 
o General Purpose 
▪   Activity supported/enabled 
o Activities of Daily Living 
o Hygiene and personal care 
o Reading 
o Fall detection 
o Care and Therapy 
o Health monitoring  
o Environmental and/or sensing and/or monitoring 
o Mood enhancement 
o Social behavior 
o Communication 
o Verbal communication 
o Telephoning 
o Mobility 
o Entertainment 
o Music 
o Art 
o Device control (Human-Machine interaction) 
▪   Target Population 
o Alzheimer’s disease 
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o Mild Cognitive Impairment 
o AD and other dementias 
o Any Cognitive Impairment 
o General elderly and disabled population (GEDB) 
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6.2. Appendix 2: Systematic Review Analysis – List of Logistic Regressions’ 
Source Codes 
 
In Module 1, the following logistic regressions were carried out using the R open-source 
programming language and software environment for statistical computing93.  
 
 
# == Analysis == 
# Logistic regression 
library(xlsx) 
library(rms) 
 
# Read the data into memory 
dataset = read.xlsx(file.choose(),1) 
 
# Compute logistic regression using default GLM model 
model1 = glm(Modelofdevelopment ~ YearofPublication, family = "binomial", data = dataset) 
print(summary(model1)) 
 
# Compute logistic regression using rms' lrm function 
# as it contains more statistics (e.g., pseudo-R2) 
model2 = lrm(Modelofdevelopment ~ YearofPublication, data = dataset, tol = 0) 
print(model2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 For more information see R Foundation for Statistical Computing: https://cran.r-project.org/ 
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6.3. Appendix 3: Qualitative Data Collection – Interview Guide 
 
Title: Intelligent Assistive Technology for Dementia and Neurocognitive Decline 
Study goal: The goal of this study is to examine the attitudes and values of health professionals 
regarding the use of Intelligent Assistive Technology in dementia care.  
 
Interview guide questions 
 
1) Could you briefly explain your profession and your role in dementia care? 
2) What are the major limitations and problems you experience in current dementia care? 
Prompts: 
• Do you perceive a lack of resources and caregiving tools? 
• Did you ever experience caregiving burden? 
• Do you think we could do more to enhance care? 
3) What are the major factors affecting the quality of life of people with dementia? 
4) What are the major components of caregiving burden for caregivers of people with dementia? 
5) Have you ever used any computer technology or robotic system to facilitate the assistance of 
people with dementia or the delivery of care? If yes, could you please tell me more about your 
experience with it? 
6) What is “intelligent technology” for you? 
• (Assistance and hints from the interviewer if needed) 
7) Based on the situation at your unit, how do you think intelligent technology could help improve 
dementia care and the life of people with dementia? 
Prompts: 
• Physical assistance? 
• Care delivery? 
• Cognitive support? 
• Favouring interaction? 
• Quality of life? Quality of care? 
8) How aware are you of current technological availabilities for dementia care? 
Prompts: 
• How many IATs do you think have application to dementia care? 
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• For the compensation of what specific deficits? 
• For the achievement of what caregiving needs? 
9) Have you ever attended a course about assistive technology or had a professional exchange with 
IAT developers and producers? 
10) Have you ever interacted (e.g. during conferences, seminars, informal meetings or as a 
consultant) with IAT designers and developers? 
11) If you could contribute to the design of an IAT for dementia care what would you primarily 
focus on? 
Prompts: 
• What patients’ needs would focus on? What caregivers’ needs? 
• Would you involve patients in the research design to assess the end-users’ needs? 
12) If you could contribute to the development and implementation of an IAT, what would your 
major concern be? 
Prompts: 
• Logistics issues 
• Financial issues 
• Ethical issues 
13) At the ethical level, what is of greater concern? And why? 
Prompts: 
• Privacy, Information Security, Hacking 
• Human dignity and dehumanization of care 
• Autonomy and independence of the patient 
• Affordability, equality and justice 
• Beneficence and best interest of the patient 
 
14)  What strategies, in your view, could facilitate the incorporation of patients’ and caregivers’ 
needs/views into the design of future technologies? 
15) How do you imagine dementia care and, specifically, your profession in 20 years? 
Prompts:  
• In the light of demographic trends 
• In the light of technology development 
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Before I end our discussion, I would like to ask whether you have anything that you would like 
to add concerning your experience with people with dementia, the major care needs and your 
prospects for the future.  
 
Please feel free to contact me marcello.ienca@unibas.ch or if you have questions and need to 
discuss the study. Here is my university business card for further inquiries. 
Thank You. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 391 
 
6.4. Appendix 4: Qualitative Data Collection – Invitation to Participate 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Marcello Ienca. I am a researcher at the Institute for Biomedical Ethics, University 
of Basel, Switzerland. We are currently carrying out a study on “Intelligent Assistive 
Technology for Elderly and Dementia Care“.  
 
This information is being given to you because I wish to invite you to participate in this study.  
The goal of this study is to examine the needs, attitudes and values of health professionals in 
Europe regarding the use of Intelligent Assistive Technology in elderly and dementia care. The 
study seeks to explore their views, attitudes and levels of awareness towards Intelligent 
Assistive Technologies (IATs) for elderly and dementia care. This knowledge is critical to 
understand how IATs should be designed, developed and implemented in a manner that 
maximizes their benefits for patients and caregivers.  
  
To this purpose, I would like to invite you to participate in an in-depth interview (IDI) with me 
at a time, place or system of communication of your convenience.   The IDI would last for 
between 20 and 30 minutes. In case you won’t be able to attend a face-to-face meeting, the 
interview could be also performed via telephone or online (e.g. via Skype or alike). Before the 
IDI, I will thoroughly explain the study once again and complete the informed consent process.  
 
Your responses will be protected through utmost confidentiality of subject data. In particular, 
study codes will be applied on data documents and identifiable data will be encrypted. In 
addition, data documents will be securely stored within locked locations and security codes will 
be assigned to computerized records. Confidentiality of information collected from research 
participants will be maintained throughout the entire study. Only the investigator(s) or 
individuals of the research team can identify the responses of individual subjects 
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Please note that your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. It is your choice to decide 
whether you wish to participate or not. The choice that you make will have no bearing on your 
job or on any work-related evaluations or reports. If you decide to participate now but change 
your mind later, you have the right to withdraw at any time. 
 
I look forward to your response. I would be highly thankful if you would inform me about your 
decision in a week’s time. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you have any questions or 
doubts.  
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Marcello Ienca, M.Sc., M.A. 
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6.5. Appendix 5 - Participant Information and Informed Consent Document 
 
Title: Intelligent Assistive Technology for Dementia and Neurocognitive Decline 
 
Dear Participants, 
 
My name is Marcello Ienca. I am a PhD candidate at the Institute for Biomedical Ethics, 
University of Basel, Switzerland. I am doing a research on the use of Intelligent Assistive 
Technologies (IATs) for dementia and neurocognitive decline. This research is necessary for the 
completion of my PhD program at the University of Basel.  
 
Below is information about this study that will inform you on the study purpose and your rights 
as a research participant. Please feel free to contact me via email or phone, if anything is unclear 
to you.  
 
Purpose of research  
The goal of this study is to understand the needs, views, attitudes, and expectations European 
experts, researchers and health professionals involved in dementia and elderly care regarding the 
use of IATs. The study seeks to explore what values, considerations and care needs are critical 
to maximize the possible benefits of these technologies for patients and caregivers. 
  
Voluntary participation 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is your choice to decide whether you 
wish to participate or not. The choice that you make will have no bearing on your job or on any 
work-related evaluations or reports. If you decide to participate now but change your mind later, 
you have the right to withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Study participants 
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For this study, participants will be health professionals working in dementia care or elderly care 
belonging to the following categories: 
Doctors (MDs) with specialization in geriatrics, psychiatry, or neurology and with direct 
professional experience in the assistance and care of older adults with dementia or other 
neurocognitive disability.  
Neuropsychologists, psychologists, and psychotherapists.  
Specialized nurses with direct professional experience in the assistance and care of older adults 
with dementia or other neurocognitive disability.  
Rehabilitation and occupational therapists with professional experience in the assistance and 
care of older adults with dementia or other neurocognitive disability.  
 
Reason for participating 
You are being requested to take part in this research because you belong to one of the three 
categories mentioned above and are thus qualified to participate in this research. By taking part 
in this research, you are contributing to the understanding of the specific care needs and 
considerations that are relevant to the correct design, development and implementation of IATs 
in dementia care. The knowledge generated by your participation in this research may be used to 
inform the creation and use of assistive devices that better match the care needs of people living 
with dementia and their carers. On the long term, this might result in improving the quality of 
care and the quality of life of this vulnerable patient population.   
 
Research Procedure 
This research includes a one-on-one in-depth interview (IDIs). The in-depth interview will take 
approximately 30 - 40 minutes). Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to 
withdraw from the study anytime. 
 
Questions will regard your professional dimension and the context of elderly and dementia care. 
During and after the recording of the interview your anonymity will be protected.  
 
In case you have any doubt or curiosity as well as in case you may want to ask questions 
yourself, you are free to ask me anytime – including during the interview. In case you are not 
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familiar with one of the notions or concepts referred to in my interview questions, I will provide 
conceptual clarification.  
 
Risk 
Both the questionnaire and the interview questions will focus on your professional experience 
and will not directly allude to private or sensitive issues. There is a possibility that you may 
share some personal or confidential information unintentionally, or that you may feel 
uncomfortable recalling some events of your professional life in the context of dementia care. 
However, you are free to decline to answer any question you feel uncomfortable with. In 
addition, your anonymity will be strictly protected and your responses will not by identifiable by 
anyone except the Project Leader (MI).  
 
Benefit 
There will be no direct benefit to you, but your participation may help us find out more about 
how to design, develop and use IATs that better match the care needs of people living with 
dementia and their carers. On the long term, this might result in improving the quality of care 
and the quality of life of this vulnerable patient population.   
 
Incentive/compensation 
No financial compensation will be given for taking part in this study. However, interviews 
participants will be provided with light refreshment during the course of the 
discussion/interview.  
 
Confidentiality 
The entire discussion and interview will be tape-recorded upon your consent, but no one will be 
identified by name in the tape. Consequently, your responses will not by identifiable by anyone 
except the interviewer (myself). During the discussion and interview no one else but the people, 
who take part in the discussion and interview, will be present. You have the right to request for 
the destruction of your recorded interview tape if you do not want to continue in the study. 
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Your responses will be protected through utmost confidentiality of subject data. In particular, 
study codes will be applied on data documents and identifiable data will be encrypted. In 
addition, data documents will be securely stored within locked locations and security codes will 
be assigned to computerized records. Confidentiality of information collected from research 
participants will be maintained throughout the entire study. Only the investigator(s) or 
individuals of the research team can identify the responses of individual subjects. The tapes will 
be destroyed after the completion of my PhD program at a specified time by the Institute for 
Biomedical Ethics, University of Basel, Switzerland. 
 
Project Financing: This study is funded by the Institute for Biomedical Ethics, University of 
Basel, Bernoullistrasse 28, CH 4056, Basel - Switzerland. 
 
Who to Contact 
If you have any questions, you can ask us now or later. If you wish to ask questions later, you 
may contact any of the following: 
 
Marcello Ienca 
Institute for Biomedical Ethics 
Bernoullistrasse 28, CH 4056,  
University of Basel, Switzerland. 
Phone: +41 (0)61 267 17 85 
E-mail address: marcello.ienca@unibas.ch 
 
Prof. Dr. med. Reto W. Kressig 
Supervisor 
Chair of Geriatrics, University of Basel, Switzerland  
University Center for Medicine of Aging, Felix Platter Hospital, Basel, Switzerland 
Phone number: +41 (0)61 265 29 98 
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E-mail: RetoW.Kressig@fps-basel.ch  
 
Prof. Dr. med. Bernice Simone Elger  
Head of Department 
Institute for Biomedical Ethics,  
Bernoullistrasse 28, CH 4056, 
University of Basel, Switzerland. 
Phone number: +41 (0)61 267 17 78 
E-Mail: b.elger@unibas.ch 
 
Participant’s consent to participate 
 
I confirm that the researcher has done the following: 
Informed me orally and in writing of the purpose and structure of the study. 
Answered all my questions about participating in the research to my satisfaction.  
Stated that I can keep the written participation information and my declaration of consent.  
 
Based on the study information provided above, I state that: 
I am participating in the study of my own free will.  
I understand that I can withdraw my consent to take part at any time without explaining my 
reason for doing so, and without being put at a disadvantage of any form. 
I have been given sufficient time to reach a decision. 
I therefore consent to take part in this study. 
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Participants 
Last name and first name (Please print): 
 
 
Place, date Signature of study participants 
 
 
 
 
Confirmation by investigator: 
 I hereby confirm that I have explained the significance and implication of the study to the 
participant. I affirm that I will fulfil the entire obligation connected with this study in 
accordance with applicable law. If at any time during the study I am made aware of any aspect 
that could influence the participant’s willingness to take part in the study, I will inform her 
immediately. 
 
Place, date Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6. Appendix 6: Qualitative Data Collection – Protocoll Snyopsis Submitted for Approval 
to the Ethikkommission Nordwest- und Zentralschweiz (EKNZ) 
 
Project Leader Marcello Ienca (M.Sc., M.A.) 
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Sponsor/Sponsor-
Investigator 
Prof. Dr. med. Bernice Elger (M.D., PhD) 
Study Title: Intelligent Assistive Technology for Dementia and Neurocognitive 
Disability  
Short Title/Study 
ID: 
INTEND 
Protocol Version and 
Date: 
Version 1; July 26, 2016   
Study Category with 
Rationale 
(A) Research project in which qualitative interviews and survey 
questionnaires are conducted with healthy subjects (health 
professionals working in dementia care) 
 
Background and 
Rationale: 
With the growing prevalence of dementia and neurocognitive 
disability worldwide, the massive deployment of Intelligent 
Assistive Technologies (IATs) represents a revolutionary solution 
to increase the quality of life and quality of care of people with 
dementia and reduce burden on caregivers. However, the 
translation of IAT into the clinical practice of dementia care is still 
reportedly low. In our study we investigate the views and attitudes 
of health professionals working in dementia care in order to 
explore their perceived care needs, predict determinants of low 
adoption and understand what considerations should be 
incorporated into IATs to maximize the benefits of these 
technologies among dementia patients and their caregivers. 
Objective(s): The objective of this study is investigate the views and attitudes of 
professional caregivers of older adults with dementia in order to 
explore their perceived care needs, predict determinants of low 
adoption and understand what clinical, logistical and ethical-social 
evaluations should be incorporated into IATs to maximize the 
benefits of these technologies for dementia patients and their 
caregivers. 
Outcomes  On the short term, the knowledge produced by this study will 
contribute to the understanding of (i) what factors are currently 
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 delaying the adoption of IATs as part of standard clinical practice, 
(ii) what features should be incorporated in IAT designs in order to 
better match care needs, hence increase their clinical effectiveness, 
and (iii) what ethical-social considerations should be prioritized 
when using IATs in the clinical setting.  
On the long term, the knowledge produced by this study could 
favour the design and development of IATs that better match care 
needs and provide a greater assistive benefit for elders with 
dementia and their caregivers. 
Study Design Mixed method research that integrates quantitative (survey 
questionnaire) and qualitative (in-depth interviews) data within a 
sequential design. Following previous studies (781-784), the 
sampling will be purposive in nature, a form of non-probability 
sampling method. Respondents will be divided into the following 
three segments: doctors (e.g. geriatricians, neurologists, 
psychiatrists), nurses and occupational/rehabilitation therapists.  
Inclusion/Exclusion 
Criteria 
The project population comprises health professionals working in 
Switzerland as formal caregivers of elderly patients with dementia. 
Participants will be further divided into three sub-segments: (i) 
doctors (e.g. neurologists, geriatricians and psychiatrists); (ii) 
nurses; and (iii) rehabilitation and occupational therapists. 
Measurements and 
Procedures: 
A two-phase iterative data collection strategy will be adopted. In 
the first phase, a survey questionnaire will be administered both 
online and in printed version among 150 health professionals 
working in dementia care in Switzerland (50 participants for each 
sub-segment). Survey questions will be close-ended, and the 
response categories are developed in accordance with previous 
well-validated sources.In the second phase, in-depth qualitative 
interviews will be performed with 20 health professionals working 
in dementia care, recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Study 
Product/Intervention  
Survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews 
Number of 
Participants with 
Rationale (if no 
Power Analysis 
The overall number of participants projected for the entire study is 
150-170. 150 health professionals will be recruited for the survey 
questionnaire, 50 for each population sub-segment (doctors, 
nurses, care therapists). 20 health professionals will be recruited 
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conducted): for the in-depth interviews. Sample size of each study component 
is calibrated based on previous study (781-784).   
Study Duration: 1 year 
Study Schedule: Month Year of First-Participant-In:  October 2016 
Month Year of Last-Participant-Out: February 2017 
Completion of Data Analysis: July 2017 
End of the Project: October 2017 
Investigator(s): Marcello Ienca 
Institute for Biomedical Ethics 
Bernoullistrasse 28, CH 4056,  
University of Basel, Switzerland. 
Phone: +41 (0)61 267 17 85 
E-mail address: marcello.ienca@unibas.ch 
 
Prof. Dr. med. Reto W. Kressig 
Supervisor 
Chair of Geriatrics, University of Basel, Switzerland  
University Center for Medicine of Aging, Felix Platter Hospital, 
Basel, Switzerland 
Phone number: +41 (0)61 265 29 98 
E-mail: RetoW.Kressig@fps-basel.ch  
 
Prof. Dr. med. Bernice Simone Elger  
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Head of Department 
Institute for Biomedical Ethics,  
Bernoullistrasse 28, CH 4056, 
University of Basel, Switzerland. 
Phone number: +41 (0)61 267 17 78 
E-Mail: b.elger@unibas.ch 
 
Study Centre(s): Multi-centre 
Data will be collected from health professionals from 5 major 
centres in Basel (University Hospital, Memory Clinic, Felix Platter 
Hospital), Aarau (Psychiatrische Dienste Aargau AG, Memory 
Clinic), Luzern (Memory Clinic Zentralschweiz), Olten (Olten), 
Zürich (Psychiatrische Universitätsklinik, Memory Clinic Rehalp).  
GCP Statement: This study will be conducted in compliance with the protocol, the 
current version of the Declaration of Helsinki, the ICH-GCP or 
ISO EN 14155 (as far as applicable) as well as all national legal 
and regulatory requirements.  
 
 
 
Explanation for the Inclusion of vulnerable Subjects (if applicable): No vulnerable subjects 
will be involved in the study.  
  
Recruitment Procedure: The invitation letter (in attachment) will be sent to target respondents 
both in printed and online form. Personal delivery in loco will be performed in case the other 
strategies are not applicable.  
Informed consent will be obtained from all participants involved in the research project (see 
enclosed Informed Consent Form). Participants will be extensively informed about the research 
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project (what data will be collected, how, by whom and for what purposes) and consent will be 
sought for general and further reuse of data from each participant following research ethics 
guidelines. No monetary compensation for participants is foreseen.  
 
Study Procedure: A sequential data collection strategy will be adopted to perform a data 
collection in an iterative process. In-depth qualitative interviews will be performed with 20 
health professionals working in dementia care. Interviews will be recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Data analysis will be performed on both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
Interviews will be recorded, transcribed verbatim using the F4 software (equipped with headset 
and foot pedal) and analyzed assisted by MaxQDA. Transcripts will be searched for common 
thematic elements by using thematic analysis. The themes and subthemes will be coded as 
recurring motifs in the text and will be identified through a thorough reading of the transcripts.  
This framework will be then applied to the data, which will be organized initially into the 
following core themes: (i) technical/functional evaluations, (ii) psychosocial evaluations, (iii) 
ethical evaluations and (iv) other. 
 
Risks/ Inconveniences, which are Study specific: The study does not involve any increased 
risk for the physical and psychological safety of research participants. To guarantee the privacy 
and security of collected data, interviews will be anonymized and data will be coded and 
securely archived by the Project Leader.  
 
Coverage of Damages: Yes 
 
Storage of Data-and Samples for Future Research Aims: No  
 
Individual participant medical information obtained as a result of this research project is 
considered confidential and disclosure to third parties will not occur. Participant confidentiality 
will be further ensured by utilising identification code numbers to correspond to information in 
the computer files. 
 
Ethical Considerations: 
The relevance of this study chiefly relies in the oft stated demand of making IATs more user-
oriented, hence more capable to fulfil unmet clinical, technological and psychosocial needs in 
 404 
 
the context of dementia care (75, 107, 167). On the long term, this project has the potential to 
change the way IATs for elders with dementia are developed and implemented, and maximize 
their potential benefit at the individual, familial, and societal levels. At the micro-level, it will 
gather data on to use IATs with the purpose of improving the quality of life of older patients and 
thereby, promote healthy and successful aging-in-place. At the familial level, the study stands to 
provide information to help alleviate caregiving burden, and for the society at large, cost-
reduction for public finances. 
The probability and magnitude of physical or psychological harm anticipated in the research 
(survey questionnaires and interviews) are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life. 
Possible risks associated with this study include the risk of unauthorised data access and/or 
unwanted identification of project participants. Risks to project participants will be minimised 
by anonymizing interviewees and by utilising identification code numbers to correspond to 
information in the computer files. 
No immediate benefit to the project participant is foreseen. However, the results of the project 
could benefit health professionals working in dementia care as well as dementia patients since 
they could lead to a better understanding of the possible uses of IAT, their adaptation to 
caregiving needs, hence resulting in a more effective and successful integration of IAT into 
dementia care and standard clinical practice. On the long term, research results could lead to 
increase societal uptake of IATs, reduced caregiving burden among formal and informal 
caregivers, and improved wellbeing of people living with dementia and neurocognitive 
disability.  
The research project will be carried out in accordance to the research plan and with principles 
enunciated in the current version of the Declaration of Helsinki (DoH), the Essentials of Good 
Epidemiological Practice issued by Public Health Schweiz (EGEP), the Swiss Law and Swiss 
regulatory authority’s requirements as applicable. The EKNZ and regulatory authorities will be 
informed about project start, termination and possible amendments to the project design. 
Commencement of this research project is conditional of the documented decision of the EC 
(and if applicable the FOPH) concerning the conduct of the project. The researchers will only 
begin the data collection once approval from all required authorities has been received.  
 
 
 
 
 405 
 
Full Reference List 
 
1. M. Ienca, T. Wangmo, F. Jotterand, R. W. Kressig, B. Elger, Ethical Design of 
Intelligent Assistive Technologies for Dementia: A Descriptive Review. Science and 
Engineering Ethics,  (2017). 
2. A. J. Bharucha et al., Intelligent Assistive Technology Applications to Dementia Care: 
Current Capabilities, Limitations, and Future Challenges. American Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry 17, 88-104 (2009). 
3. D. Moher, A. Liberati, J. Tetzlaff, D. G. Altman, Preferred reporting items for systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. Annals of internal medicine 151, 
264-269 (2009). 
4. M. Ienca et al., Intelligent assistive technology for Alzheimer’s disease and other 
dementias: a systematic review. Journal of Alzheimer's Disease 56, 1301-1340 (2017). 
5. K. Olson, Essentials of qualitative interviewing.  (Routledge, 2016). 
6. M. Ienca et al., Intelligent Assistive Technology for Alzheimer's Disease and Other 
Dementias: A Systematic Review. Journal of Alzheimer's disease : JAD 56, 1301-1340 
(2017). 
7. C. Daly, An introduction to philosophical methods.  (Broadview Press, 2010). 
8. F. Brom, R. van Est, in Encyclopedia of applied ethics. (Elsevier, Amsterdam:, 2011). 
9. E. Palm, S. O. Hansson, The case for ethical technology assessment (eTA). Technol. 
Forecast. Soc. Change 73, 543-558 (2006). 
10. World Health Organization, Ageing and health (2015 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs404/en/). 
11. W. Lutz, W. Sanderson, S. Scherbov, The coming acceleration of global population 
ageing. Nature 451, 716 (2008). 
12. W. H. Organization, World report on ageing and health.  (World Health Organization, 
2015). 
13. B. Rechel et al., Ageing in the European union. The Lancet 381, 1312-1322 (2013). 
14. Eurostat. (European Commission Luxembourg, 2017). 
15. WHO, World Health Statistics 2016: Monitoring Health for the SDGs Sustainable 
Development Goals.  (World Health Organization, 2016). 
16. Population Division, World Population Ageing (2015 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/ageing/WPA2015_
Report.pdf). 
17. SAMW, S. A. o. M. Sciences, Ed. (Käthe-Zingg-Schwichtenberg-Fonds, 2017). 
18. R. Tarricone, A. D. Tsouros, Home care in Europe: the solid facts.  (WHO Regional 
Office Europe, 2008). 
19. T. A. Salthouse, When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of aging 
30, 507-514 (2009). 
20. M. Ienca, D. M. Shaw, B. Elger, Cognitive enhancement for the ageing world: 
opportunities and challenges. Ageing & Society, 1-14 (2018). 
21. S. Banerjee, Multimorbidity—older adults need health care that can count past one. The 
Lancet 385, 587-589 (2015). 
22. WHO, "Neurological disorders: public health challenges,"  (World Health Organization, 
Brussels/Geneva, 2006). 
23. T. Niccoli, L. Partridge, Ageing as a Risk Factor for Disease. Current Biology 22, R741-
R752 (2012). 
 406 
 
24. T. R. Insel, B. N. Cuthbert, Brain disorders? Precisely. Science 348, 499-500 (2015). 
25. H. Frankish, R. Horton, Prevention and management of dementia: a priority for public 
health. The Lancet 390, 2614-2615 (2017). 
26. A. s. Association, 2017 Alzheimer's disease facts and figures. Alzheimer's & Dementia 
13, 325-373 (2017). 
27. R. Brookmeyer, E. Johnson, K. Ziegler-Graham, H. M. Arrighi, Forecasting the global 
burden of Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer's & dementia 3, 186-191 (2007). 
28. A. Reeve, E. Simcox, D. Turnbull, Ageing and Parkinson's disease: Why is advancing 
age the biggest risk factor? Ageing Research Reviews 14, 19-30 (2014). 
29. P. B. Gorelick, Risk factors for vascular dementia and Alzheimer disease. Stroke 35, 
2620-2622 (2004). 
30. C. Clarke, R. Howard, M. Rossor, S. Shorvon, Neurology: a queen square textbook.  
(John Wiley & Sons, 2016). 
31. M. Kelly-Hayes, Influence of Age and Health Behaviors on Stroke Risk: Lessons from 
Longitudinal Studies. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 58, S325-S328 (2010). 
32. WHO, Mental health and older adults.  (2000). 
33. C. f. D. C. a. Prevention, "Data & Statistics Fatal Injury Report for 2015,"  (2015). 
34. M. DiLuca, J. Olesen, The Cost of Brain Diseases: A Burden or a Challenge? Neuron 82, 
1205-1208 (2014). 
35. M. D. Hurd, P. Martorell, A. Delavande, K. J. Mullen, K. M. Langa, Monetary costs of 
dementia in the United States. New England Journal of Medicine 368, 1326-1334 
(2013). 
36. M. Prince et al., World Alzheimer Report 2015—The global impact of dementia: an 
analysis of prevalence, incidence, cost and trends. Alzheimer's Disease International, 
London,  (2015). 
37. M. Ienca, F. Jotterand, C. Vică, B. Elger, Social and Assistive Robotics in Dementia 
Care: Ethical Recommendations for Research and Practice. International Journal of 
Social Robotics 8, 565-573 (2016). 
38. P. P. Vitaliano, E. Strachan, E. Dansie, J. Goldberg, D. Buchwald, Does caregiving 
cause psychological distress? The case for familial and genetic vulnerabilities in female 
twins. Annals of Behavioral Medicine 47, 198-207 (2014). 
39. S. Sörensen, Y. Conwell, Issues in Dementia Caregiving: Effects on Mental and Physical 
Health, Intervention Strategies, and Research Needs. The American journal of geriatric 
psychiatry : official journal of the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry 19, 
491-496 (2011). 
40. R. Schulz, L. M. Martire, Family caregiving of persons with dementia: prevalence, 
health effects, and support strategies. The American journal of geriatric psychiatry 12, 
240-249 (2004). 
41. WHO, Dementia: a public health priority.  (World Health Organization, 2012). 
42. R. Bhimani, Understanding the Burden on Caregivers of People with 
Parkinson&#x2019;s: A Scoping Review of the Literature. Rehabilitation Research and 
Practice 2014, 8 (2014). 
43. H. Frankish, R. Horton, Prevention and management of dementia: a priority for public 
health. The Lancet,  (2017). 
44. OECD, Emerging Trends in Biomedicine and Health Technology Innovation.  (OECD 
Publishing, 2013). 
45. J. Marescaux et al., Transatlantic robot-assisted telesurgery. Nature 413, 379 (2001). 
46. M. Hanoon, UV light disinfection robots help to overpower pathogens. OR manager 31, 
24 (2015). 
 407 
 
47. N. Khader, A. Lashier, S. W. Yoon, Pharmacy robotic dispensing and planogram 
analysis using association rule mining with prescription data. Expert Sys Appl 57, 296-
310 (2016). 
48. R. Bemelmans, G. J. Gelderblom, P. Jonker, L. De Witte, Socially assistive robots in 
elderly care: A systematic review into effects and effectiveness. Journal of the American 
Medical Directors Association 13, 114-120. e111 (2012). 
49. T. P. Moran, P. Dourish, Introduction to this special issue on context-aware computing. 
Human–Computer Interaction 16, 87-95 (2001). 
50. C. Orwat, A. Graefe, T. Faulwasser, Towards pervasive computing in health care – A 
literature review. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 8, 26 (2008). 
51. K. Morris, New-wave neurotechnology: Small-scale makes big promises. The Lancet 
Neurology 3, 202 (2004). 
52. T. R. Insel, S. C. Landis, F. S. Collins, The NIH brain initiative. Science 340, 687-688 
(2013). 
53. A. V. Pedro, Coping with Brain Disorders using Neurotechnology. The Malaysian 
journal of medical sciences: MJMS 19, 1-3 (2012). 
54. R. Yuste, C. Bargmann, Toward a Global BRAIN Initiative. Cell 168, 956-959 (2017). 
55. N. J. Nilsson, Principles of artificial intelligence.  (Morgan Kaufmann, 2014). 
56. K.-R. Müller et al., Machine learning for real-time single-trial EEG-analysis: from 
brain–computer interfacing to mental state monitoring. Journal of neuroscience methods 
167, 82-90 (2008). 
57. R. Kurzweil, The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology.  (Penguin, 2005). 
58. B. Goertzel, C. Pennachin, Artificial general intelligence.  (Springer, 2007), vol. 2. 
59. N. Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies.  (OUP Oxford, 2014). 
60. S. Russell, Artificial intelligence: The future is superintelligent. Nature 548, 520-521 
(2017). 
61. R. High, The era of cognitive systems: An inside look at ibm watson and how it works. 
IBM Corporation, Redbooks,  (2012). 
62. T. B. Murdoch, A. S. Detsky, The inevitable application of big data to health care. Jama 
309, 1351-1352 (2013). 
63. A. Pannu, Artificial intelligence and its application in different areas. Artificial 
Intelligence 4,  (2015). 
64. P. Hamet, J. Tremblay, Artificial intelligence in medicine. Metabolism 69, S36-S40 
(2017). 
65. A. M. Turing, Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59, 433-460 (1950). 
66. A. s. Association, 2016 Alzheimer's disease facts and figures. Alzheimer's & Dementia 
12, 459-509 (2016). 
67. M. E. Pollack, in User Modeling 2007, Proceedings, C. Conati, K. McCoy, G. Paliouras, 
Eds. (2007), vol. 4511, pp. 5-6. 
68. M. J. Prince, World Alzheimer Report 2015: the global impact of dementia: an analysis 
of prevalence, incidence, cost and trends.  (Alzheimer's Disease International, 2015). 
69. P. Moore, F. Xhafa, L. Barolli, A. Thomas, in P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet 
Computing (3PGCIC), 2013 Eighth International Conference on. (2013), pp. 128-135. 
70. A. Mihailidis, G. R. Fernie, J. C. Barbenel, The use of artificial intelligence in the design 
of an intelligent cognitive orthosis for people with dementia. Assistive Technology 13, 
23-39 (2001). 
71. T.-S. Lee et al., Efficacy and usability of a brain-computer interface system in improving 
cognition in the elderly. Alzheimer's & Dementia: The Journal of the Alzheimer's 
Association 9, P296 (2013). 
 408 
 
72. R. Ferrucci et al., ID 303–Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) in patients with 
frontotemporal dementia. Clinical Neurophysiology 127, e100 (2016). 
73. M. E. Pollack, Intelligent technology for an aging population: The use of AI to assist 
elders with cognitive impairment. AI Magazine 26, 9-24 (2005). 
74. C. N. Xenakidis, A. M. Hadjiantonis, G. M. Milis, in Handbook of Research on 
Innovations in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Dementia. (IGI Global, 2015), pp. 269-
289. 
75. A. J. Bharucha et al., Intelligent assistive technology applications to dementia care: 
current capabilities, limitations, and future challenges. The American journal of geriatric 
psychiatry : official journal of the American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry 17, 88-
104 (2009). 
76. Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, With Respect to Old Age: Long Term Care: 
Rights and Responsibilities: a Report. Alternative models of care for older people 
(0101419236, 1999). 
77. M. Marshall, ASTRID: A guide to using technology within dementia care. London: 
Hawker Puplications 31,  (2000). 
78. V. Leuty, J. Boger, L. Young, J. Hoey, A. Mihailidis, Engaging older adults with 
dementia in creative occupations using artificially intelligent assistive technology. 
Assistive Technology 25, 72-79 (2013). 
79. G. F. Coulouris, J. Dollimore, T. Kindberg, Distributed systems: concepts and design.  
(pearson education, 2005). 
80. M. Dascal, I. E. Dror, The impact of cognitive technologies: Towards a pragmatic 
approach. Pragmatics & Cognition 13, 451-457 (2005). 
81. W. Carswell et al., A review of the role of assistive technology for people with dementia 
in the hours of darkness. Technology and Health Care 17, 281-304 (2009). 
82. J. Kaye, in Supporting people with dementia using pervasive health technologies. 
(Springer, 2010), pp. 221-234. 
83. P. Ralph, Y. Wand, A proposal for a formal definition of the design concept. Design 
requirements engineering: A ten-year perspective 14, 103-136 (2009). 
84. F. Baumann, T. Friehe, Design standards and technology adoption: welfare effects of 
increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous. Environmental 
Economics and Policy Studies 19, 427-450 (2017). 
85. E. Stojmenova, B. Imperl, T. Žohar, D. Dinevski, Adapted user-centered design: a 
strategy for the higher user acceptance of innovative e-health services. Future internet 4, 
776-787 (2012). 
86. E. Krajnc, J. Feiner, S. Schmidt, User centered interaction design for mobile applications 
focused on visually impaired and blind people. HCI in Work and Learning, Life and 
Leisure, 195-202 (2010). 
87. J. L. Pons, Rehabilitation exoskeletal robotics. IEEE Engineering in Medicine and 
Biology Magazine 29, 57-63 (2010). 
88. J. H. Baik, H. H. Kim, paper presented at the The 16th pacific basin nuclear conference 
Pacific partnership toward a sustainable nuclear future, Japan,  2008. 
89. M. Naylor et al., Advancing Alzheimer's Diagnosis, Treatment and Care: 
Recommendations from the Ware Invitational Summit. Alzheimer's & dementia : the 
journal of the Alzheimer's Association 8, 445-452 (2012). 
90. P. Brey, Values in technology and disclosive computer ethics. The Cambridge handbook 
of information and computer ethics, 41-58 (2010). 
91. K. E. Himma, H. T. Tavani, The handbook of information and computer ethics.  (John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008). 
 409 
 
92. B. Friedman, P. Kahn, A. Borning, Value sensitive design: Theory and methods. 
University of Washington technical report, 02-12 (2002). 
93. A. Karr, in IX Interactions. (2014), vol. 2014. 
94. P.-P. Verbeek, Materializing morality: Design ethics and technological mediation. 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 31, 361-380 (2006). 
95. B. Friedman, P. H. Kahn Jr, A. Borning, A. Huldtgren, in Early engagement and new 
technologies: Opening up the laboratory. (Springer, 2013), pp. 55-95. 
96. D. F. Mahoney et al., In-home monitoring of persons with dementia: Ethical guidelines 
for technology research and development. Alzheimer's & Dementia 3, 217-226 (2007). 
97. S. Pakrasi, O. Burmeister, J. Coppola, T. McCallum, G. Loeb, Ethical telehealth design 
for users with dementia. Gerontechnology 13, 383-387 (2015). 
98. F. Nijboer, Technology transfer of brain-computer interfaces as assistive technology: 
barriers and opportunities. Ann. Phys. Rehabil. Med. 58, 35-38 (2015). 
99. F. Nijboer, D. Plass-Oude Bos, Y. Blokland, R. van Wijk, J. Farquhar, Design 
requirements and potential target users for brain-computer interfaces–recommendations 
from rehabilitation professionals. Brain-Computer Interfaces 1, 50-61 (2014). 
100. P. Brey, Disclosive computer ethics. ACM Sigcas Computers and Society 30, 10-16 
(2000). 
101. D. Castelvecchi, Can we open the black box of AI? Nature News 538, 20 (2016). 
102. P. Feng, Rethinking technology, revitalizing ethics: Overcoming barriers to ethical 
design. Science and Engineering Ethics 6, 207-220 (2000). 
103. S. Goering, R. Yuste, On the Necessity of Ethical Guidelines for Novel 
Neurotechnologies. Cell 167, 882-885 (2016). 
104. P. E. Ekmekci, M. Oral, E. S. Yurdakul, A Qualitative Evaluation of Ethics Educational 
Program in Health Science(). Medicine and law 34, 217-228 (2015). 
105. B. Kramer, Dementia caregivers in Germany and their acceptance of new technologies 
for care: the information gap. Public Policy & Aging Report 24, 32-34 (2013). 
106. P. Domenig, B. Black, D. Johnston, C. Lyketsos, Prevalence and Perception of Assistive 
Technology in the care of Patients with Dementia.  (2016). 
107. B. Kramer, Dementia caregivers in Germany and their acceptance of new technologies 
for care: the information gap. Public Policy & Aging Report 24, 32-34 (2014). 
108. N. S. Keränen et al., Use of information and communication technologies among older 
people with and without frailty: a population-based survey. Journal of medical Internet 
research 19,  (2017). 
109. I. L. Boman, S. Lundberg, S. Starkhammar, L. Nygård, Exploring the usability of a 
videophone mock-up for persons with dementia and their significant others. BMC 
Geriatrics 14,  (2014). 
110. S. Mehrabian et al., The perceptions of cognitively impaired patients and their caregivers 
of a home telecare system. Med. Devices Evid. Res. 8, 21-29 (2014). 
111. D. Hume. (John Noon London, 1739). 
112. E. Moore George, Principia Ethica.  (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1903). 
113. R. D. Porter, The health ethics typology: Six domains to improve care.  (Socratic 
Publishing, Incorporated, 2006). 
114. J. H. Moor, The nature, importance, and difficulty of machine ethics. IEEE intelligent 
systems 21, 18-21 (2006). 
115. S. Reardon, Welcome to the Cyborg Olympics. Nature 536, 20-22 (2016). 
116. K. Warwick, Cyborg morals, cyborg values, cyborg ethics. Ethics and information 
technology 5, 131-137 (2003). 
117. D. Gracia, History of medical ethics. Bioethics in a European perspective, 17-50 (2001). 
 410 
 
118. T. L. Beauchamp, J. F. Childress, Principles of biomedical ethics.  (Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2001). 
119. T. L. Beauchamp, Methods and principles in biomedical ethics. Journal of Medical 
ethics 29, 269-274 (2003). 
120. S. Holm, Not just autonomy--the principles of American biomedical ethics. Journal of 
medical ethics 21, 332-338 (1995). 
121. P. Schröder-Bäck, P. Duncan, W. Sherlaw, C. Brall, K. Czabanowska, Teaching seven 
principles for public health ethics: towards a curriculum for a short course on ethics in 
public health programmes. BMC medical ethics 15, 73 (2014). 
122. L. Floridi, J. W. Sanders, Mapping the foundationalist debate in computer ethics. Ethics 
and information Technology 4, 1-9 (2002). 
123. H. T. Tavani, in The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics. 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010), pp. 251. 
124. K. Einar Himma, Foundational issues in information ethics. Library Hi Tech 25, 79-94 
(2007). 
125. A. Clark, D. Chalmers, The extended mind. analysis, 7-19 (1998). 
126. M. Rowlands, The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied 
phenomenology.  (Mit Press, 2010). 
127. Sutton, John. (The MIT Press, 2010), vol. The Extended Mind. 
128. L. Harrington, Technology and the digitization of health care. AACN advanced critical 
care 25, 15-17 (2014). 
129. C. L. Anderson, R. Agarwal, The digitization of healthcare: boundary risks, emotion, 
and consumer willingness to disclose personal health information. Information Systems 
Research 22, 469-490 (2011). 
130. D. Feinleib, in Big Data Bootcamp. (Springer, 2014), pp. 15-34. 
131. D. Reinsel, J. Gantz, J. Rydning, "Data Age 2025: The Evolution of Data to Life-Critical 
"  (IDC Seagate, 2017). 
132. A. S. Khachaturian, D. H. Meranus, W. A. Kukull, Z. S. Khachaturian, Big data, aging, 
and dementia: Pathways for international harmonization on data sharing. Alzheimer's & 
dementia: the journal of the Alzheimer's Association 9, S61-S62 (2013). 
133. B. Dupont, Cybersecurity Futures: How Can We Regulate Emergent Risks? Technology 
Innovation Management Review 3, 6 (2013). 
134. Y. Dahl et al., in 7th International Conference on Universal Access in Human-Computer 
Interaction: Design Methods, Tools, and Interaction Techniques for eInclusion, UAHCI 
2013, Held as Part of 15th International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, 
HCI 2013. (Las Vegas, NV, 2013), vol. 8011 LNCS, pp. 38-47. 
135. O. Dale, in Computers Helping People with Special Needs, Proceedings, Pt 1, K. 
Miesenberger, J. Klaus, W. Zagler, A. Karshmer, Eds. (2010), vol. 6179, pp. 300-307. 
136. L. M. Bachinger, W. Fuchs, Legal challenges of technological applications in elder care 
- A socio-iegal perspective on ambient assisted living. SWS - Rundschau 53, 73-94 
(2013). 
137. S. A. Zwijsen, A. R. Niemeijer, C. M. P. M. Hertogh, Ethics of using assistive 
technology in the care for community-dwelling elderly people: An overview of the 
literature. Aging & Mental Health 15, 419-427 (2011). 
138. E. Klein, T. Brown, M. Sample, A. R. Truitt, S. Goering, Engineering the Brain: Ethical 
Issues and the Introduction of Neural Devices. Hastings Center Report 45, 26-35 (2015). 
139. S. Miller, M. J. Selgelid, Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use 
dilemma in the biological sciences. Science and engineering ethics 13, 523-580 (2007). 
140. M. Ienca, F. Jotterand, B. S. Elger, From Healthcare to Warfare and Reverse: How 
Should We Regulate Dual-Use Neurotechnology? Neuron 97, 269-274 (2018). 
 411 
 
141. I. Martinovic et al., in Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security 
symposium. (USENIX Association, 2012). 
142. T. Bonaci, J. Herron, C. Matlack, H. J. Chizeck, Securing the Exocortex: A Twenty-First 
Century Cybernetics Challenge. Technology and Society Magazine, IEEE 34, 44-51 
(2015). 
143. T. Bonaci, paper presented at the USENIX 2017, San Francisco,  2017. 
144. D. Feil-Seifer, M. J. Matarić, Socially assistive robotics. IEEE Robotics & Automation 
Magazine 18, 24-31 (2011). 
145. A. Sharkey, N. Sharkey, Granny and the robots: ethical issues in robot care for the 
elderly. Ethics and Information Technology 14, 27-40 (2012). 
146. E. Fisher, Lessons learned from the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications program 
(ELSI): Planning societal implications research for the National Nanotechnology 
Program. Technology in Society 27, 321-328 (2005). 
147. M. K. Cho, P. Sankar, Forensic genetics and ethical, legal and social implications 
beyond the clinic. Nature genetics 36, S8 (2004). 
148. D. Greenbaum, Expanding ELSI to all areas of innovative science and technology. 
Nature biotechnology 33, 425 (2015). 
149. J. Sullins, Rights and computer ethics. The Cambridge handbook of information and 
computer ethics, 116-132 (2010). 
150. U. G. Assembly, Universal declaration of human rights. UN General Assembly,  (1948). 
151. P. Alston, Conjuring up new human rights: A proposal for quality control. The American 
Journal of International Law 78, 607-621 (1984). 
152. L. Floridi, The ontological interpretation of informational privacy. Ethics and 
Information Technology 7, 185-200 (2005). 
153. M. Killias, The Opening and Closing of Breaches. European Journal of Criminology 3, 
11-31 (2006). 
154. L. D. Brandeis, Letters of Louis D. Brandeis: Volume V, 1921-1941: Elder Statesman.  
(Suny Press, 1978), vol. 5. 
155. L. T. Yang, B. Di Martino, Q. Zhang, Internet of Everything. Mobile Information 
Systems 2017,  (2017). 
156. M. Parrot, E. Boots, K. McDermot, K. Kauwe, J. Edwards, in Alzheimer’s Association 
International Conference 2016. (2016). 
157. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd enl. ed.  (University of Chicago 
Press, 1970). 
158. C. Ess, M. Thorseth, in The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics, 
L. Floridi, Ed. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010), pp. 163-180. 
159. F. Jotterand, M. Ienca, in Debates About Neuroethics: Perspectives on Its Development, 
Focus, and Future, E. Racine, J. Aspler, Eds. (Springer International Publishing, Cham, 
2017), pp. 247-261. 
160. UN, D. o. E. a. S. Affairs, P. Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision 
(United Nations, New York, 2015). 
161. A. Alzheimer’s, 2015 Alzheimer's disease facts and figures. Alzheimer's & dementia: the 
journal of the Alzheimer's Association 11, 332 (2015). 
162. WHO, "Current and future long-term care needs,"  (World Health Organization, 2002). 
163. R. Fleming, S. Sum, Empirical studies on the effectiveness of assistive technology in the 
care of people with dementia: a systematic review. Journal of Assistive Technologies 8, 
14-34 (2014). 
164. E. de Joode, C. van Heugten, F. Verhey, M. van Boxtel, Efficacy and usability of 
assistive technology for patients with cognitive deficits: a systematic review. Clinical 
rehabilitation 24, 701-714 (2010). 
 412 
 
165. J. W. S. Liu, in EMSOFT'07: 7th ACM and IEEE International Conference on 
Embedded Software. (Salzburg, 2007), pp. 1. 
166. Q. Meng, M. H. Lee, Design issues for assistive robotics for the elderly. Adv. Eng. Inf. 
20, 171-186 (2006). 
167. A. Astell et al., Involving older people with dementia and their carers in designing 
computer based support systems: some methodological considerations. Universal Access 
in the Information Society 8, 49-58 (2009). 
168. P. Khosravi, A. H. Ghapanchi, Investigating the effectiveness of technologies applied to 
assist seniors: A systematic literature review. International Journal of Medical 
Informatics 85, 17-26 (2016). 
169. J. Evans, M. Brown, T. Coughlan, G. Lawson, M. P. Craven, in Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and 
Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). (2015), vol. 9170, pp. 406-417. 
170. A. Gillespie, C. Best, B. O'Neill, Cognitive function and assistive technology for 
cognition: A systematic review. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 
18, 1-19 (2012). 
171. W. Carswell et al., A review of the role of assistive technology for people with dementia 
in the hours of darkness. Technology and health care : official journal of the European 
Society for Engineering and Medicine 17, 281-304 (2009). 
172. P. Verissimo, L. Rodrigues, Distributed systems for system architects.  (Springer Science 
& Business Media, 2012), vol. 1. 
173. A. Acevedo, D. A. Loewenstein, Nonpharmacological cognitive interventions in aging 
and dementia. Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology 20, 239-249 (2007). 
174. M. Gersch, B. Lindert, M. Hewing, in Proceedings of the AALIANCE European 
Conference on AAL, Malaga, Spain. (2010), pp. 11-12. 
175. Q. Zhang, Y. Su, P. Yu, in 15th IFIP WG 8.1 International Conference on Informatics 
and Semiotics in Organisations, ICISO 2014, C. Yu, K. Liu, S. R. Gulliver, W. Li, Eds. 
(Springer New York LLC, 2014), vol. 426, pp. 398-404. 
176. K. Inoue, K. Wada, Y. Ito, Effective application of Paro: Seal type robots for disabled 
people in according to ideas of occupational therapists.  (Springer, 2008). 
177. W. Moyle et al., Exploring the effect of companion robots on emotional expression in 
older adults with dementia: a pilot randomized controlled trial. Journal of gerontological 
nursing,  (2013). 
178. C. Yamagata, M. Kowtko, J. F. Coppola, S. Joyce, in Systems, Applications and 
Technology Conference (LISAT), 2013 IEEE Long Island. (2013), pp. 1-6. 
179. L. Tárraga et al., A randomised pilot study to assess the efficacy of an interactive, 
multimedia tool of cognitive stimulation in Alzheimer’s disease. Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 77, 1116-1121 (2006). 
180. V. Ahanathapillai, J. Amor, C. James, Assistive technology to monitor activity, health 
and wellbeing in old age: The wrist wearable unit in the USEFIL project. Technology 
and Disability 27, 17-29 (2015). 
181. A. Vallabhaneni, T. Wang, B. He, in Neural engineering. (Springer, 2005), pp. 85-121. 
182. G. Liberati et al., Toward a brain-computer interface for Alzheimer's disease patients by 
combining classical conditioning and brain state classification. Journal of Alzheimer's 
disease : JAD 31 Suppl 3, S211-220 (2012). 
183. T.-S. Lee et al., Efficacy and usability of a brain-computer interface system in improving 
cognition in the elderly. Alzheimer's & Dementia: The Journal of the Alzheimer's 
Association 9, P296. 
 413 
 
184. K. Brittain, L. Corner, L. Robinson, J. Bond, Ageing in place and technologies of place: 
the lived experience of people with dementia in changing social, physical and 
technological environments. Sociology of health & illness 32, 272-287 (2010). 
185. F. J. M. Meiland et al., Usability of a new electronic assistive device for community-
dwelling persons with mild dementia. Aging & Mental Health 16, 584-591 (2012). 
186. H. Khai-Long Ho, K. D. Mombaur, in Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2015 IEEE 
International Conference on. (2015), pp. 5891-5897. 
187. E. B.-N. Sanders, From user-centered to participatory design approaches. Design and the 
social sciences: Making connections, 1-8 (2002). 
188. R. C. Merkle, Making smaller, faster, cheaper computers. Proceedings of the IEEE 86, 
2384-2386 (1998). 
189. A. Whitmore, A. Agarwal, L. Da Xu, The Internet of Things—A survey of topics and 
trends. Information Systems Frontiers 17, 261-274 (2015). 
190. A. Lotfi, C. Langensiepen, S. M. Mahmoud, M. J. Akhlaghinia, Smart homes for the 
elderly dementia sufferers: identification and prediction of abnormal behaviour. Journal 
of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing 3, 205-218 (2012). 
191. A. L. Bossen, H. Kim, K. N. Williams, A. E. Steinhoff, M. Strieker, Emerging roles for 
telemedicine and smart technologies in dementia care. Smart homecare technology and 
telehealth 3, 49 (2015). 
192. M. Chan, D. Estève, J. Y. Fourniols, C. Escriba, E. Campo, Smart wearable systems: 
Current status and future challenges. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 56, 137-156 
(2012). 
193. S. Sävenstedt, P.-O. Sandman, K. Zingmark, The duality in using information and 
communication technology in elder care. Journal of Advanced Nursing 56, 17-25 (2006). 
194. E. L. Sampson et al., Pain, agitation, and behavioural problems in people with dementia 
admitted to general hospital wards: a longitudinal cohort study. Pain 156, 675-683 
(2015). 
195. R. Picard. (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
196. WHO, The World Health Report 2001: Mental health: new understanding, new hope.  
(World Health Organization, 2001). 
197. M.-J. Chiu, T.-F. Chen, P.-K. Yip, M.-S. Hua, L.-Y. Tang, Behavioral and psychologic 
symptoms in different types of dementia. Journal of the Formosan Medical Association 
105, 556-562 (2006). 
198. R. A. Sperling et al., Toward defining the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease: 
Recommendations from the National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer's Association 
workgroups on diagnostic guidelines for Alzheimer's disease. Alzheimer's & Dementia 7, 
280-292 (2011). 
199. R. Picking, V. Grout, J. McGinn, J. Crisp, H. Grout, Simplicity, consistency, 
universality, flexibility and familiarity: The scuff principles for developing user 
interfaces for ambient computer systems. International Journal of Ambient Computing 
and Intelligence 2, 40-49 (2010). 
200. S. Kumar, L. C. Ureel Ii, H. King, C. Wallace, in 6th ACM International Conference on 
PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments, PETRA 2013. (Rhodes, 
2013). 
201. P. L. Emiliani, in 2nd International Conference on Biomedical Electronics and Devices, 
BIODEVICES 2009. (Porto, 2009), pp. IS9-IS12. 
202. A. C. M. Fong, B. Fong, C. K. Li, in 1st IEEE Global Conference on Consumer 
Electronics, GCCE 2012. (Tokyo, 2012), pp. 448-449. 
 414 
 
203. D. Vergados, A. Alevizos, A. Mariolis, M. Caragiozidis, in 1st International Conference 
on Pervasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments, PETRA 2008. (Athens, 
2008). 
204. M. Al Ameen, J. Liu, K. Kwak, Security and privacy issues in wireless sensor networks 
for healthcare applications. J. Med. Syst. 36, 93-101 (2012). 
205. M. Enserink, G. Chin, The end of privacy. Science 347, 490-491 (2015). 
206. M. Ienca, P. Haselager, Hacking the brain: brain–computer interfacing technology and 
the ethics of neurosecurity. Ethics and Information Technology 18, 117-129 (2016). 
207. V. Patel et al., Grand Challenges: Integrating Mental Health Services into Priority 
Health Care Platforms. PLOS Medicine 10, e1001448 (2013). 
208. T. Adlam et al., The installation and support of internationally distributed equipment for 
people with dementia. Information Technology in Biomedicine, IEEE Transactions on 8, 
253-257 (2004). 
209. A. Tinker, F. Wright, C. McCreadie, With respect to old age Long term care-rights and 
responsibilities; alternative models of care for older people; research volume 2.  
(London: The Stationery Office Ltd., 1999). 
210. M. Ienca et al., Intelligent Assistive Technology for Alzheimer's Disease and Other 
Dementias: A Systematic Review. J Alzheimers Dis 56, 1301-1340 (2017). 
211. R. Mégret et al., in Proceedings of the 18th ACM international conference on 
Multimedia. (ACM, 2010), pp. 1299-1302. 
212. P. Rashidi, A. Mihailidis, A survey on ambient-assisted living tools for older adults. 
IEEE journal of biomedical and health informatics 17, 579-590 (2013). 
213. A. Mihailidis, J. C. Barbenel, G. Fernie, The efficacy of an intelligent cognitive orthosis 
to facilitate handwashing by persons with moderate to severe dementia. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 14, 135-171 (2004). 
214. R. Compano, in Information and Communication Technologies for Active Ageing: 
Opportunities and Challenges for the European Union, M. Cabrera, N. Malanowski, 
Eds. (2009), vol. 23, pp. 235-252. 
215. G. Liberati et al., Toward a brain-computer interface for Alzheimer's disease patients by 
combining classical conditioning and brain state classification. Journal of Alzheimer's 
Disease 31, S211-S220 (2012). 
216. E. Mordoch, A. Osterreicher, L. Guse, K. Roger, G. Thompson, Use of social 
commitment robots in the care of elderly people with dementia: A literature review. 
Maturitas 74, 14-20 (2013). 
217. H. Felzmann, K. Murphy, D. Casey, O. Beyan, in 10th ACM/IEEE international 
conference on human–robot interaction. (2015). 
218. K. S. Sifford, A. Bharucha, Benefits and challenges of electronic surveillance in nursing 
home research. Research in gerontological nursing 3, 5-10 (2010). 
219. L. Magnusson, E. J. Hanson, Ethical issues arising from a research, technology and 
development project to support frail older people and their family carers at home. Health 
& social care in the community 11, 431-439 (2003). 
220. M. Marzanski, Would you like to know what is wrong with you? On telling the truth to 
patients with dementia. Journal of Medical Ethics 26, 108-113 (2000). 
221. P. Novitzky et al., A review of contemporary work on the ethics of ambient assisted 
living technologies for people with dementia. Science and engineering ethics 21, 707-
765 (2015). 
222. M. Mulvenna et al., Views of Caregivers on the Ethics of Assistive Technology Used for 
Home Surveillance of People Living with Dementia. Neuroethics, 1-12 (2017). 
 415 
 
223. L. Boise et al., Willingness of older adults to share data and privacy concerns after 
exposure to unobtrusive in-home monitoring. Gerontechnology : international journal 
on the fundamental aspects of technology to serve the ageing society 11, 428-435 (2013). 
224. J. Perry, S. Beyer, S. Holm, Assistive technology, telecare and people with intellectual 
disabilities: ethical considerations. Journal of Medical Ethics 35, 81-86 (2009). 
225. M. Ienca, F. Jotterand, C. Vică, B. Elger, Social and Assistive Robotics in Dementia 
Care: Ethical Recommendations for Research and Practice. International Journal of 
Social Robotics, 1-9 (2016). 
226. J. Van den Hoven, Design for values and values for design. Information age 4, 4-7 
(2005). 
227. B. Deng, The robot’s dilemma. Nature 523, 24-26 (2015). 
228. M. A. Constas, Qualitative analysis as a public event: The documentation of category 
development procedures. American Educational Research Journal 29, 253-266 (1992). 
229. T. C. Rindfleisch, Privacy, information technology, and health care. Communications of 
the ACM 40, 92-100 (1997). 
230. H. Gross, Privacy and autonomy. Nomos XIII: Privacy 169, 81 (1971). 
231. G. Laurie, Recognizing the right not to know: conceptual, professional, and legal 
implications. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 42, 53-63 (2014). 
232. R. Wacks, Privacy: A very short introduction.  (OUP Oxford, 2015). 
233. A. Marmor, What is the right to privacy? Philosophy & Public Affairs 43, 3-26 (2015). 
234. L. Koontz. (HIMSS, 2013). 
235. G. J. Agich, Autonomy and long-term care.  (Oxford University Press, USA, 1993). 
236. T. A. Abma, V. E. Baur, B. Molewijk, G. A. Widdershoven, Inter‐ethics: Towards an 
interactive and interdependent bioethics. Bioethics 24, 242-255 (2010). 
237. J. Varelius, The value of autonomy in medical ethics. Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy 9, 377-388 (2006). 
238. C. f. D. Control, Prevention. (2012). 
239. E. D. Pellegrino, For the patient's good: The restoration of beneficence in health care.  
(1988). 
240. W. Branch Jr, A piece of my mind. The ethics of patient care. JAMA 313, 1421 (2015). 
241. J. Savulescu, In defence of procreative beneficence. J. Med. Ethics 33, 284-288 (2007). 
242. I. Persson, J. Savulescu, Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement.  (OUP 
Oxford, 2012). 
243. The World Health Organization quality of life assessment (WHOQOL): position paper 
from the World Health Organization (0277-9536, 1995). 
244. H. P. Meininger, Autonomy and professional responsibility in care for persons with 
intellectual disabilities. Nursing Philosophy 2, 240-250 (2001). 
245. T. Inoue et al., Field-based development of an information support robot for persons 
with dementia. Technology and Disability 24, 263-271 (2012). 
246. U. Cortés et al., in 2008 AAAI Fall Symposium. (Arlington, VA, 2008), vol. FS-08-02, 
pp. 32-38. 
247. S. Kyriazakos et al., eWALL: An Intelligent Caring Home Environment Offering 
Personalized Context-Aware Applications Based on Advanced Sensing. Wireless 
Personal Communications 87, 1093-1111 (2016). 
248. D. D. Vergados, Service personalization for assistive living in a mobile ambient 
healthcare-networked environment. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 14, 575-590 
(2010). 
249. J. J. Lee, K. H. Seo, C. Oh, Z. Z. Bien, Development of a future Intelligent Sweet Home 
for the disabled. Artif. Life Rob. 11, 8-12 (2007). 
 416 
 
250. R. Martinez et al., in Trends in Practical Applications of Agents and Multiagent Systems, 
Y. Demazeau et al., Eds. (2010), vol. 71, pp. 689-696. 
251. J. Heijkers, J. Rietsema, L. De Witte, E. Hagedoren, R. Van Leeuwen, in Assistive 
Technology Research Series, P. Encarnacao, L. Azevedo, G. J. Gelderblom, A. Newell, 
N. E. Mathiassen, Eds. (2013), vol. 33, pp. 917-923. 
252. O. Lebec et al., in 2013 IEEE 13th International Conference on Rehabilitation Robotics, 
ICORR 2013. (Seattle, WA, 2013). 
253. A. Mitseva et al., Gerontechnology: Providing a helping hand when caring for 
cognitively impaired older adults-intermediate results from a controlled study on the 
satisfaction and acceptance of informal caregivers. Current Gerontology and Geriatrics 
Research 2012,  (2012). 
254. A. G. Money, L. Lines, S. Fernando, A. D. Elliman, e-Government online forms: design 
guidelines for older adults in Europe. Universal Access in the Information Society 10, 1-
16 (2011). 
255. Y. H. Wu, C. Fassert, A. S. Rigaud, Designing robots for the elderly: Appearance issue 
and beyond. Arch. Gerontol. Geriatr. 54, 121-126 (2012). 
256. J. Tung et al., Everyday patient-care technologies for Alzheimer's disease. IEEE 
Pervasive Computing 12, 80-83 (2013). 
257. F. Cavallo, M. Aquilano, M. Arvati, An ambient assisted living approach in designing 
domiciliary services combined with innovative technologies for patients with alzheimer's 
disease: A case study. Am. J. Alzheimer's Dis. Other Dem. 30, 69-77 (2015). 
258. H. M. Fardoun, A. A. Mashat, J. Ramirez Castillo, Recognition of familiar people with a 
mobile cloud architecture for Alzheimer patients. Disability and rehabilitation, 1-5 
(2015). 
259. K. Giokas et al., in 2014 36th Annual International Conference of the Ieee Engineering 
in Medicine and Biology Society. (2014), pp. 5816-5819. 
260. J. Güttler, C. Georgoulas, T. Linner, T. Bock, Towards a future robotic home 
environment: A survey. Gerontology 61, 268-280 (2015). 
261. L. K. Au, W. H. Wu, M. A. Batalin, T. Stathopoulos, W. J. Kaiser, in Information 
Processing in Sensor Networks, 2008. IPSN '08. International Conference on. (2008), 
pp. 537-538. 
262. F. Grossi, V. Bianchi, G. Matrella, I. De Munari, P. Ciampolini, Senior-friendly kitchen 
activity: The FOOD Project. Gerontechnology 13, 200 (2014). 
263. A. Mihailidis, P. Elinas, J. Boger, J. Hoey, An intelligent powered wheelchair to enable 
mobility of cognitively impaired older adults: An anticollision system. Ieee Transactions 
on Neural Systems and Rehabilitation Engineering 15, 136-143 (2007). 
264. T.-V. How, R. H. Wang, A. Mihailidis, Evaluation of an intelligent wheelchair system 
for older adults with cognitive impairments. J. Neuroeng. Rehabil. 10,  (2013). 
265. A. Morris et al., in 2003 Ieee International Conference on Robotics and Automation, 
Vols 1-3, Proceedings. (2003), pp. 25-30. 
266. K. Zsiga et al., Home care robot for socially supporting the elderly: focus group studies 
in three European countries to screen user attitudes and requirements. International 
Journal of Rehabilitation Research 36, 375-378 (2013). 
267. J. Moreno, U. Cortés, D. Garcia-Gasulla, I. Gómez-Sebastià, S. Alvarez-Napagao, in 
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, K. Gibert, V. Botti, R. Reig-Bolano, 
Eds. (2013), vol. 256, pp. 326-335. 
268. I. Gómez-Sebastià et al., Situated Agents and Humans in Social Interaction for Elderly 
Healthcare: From Coaalas to AVICENA. Journal of Medical Systems 40, 1-20 (2016). 
 417 
 
269. D. O. Johnson et al., Socially Assistive Robots: A Comprehensive Approach to 
Extending Independent Living. International Journal of Social Robotics 6, 195-211 
(2014). 
270. F. Meiland, R.-M. Droes, S. Savenstedt, in Supporting People with Dementia Using 
Pervasive Health Technologies, M. D. Mulvenna, C. D. Nugent, Eds. (2010), pp. 207-
220. 
271. S. Martin et al., Participatory research to design a novel telehealth system to support the 
night-time needs of people with dementia: NOCTURNAL. International Journal of 
Environmental Research and Public Health 10, 6764-6782 (2013). 
272. A. Attarwala, C. Munteanu, R. Baecker, in 15th International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services, MobileHCI 2013. (Munich, 
2013), pp. 440-443. 
273. H. AlMazrua, A. Al-Wabil, H. Al-Muhanna, R. Al-Wabil, in Science and Information 
Conference (SAI), 2013. (2013), pp. 171-175. 
274. A. Murua, I. Gonzalez, E. Gomez-Martinez, Cloud-based assistive technology services. 
2011 Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems (2011), pp. 
985-989. 
275. B. Bruno, F. Mastrogiovanni, A. Sgorbissa, Ieee, in 2014 23rd Ieee International 
Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication. (2014), pp. 738-743. 
276. P. C. Roy, N. Al Haider, W. Van Woensel, A. M. Ahmad, S. S. R. Abidi, in 28th AAAI 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014. (AI Access Foundation, 2014), vol. 
WS, pp. 38-43. 
277. M. F. Larizza et al., In-home monitoring of older adults with vision impairment: 
Exploring patients', caregivers' and professionals' views. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association 21, 56-63 (2014). 
278. J. Stilgoe, R. Owen, P. Macnaghten, Developing a framework for responsible 
innovation. Research Policy 42, 1568-1580 (2013). 
279. U. DESA, World population prospects: The 2015 revision, key findings and advance 
tables. Working PaperNo,  (2015). 
280. T. George, K. S. George, K. S. Sivanandan, in Sustainable Energy and Intelligent 
Systems (SEISCON 2011), International Conference on. (2011), pp. 749-753. 
281. M. Ienca, P. Haselager, Hacking the brain: brain–computer interfacing technology and 
the ethics of neurosecurity. Ethics and Information Technology, 1-13 (2016). 
282. A. Cavoukian, Privacy by design [leading edge]. IEEE Technology and Society 
Magazine 31, 18-19 (2012). 
283. W. H. Organization, Medical devices: managing the mismatch: an outcome of the 
priority medical devices project.  (World Health Organization, 2010). 
284. N. Nestorov, E. Stone, P. Lehane, R. Eibrand, Ieee, in 2014 Ieee 27th International 
Symposium on Computer-Based Medical Systems. (2014), pp. 396-400. 
285. T. Nomura et al., What people assume about humanoid and animal-type robots: cross-
cultural analysis between Japan, Korea, and the United States. International Journal of 
Humanoid Robotics 5, 25-46 (2008). 
286. N. Nestorov, E. Stone, P. Lehane, R. Eibrand, in Computer-Based Medical Systems 
(CBMS), 2014 IEEE 27th International Symposium on. (2014), pp. 396-400. 
287. Y. H. Wu et al., Acceptance of an assistive robot in older adults: A mixed-method study 
of human-robot interaction over a 1-month period in the living lab setting. Clinical 
Interventions in Aging 9, 801-811 (2014). 
288. R. Riener, The Cybathlon promotes the development of assistive technology for people 
with physical disabilities. Journal of neuroengineering and rehabilitation 13, 49 (2016). 
 418 
 
289. A. C. Lo et al., Robot-assisted therapy for long-term upper-limb impairment after stroke. 
N. Engl. J. Med. 362, 1772-1783 (2010). 
290. V. Klamroth-Marganska et al., Three-dimensional, task-specific robot therapy of the arm 
after stroke: a multicentre, parallel-group randomised trial. Lancet Neurol. 13, 159-166 
(2014). 
291. C. S. Hung et al., The Effects of Combination of Robot-Assisted Therapy With Task-
Specific or Impairment-Oriented Training on Motor Function and Quality of Life in 
Chronic Stroke. PM & R : the journal of injury, function, and rehabilitation 8, 721-729 
(2016). 
292. C. T. Moritz et al., New Perspectives on Neuroengineering and Neurotechnologies: 
NSF-DFG Workshop Report. IEEE Trans. Biomed. Eng. 63, 1354-1367 (2016). 
293. G. Gallegos-Ayala et al., Brain communication in a completely locked-in patient using 
bedside near-infrared spectroscopy. Neurology 82, 1930-1932 (2014). 
294. R. C. V. Loureiro, W. S. Harwin, K. Nagai, M. Johnson, Advances in upper limb stroke 
rehabilitation: a technology push. Med. Biol. Eng. Comput. 49, 1103 (2011). 
295. F. Bovolenta, P. Sale, V. Dall'Armi, P. Clerici, M. Franceschini, Robot-aided therapy for 
upper limbs in patients with stroke-related lesions. Brief report of a clinical experience. 
Journal of neuroengineering and rehabilitation 8, 18 (2011). 
296. T. Denning, Y. Matsuoka, T. Kohno, Neurosecurity: security and privacy for neural 
devices. Neurosurgical Focus 27, E7 (2009). 
297. T. Bonaci, J. Herron, C. Matlack, H. J. Chizeck, Securing the Exocortex: A Twenty-First 
Century Cybernetics Challenge. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 34, 44-51 
(2015). 
298. G. Svensson, G. Wood, Proactive versus reactive business ethics performance: a 
conceptual framework of profile analysis and case illustrations. Corporate Governance: 
The international journal of business in society 4, 18-33 (2004). 
299. M. Danis, The promise of proactive ethics consultation. Crit. Care Med. 26, 203-204 
(1998). 
300. C. Pavlish, K. Brown-Saltzman, A. Fine, P. Jakel, in HEC Forum. (Springer, 2013), vol. 
25, pp. 269-283. 
301. S. Roeser, Emotional engineers: Toward morally responsible design. Science and 
Engineering Ethics 18, 103-115 (2012). 
302. A. De Vito Dabbs et al., User-Centered Design and Interactive Health Technologies for 
Patients. Computers, informatics, nursing : CIN 27, 175 (2009). 
303. Nature, Anticipating artificial intelligence. Nature 532, 413-413 (2016). 
304. P. Kellmeyer et al., The Effects of Closed-Loop Medical Devices on the Autonomy and 
Accountability of Persons and Systems. Camb. Q. Healthc. Ethics 25, 623-633 (2016). 
305. A. Albrechtslund, Ethics and technology design. Ethics and Information Technology 9, 
63-72 (2007). 
306. P. Markopoulos, A. A. Timmermans, L. Beursgens, R. Van Donselaar, H. A. Seelen, in 
Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society, EMBC, 2011 Annual International 
Conference of the IEEE. (IEEE, 2011), pp. 5182-5187. 
307. R. Grott, in RESNA. (2016). 
308. C.-P. Milne, K. I. Kaitin, Translational Medicine: An Engine of Change for Bringing 
New Technology to Community Health. Sci. Transl. Med. 1, 5cm5-5cm5 (2009). 
309. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1861). 
310. M. Cardol, B. D. Jong, C. D. Ward, On autonomy and participation in rehabilitation. 
Disabil. Rehabil. 24, 970-974 (2002). 
311. J. A. Simpson, E. S. Weiner, The Oxford English dictionary: Vol. 1.  (Clarendon Press, 
1989). 
 419 
 
312. B. Friedman, P. H. Kahn Jr, in The human-computer interaction handbook: 
Fundamentals, evolving technologies ad emerging applications. (Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc., Mahwah, NJ, 2003), pp. 1177-1201. 
313. A. van Wynsberghe, Designing Robots for Care: Care Centered Value-Sensitive Design. 
Science and Engineering Ethics 19, 407-433 (2013). 
314. A. Borning, M. Muller, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors in 
computing systems. (ACM, 2012), pp. 1125-1134. 
315. N. Manders-Huits, What values in design? The challenge of incorporating moral values 
into design. Science and engineering ethics 17, 271-287 (2011). 
316. L. P. Nathan, B. Friedman, P. Klasnja, S. K. Kane, J. K. Miller, in Proceedings of the 7th 
ACM conference on Designing interactive systems. (ACM, 2008), pp. 1-10. 
317. S. Moghimi, A. Kushki, A. Marie Guerguerian, T. Chau, A review of EEG-based brain-
computer interfaces as access pathways for individuals with severe disabilities. Assist. 
Technol. 25, 99-110 (2013). 
318. M. J. Scherer, Living in the state of stuck: How assistive technology impacts the lives of 
people with disabilities.  (Brookline Books, 2005). 
319. J. Nihlén Fahlquist, in Managing in Critical Times–Philosophical Responses to 
Organisational Turbulence. St Anne's College, Oxford. 23-26 July 2009. (Reason in 
Practice Ltd., 2009). 
320. M. Iosa, G. Morone, A. Cherubini, S. Paolucci, The Three Laws of Neurorobotics: A 
Review on What Neurorehabilitation Robots Should Do for Patients and Clinicians. 
Journal of Medical and Biological Engineering 36, 1-11 (2016). 
321. I. Asimov, I, Robot Bantam Dell, New York,  (1950). 
322. ISO, I. O. f. Standardization, Ed. (2014). 
323. G. Morone, M. Domenico De Angelis, P. Coiro, L. Pratesi, S. Paolucci, Driving 
electromechanically assisted Gait Trainer for people with stroke. J. Rehabil. Res. Dev. 
48, 135 (2011). 
324. S. H. Woolf, The meaning of translational research and why it matters. JAMA 299, 211-
213 (2008). 
325. C. Juma, Innovation and its enemies: Why people resist new technologies.  (Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
326. D. Lorence, M. Richards, Adoption of regulatory compliance programmes across United 
States healthcare organizations: a view of institutional disobedience. Health Services 
Management Research 16, 167-178 (2003). 
327. A. Smith, "US Views of Technology and the Future," Internet & Technology  (Pew 
Research Center, 2014). 
328. E. G. Poon et al., Overcoming barriers to adopting and implementing computerized 
physician order entry systems in US hospitals. Health Affairs 23, 184-190 (2004). 
329. R. E. Herzlinger, Why innovation in health care is so hard. Harvard business review 84, 
58 (2006). 
330. J. Copley, J. Ziviani, Barriers to the use of assistive technology for children with 
multiple disabilities. Occupational Therapy International 11, 229-243 (2004). 
331. M. Prince et al., World Alzheimer Report 2015. The global impact of dementia. An 
analysis of prevalence, incidence, cost and trends. Alzheimer's Disease International, 
London,  (2015). 
332. WHO, Global Health and Ageing.  (World Health Organization, 2015). 
333. R. Bemelmans, G. J. Gelderblom, P. Jonker, L. de Witte, Effectiveness of Robot Paro in 
Intramural Psychogeriatric Care: A Multicenter Quasi-Experimental Study. Journal of 
the American Medical Directors Association 16, 946-950 (2015). 
 420 
 
334. G. W. Lane et al., Effectiveness of a social robot, "Paro," in a VA long-term care setting. 
Psychological services 13, 292-299 (2016). 
335. R. Phull, R. Liscano, A. Mihailidis, Comparative Analysis of Prominent Middleware 
Platforms in the Domain of Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) for an Older Adults with 
Dementia (OAwD) Scenario. Procedia Computer Science 83, 537-544 (2016). 
336. G. Gibson, C. Dickinson, K. Brittain, L. Robinson, The everyday use of assistive 
technology by people with dementia and their family carers: a qualitative study. BMC 
geriatrics 15, 89 (2015). 
337. Sustaining innovation in telehealth and telecare (2010). 
338. L. Newton, C. Dickinson, G. Gibson, K. Brittain, L. Robinson, Exploring the views of 
GPs, people with dementia and their carers on assistive technology: a qualitative study. 
BMJ open 6, e011132 (2016). 
339. J. McHugh, J. Wherton, D. Prendergast, B. Lawlor, Identifying opportunities for 
supporting caregivers of persons with dementia through information and communication 
technology. Gerontechnology 10, 220-230 (2012). 
340. R. L. Glueckauf, T. U. Ketterson, J. S. Loomis, P. Dages, Online Support and Education 
for Dementia Caregivers: Overview, Utilization, and Initial Program Evaluation. 
Telemedicine Journal and e-Health 10, 223-232 (2004). 
341. C. K. Lai et al., Online and onsite training for family caregivers of people with 
dementia: results from a pilot study. International journal of geriatric psychiatry 28, 
107-108 (2013). 
342. A. Bryman, Social research methods.  (Oxford university press, 2015). 
343. V. Braun, V. Clarke, Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 3, 77-101 (2006). 
344. Y. Kang, W. Moyle, L. Venturato, Korean nurses' attitudes towards older people with 
dementia in acute care settings. International journal of older people nursing 6, 143-152 
(2011). 
345. A. s. Society, Assistive Technology Position Paper. Alzheimer's Society,  (2011). 
346. W. Kearns, J. Fozard, Evaluating new gerontechnologies: Proof of concept is necessary, 
but not sufficient. Gerontechnology 14, 139-145 (2016). 
347. S. Shaikh, S. S. Shaikh, Fundamental Engineering to Design and Implement Facial 
Expression, Emotions Recognition and Artificial Emotional Intelligence (AEI) in 
Humanoid Robotics. Computer Science and Applications 1, 102-112 (2014). 
348. F. A. Azevedo et al., Equal numbers of neuronal and nonneuronal cells make the human 
brain an isometrically scaled‐up primate brain. Journal of Comparative Neurology 513, 
532-541 (2009). 
349. M. J. West, H. Gundersen, Unbiased stereological estimation of the number of neurons 
in the human hippocampus. Journal of Comparative Neurology 296, 1-22 (1990). 
350. S. Herculano-Houzel, The human brain in numbers: a linearly scaled-up primate brain. 
Frontiers in human neuroscience 3, 31 (2009). 
351. P. Singer, Practical Ethics Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.  (1993). 
352. G. Gigerenzer, R. Selten, Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox.  (MIT press, 2002). 
353. R. A. Brooks, Intelligence without representation. Artificial intelligence 47, 139-159 
(1991). 
354. R. A. Wilson, L. Foglia, Embodied cognition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  
(2011). 
355. E. Balcetis, D. Dunning, Cognitive dissonance and the perception of natural 
environments. Psychological Science 18, 917-921 (2007). 
 421 
 
356. S. F. Neggers, H. Bekkering, Gaze anchoring to a pointing target is present during the 
entire pointing movement and is driven by a non-visual signal. Journal of 
Neurophysiology 86, 961-970 (2001). 
357. J. K. O'Regan, A. Noë, A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. 
Behavioral and brain sciences 24, 939-973 (2001). 
358. D. S. McNamara, J. L. Scott, Working memory capacity and strategy use. Memory & 
cognition 29, 10-17 (2001). 
359. A. J. Olmstead, N. Viswanathan, K. A. Aicher, C. A. Fowler, Sentence comprehension 
affects the dynamics of bimanual coordination: Implications for embodied cognition. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 62, 2409-2417 (2009). 
360. J. Greene, J. Haidt, How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in cognitive 
sciences 6, 517-523 (2002). 
361. W. M. Mace, James J. Gibson's strategy for perceiving: Ask not what's inside your head, 
but what's your head inside of. Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Towards an ecological 
psychology,  (1977). 
362. E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild.  (MIT press, 1995). 
363. I. E. Dror, S. Harnad, Cognition distributed: How cognitive technology extends our 
minds.  (John Benjamins Publishing, 2008), vol. 16. 
364. B. Sparrow, J. Liu, D. M. Wegner, Google effects on memory: Cognitive consequences 
of having information at our fingertips. science 333, 776-778 (2011). 
365. R. Brooks, A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE journal on robotics 
and automation 2, 14-23 (1986). 
366. M. Wilson, How did we get from there to here? An evolutionary perspective on 
embodied cognition. Handbook of cognitive science: An embodied approach 375393,  
(2008). 
367. D. A. Gusnard, M. E. Raichle, Searching for a baseline: functional imaging and the 
resting human brain. Nature reviews neuroscience 2, 685 (2001). 
368. H. J. Morowitz, A theory of biochemical organization, metabolic pathways, and 
evolution. Complexity 4, 39-53 (1999). 
369. J. L. McClelland, "Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and 
development,"  (Carnagie Mellon AI Project, 1988). 
370. G. Piccinini, A. Scarantino, Information processing, computation, and cognition. Journal 
of biological physics 37, 1-38 (2011). 
371. D. Kirsh, P. Maglio, On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive 
science 18, 513-549 (1994). 
372. D. Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird, S. E. Black, False-belief understanding in 
frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology 31, 489-497 (2009). 
373. A. Clark, Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension.  (OUP 
USA, 2008). 
374. H. Hendriks-Jansen, Catching ourselves in the act: Situated activity, interactive 
emergence, evolution, and human thought.  (MIT Press, 1996). 
375. H. Förstl, A. Kurz, Clinical features of Alzheimer’s disease. European archives of 
psychiatry and clinical neuroscience 249, 288-290 (1999). 
376. J. A. Carter, S. O. Palermos, Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? 
The ethics of extended cognition. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, 
542-560 (2016). 
377. M. Ienca, P. Haselager, Hacking the brain: brain–computer interfacing technology and 
the ethics of neurosecurity. Ethics and Information Technology 18, 117-129 (2016). 
 422 
 
378. S. Torrance, Machine ethics and the idea of a more-than-human moral world. Machine 
ethics, 115-137 (2011). 
379. N. Bostrom, A. Sandberg, Cognitive enhancement: methods, ethics, regulatory 
challenges. Science and engineering ethics 15, 311-341 (2009). 
380. E. T. Juengst, Can enhancement be distinguished from prevention in genetic medicine? 
The Journal of medicine and philosophy 22, 125-142 (1997). 
381. N. Daniels, Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, 309-322 (2000). 
382. L. Colleton, The elusive line between enhancement and therapy and its effects on health 
care in the US. Journal of Evolution & Technology 18, 70-78 (2008). 
383. J. Harris, S. Chan, Enhancement is good for you!: understanding the ethics of genetic 
enhancement. Gene therapy 15, 338-339 (2008). 
384. K. Leuner, C. Kurz, G. Guidetti, J.-M. Orgogozo, W. E. Müller, Improved mitochondrial 
function in brain aging and Alzheimer disease-the new mechanism of action of the old 
metabolic enhancer piracetam. Frontiers in neuroscience 4, 44 (2010). 
385. D. J. Guggenmos et al., Restoration of function after brain damage using a neural 
prosthesis. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, 21177-21182 (2013). 
386. R. A. Andersen, E. J. Hwang, G. H. Mulliken, Cognitive Neural Prosthetics. Annual 
review of psychology 61, 169-C163 (2010). 
387. W. T. To, D. De Ridder, J. Hart Jr, S. Vanneste, Changing brain networks through non-
invasive neuromodulation. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12, 128 (2018). 
388. J. M. Halperin, D. M. Healey, The Influences of Environmental Enrichment, Cognitive 
Enhancement, and Physical Exercise on Brain Development: Can we Alter the 
Developmental Trajectory of ADHD? Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 35, 621-
634 (2011). 
389. N. Barr, G. Pennycook, J. A. Stolz, J. A. Fugelsang, The brain in your pocket: Evidence 
that Smartphones are used to supplant thinking. Computers in Human Behavior 48, 473-
480 (2015). 
390. A. Sandberg, N. Bostrom, Converging cognitive enhancements. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences 1093, 201-227 (2006). 
391. L. Carr, S. Harnad, Offloading cognition onto the web. IEEE Intelligent Systems 26, 33-
39 (2011). 
392. H. Greely et al., Towards responsible use of cognitive-enhancing drugs by the healthy. 
Nature 456, 702 (2008). 
393. D. Shaw, Neuroenhancing public health. Journal of Medical Ethics 40, 389-391 (2014). 
394. I. Singh, K. J. Kelleher, Neuroenhancement in young people: Proposal for research, 
policy, and clinical management. Ajob Neuroscience 1, 3-16 (2010). 
395. L. Y. Cabrera, in Rethinking Human Enhancement. (Springer, 2015), pp. 1-30. 
396. D. C. Park, G. N. Bischof, The aging mind: neuroplasticity in response to cognitive 
training. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 15, 109-119 (2013). 
397. J. Allen, V. Morelli, Aging and exercise. Clinics in geriatric medicine 27, 661-671 
(2011). 
398. Y.-S. Han et al., Development and effect of a cognitive enhancement gymnastics 
program for elderly people with dementia. Journal of Exercise Rehabilitation 12, 340-
345 (2016). 
399. G. Kemoun et al., Effects of a physical training programme on cognitive function and 
walking efficiency in elderly persons with dementia. Dement Geriatr Cogn Disord 29, 
109-114 (2010). 
 423 
 
400. M. Montero‐Odasso, J. Verghese, O. Beauchet, J. M. Hausdorff, Gait and cognition: a 
complementary approach to understanding brain function and the risk of falling. Journal 
of the American Geriatrics Society 60, 2127-2136 (2012). 
401. M. Montero-Odasso et al., Donepezil improves gait performance in older adults with 
mild Alzheimer's disease: a phase II clinical trial. Journal of Alzheimer's Disease 43, 
193-199 (2015). 
402. M. P. Buman et al., The stanford healthy neighborhood discovery tool: A computerized 
tool to assess active living environments. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 44, 
e41-e47 (2013). 
403. R. Hellman, Assistive technologies for coping at home and increased quality of life for 
persons with dementia. eChallenges e-2014 Conference Proceedings (2014), pp. 7 pp.-7 
pp. 
404. R. Saracchini, C. Catalina, L. Bordoni, A mobile augmented reality assistive technology 
for the elderly. Comunicar 23, 65-73 (2015). 
405. O. Hashizume et al., Epigenetic regulation of the nuclear-coded GCAT and SHMT2 
genes confers human age-associated mitochondrial respiration defects. Scientific reports 
5,  (2015). 
406. W. Sententia, Neuroethical considerations: cognitive liberty and converging technologies 
for improving human cognition. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1013, 
221-228 (2004). 
407. M. Ienca, R. Andorno, Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and 
neurotechnology. Life Sciences, Society and Policy 13, 5 (2017). 
408. J.-C. Bublitz, in Cognitive enhancement. (Springer, 2013), pp. 233-264. 
409. B. Fateh-Moghadam, T. Gutmann, Governing [through] autonomy. The moral and legal 
limits of “soft paternalism”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, 383-397 (2014). 
410. C. Hertogh, in Ethics, Health Policy and (Anti-) Aging: Mixed Blessings. (Springer, 
2013), pp. 91-104. 
411. UN, "World population ageing,"  (United Nations, New York, 2015). 
412. G. Corbellini, E. Sirgiovanni, Against paternalistic views on Neuroenhancement: a 
libertarian evolutionary account Medicina nei secoli 27, 1089-1110 (2015). 
413. Population Division, World population prospects: the 2015 revision (0048-4849, 2015). 
414. E. Guizzo, A robot in the family. IEEE Spectrum 52, 28-58 (2015). 
415. S. Sabanovic, C. C. Bennett, W.-L. Chang, L. Huber, in Rehabilitation Robotics 
(ICORR), 2013 IEEE International Conference on. (IEEE, 2013), pp. 1-6. 
416. M. W. Zhang, R. C. Ho, Personalized reminiscence therapy M-health application for 
patients living with dementia: Innovating using open source code repository. Technol. 
Health Care 25, 153-156 (2017). 
417. W. Sabbah, R. G. Watt, A. Sheiham, G. Tsakos, The Role of Cognitive Ability in Socio-
economic Inequalities in Oral Health. Journal of Dental Research 88, 351-355 (2009). 
418. L. J. Whalley, I. J. Deary, Longitudinal cohort study of childhood IQ and survival up to 
age 76. Bmj 322, 819 (2001). 
419. C. L. Hart et al., Childhood IQ and cardiovascular disease in adulthood: prospective 
observational study linking the Scottish Mental Survey 1932 and the Midspan studies. 
Social Science & Medicine 59, 2131-2138 (2004). 
420. L. S. Gottfredson, I. J. Deary, Intelligence Predicts Health and Longevity, but Why? 
Current Directions in Psychological Science 13, 1-4 (2004). 
421. A. Sörberg, P. Allebeck, T. Hemmingsson, IQ and somatic health in early adulthood - a 
cross-sectional analysis of associations. Alma Sörberg 23,  (2013). 
 424 
 
422. N. S. Schutte, J. M. Malouff, E. B. Thorsteinsson, N. Bhullar, S. E. Rooke, A meta-
analytic investigation of the relationship between emotional intelligence and health. 
Personality and Individual Differences 42, 921-933 (2007). 
423. J. M. Starr et al., Childhood mental ability and blood pressure at midlife: linking the 
Scottish Mental Survey 1932 and the Midspan studies. Journal of Hypertension 22, 893-
897 (2004). 
424. N. P. Walker, P. M. McConville, D. Hunter, I. J. Deary, L. J. Whalley, Childhood mental 
ability and lifetime psychiatric contact: A 66-year follow-up study of the 1932 Scottish 
Mental Ability Survey. Intelligence 30, 233-245 (2002). 
425. D. Morrow et al., Correlates of Health Literacy in Patients With Chronic Heart Failure. 
The Gerontologist 46, 669-676 (2006). 
426. N. Daniels, B. Kennedy, I. Kawachi, Is social justice good for our health. Boston Review, 
4-9 (2000). 
427. M. Prince, Progress on dementia—leaving no one behind. The Lancet,  (2017). 
428. M. N. Tennison, J. D. Moreno, Neuroscience, Ethics, and National Security: The State of 
the Art. PLoS Biol 10, e1001289 (2012). 
429. R. A. Miranda et al., DARPA-funded efforts in the development of novel brain–
computer interface technologies. Journal of neuroscience methods 244, 52-67 (2015). 
430. G. Marchant, L. Gulley, National security neuroscience and the reverse dual-use 
dilemma. AjOB Neuroscience 1, 20-22 (2010). 
431. J. Lange, C. Massart, A. Mouraux, F.-X. Standaert, in Constructive Side-Channel 
Analysis and Secure Design: 8th International Workshop, COSADE 2017, Paris, 
France, April 13-14, 2017, Revised Selected Papers, S. Guilley, Ed. (Springer 
International Publishing, Cham, 2017), pp. 171-189. 
432. R. E. Hampson et al., Closing the Loop for Memory Prosthesis: Detecting the Role of 
Hippocampal Neural Ensembles Using Nonlinear Models. IEEE Transactions on Neural 
Systems and Rehabilitation Engineering 20, 510-525 (2012). 
433. T. c. i. Requarth, in Foreign Policy. (World Scientific, 2015), vol. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/14/this-is-your-brain-this-is-your-brain-as-a-weapon-
darpa-dual-use-neuroscience/. 
434. D. c. i. Cressey, in Nature NewsBlog. (2008), vol. 2016. 
435. A. U. Schmid, Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties. BWC 
Implementation Support Unit, United Nations, Geneva 7,  (2014). 
436. L. K. Sydnes, Policy: Update the Chemical Weapons Convention. Nature 496, 25-26 
(2013). 
437. G. Noll, Weaponising neurotechnology: international humanitarian law and the loss of 
language. London Review of International Law 2, 201-231 (2014). 
438. C. Bell, in Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: Practical Considerations, 
Neuroethical Concerns, J. Giordano, Ed. (CRC Press, Boca Raton, USA, 2014), pp. 227-
237. 
439. R. Flower et al., "Brain Waves Module 3: Neuroscience, conflict and security,"  (The 
British Royal Society, London, UK, 2012). 
440. J. P. Rosenfeld, P300 in detecting concealed information. Memory detection: Theory and 
application of the Concealed Information Test, 63-89 (2011). 
441. I. Martinovic et al., in USENIX Security Symposium. (2012), pp. 143-158. 
442. M. Conner, Hacking the brain: Brain-to-computer interface hardware moves from the 
realm of research. EDN 55, 30-35 (2010). 
443. R. Gillon, Ethics needs principles—four can encompass the rest—and respect for 
autonomy should be “first among equals”. Journal of Medical Ethics 29, 307-312 
(2003). 
 425 
 
444. D. Halder, K. Jaishankar, "Cyber crime and the Victimization of Women: Laws, Rights, 
and Regulations. Hershey, PA, USA: IGI Global,"  (ISBN 978-1-60960-830-9, 2011). 
445. D. Evans, The internet of things: How the next evolution of the internet is changing 
everything. CISCO white paper 1,  (2011). 
446. B. Dupont, Cybersecurity Futures: How Can We Regulate Emergent Risks? Technology 
Innovation Management Review,  (2013). 
447. C. Shannon, The mathematical theory of environments. The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1-93 (1949). 
448. P. Godfrey-Smith, K. Sterelny, Biological information.  (2007). 
449. D. Halperin et al., in Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008. IEEE Symposium on. (IEEE, 
2008), pp. 129-142. 
450. V. M. Tronnier, D. Rasche, in Textbook of Neuromodulation. (Springer, 2015), pp. 61-
72. 
451. A. R. Brunoni et al., Clinical Research with Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
(tDCS): Challenges and Future Directions. Brain stimulation 5, 175-195 (2012). 
452. E. Strickland, Brain hacking: Self-experimenters are zapping their heads. IEEE Spectrum 
51, 23-25 (2014). 
453. B. Z. Allison, E. W. Wolpaw, J. R. Wolpaw, Brain-computer interface systems: Progress 
and prospects. Expert Review of Medical Devices 4, 463-474 (2007). 
454. E. E. Fetz, Restoring motor function with bidirectional neural interfaces. Progress in 
brain research 218, 241-252 (2015). 
455. C. Powell, M. Munetomo, M. Schlueter, M. Mizukoshi, in Brain and Health Informatics. 
(Springer, 2013), pp. 427-438. 
456. B. J. Yuan, C.-H. Hsieh, C.-C. Chang, National technology foresight research: a 
literature review from 1984 to 2005. International Journal of Foresight and Innovation 
Policy 6, 5-35 (2010). 
457. I. S. Kotchetkov, B. Y. Hwang, G. Appelboom, C. P. Kellner, E. S. Connolly Jr, Brain-
computer interfaces: military, neurosurgical, and ethical perspective. Neurosurgical 
focus 28, E25 (2010). 
458. Q. Li, D. Ding, M. Conti, in Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2015 IEEE 
Conference on. (IEEE, 2015), pp. 663-666. 
459. M. van Gerven et al., The brain–computer interface cycle. Journal of Neural 
Engineering 6, 041001 (2009). 
460. R. Fazel-Rezai et al., P300 brain computer interface: current challenges and emerging 
trends. Frontiers in neuroengineering 5,  (2012). 
461. J. P. Rosenfeld, J. R. Biroschak, J. J. Furedy, P300-based detection of concealed 
autobiographical versus incidentally acquired information in target and non-target 
paradigms. International Journal of Psychophysiology 60, 251-259 (2006). 
462. M. van Vliet, C. Mühl, B. Reuderink, M. Poel, in Brain Informatics. (Springer, 2010), 
pp. 180-191. 
463. S. V. Pustovit, E. D. Williams, Philosophical aspects of dual use technologies. Science 
and Engineering Ethics 16, 17-31 (2010). 
464. H. J. Chizeck, T. Bonaci. (Google Patents, 2014). 
465. J. Clausen, Conceptual and ethical issues with brain–hardware interfaces. Current 
opinion in psychiatry 24, 495-501 (2011). 
466. T. Bonaci, R. Calo, H. J. Chizeck, in Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering, 
2014 IEEE International Symposium on. (IEEE, 2014), pp. 1-7. 
467. A. B. A. Privacy, C. C. Committee, A. B. A. S. o. Science, T. Law, J. R. Westby. 
(American Bar Association, 2004). 
 426 
 
468. D. Heisenberg, Negotiating privacy: The European Union, the United States, and 
personal data protection.  (Lynne Rienner Publishers BoulderColorado, 2005). 
469. S. Buss, Personal autonomy.  (2002). 
470. J. Anderson, Autonomy. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics,  (2013). 
471. J. S. Mill, On liberty.  (Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869). 
472. P. Haselager, Did I do that? Brain–computer interfacing and the sense of agency. Minds 
and Machines 23, 405-418 (2013). 
473. H. Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code. 
Columbia Law Review, 1425-1456 (1968). 
474. A. Fernandez, S. N., Pervasive Neurotechnology. A Groundbreaking Analysis of 
10,000+ Patent Filings Transforming Medicine, Health, Entertainment and Business 
(SharpBrains, 2015). 
475. T. Bonaci, paper presented at the USENIX Enigma, Oakland, CA, Jan 30-Feb 1 2017 
2017. 
476. N. J. Davis, M. G. van Koningsbruggen, “Non-invasive” brain stimulation is not non-
invasive. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 7, 76 (2013). 
477. J. Medina, S. Cason, No evidential value in samples of transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) studies of cognition and working memory in healthy populations. 
Cortex; a journal devoted to the study of the nervous system and behavior 94, 131-141 
(2017). 
478. G. Mecacci, P. Haselager, Identifying Criteria for the Evaluation of the Implications of 
Brain Reading for Mental Privacy. Science and engineering ethics,  (2017). 
479. S. Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by 
Natural Movies. Curr. Biol. 21, 1641-1646. 
480. E. Boto et al., Moving magnetoencephalography towards real-world applications with a 
wearable system. Nature 555, 657 (2018). 
481. R. A. Charo, Yellow lights for emerging technologies. Science 349, 384-385 (2015). 
482. E. Symantec, "Internet Security Threat Report 2016,"  (2016). 
483. R. M. Green, Neural Technologies: The Ethics of Intimate Access to the Mind. Hastings 
Center Report 45, 36-37 (2015). 
484. M. L. Eaton, J. Illes, Commercializing cognitive neurotechnology—the ethical terrain. 
Nature biotechnology 25, 393-397 (2007). 
485. M. H. Mobasheri et al., The ownership and clinical use of smartphones by doctors and 
nurses in the UK: a multicentre survey study. BMJ Innovations 0, 1-8 (2015). 
486. R. Sharp, Lacking regulation, many medical apps questionable at best. New England 
Center for Investigative Reporting 18,  (2012). 
487. M. J. Farah, P. R. Wolpe, Monitoring and manipulating brain function: New 
neuroscience technologies and their ethical implications. Hastings Center Report 34, 35-
45 (2004). 
488. J. D. Moreno, Mind wars: Brain science and the military in the twenty-first century.  
(Bellevue Literary Press, 2012). 
489. N. A. Farahany, Searching secrets. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 160, 1239-
1308 (2012). 
490. U. D. o. Health, H. Services, Summary of the HIPAA privacy rule. Washington, DC: 
Department of Health and Human Services,  (2003). 
491. Food, D. Administration, Mobile medical applications: guidance for industry and Food 
and Drug Administration staff. USA: Food and Drug Administration,  (2013). 
492. S. R. Steinhubl, E. D. Muse, E. J. Topol, The emerging field of mobile health. Science 
Translational Medicine 7, 283 (2015). 
 427 
 
493. NIH, Request for Information (RFI): Guidance for Opportunities in Neuroethics. NIH 
BRAIN Initiative,  (2016). 
494. J. A. Obar, A. Oeldorf-Hirsch, paper presented at the The 44th Research Conference on 
Communication, Information and Internet Policy 2016. 
495. T. Bonaci, R. Calo, H. J. Chizeck, App Stores for the Brain : Privacy and Security in 
Brain-Computer Interfaces. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 34, 32-39 (2015). 
496. M. Baker, Making money and opening minds. Nature biotechnology 25, 377-379 (2007). 
497. S. D. Warren, L. D. Brandeis, The right to privacy. Harvard law review, 193-220 (1890). 
498. A. F. Westin, Privacy and freedom. Washington and Lee Law Review 25, 166 (1968). 
499. E. J. Bloustein, Privacy as an aspect of human dignity: An answer to Dean Prosser. 
NYUL Rev. 39, 962 (1964). 
500. A. L. Allen, Uneasy access: Privacy for women in a free society.  (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1988). 
501. G. van den Broek, F. Cavallo, C. Wehrmann, AALIANCE ambient assisted living 
roadmap.  (IOS press, 2010), vol. 6. 
502. A. Judge, Naive Acquisition of Dual-use Surveillance Technology.  (2015). 
503. J. Kaye et al., Dynamic consent: a patient interface for twenty-first century research 
networks. European Journal of Human Genetics 23, 141-146 (2015). 
504. F. La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression.  (2011). 
505. P. Lukowicz, T. Kirstein, G. Troster, Wearable systems for health care applications. 
Methods of Information in Medicine-Methodik der Information in der Medizin 43, 232-
238 (2004). 
506. D. D. Luxton, J. D. June, A. Sano, T. Bickmore, Intelligent Mobile, Wearable, and 
Ambient Technologies for Behavioral Health Care. Artificial Intelligence in Behavioral 
and Mental Health Care, 137 (2015). 
507. V. G. Motti, K. Caine, in Financial Cryptography and Data Security. (Springer, 2015), 
pp. 231-244. 
508. A. s. D. International, World Alzheimer Report 2015: The Global Impact of Dementia. 
An analysis of prevalence, incidence, cost and trends.  (Alzheimer's Disease 
International (ADI), London, 2015), vol. World Alzheimer Report 2015. 
509. M. Prince, M. Guerchet, M. Prina, The Global Impact of Dementia 2013-2050.  
(Alzheimer's Disease International, 2013). 
510. G. Arling et al., Impact of Dementia on Payments for Long-term and Acute Care in an 
Elderly Cohort. Medical care 51, 575-581 (2013). 
511. C. Y. Chiao, H. S. Wu, C. Y. Hsiao, Caregiver burden for informal caregivers of patients 
with dementia: A systematic review. International nursing review 62, 340-350 (2015). 
512. K. J. Joling et al., The Two-Year Incidence of Depression and Anxiety Disorders in 
Spousal Caregivers of Persons with Dementia: Who is at the Greatest Risk? The 
American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 23, 293-303 (2015). 
513. R. Bhimani, Understanding the Burden on Caregivers of People with Parkinson’s: A 
Scoping Review of the Literature. Rehabilitation research and practice 2014,  (2014). 
514. S. Bennett, A. J. Thomas, Depression and dementia: Cause, consequence or 
coincidence? Maturitas 79, 184-190 (2014). 
515. V. Cotrell, R. Schulz, The perspective of the patient with Alzheimer's disease: a 
neglected dimension of dementia research. The Gerontologist 33, 205-211 (1993). 
516. W. H. Organization. (WHO Geneva, 2015). 
517. C. Reitz, R. Mayeux, Alzheimer disease: epidemiology, diagnostic criteria, risk factors 
and biomarkers. Biochemical pharmacology 88, 640-651 (2014). 
 428 
 
518. B. L. Plassman et al., Prevalence of dementia in the United States: the aging, 
demographics, and memory study. Neuroepidemiology 29, 125-132 (2007). 
519. J. C. Morris, Clinical dementia rating: a reliable and valid diagnostic and staging 
measure for dementia of the Alzheimer type. International psychogeriatrics 9, 173-176 
(1997). 
520. T. Benke, E. Karner, S. Petermichl, V. Prantner, G. Kemmler, Neuropsychological 
deficits associated with route learning in Alzheimer disease, MCI, and normal aging. 
Alzheimer Disease & Associated Disorders 28, 162-167 (2014). 
521. P. Duff, C. Dolphin, Cost-benefit analysis of assistive technology to support 
independence for people with dementia–Part 2: Results from employing the ENABLE 
cost-benefit model in practice. Technol. Disabil. 19, 79-90 (2007). 
522. W. L. Anderson, J. M. Wiener, The Impact of Assistive Technologies on Formal and 
Informal Home Care. The Gerontologist 55, 422-433 (2015). 
523. R. Orpwood et al., Designing technology to support quality of life of people with 
dementia. Technol. Disabil. 19, 103-112 (2007). 
524. E. Commission, i2010 Independent Living for the Ageing Society.  (2007). 
525. F. Martín, C. E. Agüero, J. M. Cañas, M. Valenti, P. Martínez-Martín, Robotherapy with 
Dementia patients. Int J Adv Robotic Sy 10,  (2013). 
526. V. Bernabei et al., Animal-assisted interventions for elderly patients affected by 
dementia or psychiatric disorders: a review. Journal of psychiatric research 47, 762-773 
(2013). 
527. T. Shibata, K. Wada, Robot therapy: A new approach for mental healthcare of the 
elderly–A mini-review. Gerontology 57, 378-386 (2010). 
528. T. Sugihara, T. Fujinami, R. Phaal, Y. Ikawa, in Technology Management for Emerging 
Technologies (PICMET), 2012 Proceedings of PICMET '12:. (2012), pp. 3067-3072. 
529. S. Lauriks et al., Review of ICT-based services for identified unmet needs in people with 
dementia. Ageing research reviews 6, 223-246 (2007). 
530. C. Peterson, N. R. Prasad, R. Prasad, The future of assistive technologies for dementia. 
Gerontechnology 11, 195 (2012). 
531. G. Randhawa, Moving To A User-Driven Research Paradigm. EGEMS 1,  (2013). 
532. H. G. van der Roest et al., What do community-dwelling people with dementia need? A 
survey of those who are known to care and welfare services. International 
Psychogeriatrics 21, 949-965 (2009). 
533. L. Robinson, K. Brittain, S. Lindsay, D. Jackson, P. Olivier, Keeping In Touch Everyday 
(KITE) project: developing assistive technologies with people with dementia and their 
carers to promote independence. International Psychogeriatrics 21, 494-502 (2009). 
534. A. R. Niemeijer et al., Ethical and practical concerns of surveillance technologies in 
residential care for people with dementia or intellectual disabilities: an overview of the 
literature. International Psychogeriatrics 22, 1129-1142 (2010). 
535. M. Heerink et al., in Social Robotics. (Springer, 2013), pp. 104-115. 
536. C. f. I. O. o. M. Sciences, International ethical guidelines for biomedical research 
involving human subjects. Bulletin of medical ethics, 17 (2002). 
537. A. Europe, The ethics of dementia research.  (Alzeheimer Europe, 2011). 
538. J. Warner, R. McCarney, M. Griffin, K. Hill, P. Fisher, Participation in dementia 
research: rates and correlates of capacity to give informed consent. Journal of Medical 
Ethics 34, 167-170 (2008). 
539. A. Niemeijer, C. Hertogh, Implantable tags: don't close the door for aunt Millie! The 
American Journal of Bioethics 8, 50-52 (2008). 
 429 
 
540. E. Directive, 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data. Official Journal of the EC 23,  (1995). 
541. A. Tergesen, M. Inada, It’s not a stuffed animal, it’sa $6,000 medical device. The Wall 
Street Journal, 1 (2010). 
542. C. J. Calo, N. Hunt-Bull, L. Lewis, T. Metzler, in 2011 AAAI Workshop (WS-2011-
2012). (2011), pp. 20-24. 
543. U. P. C. o. t. S. o. B. I. Presidential Commission. (Washington DC, 2014), vol. 1. 
544. J. Illes, Neuroethics in a new era of neuroimaging. American Journal of Neuroradiology 
24, 1739-1741 (2003). 
545. W. Koch et al., Diagnostic power of default mode network resting state fMRI in the 
detection of Alzheimer's disease. Neurobiology of aging 33, 466-478 (2012). 
546. J.-D. Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain. Current Biology 17, 
323-328 (2007). 
547. K. Smith, Reading minds. Nature 502, 428-430 (2013). 
548. D. Schreiber et al., Red brain, blue brain: Evaluative processes differ in Democrats and 
Republicans. PLoS one 8, e52970 (2013). 
549. S. Baron-Cohen, Essential difference: Male and female brains and the truth about 
autism.  (Basic Books, 2004). 
550. S. M. McClure et al., Neural correlates of behavioral preference for culturally familiar 
drinks. Neuron 44, 379-387 (2004). 
551. A. Penenberg, NeuroFocus uses neuromarketing to hack your brain. Fast Company,  
(2011). 
552. Y. I. Ulman, T. Cakar, G. Yildiz, Ethical issues in neuromarketing:“I consume, therefore 
I am!”. Science and engineering ethics 21, 1271-1284 (2015). 
553. C. Powell, M. Munetomo, M. Schlueter, M. Mizukoshi, in International Conference on 
Brain and Health Informatics. (Springer, 2013), pp. 427-438. 
554. J.-P. Lefaucheur et al., Evidence-based guidelines on the therapeutic use of repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). Clinical Neurophysiology 125, 2150-2206 
(2014). 
555. O. R. Goodenough, M. Tucker, Law and cognitive neuroscience. Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science 6, 61-92 (2010). 
556. E. Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of future rearrest. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 110, 6223-6228 (2013). 
557. P. K. Dick, The Minority Report: And Other Classic Stories.  (Citadel Press, 2002), vol. 
4. 
558. H. T. Greely, Law and the revolution in neuroscience: An early look at the field. Akron 
L. Rev. 42, 687 (2009). 
559. F. A. Kozel et al., Detecting deception using functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Biological psychiatry 58, 605-613 (2005). 
560. D. Langleben et al., Polygraphy and functional magnetic resonance imaging in lie 
detection: a controlled blind comparison using the concealed information test. The 
Journal of clinical psychiatry,  (2016). 
561. B. Mirkovic, S. Debener, M. Jaeger, M. De Vos, Decoding the attended speech stream 
with multi-channel EEG: implications for online, daily-life applications. Journal of 
neural engineering 12, 046007 (2015). 
562. C. Herff et al., Brain-to-text: decoding spoken phrases from phone representations in the 
brain. Frontiers in neuroscience 9,  (2015). 
563. F. Biondi, L. Skrypchuk, in Advances in Human Factors and System Interactions. 
(Springer, 2017), pp. 99-105. 
 430 
 
564. B. C. Armstrong et al., Brainprint: Assessing the uniqueness, collectability, and 
permanence of a novel method for ERP biometrics. Neurocomputing 166, 59-67 (2015). 
565. R. Andorno, Principles of international biolaw. Seeking common ground at the 
intersection of bioethics and human rights. Brussels: Bruylant,  (2013). 
566. J. W. Nickel, Making sense of human rights: Philosophical reflections on the universal 
declaration of human rights.  (Univ of California Press, 1987). 
567. J. Habermas, The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights. 
Metaphilosophy 41, 464-480 (2010). 
568. A. Fagan. (Online at: http://www/. iep. utm. edu/hum-rts, 2005). 
569. C. R. Beitz, The idea of human rights.  (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
570. A. Fagan, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism. Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 33, 274-275 (2015). 
571. J. Nickel, "Human Rights", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  (2014). 
572. W. G. Iacono, Accuracy of polygraph techniques: Problems using confessions to 
determine ground truth. Physiol. Behav. 95, 24-26 (2008). 
573. I. Berlin, Two concepts of liberty: an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of 
Oxford on 31 October 1958.  (Clarendon, 1959). 
574. M. Sepuldeva, T. Van Banning, W. van Genugten, Human rights reference handbook.  
(2004). 
575. A. D. Moore, Privacy rights: Moral and legal foundations.  (Penn State Press, 2010). 
576. O. Diggelmann, M. N. Cleis, How the right to privacy became a Human Right. Human 
Rights Law Review, ngu014 (2014). 
577. V. Mitchell, Enemy Unseen.  (Simon and Schuster, 1990), vol. 51. 
578. F. X. Shen, Neuroscience, mental privacy, and the law. Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 36, 653 
(2013). 
579. R. Palaniappan, D. P. Mandic, EEG based biometric framework for automatic identity 
verification. The Journal of VLSI Signal Processing Systems for Signal, Image, and 
Video Technology 49, 243-250 (2007). 
580. D. La Rocca, P. Campisi, G. Scarano, in Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG), 
2012 BIOSIG-Proceedings of the International Conference of the. (IEEE, 2012), pp. 1-
12. 
581. P. Campisi, D. La Rocca, G. Scarano, EEG for automatic person recognition. Computer 
45, 87-89 (2012). 
582. S. Marcel, J. R. Del Millan, Person authentication using brainwaves (EEG) and 
maximum a posteriori model adaptation. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 
IEEE Transactions on 29, 743-752 (2007). 
583. R. Palaniappan, Two-stage biometric authentication method using thought activity brain 
waves. International journal of neural systems 18, 59-66 (2008). 
584. G. Mohammadi, P. Shoushtari, B. Molaee Ardekani, M. B. Shamsollahi, in Proceeding 
of World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology. (2006), vol. 11, pp. 281-
285. 
585. K. Brigham, B. Kumar, in Biometrics: Theory Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2010 
Fourth IEEE International Conference on. (IEEE, 2010), pp. 1-8. 
586. T. Dinev, P. Hart, Internet privacy concerns and their antecedents-measurement validity 
and a regression model. Behaviour & Information Technology 23, 413-422 (2004). 
587. P. R. Wolpe, Is my mind mine? Neuroethics and brain imaging.  (2009). 
588. J. Stanley. (American Civil Liberties Union, 2012), vol. 2. 
589. A. Ashworth, Self-incrimination in European human rights law-a pregnant pragmatism. 
Cardozo L. Rev. 30, 751 (2008). 
 431 
 
590. M. Redmayne, Rethinking the privilege against self-incrimination. Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 27, 209-232 (2007). 
591. S. Trechsel, Human rights in criminal proceedings.  (2005). 
592. N. A. Farahany, Incriminating thoughts. Stanford Law Review 64, 351 (2012). 
593. M. A. Lebedev et al., Future developments in brain-machine interface research. Clinics 
66, 25-32 (2011). 
594. US Committee on Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications, 
Opportunities in neuroscience for future army applications (2012). 
595. R. Mackenzie, Who should hold the remote for the new me? Cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral side effects of DBS and authentic choices over future personalities. AJOB 
Neuroscience 2, 18-20 (2011). 
596. S. Nabavi et al., Engineering a memory with LTD and LTP. Nature,  (2014). 
597. I. Persson, J. Savulescu, The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative 
to enhance the moral character of humanity. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, 162-177 
(2008). 
598. M. Ellegaard, K. Kragh,  (2015). 
599. M. Decker, T. Fleischer, Contacting the brain–aspects of a technology assessment of 
neural implants. Biotechnology journal 3, 1502-1510 (2008). 
600. L. Klaming, P. Haselager, Did my brain implant make me do it? Questions raised by 
DBS regarding psychological continuity, responsibility for action and mental 
competence. Neuroethics 6, 527-539 (2013). 
601. M. Sensi et al., Explosive-aggressive behavior related to bilateral subthalamic 
stimulation. Parkinsonism & related disorders 10, 247-251 (2004). 
602. M. J. Frank, J. Samanta, A. A. Moustafa, S. J. Sherman, Hold your horses: impulsivity, 
deep brain stimulation, and medication in parkinsonism. Science 318, 1309-1312 (2007). 
603. J. Houeto et al., Behavioural disorders, Parkinson's disease and subthalamic stimulation. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry 72, 701-707 (2002). 
604. M. Schüpbach et al., Neurosurgery in Parkinson disease A distressed mind in a repaired 
body? Neurology 66, 1811-1816 (2006). 
605. U. Pham et al., Personality changes after deep brain stimulation in Parkinson’s disease. 
Parkinson’s Disease 2015,  (2015). 
606. C. Lewis et al., Subjectively perceived personality and mood changes associated with 
subthalamic stimulation in patients with Parkinson's disease. Psychological medicine 45, 
73-85 (2015). 
607. C. A. Ross, Ethics of CIA and military contracting by psychiatrists and psychologists. 
Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry 9, 25-34 (2007). 
608. L. Pycroft et al., Brainjacking: Implant Security Issues in Invasive Neuromodulation. 
World Neurosurgery 92, 454-462 (2016). 
609. P. Tiedemann, in Right to Identity 
. (Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016). 
610. L. M. Mănuc, Features and evolution references to personality rights. Contemporary 
Readings in Law and Social Justice 4, 360-370 (2012). 
611. N. Singer, Making ads that whisper to the brain. The New York Times 14,  (2010). 
612. C. Holbrook, K. Izuma, C. Deblieck, D. M. Fessler, M. Iacoboni, Neuromodulation of 
group prejudice and religious belief. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 11, 387-
394 (2016). 
613. J. Sweller, Cognitive technology: Some procedures for facilitating learning and problem 
solving in mathematics and science. Journal of educational psychology 81, 457 (1989). 
 432 
 
614. M. Beynon, C. L. Nehaniv, K. Dautenhahn, Cognitive Technology: Instruments of Mind: 
4th International Conference, CT 2001 Coventry, UK, August 6-9, 2001 Proceedings.  
(Springer, 2003), vol. 2117. 
615. B. Gorayska, J. L. Mey, in Information Society: New Media, Ethics and Postmodernism, 
K. S. Gill, Ed. (Springer London, London, 1996), pp. 287-294. 
616. W. R. Walker, D. J. Herrmann, Cognitive technology: Essays on the transformation of 
thought and society.  (McFarland, 2004). 
617. A. Manuti, P. D. de Palma, in Digital HR: A Critical Management Approach to the 
Digitilization of Organizations, A. Manuti, P. D. de Palma, Eds. (Springer International 
Publishing, Cham, 2018), pp. 21-37. 
618. D. Schatsky, C. Muraskin, R. Gurumurthy, Cognitive technologies: The real 
opportunities for business. Deloitte Review 16, 115-129 (2015). 
619. P. J. Kiger, in HowStuffWorks. ( InfoSpace Holdings LLC, 2017), vol. 2017. 
620. S. Ikegami, K. Takano, N. Saeki, K. Kansaku, Operation of a P300-based brain–
computer interface by individuals with cervical spinal cord injury. Clinical 
Neurophysiology 122, 991-996 (2011). 
621. E. Buch et al., Think to move: a neuromagnetic brain-computer interface (BCI) system 
for chronic stroke. Stroke 39, 910-917 (2008). 
622. L. M. McCane et al., P300-based brain-computer interface (BCI) event-related potentials 
(ERPs): People with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) vs. age-matched controls. 
Clinical Neurophysiology 126, 2124-2131 (2015). 
623. A. Kübler et al., Patients with ALS can use sensorimotor rhythms to operate a brain-
computer interface. Neurology 64, 1775-1777 (2005). 
624. T.-S. Lee et al., A brain-computer interface based cognitive training system for healthy 
elderly: a randomized control pilot study for usability and preliminary efficacy. PloS one 
8, e79419 (2013). 
625. A. Clark, Reasons, robots and the extended mind. Mind & Language 16, 121-145 
(2001). 
626. N. S. Fitz, P. B. Reiner, Perspective: Time to expand the mind. Nature 531, S9-S9 
(2016). 
627. A. Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human 
Intelligence.  (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 229. 
628. D. Göhring, D. Latotzky, M. Wang, R. Rojas, Semi-autonomous car control using brain 
computer interfaces. Intelligent autonomous systems 12, 393-408 (2013). 
629. N. Kosmyna, F. Tarpin-Bernard, B. Rivet, in Human-Computer Interaction. (Springer, 
2015), pp. 506-522. 
630. L. Tonin, T. Carlson, R. Leeb, J. d. R. Millán, in Engineering in Medicine and Biology 
Society, EMBC, 2011 Annual International Conference of the IEEE. (IEEE, 2011), pp. 
4227-4230. 
631. N. Statt, in The Verge. (2017). 
632. J. Illes, S. J. Bird, Neuroethics: a modern context for ethics in neuroscience. Trends in 
neurosciences 29, 511-517 (2006). 
633. L. Floridi, The Cambridge handbook of information and computer ethics.  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
634. M. Ienca, in The Neuroethics Blog. (2016). 
635. M. J. Farah et al., Neurocognitive enhancement: what can we do and what should we 
do? Nature reviews neuroscience 5, 421 (2004). 
636. R. Yuste et al., Four ethical priorities for neurotechnologies and AI. Nature News 551, 
159 (2017). 
 433 
 
637. S. Russell, D. Dewey, M. Tegmark, Research priorities for robust and beneficial 
artificial intelligence. AI Magazine 36, 105-114 (2015). 
638. F. Gilbert, Deep brain stimulation: Inducing self-estrangement. Neuroethics, 1-9 (2017). 
639. M. Ienca, Cognitive Technology and Human-Machine Interaction: The Contribution of 
Externalism to the Theoretical Foundations of Machine and Cyborg Ethics. Annals of the 
University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series; Vol 66 No 2 (2017): Annals of the 
University of Bucharest: Philosophy Series,  (2018). 
640. K. Kirkpatrick, Battling algorithmic bias: how do we ensure algorithms treat us fairly? 
Communications of the ACM 59, 16-17 (2016). 
641. M. Taddeo, L. Floridi, Regulate artificial intelligence to avert cyber arms race. Nature 
556, 296-298 (2018). 
642. J. Forge, A Note on the Definition of “Dual Use”. Science and Engineering Ethics 16, 
111-118 (2010). 
643. M. J. Selgelid, Governance of dual-use research: an ethical dilemma. Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization 87, 720-723 (2009). 
644. L. Floridi, The latent nature of global information warfare. The Philosophers' Magazine, 
17-19 (2014). 
645. A. Hodges, Alan Turing: the enigma.  (Random House, 2012). 
646. D. Ferbrache, in A Pathology of Computer Viruses. (Springer, 1992), pp. 5-30. 
647. L. Floridi, The fourth revolution: How the infosphere is reshaping human reality.  (OUP 
Oxford, 2014). 
648. Europol, "2016 Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA),"  (European 
Cybercrime Center, 2016). 
649. W. E. Forum, "The global risks report 2016,"  (World Economic Forum, Geneva, 2016). 
650. B. Mitterlehner, in Cyber-Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense. 
(Springer, 2014), pp. 207-230. 
651. J. M. Ehrenfeld, Wannacry, cybersecurity and health information technology: A time to 
act. Journal of medical systems 41, 104 (2017). 
652. H. Nissenbaum, Where computer security meets national security. Ethics and 
Information Technology 7, 61-73 (2005). 
653. J. Matusitz, Cyberterrorism: How can American foreign policy be strengthened in the 
Information Age? American Foreign Policy Interests 27, 137-147 (2005). 
654. M. Lacy, D. Prince, Securitization and the global politics of cybersecurity. Global 
Discourse 8, 100-115 (2018). 
655. R. Deibert, The geopolitics of cyberspace after Snowden. Current History 114, 9 (2015). 
656. C. Stewart III, Electoral Vulnerabilities in the United States: Past, Present, and Future. 
MIT Political Science Department Research Paper,  (2017). 
657. P. Sapaty, Military robotics: Latest trends and spatial grasp solutions. International 
Journal of Advanced Research in Artificial Intelligence 4, 9-18 (2015). 
658. D. Gershgorn, in Quartz. (2016). 
659. M. Taddeo, in Science Views the News. (2017), vol. January 4, 2017. 
660. A. Callam, Drone wars: Armed unmanned aerial vehicles. International Affairs Review 
18,  (2015). 
661. D. Helbing et al., Will Democracy Survive Big Data and Artificial Intelligence. 
Scientific American. Feb 25,  (2017). 
662. F. Langfitt, In China Beware: A Camera May be Watching You. NPR, Jan 29, 40 
(2013). 
663. C. T. C. Limited. (Investor Relations Asia Pacific, 2014). 
664. P. Paganini, New powers for the Russian surveillance system SORM-2. Security Affairs. 
2014. 
 434 
 
665. D. Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and big data: Capacities, consequences, critique. Big 
Data & Society 1, 2053951714541861 (2014). 
666. J. Vincent, Badly implemented AI could ‘jeopardize democracy’.  (The Verge, 2018). 
667. M. Jamieson, B. Cullen, M. McGee-Lennon, S. Brewster, J. J. Evans, The efficacy of 
cognitive prosthetic technology for people with memory impairments: A systematic 
review and meta-analysis. Neuropsychological rehabilitation 24, 419-444 (2014). 
668. B. E. Moore, Air University,  (2013). 
669. Cognitive Technology Threat Warning Systems (CT2WS) (2007 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080204203721/http://www.darpa.mil/baa/BAA07-
25.html). 
670. A. White, Future special operations protection systems (tactical assault light operator 
suit). Military Technology 38, 70-73 (2014). 
671. C.-C. Mao, C.-H. Chen, C.-C. Sun, in Advances in Ergonomics Modeling, Usability & 
Special Populations: Proceedings of the AHFE 2016 International Conference on 
Ergonomics Modeling, Usability & Special Populations, July 27-31, 2016, Walt Disney 
World®, Florida, USA, M. Soares, C. Falcão, T. Z. Ahram, Eds. (Springer International 
Publishing, Cham, 2017), pp. 663-671. 
672. E. Gans et al. (2015), vol. 9470, pp. 947004-947004-947011. 
673. The Safety Promise and Challenge of Automotive Electronics Insights from Unintended 
Acceleration (2012). 
674. D. D. Langleben et al., Telling truth from lie in individual subjects with fast event-
related fMRI. Human brain mapping 26, 262-272 (2005). 
675. D. D. Langleben et al., Polygraphy and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Lie 
Detection: A Controlled Blind Comparison Using the Concealed Information Test. The 
Journal of clinical psychiatry 77, 1372-1380 (2016). 
676. V. Hughes, Head case. Nature 464, 340 (2010). 
677. R. Inglehart, P. Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism: Economic have-nots 
and cultural backlash," Faculty Research Working Paper Series  (Harvard Kennedy 
School, 2016). 
678. P. Chacko, K. Jayasuriya, Trump, the authoritarian populist revolt and the future of the 
rules-based order in Asia. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 1-7 (2017). 
679. D. Sarewitz, T. H. Karas, "17 Policy Implications of Technologies for Cognitive 
Enhancement," Neurotechnology: Premises, potential, and problems  (Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 2012). 
680. J. Cavuoto, in Neurotech Business Report. (2012). 
681. J. Giordano, Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense: Practical 
Considerations, Neuroethical Concerns.  (CRC Press, 2014). 
682. T. Christiano, The authority of democracy. Journal of Political Philosophy 12, 266-290 
(2004). 
683. T. Christiano, Social choice and democracy. The idea of democracy, 173-195 (1993). 
684. J. H. Moor, Why we need better ethics for emerging technologies. Ethics and 
Information Technology 7, 111-119 (2005). 
685. E. Yudkowsky, Artificial intelligence as a positive and negative factor in global risk. 
Global catastrophic risks 1, 184 (2008). 
686. D. Helbing, E. Pournaras, Build digital democracy: open sharing of data that are 
collected with smart devices would empower citizens and create jobs. Nature 527, 33-35 
(2015). 
687. H. Gil de Zúñiga, A. Veenstra, E. Vraga, D. Shah, Digital democracy: Reimagining 
pathways to political participation. Journal of Information Technology & Politics 7, 36-
51 (2010). 
 435 
 
688. R. A. Posner, Antitrust law.  (University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
689. S. Ølnes, J. Ubacht, M. Janssen, Blockchain in government: Benefits and implications of 
distributed ledger technology for information sharing. Government Information 
Quarterly 34, 355-364 (2017). 
690. A. Collomb, K. Sok, Blockchain/Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): What Impact 
on the Financial Sector? Communications & Strategies, 93 (2016). 
691. . (2016). 
692. H. Mascarenhas, in International Business Times. (2016). 
693. N. Bostrom, Strategic implications of openness in AI development. Global Policy 8, 
135-148 (2017). 
694. IBM-THINK, in IBM THINK, IBM, Ed. (2017), vol. 2017 
. 
695. Z. Ghahramani, Probabilistic machine learning and artificial intelligence. Nature 521, 
452-459 (2015). 
696. B. F. Klare, M. J. Burge, J. C. Klontz, R. W. V. Bruegge, A. K. Jain, Face Recognition 
Performance: Role of Demographic Information. IEEE Transactions on Information 
Forensics and Security 7, 1789-1801 (2012). 
697. A. Kübler et al., The User-Centered Design as Novel Perspective for Evaluating the 
Usability of BCI-Controlled Applications. PLOS ONE 9, e112392 (2014). 
698. T. Kaufmann, S. Völker, L. Gunesch, A. Kübler, Spelling is just a click away – a user-
centered brain-computer interface including auto-calibration and predictive text entry. 
Frontiers in Neuroscience 6,  (2012). 
699. C. Zickler, S. Halder, S. C. Kleih, C. Herbert, A. Kübler, Brain Painting: Usability 
testing according to the user-centered design in end users with severe motor paralysis. 
Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 59, 99-110 (2013). 
700. J. d. R. Millán et al., Combining brain–computer interfaces and assistive technologies: 
state-of-the-art and challenges. Front. Neurosci. 4, 161 (2010). 
701. L. Tonin, R. Leeb, M. Tavella, S. Perdikis, J. d. R. Millán, in Systems Man and 
Cybernetics (SMC), 2010 IEEE International Conference on. (IEEE, 2010), pp. 1462-
1466. 
702. E. Gent, in Live Science. (2017), vol. 2017. 
703. J. Liu et al., Syringe-injectable electronics. Nat Nano 10, 629-636 (2015). 
704. T.-M. Fu et al., Stable long-term chronic brain mapping at the single-neuron level. Nat 
Meth 13, 875-882 (2016). 
705. M. Vaismoradi, J. Jones, H. Turunen, S. Snelgrove, Theme development in qualitative 
content analysis and thematic analysis. Journal of Nursing Education and Practice 6, 
100 (2016). 
706. S. Martin, C. Cunningham, C. Nugent, Ethical considerations for integrating technology 
into community-based service models for adults with dementia. Alzheimer's Care Today 
8, 251-258 (2007). 
707. A. G. Greenwald, L. H. Krieger, Implicit bias: Scientific foundations. California Law 
Review 94, 945-967 (2006). 
708. W. Newton-Smith, S. Lukes, The underdetermination of theory by data. Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 52, 71-107 (1978). 
709. G. A. Cook, C. Bailey, W. Moyle, in Human System Interaction (HSI), 2013 The 6th 
International Conference on. (2013), pp. 614-619. 
710. V. Ryan, in World Association of Technology Teachers, WATT, Ed. (2013). 
711. C. Doukas et al., Digital cities of the future: Extending @home assistive technologies for 
the elderly and the disabled. Telematics Inf 28, 176-190 (2011). 
 436 
 
712. J. Kester, Introduction of domotics. Gerontechnology 4, 116 (2005). 
713. L. Wood. (Research and Markets, 2014), pp. 1-184. 
714. P. Topo, Technology studies to meet the needs of people with dementia and their 
caregivers: a literature review. Journal of applied Gerontology 28, 5-37 (2009). 
715. H. G. Van der Roest et al., What do community-dwelling people with dementia need? A 
survey of those who are known to care and welfare services. International 
Psychogeriatrics 21, 949-965 (2009). 
716. L. Nygård, S. Starkhammar, The use of everyday technology by people with dementia 
living alone: Mapping out the difficulties. Aging & Mental Health 11, 144-155 (2007). 
717. C. Adami, Artificial intelligence: Robots with instincts. Nature 521, 426-427 (2015). 
718. B. Hayes-Roth, An architecture for adaptive intelligent systems. Artificial Intelligence 
72, 329-365 (1995). 
719. J. Cohen-Mansfield, A. Bester, Flexibility as a management principle in dementia care: 
The Adards example. The Gerontologist 46, 540-544 (2006). 
720. M. Boustani, C. Schubert, Y. Sennour, The challenge of supporting care for dementia in 
primary care. Clinical interventions in aging 2, 631 (2007). 
721. H. Dreyfus, What Computer Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason.  (MIT Press, 
original edition published in, 1972). 
722. M. Minsky, The emotion machine: Commonsense thinking, artificial intelligence, and 
the future of the human mind.  (Simon and Schuster, 2007). 
723. A. Beric et al., Complications of deep brain stimulation surgery. Stereotactic and 
functional neurosurgery 77, 73-78 (2001). 
724. M. Y. Oh, A. Abosch, S. H. Kim, A. E. Lang, A. M. Lozano, Long-term hardware-
related complications of deep brain stimulation. Neurosurgery 50, 1268-1276 (2002). 
725. J. Sevigny et al., The antibody aducanumab reduces Aβ plaques in Alzheimer’s disease. 
Nature 537, 50-56 (2016). 
726. I. Melnikova, Therapies for Alzheimer's disease. Nat Rev Drug Discov 6, 341-342 
(2007). 
727. C.-C. Lin et al., Reduced health-related quality of life in elders with frailty: a cross-
sectional study of community-dwelling elders in Taiwan. PloS one 6, e21841 (2011). 
728. G. Allali et al., Impact of Impaired Executive Function on Gait Stability. Dementia and 
Geriatric Cognitive Disorders 26, 364-369 (2008). 
729. J. Martınez-Miranda, A. Aldea, Emotions in human and artificial intelligence. 
Computers in Human Behavior 21, 323-341 (2005). 
730. R. Y. Lee, A. J. Carlisle, Detection of falls using accelerometers and mobile phone 
technology. Age and ageing 40, 690-696 (2011). 
731. J. Hilbe, E. Schulc, B. Linder, C. Them, Development and alarm threshold evaluation of 
a side rail integrated sensor technology for the prevention of falls. International journal 
of medical informatics 79, 173-180 (2010). 
732. F. Sposaro, J. Danielson, G. Tyson, in Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society 
(EMBC), 2010 annual international conference of the IEEE. (IEEE, 2010), pp. 3875-
3878. 
733. T. J. Holwerda et al., Feelings of loneliness, but not social isolation, predict dementia 
onset: results from the Amsterdam Study of the Elderly (AMSTEL). J Neurol Neurosurg 
Psychiatry, jnnp-2012-302755 (2012). 
734. J. Tomaka, S. Thompson, R. Palacios, The relation of social isolation, loneliness, and 
social support to disease outcomes among the elderly. Journal of aging and health 18, 
359-384 (2006). 
735. S. J. Czaja, M. P. Rubert, Telecommunications technology as an aid to family caregivers 
of persons with dementia. Psychosomatic medicine 64, 469-476 (2002). 
 437 
 
736. S. Coradeschi et al., in 2013 6th International Conference on Human System 
Interactions, HSI 2013. (Gdansk, Sopot, 2013), pp. 578-585. 
737. J. Cochran, Continuous healing relationships through connectivity. As the nation edges 
to widespread implementation of EMRs, physicians are concerned about weakening the 
important doctor-patient relationship. Journal of healthcare information management: 
JHIM 24, 19-20 (2009). 
738. O. Kurkin, M. Januška, Product life cycle in digital factory. Knowledge management and 
innovation: a business competitive edge perspective. Cairo: International Business 
Information Management Association (IBIMA), 1881-1886 (2010). 
739. A. Karniel, Y. Reich, Managing the Dynamics of New Product Development Processes: 
A New Product Lifecycle Management Paradigm.  (Springer Science & Business Media, 
2011). 
740. K. Vredenburg, J.-Y. Mao, P. W. Smith, T. Carey, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
conference on Human factors in computing systems. (ACM, 2002), pp. 471-478. 
741. D. M. Buede, W. D. Miller, The engineering design of systems: models and methods.  
(John Wiley & Sons, 2016). 
742. M. Bano, D. Zowghi, A systematic review on the relationship between user involvement 
and system success. Information and Software Technology 58, 148-169 (2015). 
743. M. Bano, D. Zowghi, F. da Rimini, User satisfaction and system success: an empirical 
exploration of user involvement in software development. Empirical Software 
Engineering, 1-34 (2016). 
744. U. Abelein, B. Paech, Understanding the influence of user participation and involvement 
on system success–A systematic mapping study. Empirical Software Engineering 20, 28-
81 (2015). 
745. S. Kumar, C. Wallace, in 6th ACM International Conference on PErvasive Technologies 
Related to Assistive Environments, PETRA 2013. (Rhodes, 2013). 
746. E. Vayena, M. Ienca, Digital Medicine and Ethics: Rooting for Evidence. The American 
Journal of Bioethics 18, 49-51 (2018). 
747. M. Ienca et al., Health professionals’ and researchers’ views on Intelligent Assistive 
Technology for psychogeriatric care. Gerontechnology 17, 139-150 
 (2018). 
748. S. Bordin, A. De Angeli, in Agile Processes, in Software Engineering, and Extreme 
Programming: 17th International Conference, XP 2016, Edinburgh, UK, May 24-27, 
2016, Proceedings, H. Sharp, T. Hall, Eds. (Springer International Publishing, Cham, 
2016), pp. 3-15. 
749. S. De Rouck, A. Jacobs, M. Leys, A methodology for shifting the focus of e-health 
support design onto user needs: a case in the homecare field. International journal of 
medical informatics 77, 589-601 (2008). 
750. T. Kleinberger, M. Becker, E. Ras, A. Holzinger, P. Müller, in International Conference 
on Universal Access in Human-Computer Interaction. (Springer, 2007), pp. 103-112. 
751. J. van den Hoven, in Responsible Innovation. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013), pp. 75-
83. 
752. B. Taebi, A. Correlje, E. Cuppen, M. Dignum, U. Pesch, Responsible innovation as an 
endorsement of public values: The need for interdisciplinary research. Journal of 
Responsible Innovation 1, 118-124 (2014). 
753. M. Martin, R. W. Kressig, C. Röcke, Maintaining and promoting mobility and functional 
independence in older adults. Gerontology 57, 237-238 (2011). 
754. L. E. Benefield, B. J. Holtzclaw, Aging in place: merging desire with reality. The 
Nursing clinics of North America 49, 123-131 (2014). 
 438 
 
755. J. A. Van Dijk, The deepening divide: Inequality in the information society.  (Sage 
Publications, 2005). 
756. W. Wilkowska, M. Ziefle, Privacy and data security in E-health: Requirements from the 
user's perspective. Health Informatics Journal 18, 191-201 (2012). 
757. M. Ienca, P. Haselager, E. J. Emanuel, Brain leaks and consumer neurotechnology. 
Nature biotechnology 36, 805-810 (2018). 
758. T. Bonaci, J. Yan, J. Herron, T. Kohno, H. J. Chizeck, in Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 
Sixth International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems. (ACM, 2015), pp. 11-20. 
759. A. Kott, D. S. Alberts, C. Wang, Will Cybersecurity Dictate the Outcome of Future 
Wars? Computer 48, 98-101 (2015). 
760. L. Piwek, D. A. Ellis, S. Andrews, A. Joinson, The rise of consumer health wearables: 
promises and barriers. PLoS Medicine 13, e1001953 (2016). 
761. K. Austen, The trouble with wearables. Nature 525, 22 (2015). 
762. O. Stutz et al., in Ambient Assisted Living. (Springer, 2016), pp. 59-68. 
763. WMA, World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical principles for 
medical research involving human subjects. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
79, 373 (2001). 
764. P. Shivayogi, Vulnerable population and methods for their safeguard. Perspectives in 
Clinical Research 4, 53-57 (2013). 
765. C. Cerrudo, L. Apa, "Hacking Robots Before Skynet,"  ( IOActive, Inc. , Seattle, USA, 
2017). 
766. J. Lange, C. Massart, A. Mouraux, F.-X. Standaert, in International Workshop on 
Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. (Springer, 2017), pp. 171-189. 
767. J. Anderson, in International Encyclopedia of Ethics. (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2013). 
768. M. B. Barcena, C. Wueest, H. Lau, How safe is your quantified self. Symantech: 
Mountain View, CA, USA,  (2014). 
769. A. Stopczynski, D. Greenwood, L. K. Hansen, A. Pentland, Privacy for Personal 
Neuroinformatics. Available at SSRN 2427564,  (2014). 
770. J. Clausen, Ethical brain stimulation–neuroethics of deep brain stimulation in research 
and clinical practice. European Journal of Neuroscience 32, 1152-1162 (2010). 
771. S. G. S. Shah, I. Robinson, Benefits of and barriers to involving users in medical device 
technology development and evaluation. International journal of technology assessment 
in health care 23, 131-137 (2007). 
772. S. Gasson, The reality of user-centered design. Journal of Organizational and End User 
Computing (JOEUC) 11, 5-15 (1999). 
773. N. Oudshoorn, E. Rommes, M. Stienstra, Configuring the user as everybody: Gender and 
design cultures in information and communication technologies. Science, Technology, & 
Human Values 29, 30-63 (2004). 
774. P. T. Jaeger, J. C. Bertot, Designing, implementing, and evaluating user-centered and 
citizen-centered e-government. International Journal of Electronic Government 
Research 6, 1-17 (2010). 
775. EU, T. E. P. a. t. C. o. t. E. Union, Ed. (1995). 
776. M. Zinn, O. Khatib, B. Roth, J. K. Salisbury, Playing it safe [human-friendly robots]. 
IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine 11, 12-21 (2004). 
777. J. Cascio, Do brains need rights? New Scientist 234, 24-25 (2017). 
778. R. Arkin, The case for banning killer robots: counterpoint. Communications of the ACM 
58, 46-47 (2015). 
779. S. D. Goose, M. Wareham, The Growing International Movement Against Killer Robots. 
Harvard International Review 37, 28 (2016). 
 439 
 
780. M. Ienca, Democratizing cognitive technology: a proactive approach. Ethics and 
Information Technology, 1-14 (2018). 
781. V. Rialle, C. Ollivet, C. Guigui, C. Hervé, What do family caregivers of Alzheimer's 
disease patients desire in smart home technologies? arXiv preprint arXiv:0904.0437,  
(2009). 
782. J. P. Wherton, A. F. Monk, Technological opportunities for supporting people with 
dementia who are living at home. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 66, 
571-586 (2008). 
783. A. J. Sixsmith, G. Gibson, R. D. Orpwood, J. M. Torrington, Developing a technology 
‘wish-list’to enhance the quality of life of people with dementia. Gerontechnology 6, 2-
19 (2007). 
784. A. Pilotto et al., Information and communication technology systems to improve quality 
of life and safety of Alzheimer's disease patients: a multicenter international survey. 
Journal of Alzheimer's Disease 23, 131-141 (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 440 
 
Selbstverfasste Deklaration 
 
 
I declare that I have written this dissertation, Intelligent 
Technologies for the Aging Brain: Opportunities and 
Challenges, with only the aid specified therein and that I 
have not submitted it to any other university or to any other 
faculty of the University of Basel.  
 
Marcello Ienca 
 
Basel, 1 September 2017 
 
